Summary: Acquittal granted----(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860): ----S. 302(b)—Qatl-e-amd (Murder)—Benefit of doubt—Delay in FIR—Interested witnesses—Contradictions in ocular and medical evidence—Acquittal. The appellant was charged with the murder of the deceased based on the statements of two eyewitnesses, who were close relatives of the deceased. The FIR was lodged with an unexplained delay of two hours, despite the proximity of the hospital and police station to the place of occurrence. The prosecution's version of the events was contradicted by medical evidence, as the number of entry wounds did not match the number of shots allegedly fired. Additionally, the investigation was found to be flawed, with failure to associate the vehicle driver, notice blood stains, or corroborate key facts. The court held that the testimonies of interested witnesses require independent corroboration, which was absent in this case. The prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and benefit of the doubt was extended to the appellant. ----Cited Cases: Nazir v. The State (PLD 1962 SC 269) Munawar Ali alias Munawar Hussain v. The State (PLD 1993 SC 251) Machia and others v. The State (PLD 1976 SC 695) Sardaran Bibi v. The State (2024 SCMR 1116) (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 342, S. 173, S. 374—Trial procedure—Investigation flaws—Defective investigation—Delay in FIR—Acquittal. The FIR was registered after an unexplained delay, raising doubts about the veracity of the prosecution's story. The investigation lacked diligence as neither the driver of the vehicle used for transporting the deceased was examined nor were the blood stains on the witnesses or vehicle observed. The prosecution failed to provide an independent corroboration of the eyewitness testimonies, and the evidence gathered was insufficient to convict the accused. Held, mere recovery of a weapon after two months could not substantiate guilt in the absence of credible ocular evidence. ----Cited Case: Sardaran Bibi v. The State (2024 SCMR 1116) (c) Evidence Act (I of 1872): ----Interested witnesses—Ocular account contradicted by medical evidence—Reliability of testimonies. The eyewitnesses were close relatives of the deceased and had a vested interest in implicating the appellant. Their testimonies were inconsistent with the medical evidence, as the number of injuries found on the deceased exceeded the number of shots allegedly fired. The court emphasized that interested witnesses' testimony requires independent corroboration, and in its absence, their credibility is doubtful. ----Cited Case: Nazir v. The State (PLD 1962 SC 269) (d) Benefit of Doubt: ----Principle of benefit of doubt—Single circumstance creating doubt—Acquittal. It is a settled principle of criminal law that a single reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case is sufficient to acquit the accused. In this case, multiple contradictions, delays, and investigative lapses collectively created substantial doubts, leading to the appellant's acquittal. ----Cited Case: Sardaran Bibi v. The State (2024 SCMR 1116) (e) Recovery of Weapon: ----Delay in recovery—Credibility of evidence—Reasonable doubt. The weapon allegedly used in the crime was recovered two months after the occurrence. The appellant had reportedly absconded, and repeated searches of his residence had failed to locate the weapon earlier. The delayed recovery cast significant doubt on the credibility of this evidence. Held, recovery alone, without corroborative ocular evidence, could not form the basis of conviction. (f) Disposition: ----Criminal appeal allowed—Death sentence not confirmed—Acquittal ordered. The court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellant was acquitted, the sentence of death was not confirmed, and he was ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. ----Disposition: Appeal allowed, Murder Reference answered in the negative.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: The Supreme Court considered whether the Chairman of PEMRA had the authority to approve the recommendations of the Council of Complaints (COC) regarding the violation. PEMRA, established as an independent statutory body by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2002, has the power to regulate electronic media in Pakistan.The Court examined the delegation of powers and noted that while PEMRA had the authority to delegate powers, it must be done in accordance with legally relevant and sustainable conditions imposed by rules. In this case, the Court found that there were no rules prescribing conditions for the delegation of the authority to approve COC recommendations. The Court emphasized that the delegation of such powers must be structured with conditions to control the delegate's exercise of those powers.The Court referenced a decision in a meeting held on 31.07.2007 where PEMRA delegated the power to approve COC meeting minutes to the Chairman without specifying any standards or conditions. However, the Court held that such delegation lacked the necessary formality and conditions prescribed by rules.Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded that the Chairman of PEMRA did not possess a validly delegated authority to approve the COC's recommendation. As a result, the petition was converted into an appeal, and the Court allowed the appeal, overturning the judgment of the Lahore High Court.

