Summary: ----Ss. 265 & 272---Application for grant of Letter of Administration---Term "District Delegate"---High Court may appoint such judicial officer within any district to act for the District Judge as Delegates to grant Letter of Administration in non-contentious case under S. 265 subsection (1) of the Succession Act, 1925; Judicial Officers so appointed are called "District Delegates". (b) Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)--- ----Ss. 286, Explanation & 272---Application for grant of Letter of Administration---Term 'contention'---Term 'contention is defined in Explanation of S. 286 of Succession Act, 1925, which (contention) means the appearance of any one in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader duly appointed to act on his behalf, to oppose the proceeding. (c) Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)--- ----Ss. 265, 272, 286 & 288---Application for grant of Letter of Administration---Contentious case---District Delegate, powers of---Scope---Contention (objection) raised in the application---Scope and effect---Succession appeal was filed against the order passed by the District Delegate whereby the application made by the respondent for grant of Letter of Administration was allowed---Objection/contention of the appellants was that the respondent had divorced the deceased about 35 years back; as such, application made for grant of Letter of Administration was unjustified and mala fide---Validity---Under S. 272 of the Succession Act, 1925, the District Delegate may grant Letter of Administration in an application for grant of the same, in which there is no contention---In the present case, there was contention of the appellant, as such, the District Delegate could not have granted Letter of Administration under S. 286 of the Succession Act, 1925---District Delegate can only deal with non-contentious matter; as soon as, caveat is entered and proceeding becomes contentious, he loses his jurisdiction and therefore, cannot grant Letter of Administration---In contentious cases, S. 288 of the Succession Act, 1925, provides procedure which prescribes two alternatives in contentious cases---District Delegate may either return the petition to the applicant in order that the same may be presented to the District Judge ,or the District Delegate may impound the petition and, in that case, he shall himself send the same to the District Judge-- -Section 288 of the Succession Act, 1925, firstly, applies to all contentious cases, and secondly in doubtful cases, but in either case, the District Delegate has no jurisdiction to frame issues and proceed with the proceedings after contest---In the present case, appellants opposed the grant of Letter of Administration to the respondent with the contention that the deceased/lady was divorced and, therefore, respondent could not be granted Letter of Administration---District Delegate on submission of such contention ought to have, either returned the application to the respondent for presentation to the District Judge or should have by himself sent the same to the District Judge---District Delegate instead of doing that, proceeded to frame issues and granted the Letter of Administration and exercised jurisdiction of District Judge which was not vested in him under the said provision---Thus, impugned order was simply void and liable to be set aside---District Delegate ought to have taken notice of S. 288 of the Succession Act, 1925, however, he appeared to have overlooked the mandatory provision of S. 288 of the Succession Act, 1925---High Court set-aside the impugned order passed by the District Delegate (Civil Judge) in application of Letter of Administration and matter was remanded to the District Delegate with direction to deal with the said application strictly in accordance with S. 288 of the Succession Act, 1925---Appeal was disposed of accordingly. Jameel Ahmed Khan Babai for Appellants. Muhammad Nawaz Khan Tareen for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3. Date of hearing: 6th November, 2023.

Summary: ----Ss. 265 & 272---Application for grant of Letter of Administration---Term "District Delegate"---High Court may appoint such judicial officer within any district to act for the District Judge as Delegates to grant Letter of Administration in non-contentious case under S. 265 subsection (1) of the Succession Act, 1925; Judicial Officers so appointed are called "District Delegates". (b) Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)--- ----Ss. 286, Explanation & 272---Application for grant of Letter of Administration---Term 'contention'---Term 'contention is defined in Explanation of S. 286 of Succession Act, 1925, which (contention) means the appearance of any one in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader duly appointed to act on his behalf, to oppose the proceeding. (c) Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)--- ----Ss. 265, 272, 286 & 288---Application for grant of Letter of Administration---Contentious case---District Delegate, powers of---Scope---Contention (objection) raised in the application---Scope and effect---Succession appeal was filed against the order passed by the District Delegate whereby the application made by the respondent for grant of Letter of Administration was allowed---Objection/contention of the appellants was that the respondent had divorced the deceased about 35 years back; as such, application made for grant of Letter of Administration was unjustified and mala fide---Validity---Under S. 272 of the Succession Act, 1925, the District Delegate may grant Letter of Administration in an application for grant of the same, in which there is no contention---In the present case, there was contention of the appellant, as such, the District Delegate could not have granted Letter of Administration under S. 286 of the Succession Act, 1925---District Delegate can only deal with non-contentious matter; as soon as, caveat is entered and proceeding becomes contentious, he loses his jurisdiction and therefore, cannot grant Letter of Administration---In contentious cases, S. 288 of the Succession Act, 1925, provides procedure which prescribes two alternatives in contentious cases---District Delegate may either return the petition to the applicant in order that the same may be presented to the District Judge ,or the District Delegate may impound the petition and, in that case, he shall himself send the same to the District Judge-- -Section 288 of the Succession Act, 1925, firstly, applies to all contentious cases, and secondly in doubtful cases, but in either case, the District Delegate has no jurisdiction to frame issues and proceed with the proceedings after contest---In the present case, appellants opposed the grant of Letter of Administration to the respondent with the contention that the deceased/lady was divorced and, therefore, respondent could not be granted Letter of Administration---District Delegate on submission of such contention ought to have, either returned the application to the respondent for presentation to the District Judge or should have by himself sent the same to the District Judge---District Delegate instead of doing that, proceeded to frame issues and granted the Letter of Administration and exercised jurisdiction of District Judge which was not vested in him under the said provision---Thus, impugned order was simply void and liable to be set aside---District Delegate ought to have taken notice of S. 288 of the Succession Act, 1925, however, he appeared to have overlooked the mandatory provision of S. 288 of the Succession Act, 1925---High Court set-aside the impugned order passed by the District Delegate (Civil Judge) in application of Letter of Administration and matter was remanded to the District Delegate with direction to deal with the said application strictly in accordance with S. 288 of the Succession Act, 1925---Appeal was disposed of accordingly. Jameel Ahmed Khan Babai for Appellants. Muhammad Nawaz Khan Tareen for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3. Date of hearing: 6th November, 2023.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898):----S. 265-K---Acquittal at preliminary stage---Scope and limitations---Trial Court acquitted accused before framing of charge under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C. on ground that PFSA report lacked mandatory protocols under Rule 6 of Government Analyst Rules, 2001---Held, premature acquittal without recording evidence or tendering analyst report was erroneous---Even if protocols in PFSA report were disputed, prosecution could invoke S. 510, Cr.P.C. to summon analyst or seek clarification under Ss. 11 & 12 of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency Act, 2007---Trial Court failed to grasp the statutory philosophy behind "probability of conviction", which requires deeper scrutiny beyond technicalities at pre-trial stage---Judgment of acquittal set aside and case remanded for trial.Cited Cases:• President National Bank of Pakistan v. Waqas Ahmed Khan 2023 SCMR 766• Model Customs Collectorate v. Aamir Mumtaz Qureshi 2022 SCMR 1861• State v. Raja Abdul Rehman 2005 SCMR 1544• Raja Muhammad Yasin v. Zaitoon Begum 1993 CLC 2448(b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997:----S. 9(c)---Charas recovery---PFSA report containing test protocols---Admissibility and sufficiency---PFSA Analysis Report showed full testing protocols including: (i) Analytical balance for weight, (ii) Chemical spot test, and (iii) Gas Chromatography–Mass Spectrometry---Such protocol, though not in suggested template of Qaiser Javed Khan case (PLD 2020 SC 57), was deemed sufficient in several Supreme Court rulings to satisfy Rule 6 of Government Analyst Rules, 2001---Trial Court erred in rejecting report solely for not following template format.Cited Cases:• Shazia Bibi v. The State 2020 SCMR 460• Mushtaq Ahmad v. The State 2020 SCMR 474• Asmat Ali v. The State 2020 SCMR 1000• Qaiser Javed Khan v. The State PLD 2020 SC 57(c) Control of Narcotic Substances (Govt. Analyst) Rules, 2001:----R. 6---Compliance with protocol requirement---Pending interpretation before Supreme Court---Question of mandatory protocol format under Rule 6 still sub judice before Larger Bench of the Supreme Court in Baz Khan case---Held, Trial Courts must exercise caution in rendering acquittals based on evolving jurisprudence when matter is undecided---Existing PFSA formats accepted in multiple SC cases as compliant for narcotic drug identification.Cited Cases:• The State through ANF v. Imam Bakhsh 2018 SCMR 2039• Khair-ul-Bashar v. The State 2019 SCMR 930• Minhaj Khan v. The State 2019 SCMR 326(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898):----S. 423---Appeal against acquittal---Hearing in absence of accused---Maintainability---Accused/respondent remained absent despite notice---Held, appeal against acquittal can be decided in his absence under S. 423, Cr.P.C.---Trial cannot be indefinitely delayed due to abscondence---Court justified in deciding matter without presence of respondent.Cited Case:• Hayat Bakhsh v. The State 1981 SCMR 1 = PLD 1981 SC 265----Disposition:Appeal allowed; acquittal judgment dated 06.01.2020 set aside; case remanded for trial on merits.

