Summary: Background:The petitioners challenged the judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan, Quetta, which allowed a petition filed by Syed Haji Muhammad Ayub (the respondent) under Article 199 of the Constitution. The respondent sought proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Cr.P.C.), alleging illegal possession of property by the petitioners.----Issues:Whether the Judicial Magistrate had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under section 145 of the Cr.P.C.Whether the jurisdictional requirements for initiating proceedings under section 145 were met.Whether the powers exercised by the Judicial Magistrate were lawful.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court held that the Judicial Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and exercise powers under section 145 of the Cr.P.C. The jurisdiction was exclusively vested in a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or an Executive Magistrate empowered by the Provincial Government.The Court found that the dispute did not meet the jurisdictional requirements for initiating proceedings under section 145. The alleged breach of peace was vague and unsubstantiated, and the respondent was not in possession of the property in question.The powers exercised by the Judicial Magistrate were deemed unlawful and without jurisdiction. Despite lacking authority, the Magistrate virtually adjudicated on property rights and possession in favor of the respondent.

Summary: Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----S. 41---Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S.45---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54---Suit for declaration and injunction---Mutation, cancellation of---Purchase through registered sale deed---Ostensible owner, purchase from---Scope---Petitioner / plaintiff claimed to be owner of suit land on the basis of registered sale deed which was incorporated in revenue record---Revenue authorities cancelled mutation in the name of petitioner / plaintiff and resultantly respondent / defendant purchased suit land from previous owner---Suit filed by petitioner / plaintiff was decreed in his favour by Trial Court but Lower Appellate Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit---Validity---Person claiming protection under S. 41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was bound to establish that the person from whom suit property was transferred to him was an ostensible owner, while transfer so made was with the consent of real owner, either express or implied---Such transfer must have been made for some consideration and the person who was transferee or purchaser must have acted in good faith with all reasonable care and steps before entering into such transaction for transfer---If any one of such ingredients was missing, then the transferor was not eligible to seek protection of equitable doctrine envisaged under S. 41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882---Sanctity was attached to a registered document and it was considered a notice to public at large---In order to dislodge such presumption mere inquiry of revenue record was not sufficient---Entries of revenue record were not foundation of title as such entries were made for fiscal purposes---Neither respondent / defendant specifically sought protection under S. 41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 nor had established such fact through any evidence---Sale deed executed in favour of petitioner / plaintiff remained intact and no one had challenged validity and legality of sale deed in question---Although mutation in question had been cancelled, yet petitioner / plaintiff was owner of suit property on the strength of sale deed and previous owner had no right to sell suit property in favour of respondent / defendant---Revenue officer was not competent to cancel mutation entered on the strength of registered sale deed on the ground that provision of Martial Law Regulation had been violated---Order cancelling mutation in question was void ab-initio having no effect upon the rights of petitioner / plaintiff---High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court and restored that of Trial Court---Revision was allowed accordingly. Faizullah v. Muhammad Sarwar and another 2013 CLC 1054; Mst. Aisha bibi v. Nazir Ahmad and others 1994 SCMR 1935; Syed Fakhar Imam Shah and others v. Abdul Haq (deceased) through L.Rs. and others 2006 SCMR 550 and Muhammad Ishaq v. Muhammad Shafique and 9 others 2007 SCMR 1773 rel. Tariq Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhary for Petitioner. Rao Qasim Raza Khan and Masood Arif Butt for Respondents. Date of hearing: 1st November, 2023.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: The moot point thus before this Court is as to "which provision of the "Act, 1908" would apply to the facts and circumstances of the case". Articles 56 & 115 of the "Act, 1908. From the bare reading of the above referred provisions of law it is manifestly clear that for the claim relating to the price of work done, suit is to be governed by Article 56 of the "Act, 1908" whereas Article 115 of the Act ibid caters the suit for compensation for the breech of any contract, express or implied, not in writing registered and not therein specially provided for in the Act. Admittedly the contract was awarded in the year 1999. The respondent in the first instance laid his grievance before the Federal Ombudsman on 12th January, 2000 in the shape of complaint, who allowed the complaint and directed the petitioners to make immediate payment by way of order dated 06th March, 2000. The petitioners being aggrieved challenged the order of the Federal Ombudsman before the President of Pakistan, who allowed the representation by way of order dated 26th October, 2000 and the respondent was directed to approach the Civil Court. Suit was then instituted on 16th March, 2006. The question which now emanates is as to "whether time consumed before the Federal Ombudsman can be excluded from being counted towards the limitation for instituting the suit under Section 14 of the "Act, 1908"."

Summary: The eyewitnesses were not only very closely related to deceased but they were also chance witnesses who had failed to establish the stated reason for their availability at the scene of the crime at the relevant time; it is held that eyewitnesses reached at the place of occurrence by chance and occurrence took place exactly at the time of their arrival at place of occurrence does not appeal to a prudent mind; Further according to the Inquest Report as well as statement of doctor the mouth of the deceased was opened and this fact shows that no person had afflicted to close the mouth of deceased, which couldn't have befell in the presence of eye witnesses; the eyewitnesses were not the witnesses of identification of deadbody at the time of autopsy and preparing the inquest report, held, that had they been present at the scene of the occurrence at the relevant time they must have been the witnesses of identification of deadbody. It is improbable when a person has sustained 17 injuries with fire shot and sharp-edged weapon, blood would not ooze and would not touch the clothes of attending persons. This fact constrained this Court to hold that eyewitnesses were not present at the time and place of occurrence, otherwise, their clothes must have been stained with blood while attending the deceased; Further held that ipse dixit of police is not binding on the court yet it can be considered if it is founded on some cogent and convincing evidence; evidence of call data not worthy of reliance if no voice record transcript has been brought on record; It is settled proposition of law that blood disintegrate after three weeks. Further held that if prosecution sets up a motive but fails to prove it, then, it is the prosecution who has to suffer and not the accused.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Background: Farooq Ahmed, the petitioner, was serving as a Lecturer at the Government Science College, Quetta. His father, Muhammad Azam Davi, was the Secretary of the Balochistan Provincial Assembly Secretariat and was re-employed on a contract basis after his superannuation. During his father’s tenure, Farooq Ahmed applied for the post of Deputy Secretary (BPS-18) in the Balochistan Provincial Assembly Secretariat. The appointment process, which included an advertisement, was challenged by several officers in the Assembly Secretariat on the grounds that it violated the Balochistan Provincial Assembly Secretariat (Recruitment) Rules, 2009. Despite this challenge, Farooq Ahmed was appointed to the position, leading to legal disputes. Farooq’s appointment was later withdrawn, and he challenged this withdrawal both in the Balochistan Service Tribunal and the High Court of Balochistan. Both forums ruled against him, and he sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court of Pakistan. ---- Issues: 1) Whether the appointment of the petitioner violated the Balochistan Provincial Assembly Secretariat (Recruitment) Rules, 2009. ---2) Whether the petitioner’s appointment was influenced by his father, creating a conflict of interest. ---3) Whether the petitioner’s simultaneous invocation of the jurisdiction of the Balochistan Service Tribunal and the High Court was justified. ---4) Whether the appointment process followed the principles of transparency, fairness, and merit. ---- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Violation of Rules: The Supreme Court found that the petitioner’s appointment violated the Balochistan Provincial Assembly Secretariat (Recruitment) Rules, 2009, as the appointment was supposed to be made through promotion of eligible Assistant Secretaries (BPS-17) based on seniority and fitness. The Assembly Secretariat, however, proceeded with an initial recruitment process, circumventing the prescribed promotion mechanism. ---- Conflict of Interest: The Court highlighted the conflict of interest, noting that the petitioner’s father, who was the Secretary of the Assembly Secretariat, played a significant role in the appointment process. The entire process was deemed tailored to benefit the petitioner, raising serious concerns about the transparency of the appointment. --- Jurisdiction Issue: The Court dismissed the petitioner’s argument that the Balochistan Service Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction, as the petitioner had himself invoked both the Tribunal and the High Court's jurisdiction. Since both forums had ruled on the merits of the case, the issue of jurisdiction was deemed irrelevant. --- Transparency and Merit: The Court emphasized the need for public sector appointments to adhere strictly to applicable rules and to be conducted transparently and fairly. The entire process in this case lacked transparency and fairness, and the Court concluded that the recruitment process was manipulated to favor the petitioner. ---- Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, upholding the decisions of the Balochistan Service Tribunal and the High Court of Balochistan. The Court underscored the importance of adhering to rules and avoiding conflicts of interest in public appointments. ---- Citations/Precedents: Syed Mubashir Raza Jafri and others v. Employees Old Age Benefit Institutions (EOBI) and others (2014 SCMR 949) Muhammad Ashraf Tiwana and others v. Pakistan and others (2013 SCMR 1159) Muhammad Yasin v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2012 SC 132) Chief Secretary Punjab and others v. Abdul Raoof Dast (2006 SCMR 1876) ----- Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed Farooq Ahmed’s petitions, finding that his appointment as Deputy Secretary violated the applicable rules and principles of transparency and fairness. The appointment process was found to have been manipulated, and the Court upheld the decisions of the lower forums.