Summary: Decree for maintenance passed against the father of a child cannot be executed against the grandfather, and the child has to institute a suit for maintenance against his grandfather, in case no property of his father, the judgment debtor, is found for the execution of the decree -- The central legal question is whether a maintenance decree against the father can be enforced against the grandfather.The court clarified that under Islamic law, a grandfather is responsible for a grandchild's maintenance only if the child's father is financially incapable. The court emphasized that such obligations and defenses are factual matters requiring proper legal proceedings. It stressed the importance of a fair trial and due process, asserting that evidence for claims of maintenance against the grandfather should be presented in a suit, not in execution proceedings. The court rejected the notion that a maintenance decree against the father could be directly executed against the grandfather.Consequently, the court declared the orders attaching the petitioner's property as illegal, emphasizing that the petitioner, not being a party to the original suit, could not be subjected to the decree. The court allowed the petitioner's application for the release of his property from attachment, emphasizing the need for lawful authority in court decisions. However, it clarified that if the child decided to pursue maintenance against the grandfather, a suit could be filed in accordance with the law, and the Family Court might order interim maintenance if the conditions for the grandfather's liability are met.

Summary: Background: Two Constitution Petitions were filed: one by the Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan through its Secretary and three members (Const. P. No. 32/23), and another by an advocate (Const. P. No. 36/23). These petitions sought early general elections following the dissolution of the National Assembly and provincial assemblies. The delay in elections was due to the late completion of the 7th Population and Housing Census, 2023. Additionally, Civil Miscellaneous Appeals were filed by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and an advocate regarding the same issue. ----Issues: 1- Whether the general elections can be held within ninety days of the dissolution of the assemblies as required by the Constitution. 2- Whether the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and the President can announce a new date for the general elections beyond the ninety-day period due to the delayed census and delimitation process. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Constitutional Timeline: The court acknowledged that the ninety-day period for holding general elections, as stipulated in Article 224(2) of the Constitution, could not be met due to the delay in the 7th Census and subsequent delimitation process. ---Role of ECP and President: The court encouraged the ECP and the President to determine a new election date within their constitutional domains. The President and the ECP, after a meeting, agreed to announce 8th February 2024 as the date for the general elections. ---Constitutional Adherence: The court emphasized the importance of adherence to the Constitution by all constitutional office holders and bodies, stating that democracy must be upheld, and elections should be held as soon as feasible. The petitions and appeals were resolved with the announcement of 8th February 2024 as the date for the general elections. The court facilitated the coordination between the President and the ECP to ensure the elections were scheduled promptly, underscoring the constitutional requirement to uphold democratic processes. The judgment was ordered to be translated into Urdu to ensure wider accessibility and understanding.

Summary: PLJ 2023 SC (AJK) 16 [Appellate Jurisdiction] Present Raja Saeed Akram Khan Cj Kh Muhammad Nasim Raza Ali Khan and Muhammad Younas Tahir JJ Sardar TANVEER ILYAS Member of AJK Legislative Assembly LA - 15 Bagh - II - - Appellant versus Ch MUHAMMAD YASIN Member of AJK Legislative Assembly LA - 10 Kotli - III and others - - Respondents CA No 44 of 2022 decided on 662022 (On appeal from the order of the High Court dated 1542002 in Writ Petition No 1559 of 2022) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution 1974 (VIII of 1974) - - - - - - Arts 16 18 42 (10) (44) - - Azad Jammu Kashmir Legislative Assembly Rules 1975 R 2 (??) 15 - - Resolution for vote of no confidence against Prime Minister - - Submission of resignation of Prime Minister - - Issuance of agenda of meeting - - Session was summoned - - Writ Petition - - Respondents were stay away from conducting any proceedings regarding election of Prime Minister subject to objections from other side - - Obligation of president - - At time of resignation assembly was not in session - - Scope of judicial review - - When Prime Minister resigned from his office Assembly was not in session as session was to commence on day of first sitting of Assembly election to office of Prime Minister in session summoned for another purpose would have been against constitutional provisions - - If act or order which goes against basic theme of Constitution or performed in a manner to defeat any provision of Constitution or falls into illegality then judicial scrutiny of such act or order is permissible under writ jurisdiction by High