Summary: Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983--- ----Arts. 9(2), 29 & 32---Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199---Service matter---Pensionary benefits---Jurisdiction of Wafaqi Mohtasib---Bar regarding personal grievance of public servant---Effect of undertaking given before Ombudsman---Representations before President---Maintainability of constitutional petition--- Petitioner, retired employee of Telephone Industries of Pakistan, sought redress before Wafaqi Mohtasib regarding non-settlement of pensionary benefits, including cost of living allowance, restoration of commuted pension and annual increases---Chief Financial Officer of employer gave written undertaking before Mohtasib that pension issues would be resolved within 30 to 45 days, whereupon complaint was disposed of with direction for compliance---On review, Mohtasib further directed employer to place matter before Board of Directors and determine date of payment---Representation before President was dismissed on limitation, but High Court in constitutional jurisdiction set aside orders of Mohtasib and President on ground of want of jurisdiction---Federal Constitutional Court held that grievance raised by petitioner was plainly a personal service grievance relating to his employment in agency where he had served, and thus fell squarely within bar contained in Art. 9(2) of the Order of 1983---Wafaqi Mohtasib had no lawful authority to entertain such complaint or pass directions thereon, and orders passed by him were coram non judice and void ab initio---Bar of jurisdiction of Courts under Art. 29 of the Order of 1983 did not preclude interference by High Court where order of Ombudsman suffered from want or excess of jurisdiction---Dismissal of representation before President on ground of limitation did not validate inherently void order, nor did exhaustion of alternate remedy bar constitutional jurisdiction in such case---Undertaking or participation by employer before Ombudsman could not confer jurisdiction on forum expressly barred by statute, nor could doctrine of estoppel operate against law---High Court had rightly set aside impugned orders---Leave was refused and petition dismissed. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Karachi v. Wafaqi Mohtasib and others (1998 SCMR 841); Peshawar Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman), Islamabad and others (PLD 2016 SC 940); Muhammad Afzal v. Board of Revenue, West Pakistan and another (PLD 1967 SC 314); Pir Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan, Member Provincial Assembly, N.-W.F.P. (PLD 1995 SC 66); Maulvi Aziz-ur-Rehman v. Ahmad Khan and others (2004 SCMR 1622); Multan Electric Power Company Ltd. v. Muhammad Ashiq and others (PLD 2006 SC 328); Syed Muhammad Hussain Shah v. Abdul Qayyum and others (2011 SCMR 743) rel. (a) Wafaqi Mohtasib---Jurisdiction---Service matters of employees of agency---Bar contained in Art. 9(2), Order of 1983--- Article 9(2) of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 expressly prohibits Wafaqi Mohtasib from accepting for investigation any complaint by or on behalf of a public servant or functionary concerning any matter relating to agency in which he is or has been working, where grievance pertains to his personal service affairs---Such matters are to be agitated before competent fora constituted for service disputes, and not before Ombudsman. (b) Pensionary claim of retired employee---Nature of dispute--- Claim regarding recalculation of pension, inclusion of cost of living allowance, restoration of commuted portion of pension and grant of annual increases is a personal grievance arising out of service and retirement benefits---Such dispute falls within exclusionary clause of Art. 9(2) of the Order of 1983. (c) Order passed without jurisdiction---Effect--- Any order passed by Wafaqi Mohtasib in a matter expressly excluded by Art. 9(2) is without lawful authority, coram non judice and void ab initio---Such order cannot be sustained irrespective of merits of underlying claim. (d) Article 29, Order of 1983---Bar of jurisdiction of Courts---Scope--- Statutory bar against challenge to action or order of Wafaqi Mohtasib does not oust constitutional jurisdiction of High Court where impugned order suffers from want or excess of jurisdiction, is coram non judice, or has been passed in violation of law---In such cases, judicial review under Art. 199 of the Constitution remains available. (e) Representation before President under Art. 32, Order of 1983---Dismissal on limitation---Effect--- Dismissal of representation on technical ground of limitation does not amount to affirmation of impugned order on merits, nor does it cure inherent jurisdictional defect in original proceedings---Even a decision on merits cannot validate an order that is a nullity for want of jurisdiction. (f) Alternate remedy---Exhaustion of statutory recourse---Whether bars writ jurisdiction--- Availability or even exhaustion of alternate statutory remedy does not operate as absolute bar to constitutional jurisdiction where impugned order is ex facie contrary to statute or passed without jurisdiction---High Court remains competent to correct such