Summary: Acquittal granted----(a) Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979): ----S. 17(4) Harrabah---Conviction and sentence under section 17(4) of the Ordinance and sections 412/202, P.P.C.---Benefit of doubt---Appellants were convicted for Harrabah and sentenced to life imprisonment; however, their conviction was set aside as the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to multiple material discrepancies, procedural irregularities, and unreliable evidence. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----Ss. 164 & 364---Statements of witnesses and confessional statements of accused---Procedural flaws rendering evidence inadmissible---Statements under section 164 of the Code were recorded without following mandatory procedures, including the presence of the accused and their right to cross-examine witnesses. Confessional statements of appellants were deemed involuntary, vague, and recorded without proper safeguards under sections 164 and 364 of the Code. Reliance placed on Muhammad Ismail v. The State (2017 SCMR 713). (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (X of 1984): ----Art. 129(g)---Adverse inference---Failure to examine material witnesses or produce essential documentary evidence---Prosecution abandoned material witnesses without justification and failed to explain significant procedural delays and irregularities. Adverse inference was drawn under Art. 129(g), Qanun-e-Shahadat Order. Reliance placed on Muhammad Asif v. The State (2017 SCMR 486). (d) Criminal Evidence---Reliability and corroboration: ----Recovery of crime weapons and other items---Flaws in safe custody and transmission---Alleged recoveries of pistols, mobile phones, and snatched currency notes were not corroborated by credible evidence. Prosecution failed to establish safe custody and transmission of evidence, and recovery memos lacked essential details. FSL reports were deemed unreliable due to procedural irregularities. (e) Burden of Proof---Standard of evidence in criminal cases: ----Reasonable doubt---Prosecution's failure to meet its burden---Conviction cannot be based on conjectures or probabilities---Any single infirmity creating doubt in a prudent mind entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt. Reliance placed on Ghulam Qadir and others v. The State (2008 SCMR 1221) and Muhammad Mansha v. The State (2018 SCMR 772). (f) Disposition: ----Appeal allowed---Conviction and sentences of life imprisonment awarded to the appellants under section 17(4) of the Ordinance and sections 412/202, P.P.C., were set aside due to insufficient evidence and procedural irregularities. Appellants were acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt. Criminal Acquittal Appeal No.01-I of 2023 and Criminal Revision No.01-I of 2023 were dismissed. -----Cited Cases Muhammad Asif v. The State (2017 SCMR 486) Muhammad Ismail v. The State (2017 SCMR 713) Akhtar Ali and others v. The State (2008 SCMR 6) Ghulam Qadir and others v. The State (2008 SCMR 1221) Muhammad Mansha v. The State (2018 SCMR 772) Muhammad Akram v. The State (2009 SCMR 230) Tariq Pervez v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345)

Summary: (a) Insurance Ordinance, 2000: ----Sections 45, 46, and 158; Issuance of shares and compliance with approval conditions---Failure to meet conditions for share issuance---Appellant obtained approval for issuance of shares in cash but failed to comply with the condition, engaging in sequential debit and credit transactions without actual receipt of funds---Bench held that the appellant's actions violated the conditions of approval and did not meet the statutory requirements under the Ordinance---Contention that funds could be received in tranches was deemed irrelevant as the appellant failed to substantiate compliance with the condition of cash issuance. (b) Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997: ----Section 33; Appellate jurisdiction---Principle of double jeopardy---Bench rejected the appellant's argument that the impugned order constituted double jeopardy, noting that the earlier penalty related to non-compliance with minimum paid-up capital requirements, while the impugned order addressed violations of separate provisions of the Ordinance---Mere overlap of facts in the orders does not preclude enforcement of relevant legal provisions for distinct contraventions. (c) Constitutional Law ----Article 10A; Right to fair trial---Principle of fair trial and due process---Bench held that the appellant's claim of violation of Article 10A was unfounded, as a show-cause notice was issued to the appellant and its directors, fulfilling the procedural requirements for a fair trial under the Constitution. -----Disposition: Appeal dismissed; impugned order upheld, with no order as to costs.

Summary: Against impugned order dated 23.9.19 passed by the full bench of NIRC whereby appeal against impugned order dated 29.4.19 passed by the Learned Single member NIRC has been allowed & case has been remanded back (Petition was rejected being not a workman)

Summary: Writ petition Article 199(1)(ii) of the Constitution of Islam Republic of Pakistan 1973. Accused was convicted under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. Law and Parliamentary Affairs Department through letter No.OP:15-11/2023/5503 dated 28.09.2023, opined that the principle of grant of no remissions in sentence seems to be applicable in all cases from the date of insertion of the Amendment Act, 2022 notwithstanding anything contained in Prison Rules, 1978. Provisions of section 9(A) (1) of Amended Act, 2022 from their bare reading are prospective in nature and same cannot be given effect retrospectively by placing any sort of embargo on the right of a convict qua earning remissions who had been arrested, indicted and even convicted prior to insertion of section 9(A) (1) through Amendment Act, 2022. Superintendent Jail was directed to grant remissions to the convict in accordance with law and rules.

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Article 10-A ----Right to a fair trial---Open trial requirement---Scope---The conduct of a trial in jail without adherence to procedural requirements violated the fundamental right to a fair trial under Article 10-A. It was held that trials must be conducted transparently, and public access should be ensured unless extraordinary circumstances justify deviation. (b) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 – Section 352 ----Court’s discretion to exclude public or hold trial in jail---Judicial order requirement---Scope---Section 352 Cr.P.C. requires a judicial order by the presiding officer supported by justifiable reasons to exclude the public or shift the trial venue to jail premises. Absence of such an order renders the trial procedurally defective and prejudicial to the accused. (c) Lahore High Court Rules – Rule 3 ----Trial in jail---Government sanction---Scope---Under Rule 3, prior sanction of the Government, granted through the District Magistrate, is mandatory for conducting a trial in jail. Executive orders issued without fulfilling this requirement were declared unlawful. (d) Retrospective Sanction by Executive Authorities ----Legality---Executive orders granting retrospective sanction for prior actions in violation of procedural requirements are invalid, as they infringe upon the vested rights of the accused. Retrospective approval cannot regularize procedural defects in a trial. (e) Constitutional Jurisdiction – Article 199 ----Judicial review of executive decisions---Scope---High Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of executive authorities, including Cabinet decisions, for procedural impropriety, illegality, or irrationality. Executive decisions affecting fundamental rights must be based on transparent, informed, and well-reasoned processes. Disposition Notifications issued by the Ministry of Law and Justice to conduct the trial in jail without prior judicial orders and requisite Government sanction were declared unlawful and of no legal effect. Proceedings conducted in jail without adhering to the requirements of Section 352 Cr.P.C. and Rule 3 of the Lahore High Court Rules were vitiated. Retrospective approval granted through notifications dated 13.11.2023 and 15.11.2023 was declared invalid. The appeal was allowed, and the trial proceedings were directed to be conducted afresh, ensuring compliance with the principles of open and fair trial.

Summary: Background:Rafaqat Ali, the petitioner, filed a Civil Petition seeking leave to appeal against the Order dated 05.01.2022 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal in Appeal No. 2547 of 2020, which dismissed his appeal.The petitioner, a civil servant, was charged with harassing male students. After an inquiry, the Chief Operating Officer of TEVTA imposed the penalty of Compulsory Retirement.The petitioner filed a departmental appeal before the Chairman, TEVTA, which remained pending. Subsequently, during the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown, the Chairman decided the appeal.The Tribunal dismissed the petitioner's appeal as time-barred under Section 19(2) of the PEEDA Act, stating it was filed 20 days late.---Issues:Whether the departmental appeal should have been filed before the Chief Secretary or the Chairman, TEVTA.Whether the COVID-19 lockdown justified the delay in filing the appeal.Whether the Tribunal erred in dismissing the appeal solely on grounds of limitation without considering other pertinent issues.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Tribunal primarily focused on the issue of limitation without considering relevant factors such as the appropriate appellate authority and the impact of the COVID-19 lockdown on filing deadlines.The petitioner, being a civil servant, argued that the Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab, was the competent authority for his departmental appeal.The Tribunal should have determined the competent authority before addressing the issue of limitation. Additionally, the impact of the COVID-19 lockdown on the filing deadline should have been considered.The appellate jurisdiction aims to ensure checks and balances by reevaluating lower court judgments. Thus, the Tribunal's failure to address crucial questions warranted remanding the matter for fresh consideration.The petition was converted into an appeal, and the impugned order was set aside. The Tribunal was instructed to reconsider the appeal, preferably within 60 days.---Quote:(1) Section 20 & 26 of Punjab Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority Act, 2010 (2) Section 16 & 19 of Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006. (3) For deciding appeal, Service Tribunal is deemed to be a Civil Court and has the same powers as are vested in such court.

Summary: Background: A candidate (petitioner) for the Legislative Assembly for Constituency No. LA-XVI, Bagh-3, challenged the eligibility of the returned candidate (respondent). The petitioner argued that the respondent had received pay and allowances after submitting his resignation from the Assembly, thereby disqualifying him under Sections 31(xviii) and (xxi) of the AJ&K Elections Act, 2020. The petitioner sought a ruling from the Election Tribunal, which led to the consolidation of two writ petitions addressing identical legal questions and facts. ----Issues: 1- Whether the respondent was disqualified from contesting the election due to receiving pay and allowances post-resignation. 2- Whether the Election Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the case. The validity and impact of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) proceedings and its immunity from judicial scrutiny. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Disqualification of the Respondent: The High Court acknowledged that the central issue was whether the respondent was a willful defaulter under Section 31(xviii) and (xxi) of the AJ&K Elections Act, 2020. An audit objection indicated that the respondent had received Rs. 1,218,339/- in pay and allowances post-resignation. However, the PAC had not mandated the recovery of this amount. --Jurisdiction of the Election Tribunal: The High Court affirmed that the Election Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction under Section 85 of the AJ&K Elections Act, 2020, and is equipped with all powers of a civil court trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. --Public Accounts Committee Proceedings: The High Court recognized the PAC's immunity from challenge but noted that judicial review is permissible when constitutional provisions are violated. The PAC had concluded its proceedings without requiring the respondent to refund the pay and allowances received. --Direction to the Election Tribunal: The High Court did not overturn the Election Tribunal's order dated 21.06.2022 but directed the Tribunal to expedite the trial of the election petitions, avoiding unnecessary delays and ensuring a fair trial in accordance with the right to a fair trial under the AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974. --Expeditious Disposal: The Election Tribunal was directed to conclude the election petition proceedings fairly and expeditiously, observing the principle of the right to a fair trial. --Rights and Fair Trial: The High Court reiterated that every individual is entitled to a fair trial, and the judicial system must ensure that this fundamental right is upheld. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 85 and 91 of the AJ&K Elections Act, 2020 Article 4 of the AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974 Perviaz Elahi v. Province of Punjab [PLD 1993 Lahore 595] Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujrat [(2006) 3 SCC 374] Meher Rohinton Minwalla v. Darayus Cyrus Minwalla [2014 CLC 1312] Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [AIR 1978 SC 597] Khadijah Hussain v. State [2012 P.Cr.LJ 1847] Bilal Akbar v. Election Tribunal [PLD 2015 Lahore 272] Sardar M. Hussain Khan v. Dr. Najeeb Naqi [2014 SCR 149] Karachi Bar Associal v. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada [PLD 1988 Karachi 309] Masroor Ahsan v. Ardeshir Cowasjee [PLD 1998 SC 823] Pakistan v. Ahmad Saeed Kirmani [PLD 1958 SC 397] Tahir Mahmood v. Abdul Jabbar [PLD 1983 SC AJK 97] Mrs. Anisa Rehman v. PIAC and others [1994 SCMR 2232]

Summary: (a) Civil service- (b) Judicial review- -Policy decisions of the Executive-Interference by Courts-Scope of judicial review of Government policies stated. The ambit and purview of judicial review of government policies is now well settled and defined and thereunder the Court can neither act as an appellate authority with the aim of scrutinizing the propriety, suitability, and/or adequacy of a policy, nor may it act as an advisor to the executive on matters of policy which they are entitled to formulate. The object of judicially reviewing a policy is to ascertain whether it violates the fundamental rights of the citizens, or is at variance to the provisions of the Constitution, or opposed to any statutory provision, or demonstrably arbitrary or discriminatory. The court may invalidate laws, acts and governmental actions that are incompatible with a higher authority, or an executive decision for being unlawful which maintains a check and balance. Such a declaration can be sought on the ground that the decision-maker misdirected itself in law, exercised a power wrongly or improperly or purported to exercise a power that it did not have, which is known as acting ultra vires; a decision may be challenged as unreasonable if it is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, or due to a failure to observe the statutory procedures. The dominance of judicial review of the executive and legislative action must be kept within the precincts of the constitutional structure so as to avoid any misgivings or apprehension that the judiciary is overstepping its bounds by engaging in unwarranted judicial activism.

Summary: (a) Foreigners Act (XXXI of 1946)- -Ss. 3 & 14-Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 242, 243, 244, 265-D, 265-E & 265-F-Illegally entering into Pakistan-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Confessional statement recorded at belated stage-Effect-Accused was charged that he being Afghani National entered into Pakistan without any legal documents-Record showed that charge against accused was framed on 26.12.2022 and he pleaded not guilty-Accused filed an application on 25.03.2023 through his counsel and voluntarily made an offer to make a confessional statement-Now the issue to be determined was whether the Trial Court was justified in accepting the offer of the appellant/ convict to record the appellant's/convict confessional statement at a belated stage, when admittedly as per the order sheet dated 26.12.2022 and impugned order the appellant/convict did not plead guilty and claimed trial in explicit terms or otherwise-Bare perusal of the provisions of Ss. 242, 243 & 244, Cr.P.C. clearly depicted that once a formal charge was framed and put to the appellant/convict, which was denied by him under S. 242, Cr.P.C. provisions of S. 243, Cr.P.C., shall ipso facto become inoperative and Court had to proceed under S. 244, Cr.P.C., by recording the prosecution evidence as well as that of the accused, if led in defence-Thus, the confessional statement made after so many dates of hearing when at the time of the framing charge, the appellant/convict in explicit terms had denied the same, was of no legal effect in the presence of Ss. 244, 265-D, 265-E & 265-F of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898-Hence, in the foregoing circumstances, the conviction and sentence inflicted by the Trial Court in terms of the impugned order dated 29-03-2023 was not sustainable in the eyes of the law, which was set-aside and the case was remanded to the Trial Court to decide the same in accordance with law, after recording the evidence. King Emperor v. Kasim Waled Mohamed Saffer AIR 1925 Sindh 188 rel. (b) Foreigners Act (XXXI of 1946)- -Ss. 3 & 14-Illegaly entering into Pakistan-Appreciation of evidence-Benefit of doubt-Time barred appeal-Scope-Allegedly appeal was filed with delay-Right of appeal is a substantial right which normally should not be denied on technical counts/reasons particularly when it came to the criminal administration of justice-Normally condonation of delay would do nothing with the merits of the case, but would only require the Court to decide the lis on merits-Condonation of delay is normally subject to giving a "reasonable explanation" which might have prevented party in approaching the Court-Thus, while examining the question of limitation, the circumstances claimed to have prevented one in approaching the Court in time, would always be a decisive-If the circumstances pleaded appear to be justified or even likely to be believable though no proof is offered then the delay must always be condoned-Even condonation of delay would not absolve the party from establishing his case on merits- -Hence, in the foregoing circumstances, the conviction and sentence inflicted by the Trial Court in terms of the impugned order dated 29-03-2023 was not sustainable in the eyes of the law, which was set-aside and the case was remanded back to the Trial Court to decide the same in accordance with law, after recording the evidence. Fazli Hakeem and another v. Secretary: State and Frontier Regions Division and others 2015 SCMR 795 rel. Fazal-ur-Rehman, State Counsel.