Summary: (a) Islamic Inheritance Law--- ----Concept of Takharuj---Relinquishment of Sharai share---Burden of proof and evidentiary requirements. The petitioner failed to prove that the defendant voluntarily relinquished her Sharai share in inheritance through takharuj. The court held that takharuj, as recognized under Islamic inheritance law, requires clear evidence of voluntary relinquishment, free from coercion, undue influence, or fraud. Furthermore, the alleged relinquishment must be reduced into writing or substantiated through credible evidence. In this case, neither the alleged relinquishment nor the related deed satisfied the evidentiary standards, and the customary practice of depriving women of their inheritance was deemed invalid. -----Cited Precedents: Ghulam Ali v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi (PLD 1990 SC 1) Mst. Parveen (deceased) through LRs v. Muhammad Pervaiz (2022 SCMR 64) (b) Customary practices vs. Islamic inheritance law--- ----Relinquishment of inheritance rights by women---Public policy considerations. The court reiterated that the enforcement of Islamic inheritance laws, particularly in favor of female heirs, is a matter of public policy. Any purported relinquishment of inheritance rights by women, even if proven, is void if it contravenes public policy or Islamic jurisprudence. The practice of denying women their Sharai shares under cultural or social pretexts is expressly rejected by courts in Pakistan, as emphasized by the Supreme Court in multiple judgments. (c) Evidence Law--- ----Documentary and oral evidence---Standard for proving relinquishment in inheritance disputes. Relinquishment of inheritance rights must be established through clear and credible evidence. In this case, oral testimony failed to corroborate the alleged relinquishment, as witnesses provided inconsistent statements and failed to prove the essential elements of takharuj. The court also noted that the deed presented as evidence did not bear the defendant’s signature or consent, further invalidating the claim. -----Disposition: Revision dismissed. The petitioner's claim of relinquishment was held to be unproven and devoid of merit. The defendant's Sharai share in the inheritance remains intact, with costs imposed on the petitioner.

Summary: Suit for recovery of the Plaintiff-Bank under Section 9 of the FIO, 2001 is decreed by rejecting the PLA; the Corporate Guarantee extended by associated company was not found beyond the scope of its Memorandum of Association; and the premature suit became mature in terms of alleged default during its pendency which was decreed subject to imposition of fine in order to adjust equities.

Summary: Veracity of protocols in narcotic analysis report can only be assessed once it is tendered in evidence; pre-mature termination of prosecution is deprecated.

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Against Judgment & Decree