illegality. (g) Undertaking before Ombudsman---Consent, waiver or acquiescence---Effect on jurisdiction--- Jurisdiction is creature of statute and cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, acquiescence, silence, participation or undertaking of parties---An employer’s written undertaking before Ombudsman to resolve employee’s grievance cannot validate proceedings before a forum expressly barred by law from entertaining such matter. (h) Estoppel against statute---Non-application of doctrine--- Doctrine of estoppel does not operate against statute---No concession or conduct of parties can override express prohibition contained in Art. 9(2) of the Order of 1983. (i) Undertaking given before incompetent forum---Remedy--- Although undertaking given before Wafaqi Mohtasib cannot cure lack of jurisdiction, aggrieved person may, if so advised, agitate effect of such undertaking before a competent forum in accordance with law. Leave refused; petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Punjab Educational Institutions (Reconstitution) Act (XXII of 2021) - -Ss.4, 5, 6 & 11-Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011, R.10-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.4, 10-A & 199-Constitutional petition-Lawrence College Murree-De-notification of Board members before expiry of tenure without due process-Legality-Non-compliance with mandatory procedure-Effect-Petitioners were members of the Board of Governors of Lawrence College Murree who challenged their de-notifications contending that they were removed before expiry of their statutory tenure and without being heard-The relevant issue requiring determination was-whether their removal/replacement from the Board without notice or hearing was contrary to S.7(3) read with S.4(2) of the Punjab Educational Institutions (Reconstitution) Act, 2021, and violative of Arts. 4 & 10-A of the Constitution?-Held: High Court consciously avoided encroaching upon the administrative autonomy of the College, confining its examination strictly to the question of procedural legality and violation of the petitioners’ statutory and constitutional rights-Non-inclusion of the petitioners’ name in the Board despite of undertaking of the Secretary, Higher Education Department, was badly hit by the doctrine of judicial estoppel-In order to secure fundamental rights of the petitioners, the respondents had to adhere to their own law and policies issued from time to time which were binding on every citizen under the-doctrine of sovereignty-The conduct of the respondents throughout the course of the proceedings depicted a pattern of administrative indifference and lack of promptitude in discharging their statutory obligations-The record manifested that despite clear and repeated directions issued by the High Court, and notwithstanding the solemn undertakings given by the Secretary, Higher Education Department, the matter had been delayed and the inclusion of the petitioners’ names in the Board of Governors had not been accomplished, which constrained the High Court to decide the issue to that extent in order to enforce rule of law, otherwise the matter would have been disposed of-Petitioners were de-notified prior to completion of their statutory term and without adherence to these mandatory procedural safeguards, thereby rendering such action unsustainable in the eye of law-Respondents were directed to complete all requisite formalities and issue the necessary notification for inclusion of the petitioners’ names in the existing Board of Governors-Constitutional petitions were partly allowed, in circumstances. PIA Officers Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. Province of Punjab and others 2024 CLC 947; Adnan Arif v. Province of Punjab and others 2025 CLC 550; JDW Sugar Mills Ltd. and others v. Province of Punjab and others PLD 2017 Lah. 68 and Mst. Fatima Faryad and others v. Government of Punjab and others 2020 CLC 836 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art.199-Educational institutions-Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, exercise of-Internal administration and management of educational institutions, interference in-Scope-Constitutional courts should refrain from interfering in the internal administration and management of educational institutions, particularly in matters falling within the exclusive authority of statutory bodies or governing boards constituted under the applicable law-Autonomy of educational institutions is to be respected and that Courts should refrain from substituting their own opinion for that of competent administrative forums unless the action complained of is shown to be without lawful authority or in violation of mandatory statutory provisions. Dr. Zahid Javed v. Dr. Tahir Riaz Chaudhry and others PLD 2016 SC 637; University of Punjab v. Sardar Ali 1992 SCMR 1093 and Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Tariq Pirzada 1999 SCMR 2189 rel. Anoosha Shaigan v. Lahore University of Management Sciences through Chancellor and others PLD 2007 Lah. 568; Aown Abbas Bhatti v. Forman Christian College through its Rector and others PLD 2015 Lah. 435 and Arif Majeed Malik and others v. Board of Governors Karachi, Grammer School 2004 CLC 1029 ref. (c) Estoppel- -Judicial estoppel, doctrine of-Scope and rationale-It is fundamental duty of a Court to protect the integrity of the judicial process-A party cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time-When a party takes an inconsistent position in the same case or in a prior case, the principle of judicial estoppel should be applied-Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel a Court can stop a party from taking up contradictory stances if it is clearly inconsistent with the previous position. PIA Officers Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. Province of Punjab and others 2024 CLC 947; Adnan Arif v. Province of Punjab and others 2025 CLC 550; JDW Sugar Mills Ltd. and others v. Province of Punjab and others PLD 2017 Lah. 68 and Mubashar Javed and others v. Province of Punjab and others PLD 2022 Lah. 817 ref.

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act, 1973---- ----S. 17, second proviso---Dismissal from service set aside---Reinstatement---Back pay/arrears of pay---Discretion of authority---Scope---Police officials were reinstated after their dismissal orders were set aside, with continuity of service and due adjustment, but back pay for dismissal period was denied/partially allowed---Supreme Court held that under second proviso to S.17 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act, 1973, arrears of pay do not automatically follow every annulment of dismissal order; rather, authority setting aside such order has discretion to determine arrears of pay---Such discretion, however, is not arbitrary or absolute and must be exercised fairly, rationally, transparently and in accordance with legal principles of reason, justice and proportionality. (b) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 10-A---Administrative law---Culture of justification---Exercise of administrative discretion---After insertion of Art.10-A, administrative decisions must be examined through culture of justification rather than culture of authority---Mere possession of authority to act is no longer sufficient; every exercise of public power must be supported by cogent, persuasive, rational and reasonable justification---Authorities must give reasons and cannot rely merely on command, coercion or official power---Discretion regarding back pay after reinstatement must therefore be justified on record and cannot be based on whim, caprice or unexplained administrative preference. Cited Case: • Muhammad Arshad v. Deputy District Food, Multan and others 2025 PLC (CS) 1607 (c) Administrative law---- ----Discretionary power---Fairness, transparency and accountability---Duty to give reasons---Discretion conferred by law is a grave responsibility and sacred trust---Authority must exercise such power with diligence, vigilance, impartiality, fairness and transparency---Decision-making must be guided by relevant factors, precise articulation of reasons, avoidance of bias or ulterior motives and respect for natural justice---Failure to act fairly or provide sound reasons constitutes breach of duty of fairness and invites judicial scrutiny. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Hafiz Javaid v. Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Government of Punjab and another PLD 1992 SC 31 • Anisul Hassan v. Government of Punjab through Secretary, Local Government and another 2003 SCMR 694 • Chief Executive MEPCO and others v. Muhammad Fazil and others 2019 SCMR 919 (d) Administrative law---- ----Doctrine of proportionality---Back pay after reinstatement---Authority must ensure that decision regarding arrears of pay is reasonable and proportionate to facts, circumstances and objective sought to be achieved---Decision excessive, disproportionate or unsupported by persuasive reasons may be challenged as arbitrary or unreasonable---Discretion to deny or reduce back pay cannot be used as an instrument of oppression or injustice. (e) Service law---- ----Dismissal set aside---Back pay---Unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal---Distinction---Supreme Court classified cases where dismissal is set aside into two broad categories: unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal---Unfair dismissal generally includes cases where punishment is set aside due to procedural irregularity leading to de novo inquiry, technicality or lenient view, or punishment being disproportionate to proven misconduct---Wrongful dismissal arises where alleged misconduct is not proved at all---Consequences regarding back pay may differ depending on whether dismissal was merely unfair or wholly wrongful. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Arif Khan v. Dy. Enc. E-in-C’s Branch, GHQ Rawalpindi and another 1991 SCMR 1904 • Engineer Majeed Ahmed Memon v. Liaquat University of Medical and Health Sciences Jamshoro and others 2014 SCMR 1263 • Commandant Elite Force, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others v. Jamshed Ali PLD 2019 SC 570 • Muhammad Sadiq v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and others 2017 SCMR 1880 • Raja Muhammad Shahid v. Inspector General of Police 2023 SCMR 1135 • Muhammad Sharif and others v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and others 2021 SCMR 962 (f) Service law---- ----Back pay---Principle of “fair go all round”---Individual justice and institutional justice---Orders relating to back pay must be founded on fairness not only to individual civil servant but also to institution---Court/authority must balance rights of reinstated employee, circumstances of dismissal, conduct of parties, public interest and justice of case---No rigid formula applies; each case must be assessed on its own facts. (g) Service law---- ----Back pay---Burden regarding gainful employment during dismissal period---Civil servant, in first instance, must plead or state that he was not gainfully employed during intervening period or was employed only at substantially reduced wages---If authority seeks to deny full back pay on ground of gainful employment, burden shifts to authority to specifically plead and prove that civil servant was gainfully employed and was earning same or comparable salary---This rule follows general principle that party asserting existence of a fact must prove it, and positive fact of employment is easier to establish than negative fact of non-employment. Cited Cases: • Administrator Zila Council, Sahiwal v. Arif Hussain and others 2011 SCMR 1082 • General Manager, National Radio Telecommunication Corporation, Haripur v. Muhammad Aslam and 2 others 1992 SCMR 2169 • Khalid Mehmood v. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and others 2018 SCMR 376 (h) Service law---- ----Back pay after unfair dismissal---General rule and exceptions---Civil servant unlawfully deprived of office should ordinarily be granted back pay, but such principle is not absolute---Back pay may be granted in full, in part, or denied depending on facts and circumstances---Relevant factors may include nature of appointment, length and quality of service, proven misconduct, financial circumstances and other legally relevant considerations---Full back pay is generally the standard, but authority may deviate from such norm only for compelling reasons recorded with clear and convincing rationale. Cited Case: • Inspector General of Police, Punjab v. Tariq Mahmood 2015 SCMR 77 (i) Service law---- ----Wrongful dismissal---Exoneration from charges---Full back pay---Where dismissal is set aside because misconduct is not proved and civil servant is exonerated, dismissal is wrongful and full back pay should ordinarily follow---Wrongful dismissal deprives civil servant of livelihood, reputation and means of sustenance through fault of authority---Authority cannot avoid consequences of its wrongful action by denying back pay without lawful justification. Cited Cases: • Pakistan through General Manager, P.W.R., Lahore v. Mrs. A.V. Issacs PLD 1970 SC 415 • General Manager/Circle Executive Muslim Commercial Bank Limited and another v. Mehmood Ahmed Butt and others 2002 SCMR 1064 • Umer Said and others v. District Education Officer (Female) and others 2007 SCMR 296 • Sohail Ahmed Usmani v. Director-General Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority and another 2014 SCMR 1843 • Inspector General of Police, Punjab v. Tariq Mahmood 2015 SCMR 77 (j) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 9---Wrongful dismissal from service---Constitutional tort---Right to life and livelihood---Wrongful dismissal from service, where allegations are not proved, deprives civil servant of means of livelihood and constitutes constitutional wrong/tort for which authority bears responsibility---Expression “life” under Art.9 includes means to sustain life---Back pay in such cases is not merely financial restitution but a necessary step to restore employee’s economic condition and uphold dignity and constitutional rights. (k) Service law---- ----“No work, no pay”---Wrongfully dismissed civil servant---Applicability---Doctrine of “no work, no pay” cannot be mechanically applied where civil servant was kept out of service due to wrongful dismissal and was later exonerated---Where employee was prevented from working by unlawful order of authority and charges were not proved, denial of back pay on basis of “no work, no pay” would be unjustified. (l) Service law---- ----Floating status during litigation---Prolonged proceedings---Judicial interference with back pay order---Where civil servant challenges punishment order and remains in floating status during prolonged litigation, delay not attributable to civil servant weighs in favour of full back pay upon reinstatement---Civil servant should not be penalized for systemic delay, inadequate infrastructure or slow adjudication---Courts and Tribunals may interfere where denial or reduction of back pay causes grave injustice due to prolonged litigation not caused by employee. (m) Service Tribunal---- ----Back pay---Exoneration from charges---Failure to give compelling reasons for denial---Tribunal/authority must determine whether punishment was unfair or wrongful and whether employee was gainfully employed during intervening period---Where charges were not substantiated, employee was exonerated, and no evidence of gainful employment existed, denial of full back pay without cogent reasons was misdirection