Summary: The Supreme Court, in its judgment, disagreed with high courts judgement, emphasizing the seriousness of fraud allegations in the medical education system. The Court highlighted discrepancies in the mark sheet and noted the university's right to cancel provisional admission if credentials are not verified. It concluded that the High Court's decision was erroneous, set aside the Impugned Order, and denied admission to Respondent No. 1 for the academic year 2022-2023 based on the fabricated mark sheet. The Court also refused to restore admission to the BDS program for the previous academic year.

Summary: Section 49 of The Land Revenue Act and Section 2-A of The Mines and Minerals Act, 2017. These sections unequivocally state that all mines and minerals are the property of the government --- (a) Under The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mines and Minerals Act 2017, all mines and minerals as well as minor minerals are the ownership of the Provincial Government whether such mines and minerals are embodied in the land owned by the Provincial Government or in the land of a private person and thus the Provincial Government has every right of their use and enjoyment.(b) Under the erstwhile Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Minor Mineral Mining Concessions Rules 1971, The ?minor minerals? were excluded from the ?Minerals? whereas under The Act of 2017 no exception qua the minor minerals has been provided and thus ?minor Minerals? are to be treated with the yardstick as that of minerals.(c) Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous then a Court of law could neither add or omit something from it and Court are bound to attach the same meaning as ordinarily spelling out from the language of the statute.(d) A private person in whose land minor minerals are embodied then such land owner could excavate such minor minerals for the purpose of agriculture or building purposes only but such land owner could not excavate such minerals for commercial purposes.(e) Under the provision of The Act 2017, the minor minerals available in the land of a private person could be excavated by a lessee after getting a lease as per the provision of S-78 of The Act 2017.(f) A lessee is bound to pay the surface rent to the land owner having minor minerals at the rate as agreed upon between the lessee and the land owner or in case of their disagreement at such rate as determined by the District Surface Rent Committee.(g) A land owner shall also be entitled for a compensation for the damage, if any, caused to his property as result of the mining operation by the lessee --- The judgment, dated December 6, 2023, by the Peshawar High Court Abbottabad Bench, pertains to two connected writ petitions (WP No. 811-A/2018 and WP No. 994-A/2018). The petitioners, owners of certain properties, challenged the government's actions of making blocks of their properties and auctioning leasehold rights for extracting minor minerals from their land. The petitioners sought the quashing of these actions, restraint from auctioning their property, removal of their property from the auction list, and prevention of damage to their property.The court noted that the key issue was the ownership of minor minerals embedded in the land. The petitioners claimed ownership based on their recorded ownership of the properties in revenue records. However, the court emphasized the legal provisions, specifically citing Section 49 of The Land Revenue Act and Section 2-A of The Mines and Minerals Act, 2017. These sections unequivocally state that all mines and minerals are the property of the government.The court highlighted that the petitioners' claim was misconceived as per the clear mandate of the law. It clarified that while private owners could use minor minerals for specific purposes, commercial use required a lease. The court referred to provisions in The Mines and Minerals Act, 2017, outlining the process of leasing for mining minor minerals.The judgment distinguished a precedent cited by the petitioners, emphasizing the differences in the legal frameworks. Ultimately, the court dismissed both writ petitions, finding them devoid of merit.