Court - - Order of Speaker was not in consonance with and permitted by Article 16 (3) of Constitution provisions of Article 44 of Constitution stood attracted and writ petition was competent - - Writ petition is competent where there is any violation of lawAppeal disposed of [Pp 24 27 28] C D E G AIR 1966 Cal 363 2018 SCR 592 2014 SCR 258 Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution 1974 (VIII of 1974) - - - - - - Art 29 (3) - - Proceedings of assembly - - Under Article 29 (3) of Constitution all proceedings of Assembly shall be conducted in accordance with Rules of Procedure made by Assembly and approved by President [P 23] A Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly Rules 1975 - - - - - - R 15 - - Election of vacant office of Prime Minister - - If office of Prime Minister becomes vacant during session of Assembly Assembly shall forthwith proceed to elect Prime Minister in accordance with Rule 15 and if office of Prime Minister falls vacant at time when Assembly is not in session then election to office of Prime Minister shall be conducted on day fixed by Worthy President under provisions of Article 13 of Constitution [P 24] B Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution 1974 (VIII of 1974) - - - - - - Art 44 - - Competency of writ petition - - Under Article 44 of Constitution writ petition is competent where any person performing functions in connections with affairs of Azad Jammu and Kashmir or local authority has done or is doing which is not permitted by law to do or is not doing which is required by law to be done [P 28] F Kh Ansar Ahmed Mr Tahir Aziz Khan and Sardar MR Khan Advocates for Appellant Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan Kh Attaullah Chak Ch Shoukat Aziz and Syed Zulqarnain Raza Naqvi Advocates for Respondents Kh Muhammad Maqbool War Advocate General on Courts NoticeJudgement Result:Appeal disposed of

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)- -S. 214D [since omitted]-Automatic selection for audit-Scope-In the ordinary course, and in terms of other provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance'), selection for audit is not automatic but is a result that comes about after going through various statutory filters, including such as are set out in various circulars issued by the Federal Board of Revenue-Section 214D, inasmuch as it applied automatically (subject to certain exceptions contained in its subsections (3) & (4)) and therefore bypassed the filters otherwise built into the Ordinance before an audit could be undertaken, had therefore to be construed and applied strictly-More particularly, the conditions that had to exist for the section to be attracted had to apply precisely-Any deviation or discrepancy, howsoever minor, slight or even inconsequential it may otherwise appear to be would apply, and go, in favor of the taxpayer. (b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)- -S. 214D [since omitted]-Automatic selection for audit-Scope-Taxpayer had not filed its return for tax year 2015 within the date required-Date for filing the return was 21.01.2016-On that date the respondent-taxpayer properly filed an application under section 119 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance') for extension of time-Commissioner did not respond to said request-On such basis, the department claimed that the respondent came within the ambit of section 214D-Validity-In the present case, section 214D would have applied if the Commissioner had, under section 119, extended the period for filing the return (subject to a thirty day condition) and the return was not filed within such extended period-Now, the fact of the matter was that the Commissioner never took any action on the application, which was otherwise properly filed, for extension-Subsection (3) of section 119 specifically requires the Commissioner to grant the extension in writing-Since section 214D had to be applied exactly, this meant that for purposes of this provision the refusal of the Commissioner also had to be in writing-In other words, any inaction on the part of the Commissioner, or a failure to reject or refuse the application for extension in any manner other than in writing, would mean that for the purposes of section 214D the application would be regarded as pending-There could be no refusal or denial of extension by implication-For a provision as harsh and severe as section 214D to apply merely by way of implication or on a deemed basis would be incorrect-Clearly therefore, until the application for extension was actually disposed of by an order in writing the section would not become applicable-Furthermore, the condition of thirty days would have to apply, in the context of section 214D, not from the due date for the filing of the return, but the date of the order made by the Commissioner granting an extension-Of course, if the Commissioner refused the extension in writing, then the section would apply from the date of such order, subject to any remedies available to the taxpayer to challenge such refusal-Therefore, in the facts and circumstances presented in this case, section 214D never became applicable-Appeal filed by the department was dismissed. Muhammad Mujahid Qureshi and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2019 PTD 535 declared to be incorrectly decided.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending