Summary: (a) Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020 ----Ss. 5 & 8---Recovery of rent---Scope and procedure---Complainant (widow) sought recovery of rental income from joint family property of her deceased husband’s share for period during which she was deprived of its use---Earlier, forum had already restored title and possession of her share under S.5, which order was upheld by the President of Pakistan---Subsequently, application filed under S.8 for payment of rent equivalent to market value from 2008 to 2021—Held, S.8 empowers the Ombudsperson to direct payment of rent at prevailing market rate for duration of unlawful deprivation—However, as factual controversy existed regarding whether property had been rented out and its actual rental value, evidence from both parties was necessary before adjudication. (b) Jurisdiction---Powers of Ombudsperson to award compensation---The Ombudsperson under S.8 has ancillary jurisdiction to order monetary compensation where a woman has been deprived of the use or enjoyment of her property, including rental value, even after possession has been restored—Such power flows directly from the remedial and restorative intent of the statute. (c) Factual dispute---Burden of proof---Where the existence of rental income or rate of rent is contested, both parties must produce supporting evidence (e.g., market valuations, tenancy records, or comparable rental rates) before determination—Summary relief cannot be granted in absence of evidentiary basis. (d) Disposition— Matter adjourned for recording of evidence from both sides on the question of rental value and entitlement under S.8 of the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020.

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (X of 1984) ----Arts. 140, 150 & 137—Hostile Witness—Cross-Examination of Own Witness—Contradiction with Previous Statement Under Section 161, Cr.P.C.—Scope—The prosecution sought to declare a prosecution witness (PW-2) hostile after he provided a version contrary to his earlier statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C.—Held, under Article 140 of QSO, 1984, a witness can be cross-examined on their previous statement to highlight contradictions, but the witness must be confronted with specific portions of their statement—Under Article 150, the Court may permit the party calling a witness to cross-examine them if their testimony conflicts with their earlier statement—The Trial Court erred in refusing to declare PW-2 hostile merely because his Section 161 statement lacked signatures or thumb impressions—The absence of a signature does not invalidate the statement or preclude the witness from being declared hostile if they contradict their prior version. Cited Cases: • The State v. Abdul Khaliq (PLD 2011 SC 554) • Muhammad Boota v. The State (1984 SCMR 560) • Dost Muhammad v. Malik Shah Muhammad (2023 PCr.LJ 326) • Muhammad Sarfaraz v. The State (PLD 2013 SC 386) (b) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898) ----Ss. 161 & 162—Statements Made to Police—Use in Evidence—Hostile Witness—Contradiction of Statements—Under Section 162 Cr.P.C., a statement recorded by police during an investigation cannot be signed by the witness, nor can it be used as substantive evidence—However, such a statement can be used to contradict the witness if their attention is specifically drawn to the contradictions during cross-examination as per Article 140 of QSO, 1984—The Trial Court incorrectly ruled that a witness cannot be declared hostile based on an unsigned statement recorded under Section 161—The provision does not require signatures for the statement to be used for contradiction. (c) Administration of Justice ----Judicial Discretion—Hostile Witness—Standard for Declaring Witness Hostile—The Court must exercise its discretion judiciously while declaring a witness hostile—If a witness disowns or contradicts their previous statement, the prosecution must be allowed to cross-examine their witness—The purpose is to ensure that truth is uncovered, and contradictions are properly addressed during the trial—The Trial Court’s refusal to declare PW-2 hostile without considering the substantive contradiction in testimony amounted to a miscarriage of justice. (d) Evidence Law—Cross-Examination ----Purpose of Cross-Examination—Contradicting Previous Statements—A witness whose previous statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C., contradicts their testimony in court can be cross-examined under Article 140 and 150 of QSO, 1984—The cross-examination must focus on specific contradictions in the earlier statement—The objective is not to corroborate but to highlight inconsistencies that may affect the credibility of the witness. Disposition: Revision petition allowed—Impugned order dated 26.07.2023 set aside—Trial Court directed to reconsider the testimony of Samiullah (PW-2) and allow the prosecution to declare him as a hostile witness based on the contradictions observed—Copy of the judgment directed to be circulated among Judicial Magistrates, Additional Sessions Judges, and Sessions Judges of the province for compliance and adherence.

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Background: This case arises under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and concerns the tax year 2015. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue claimed that the respondent taxpayer (Messrs Atta Cables) was subject to an automatic audit under section 214D of the Ordinance because they allegedly failed to file their tax return within the prescribed time. The taxpayer had applied for an extension of time under section 119, but the Commissioner did not respond to the application. The department initiated audit proceedings, prompting the taxpayer to challenge the notices through a writ petition, which was dismissed by the Lahore High Court. On appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court ruled in favor of the taxpayer. The Commissioner then appealed to the Supreme Court. -----Issues: 1- Does section 214D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, automatically apply when a taxpayer requests an extension to file their return but the Commissioner fails to respond? -----2- Is the inaction of the Commissioner in granting or refusing the extension under section 119 equivalent to a denial of the extension, thereby triggering section 214D? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Application of Section 214D: The Supreme Court ruled that section 214D, which mandates automatic audit for late filers, is a stringent and coercive measure. The Court held that for section 214D to apply, all the conditions must be strictly met. Since the Commissioner failed to respond to the taxpayer's application for an extension under section 119, the extension application was considered pending. The Court emphasized that the denial of an extension must be in writing. In this case, the Commissioner’s inaction could not be interpreted as a refusal, meaning section 214D did not apply. --Strict Interpretation of Section 214D: The Court underscored the need for strict construction of section 214D due to its punitive nature. It could not be applied by implication or deeming fiction. Thus, the automatic audit provision would only be triggered once the Commissioner had explicitly denied the extension in writing, which had not happened in this case. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the decision of the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court. The Court declared that section 214D did not apply because the Commissioner had failed to act on the extension request. -----Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Mujahid Qureshi and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (2019 PTD 535): Overruled by the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court. Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Independent Newspaper Corp. (Pvt.) Ltd. (2019 PTD 447): Relied upon by the Division Bench, upheld by the Supreme Court. Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, Section 214D: Strict interpretation required for automatic audit provisions.

Summary: Pending

Summary: Petitioner seeks to set aside the impugned order dated 23.11.2022 & report dated 27.10.2022. Respondents' procurement process may be quashed and set aside as being violative of PPRA Rule 2022.

Summary: Sentence reduced --- The case involves the trial of Muhammad Sarwar, Muhammad Zeshan Sarwar alias Shana, and Muhammad Arslan Sarwar alias Fana for offenses under Sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. Muhammad Sarwar was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Ahsan Aslam. However, the co-accused were acquitted due to the benefit of doubt.The incident occurred on February 12, 2017, during a cricket match in Lahore, where Muhammad Sarwar allegedly shot Ahsan Aslam. The motive behind the crime was linked to a prior quarrel between Ahsan and the accused party. The prosecution presented eyewitnesses and medical evidence to support its case.The judgment discussed various arguments raised during the appeal, including the alleged innocence of Muhammad Sarwar, issues with witness credibility, conflicting accounts of the incident, and challenges with the evidence related to the recovery of the weapon. The court ultimately maintains Muhammad Sarwar's conviction but alters the death sentence to life imprisonment, citing mitigating circumstances. The compensation awarded to the victim's legal heirs is upheld, and the court dismisses the appeal against the acquittal of the co-accused.

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)- -Ss. 18(1)(d) & 122(5) & 122(9)-Amendment of original assessment order-Pre-requisites-Income from business-Scope-Subsidiary company’s shares-Increase in value-Whether the increase in the fair market value of the subsidiary company’s shares held by the taxpayer-respondent as long-term investment was taxable under the head-income from business-in terms of section 18(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001-Held, that section 18(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 prescribes a two-pronged test for bringing income under the head "income from business"; first is that any benefit or perquisite must have a fair market value, not necessarily whether it can be converted into money; second is that a person may have received the value of that benefit or perquisite during or under a past, present, or prospective business relationship-Coexistence of both is necessary and the absence of one of them will not constitute income from a business-As regards the first constituent component of the test, the notional gain derived by the taxpayer from the increase in the fair market value of its shares may in appropriate circumstances be counted as-benefit-However, no definite answer need be given on this, in the facts and circumstances of the present case-With respect to the second constituent component of the test, the principle to be applied for purposes of present case is whether the investment which led to the notional gain was connected with the carrying on of the taxpayer's business-It bears mentioning that enhanced fair market value of any benefit or prerequisite may be so assessable under Section 18(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, where what is done is not merely a realisation or change of investment, but an act done in what is truly the carrying on, or carrying out, of a business-In the present case, the Revenue has not brought any material on record which discloses definite information that the taxpayer had made the said investment in furtherance of its business or in connection therewith-Given this scenario, the relationship between the taxpayer and its subsidiary may be held to be contractual, and governed by articles of association-So viewed, the facts of this case do not meet the test for section 18(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and thus, the taxpayer’s gain from its investment cannot be treated as business income in terms of section 18(1)(d)-Furthermore, according to section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, two conditions have to be complied with before a Taxation Officer acquires jurisdiction to issue notice under section 122(9) in respect of an assessment beyond the period of five years from the end of the relevant financial year-These two conditions are: firstly, that the Taxation Officer must have obtained definite information from the audit or otherwise; and secondly, that on that basis he must also be satisfied that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment or total income has been undervalued, or assessed at too low a rate, or has been the subject of excessive relief or refund or any amount under a head of income has been misclassified-In the present case the two conditions of section 122(5) were not adhered to while assuming jurisdiction to amend the original assessment order-Show cause notice and the order amending the original assessment speaks elaborately that the Taxation Officer had not acquired any definite information subsequent to the original assessment order-On the contrary, the Taxation Officer based on the information provided in the return and documents attached to it by the taxpayer, proceeded to amend the assessment-Taxation Officer had only made reanalysis of existing information and came to a conclusion that was different from the one that was drawn in the original assessment order-Notice issued under section 122(9) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was without jurisdiction, and the order passed in consequence of it was also void-Appeal was dismissed accordingly. Californian Copper Syndicate (Limited and Reduced) v. Harris (Surveyor of Taxes) 5 TC 159 and United Liner Agencies of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. Karachi v. Miss Mahenaee Agha 2003 SCMR 132 ref. (b) Jurisdiction- -Principle-Whenever jurisdiction is given by a statute and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained therein, it is a universal principle that those terms should be complied with, in order to create and raise the jurisdiction, and if they are not complied with, the jurisdiction does not arise. Nusserwanjee Pestonjee and others v. Meer Mrioodeen Khan Wullud Meer Sudroodeen Khan Bahadoor (1885) UKPC 15 ref.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan- -Arts. 16, 17(2), 19 & 188-Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XIII of 2002), S. 8(5)-Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017), S. 211-Election Rules, 2017, R. 161-Judgment passed by the Supreme Court in respect of Islamabad-Rawalpindi sit-in protest/ dharna by members of a religious political party ('the Judgment')-Review petitions challenging said Judgment-Formation of a Commission to implement the Judgment-Discrepancies and abnormalities in financial affairs of the protesting religious political party-Different applications filed by the review petitioners to either withdraw their review petitions or to challenge certain observations made in the Judgment-Supreme Court observed that regretfully most of the review petitioners had no explanation as to why it was first decided by them to become a party and seek review of the Judgment and then elect to withdraw the application-Detailed observations and directions recorded by the Supreme Court in respect of the different review petitioners before the Court stated.

Summary: Summary pending