Summary: Sentence Reduced --- i. True that when the relations are so close, then the factum of substitution would hardly arise, but this by itself would not relax the courts of law while determining the guilt of the accused, as under all circumstances both, the prosecution and the courts of law are burdened with the boundened duty to dig out the truth and to appreciate the collected evidence, without having been influenced from the relationship of the parties, if the relationship would prevail then there is apprehension of miscarriage of justice, which is neither permitted nor will advance the purpose.ii. When there was no pre-planning for killing the deceased and all others, present on the spot, so the escaping unhurt of the complainant and the eyewitness would hardly persuade the absence of the witnesses from the spot at the time of incident and would hardly persuade that the complainant was not present on the spot. As it was the altercation which prompted the accused and it is uncertain that whether all present on the spot took participation in altercation and that the complainant and the eyewitness remained more active in the same. When there is silence on this aspect of the case, then in our understanding may be the altercation took place between the accused and the deceased and that was the reason that instead of the complainant and the eyewitness, the deceased were fired at.iii. As in this particular case the witnesses were tested and so their credibility, but nothing to the favour of the appellant could be brought, from them, on record. When the witnesses remained consistent and when no malafide was attributed to the witnesses, then in our understanding it is the credibility and truthfulness of the witnesses which must steer the wheel and not the witnesses of identification.iv. As the witnesses remained consistent on the material aspects of the case, so minor discrepancies would hardly be a ground for dislodging the proved case of the prosecution. The contradictions in the statements could be fatal, but the discrepancies would in no way would help the accused and would damage the prosecution case.v. As not only the accused but the deceased were also instrumental in spoiling the peaceful atmosphere and in disturbing the minds of the accused, so in our understanding the learned Trial Court fell into error while awarding the sentence. As it was the rise of emotion because of hot talks between the parties, so the same excludes the possibility of a pre-determined mind to kill, rather it tells that it was the created situation which led to the death of the deceased. Though it was because of the participation of both the parties which aggravated situation, but that would hardly be a ground for extending extra ordinary benefit to the appellant. What benefit the appellant can claim is only in respect of the awarded sentence and in our understanding it would be a correct approach, if instead the appellant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Summary: The primary issue revolved around the inclusion of subsidies granted by the Federal Government in the turnover for the purpose of charging minimum tax under Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.The judgment, dated 06-12-2023, framed three crucial questions of law for the decision:Whether the Tribunal misinterpreted the subsidy granted by the Federal Government, affecting the turnover under Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the subsidy cannot be added as turnover for the purpose of charging tax under Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?Whether the Tribunal misinterpreted the exempted subsidy under clause 102-A but contended it cannot be excluded from turnover under Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?The judgment clarified that the term 'turnover' includes gross receipts from the sale of goods, and in this case, subsidies received by the power distribution companies (Discos) were considered as part of their gross receipts.The court analyzed the background of the tariff determination by the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) and the government's subsidy to certain consumer categories. It emphasized that the subsidy was not granted to the Discos but directly to consumers. The court rejected the notion that no sale of goods occurred to the government, stating that the subsidy transaction should be viewed in the context of the entire process.Referring to audited accounts, the judgment emphasized that the subsidy received by Discos was shown as revenue in their financial statements. It concluded that the amounts recovered from consumers and the subsidy constituted revenue receipts and were part of the turnover as defined in Section 113 of the Ordinance.The judgment cited precedents from other high courts supporting the inclusion of subsidies in turnover for tax purposes. In conclusion, the reference applications filed by both the department and taxpayers were decided in favor of the department, allowing some and dismissing others. The impugned orders were set aside or dismissed accordingly.

Summary: The case pertains to a dispute over the payment of Rs.31,65,640 for building material supplied by the respondent, Misri Khan & Company, to Pakistan Railways. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, and the appellate court affirmed the decision. The petitioners, dissatisfied with the judgments, filed a revision petition.The petitioner's argument centered around the contention that the respondent's claim was time-barred, and both lower courts did not properly address this issue. The petitioner relied on Article 56 of the Limitation Act, 1908, asserting that the respondent should have filed the suit within three years from the date of the work done. The petitioner cited precedent cases to support their position.Conversely, the respondent argued that the suit was filed within the stipulated time, considering the time spent in proceedings before the Federal Ombudsman. They contended that Article 115 of the Limitation Act, 1908, applied to the case. The respondent emphasized that there were concurrent findings of fact, and the petitioner failed to demonstrate any misreading or non-reading of evidence by the lower courts.The court, after hearing the arguments, focused on the core issue of determining which provision of the Limitation Act, 1908 applied to the case. The court highlighted Articles 56 and 115 of the Act, stating that Article 56 governed claims for the price of work done, while Article 115 applied to compensation for breach of contract not otherwise provided for in the Act.The court noted that the contract was awarded in 1999, and the respondent approached the Federal Ombudsman in 2000. The crucial question was whether the time spent before the Federal Ombudsman could be excluded from the limitation period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The court concluded that Section 14 did not apply to proceedings before the Federal Ombudsman and cited relevant case law to support this interpretation.In light of the above, the court allowed the petition, set aside the judgments and decrees of the lower courts, and dismissed the respondent's suit. The court emphasized that its decision was based on correcting legal errors and irregularities in the lower court's findings.--- ''The moot point thus before this Court is as to "which provision of the "Act, 1908" would apply to the facts and circumstances of the case". Articles 56 & 115 of the "Act, 1908. From the bare reading of the above referred provisions of law it is manifestly clear that for the claim relating to the price of work done, suit is to be governed by Article 56 of the "Act, 1908" whereas Article 115 of the Act ibid caters the suit for compensation for the breech of any contract, express or implied, not in writing registered and not therein specially provided for in the Act. Admittedly the contract was awarded in the year 1999. The respondent in the first instance laid his grievance before the Federal Ombudsman on 12th January, 2000 in the shape of complaint, who allowed the complaint and directed the petitioners to make immediate payment by way of order dated 06th March, 2000. The petitioners being aggrieved challenged the order of the Federal Ombudsman before the President of Pakistan, who allowed the representation by way of order dated 26th October, 2000 and the respondent was directed to approach the Civil Court. Suit was then instituted on 16th March, 2006. The question which now emanates is as to "whether time consumed before the Federal Ombudsman can be excluded from being counted towards the limitation for instituting the suit under Section 14 of the "Act, 1908"."

Summary: Acquittal --- ''The eyewitnesses were not only very closely related to deceased but they were also chance witnesses who had failed to establish the stated reason for their availability at the scene of the crime at the relevant time; it is held that eyewitnesses reached at the place of occurrence by chance and occurrence took place exactly at the time of their arrival at place of occurrence does not appeal to a prudent mind; Further according to the Inquest Report as well as statement of doctor the mouth of the deceased was opened and this fact shows that no person had afflicted to close the mouth of deceased, which couldn't have befell in the presence of eye witnesses; the eyewitnesses were not the witnesses of identification of deadbody at the time of autopsy and preparing the inquest report, held, that had they been present at the scene of the occurrence at the relevant time they must have been the witnesses of identification of deadbody. It is improbable when a person has sustained 17 injuries with fire shot and sharp-edged weapon, blood would not ooze and would not touch the clothes of attending persons. This fact constrained this Court to hold that eyewitnesses were not present at the time and place of occurrence, otherwise, their clothes must have been stained with blood while attending the deceased; Further held that ipse dixit of police is not binding on the court yet it can be considered if it is founded on some cogent and convincing evidence; evidence of call data not worthy of reliance if no voice record transcript has been brought on record; It is settled proposition of law that blood disintegrate after three weeks. Further held that if prosecution sets up a motive but fails to prove it, then, it is the prosecution who has to suffer and not the accused.'' ---- Eyewitness Testimony:The court questioned the presence of eyewitnesses at the crime scene, finding their accounts inconsistent. The case "The State through Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar vs. Hassan Jalil and others" (2019 SCMR 1154) was referenced, which discusses the improbability of coincidental presence of witnesses.Forensic Evidence:Issues with forensic evidence were highlighted, especially the absence of bloodstains on the witnesses' clothes. Precedents like ?Muhammad Asif vs. The State? (2017 SCMR 486) and ?Zahir Yousaf and another v. The State and another? (2017 SCMR 2002) were cited for guidance.Motive:The court found the motive for the crime (non-payment of dower) unconvincing. Cases like ?Manzoor Ahmed Shah and others Vs. The State and others? (2019 SCMR 2000) were cited, emphasizing the importance of proving motive in criminal cases.Call Data Record:The court deemed call data records insufficient to establish the accused's involvement. The case ?Azeem Khan and others vs. Mujahid Khan and others? (2016 SCMR 274) was cited, highlighting limitations in using call data as evidence.Recovery of Weapons:The recovery of weapons (pistol and Chhurri) was found inconclusive. Relevant cases such as ?Naveed Asghar Vs. The State and another? (PLD 2021 SC 600) and ?Muhammad Ismail and others vs. The State? (2017 SCMR 898) were mentioned.Benefit of Doubt:The principle of giving the benefit of doubt in cases of uncertainty was applied, as detailed in ?Naveed Asghar and two others Vs. The State? (PLD 2021 SC 600), ?Muhammad Imran Vs. The State? (2020 SCMR 857), and ?Mst. Hajira Bibi alias Seema and others vs. Abdul Qaseem and another? (2023 SCMR 870).Conclusion:Based on these considerations and precedents, the High Court acquitted Ashfaq Hussain and Abdul Majeed Shah, setting aside their convictions and sentences due to reasonable doubt. The death sentence against Ashfaq Hussain was not confirmed, and the criminal revision for converting Abdul Majeed Shah's life imprisonment into a death sentence was dismissed.

Summary: Law related to paternity claims '' challenges to paternity could not be brought by third parties'' --- The court discouraged the use of criminal law in family matters by not only quashing the criminal case, but also directing the IGP Islamabad for holding police officers accountable for the malpractice. ----- The FIR alleged that Shafqat Hussain had facilitated the falsification of NADRA records to show his son, Mohsin Shafqat, as his own child. Shafqat Hussain's counsel argued that the charges were baseless, motivated by malice, and initiated by a retired police officer who was trying to benefit from the distribution of property left by Shafqat Hussain's former wife, who had subsequently married the complainant. They also mentioned that the deceased wife of the complainant had claimed to be the mother of Shafqat Hussain's son in a guardian petition.The judgment, delivered by Babar Sattar, J., emphasized the legal precedents established in previous cases, particularly highlighting Article 128 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ("1984 Order"), which stated that challenges to paternity could not be brought by third parties. The court cited cases like Mst. Laila Qayyum Vs. Fawad Qayum and others (PLD 2019 SC 449) to support this principle.Furthermore, the judgment noted that even the petitioner, Shafqat Hussain, could not challenge the paternity of his son, Mohsin Shafqat, due to the expiration of the prescribed period. The court cited various legal cases, such as Mohammad Nawaz Vs. Additional District and Sessions Judge (Civil Petition No.2414-L/2015), Urooj Tabani Vs. Federation of Pakistan, Suhail Abbasi Vs. Mst. Khushboo and others, and others to emphasize the legal protections in place for the legitimacy and paternity of a child.Given the legal precedents and the absence of any valid grounds for the charges in the FIR, the court allowed the petition, quashed the FIR, and invalidated any related proceedings. The court also ordered the complainant/respondent No.1 to pay costs of Rs. 100,000 to the petitioner within 30 days and directed the Inspector General of Police Islamabad to conduct an inquiry into potential abuse of authority by the police officer who registered the FIR. Disciplinary proceedings would be initiated if abuse of authority was confirmed.

Summary: Background: The petitioner purchased plot No. 8-A/1 on 02.07.1990 from Muhammad Yasin, who was allotted the plot on 14.06.1990. The plot is situated in Sector F/2 Mirpur, A.K. The plot No. 8-A was allotted to the father of respondents Nos. 11, 12, and 13 on 19.10.1970. There was an open space and drain between plots 8-A and 8-A/1. Respondents Nos. 11, 12, and 13 claimed ownership of the petitioner's plot, resulting in multiple legal proceedings. ----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner, Abdul Majeed, is the rightful owner of plot No. 8-A/1. 2- Whether the Commission of Inquiry and related respondents acted lawfully in conducting inquiries and making orders regarding the ownership of the plot. 3- Whether the orders of the Inquiry Commission dated 01.01.2018 and 01.06.2019 should be set aside. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Rightful Ownership: The court recognized that the petitioner's ownership of plot No. 8-A/1 was previously affirmed by the relevant authorities, including the MDA, following the court's direction on 22.09.2006. --Lawful Inquiry: The court found that the inquiries conducted by the Commission of Inquiry and other respondents were not consistent with due process. The petitioner was not provided a proper opportunity to be heard, violating principles of natural justice. --Orders Set Aside: The court quashed the orders dated 01.01.2018 and 01.06.2019, directing the Allotment Committee to resolve the matter transparently and judiciously within three months, providing full opportunity of hearing to both parties. The court directed the Allotment Committee of MDA to be added as a party to the writ petition. The Allotment Committee is to adjudicate the matter within three months, providing a fair hearing to both parties and deciding in accordance with the law. ----Citations/Precedents: The court referred to the precedent set in the case of “Noman Razq vs. Faryad Hussain” [2014 SCR 921], where it was held that factual controversies regarding allotments cannot be resolved by the High Court in writ jurisdiction and should be decided by the relevant competent authorities. Legal Principles Referenced: --Audi Alteram Partum: The principle that no person should be judged without a fair hearing. The distinction between writ jurisdiction and civil suits: Writ jurisdiction is an extraordinary remedy and cannot substitute for ordinary civil litigation.

Summary: Background: The petitioner, a student of B.Sc. at Degree College Abbasspur under the University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, passed his B.Sc. examination in 2018 with 404 marks out of 900. The petitioner was awarded one grace mark in Physics (theory) but this was not included in the final result, which prevented him from obtaining a second division. The petitioner sought a writ directing the University to include the grace mark in his total score and issue a B.Sc. degree in second division. ----Issues: 1- Whether the University should include the grace mark awarded in Physics (theory) in the petitioner’s total marks. 2- Whether the petitioner is entitled to be awarded a B.Sc. degree in second division after including the grace mark. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Inclusion of Grace Mark: The court held that the University should include the grace mark in the petitioner’s total marks. Clause 9 Chapter 14 of the University regulations allows grace marks to be included in the total marks if they are given to pass a subject. This interpretation aligns with the precedent set by the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir in the case "University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir vs. Mohtasib (Ombudsman) of the Azad State of Jammu and Kashmir" (2019 YLR 373). --Entitlement to Second Division: The court found that the petitioner is entitled to a B.Sc. degree in second division. Since the petitioner was awarded one grace mark in Physics (theory), his total marks increased to 405 out of 900, achieving the required 45% for a second division. The court emphasized that while grace marks cannot be awarded to improve a division if they were used to pass a subject, the marks awarded to pass a subject should be included in the total count. The court directed the University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir to include the one grace mark awarded in Physics (theory) in the petitioner’s total marks and issue a B.Sc. degree in second division. ----Citations/Precedents: University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir vs. Mohtasib (Ombudsman) of the Azad State of Jammu and Kashmir (2019 YLR 373): This case established that grace marks given to pass a subject should be included in the total marks, and students who are declared successful in any subject with grace marks are not entitled to additional grace marks for a higher division.

Summary: Background: A group of petitioners filed a writ petition challenging the cancellation of the allotment of a plot initially granted to their deceased relative. The plot, located in Mangla Hamlet Phase II, Mirpur, had been allotted on 15.09.2008. The petitioners claimed that the cancellation was illegal and sought the restoration of the allotment. The respondents argued that the plot had been canceled following due procedure and subsequently re-allotted. ----Issues: 1- Whether the cancellation of the allotment of plot No. 269 was lawful. 2- Whether the re-allotment of the plot to respondent No. 7 was valid. 3- Whether the simultaneous allotment of two plots to one family was fair and transparent. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court found that the cancellation of the plot was based on a decision by the MDA Board dated 04.03.2006, which was not included as a respondent. The court held that without the necessary party, the order could not be effectively challenged. The court noted the arbitrary practice of the MDA in passing wholesale allotment orders without adherence to relevant laws. The allotment of two plots to one family was deemed arbitrary and a colorable exercise of power. The court held that the dual allotment was not sustainable and directed the petitioners to file an application against the allotment of plot No. 270 to the husband of respondent No. 7. The relevant authority was instructed to decide the matter judiciously. ----Citations/Precedents: The court referred to the principles of fairness, transparency, and the rule of law as embedded in the preamble clause of the Constitution and Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act.

Summary: Background: A petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 44 of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974, seeking annulment of judgments passed by the Full Board of Revenue and the Senior Member Board of Revenue. The petitioner requested the restoration of the judgment of the Commissioner Mirpur and the Teh-Zameeni order of the Collector Kotli. The land in question, comprising survey No. 391 and measuring 2 marlas, was sanctioned in favor of the petitioner by the Collector Kotli on 22.07.1995, with mutation No. 829 sanctioned on 12.05.1996. The petitioner constructed two shops on the land and rented them out. Subsequently, the Teh-Zameeni of survey No. 291 was fraudulently sanctioned in favor of another party, canceling the petitioner’s Teh-Zameeni through an order dated 15.12.2011. The Commissioner Mirpur later canceled the Teh-Zameeni of the other party through an order dated 07.02.2013. The Board of Revenue set aside the Commissioner’s order on 20.05.2016. The Full Board of Revenue dismissed the petitioner’s revision petition on 15.11.2017. ----Issues: 1- Was the cancellation of the petitioner’s Teh-Zameeni lawful? 2- Was the Teh-Zameeni in favor of the other party obtained through forgery and fraud? 3- Should the orders of the Full Board of Revenue and the Senior Member Board of Revenue be set aside? ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The land was lawfully sanctioned in favor of the petitioner, and the mutation was duly issued. The petitioner provided sufficient evidence that the land was sanctioned in his favor and that he had possession of the land. The Teh-Zameeni obtained by the other party was fraudulent, as evident from the tampering of survey numbers. The tampering of survey numbers constituted fraud. The orders of the Full Board of Revenue and the Senior Member Board of Revenue were found to be contrary to the law and evidence presented. Therefore, these orders were set aside, and the orders of the Commissioner Mirpur and Collector Kotli were restored. ----Citations/Precedents: PLD 1973 SC 24

Summary: Summary pending