and could not be sustained. (n) Civil Petitions Nos.1936 to 1938 of 2018---- ----Police officials exonerated from charges---Partial back pay by Tribunal---No compelling rationale---Effect---Petitioners were exonerated, but Tribunal treated part of intervening period as leave of kind due and remaining as leave without pay---Supreme Court held that denial of complete back pay, without credible evidence or reasoning, reflected culture of authority no longer permissible after Art.10-A---No evidence showed that petitioners were gainfully employed or that punishments were not wrongful---Petitions were converted into appeals and allowed; petitioners were held entitled to complete back pay. (o) Civil Appeal No.174 of 2020---- ----Exonerated police official---Affidavit of no gainful employment---Full back pay---Tribunal denied full back pay on principle of “no work, no pay” despite exoneration---Supreme Court held that punishment was wrongful because charges were not substantiated---Appellant submitted affidavit that he was not engaged in gainful employment during intervening period---In such circumstances, appellant could not be denied back pay---Tribunal’s judgment was set aside and appellant was held entitled to full back pay. (p) Civil Appeals Nos.185 to 187 of 2020---- ----Appeals by Provincial Police Officer---Respondents exonerated---Full back pay granted by Tribunal---Supreme Court found Tribunal’s conclusions sound because respondents had been exonerated and authority had provided no substantial justification for withholding back pay---Dismissal was wrongful and case fell within principles entitling reinstated employees to full back pay---Appeals filed by Provincial Police Officer were dismissed. (q) Service law---- ----Authority determining arrears of pay---Judicial review---Scope---Although authority has discretion under second proviso to S.17 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act, 1973 to determine arrears of pay, such discretion is subject to judicial review where exercised arbitrarily, without reasons, contrary to fairness, or without considering relevant facts---Tribunal/Court may interfere where authority denies full back pay despite exoneration and absence of proof of gainful employment. (r) Service law---- ----Back benefits after reinstatement---Continuity of service---Reinstated police officials had already been restored to service without break and with due adjustment---Remaining dispute concerned back pay for period of dismissal---Supreme Court clarified that reinstatement with continuity does not by itself finally resolve monetary consequences; back pay must be determined according to legal principles of fairness, justification, gainful employment, nature of dismissal and reasons recorded by authority. Disposition: Civil Petitions Nos.1936 to 1938 of 2018 were converted into appeals and allowed; judgment dated 19.03.2017 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal was set aside and petitioners were held entitled to complete back pay. Civil Petition No.1935 of 2018 was dismissed as withdrawn. Civil Appeal No.174 of 2020 was allowed; Tribunal’s judgment dated 18.04.2018 was set aside and appellant was held entitled to full back pay. Civil Appeals Nos.185 to 187 of 2020 filed by Provincial Police Officer, KP were dismissed. Relevant authority was directed to implement the judgment within one month from receipt of certified copy, with no order as to costs.

Summary: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989—R. 3(2)—Recruitment to post of Qari (BPS-12)—Advertisement conditions—Shahadat-ul-Aalmiya—Exclusion of additional marks—Validity of recruitment criteria—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the petitioner, who had applied for the post of Qari (BPS-12) in the Elementary and Secondary Education Department, could not claim award of additional marks for the qualification of Shahadat-ul-Aalmiya, because the advertisement expressly provided that such marks would not be counted for cadres other than Theology Teacher (TT) and Arabic Teacher (AT). The Court observed that the prescribed qualification for the post of Qari was Bachelor’s Degree from a recognized university together with Qirat Sanad from a recognized institution, and that the petitioner had applied subject to those declared conditions. Since the advertisement unambiguously excluded marks of Shahadat-ul-Aalmiya for the post in question, the petitioner’s claim that those marks ought to have been added for improvement of his merit position was held to be without substance. Service law—Recruitment qualifications—Advertisement backed by statutory rules and notifications—No condition without lawful authority—The Court further held that the qualifications and conditions mentioned in the advertisement were not arbitrary or without legal basis, but were anchored in law. Reliance was placed on Notification No. SO(PE)4-5/SSRC/Meeting/2012/Teaching Cadre dated 13.11.2012, whereby the minimum qualification for the post of Qari (BPS-12) had been prescribed, and on subsequent Notification No. SO(PE)4-5/SSRC (Meeting/2012/Teaching Cadre/2017 dated 30.01.2018), through which the qualification was enhanced to Bachelor’s Degree along with Qirat Sanad and mandatory in-service training. The Court also noted that these notifications had been issued in pursuance of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989. Accordingly, the challenge to the impugned condition on the ground that it lacked legal backing was repelled. Equality clause—Uniform treatment of candidates—No discrimination—The Federal Constitutional Court held that no case of discrimination had been made out, as the petitioner was not singled out for hostile treatment. Rather, all competing candidates for the post of Qari were treated alike, and none was given marks for Shahadat-ul-Aalmiya in respect of that cadre. Since the exclusion applied uniformly to all applicants and was founded on the governing recruitment framework, the petitioner could not successfully invoke any claim of unequal treatment. Recruitment to public post—Candidate not possessing qualification as recognized for the advertised cadre—No enforceable right to appointment—The Court concluded that the petitioner did not fulfill the qualifications in the manner recognized for the post for which he had applied, and that his grievance was rooted in an attempt to import marks from a qualification expressly excluded for that cadre. In such circumstances, he had no enforceable right to seek revision of his merit position or appointment on the basis of marks not admissible under the advertisement and the governing legal framework. Case references—No judicial precedent or prior case law was cited or discussed in the text of the reported order. The Court relied on the following statutory and administrative instruments: Notification No. SO(PE)4-5/SSRC/Meeting/2012/Teaching Cadre dated 13.11.2012; Notification No. SO(PE)4-5/SSRC (Meeting/2012/Teaching Cadre/2017 dated 30.01.2018; and Rule 3(2) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989. Petition dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court found that the petitioner was not entitled to marks for Shahadat-ul-Aalmiya for the post of Qari (BPS-12), that the recruitment conditions were lawful and uniformly applied, and that the impugned judgment of the Peshawar High Court called for no interference. Leave to appeal was, therefore, refused and the petition dismissed.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: (a) Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973)— ----S. 13(1)(i)—Civil Service Regulations, Regulation 418—Pensionary benefits—Entitlement after resignation—Effect of delay in claiming pension—Scope— Petitioner, a civil servant, resigned from service in 2007 after completing more than twenty years of qualifying service and later applied for pensionary benefits in 2020—Department and Federal Service Tribunal declined pension on grounds of voluntary resignation and belated claim—Validity—Supreme Court held that pension is a vested and constitutional right earned through long, continuous and faithful service and is not a bounty dependent upon discretion of employer—Once qualifying service requirement is fulfilled, entitlement to pension accrues immediately upon resignation followed by its acceptance—Delay in submission of formal application does not extinguish such vested right—Neither doctrine of laches nor provisions of Limitation Act apply to defeat pensionary claims—Tribunal erred in denying pensionary benefits on ground of delayed application—Petitioner held entitled to pensionary benefits in accordance with law. Cited Cases: Secretary, Government of Punjab, Finance Department v. Ismail Tayer (2015 PLC (C.S.) 296) I.A. Sharwani v. Government of Punjab (1991 SCMR 1041) (b) Civil Service Regulations— ----Regulation 418—Scope and application—Forfeiture of past service—Interpretation— Regulation 418 placed under Chapter XVII relating to reckoning of service—Said regulation governs counting of past service when civil servant resigns to take up another appointment and does not operate as an independent provision to deny pensionary benefits after completion of qualifying service—Regulation 418 cannot be interpreted to deprive a civil servant of pensionary benefits solely on ground of resignation—Tribunal and departmental authorities misapplied said regulation—Resignation after qualifying service does not disentitle civil servant from pension. Cited Cases: Chief Engineer, Hydel (North), WAPDA v. Zafarullah Shah (2003 SCMR 684) Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Mubarak (PLD 1990 SC 346) (c) Service jurisprudence— ----Pension—Nature and character— Pension is a vested, enforceable right accruing from completion of qualifying service and cannot be withheld arbitrarily—Formal application is procedural requirement and delay therein does not extinguish substantive right—Authorities are bound to grant pension once qualifying service is established. Disposition: Civil Petition was converted into appeal and allowed; impugned judgment of Federal Service Tribunal was set aside; petitioner was declared entitled to pensionary benefits in accordance with law.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: 46ITR (Income Tax Reference) 62-25 CIR OKARA ZONE VS SHAKOOR AHMAD Mr. Justice Anwaar Hussain 14-01- 2026 2026 LHC 939