Summary: Petition Dismissed---The petitioner's advocate argued that the order of registration issued by the Registrar was based on false and bogus documents submitted by the Respondent No. 2 Union. The petitioner asserted that Respondent No. 2 does not meet the criteria for being registered as an industry-wise trade union under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The petitioner approached the court seeking to have the order of registration set aside on the grounds that it was illegal and void. The petitioner's argument was primarily based on the contention that Respondent No. 2's union did not meet the legal criteria for registration. During the court proceedings, it was questioned whether the petitioner had proper standing to bring the case to the court under Article 199 of the Constitution, as it is required that the petitioner must be aggrieved and there must be no other adequate remedy available under the law. The court ruled that the petition was misconceived and incompetent, and therefore dismissed the petition. The court dismissed the petition filed by M/s. Baluchistan Wheels Limited, which challenged the registration of the "Baluchistan Wheels Workers Union" by the Registrar of Industry-wise Trade Union, citing that the petition was misconceived and the petitioner had alternative remedies available under the law.

Summary: Promotion (whether while granting promotion senior employees were considered for promotion or otherwise and submit the compliance report.)

Summary: Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997 (Section 31 (7)) In light of the foregoing, we reach to an irresistible conclusion that the exercise of passing monthly FCA on to the petitioners on the basis of NEPRAs determination dated 27.12.2019 is in accordance with law and the timeline provided under Section 31(7) of the Act, 1997 be adhered to, unless any party is restricted for a reason beyond its control, which is a case at hand. The Petitioners clearly failed to avail statutory remedies under the law while the impugned determination was being made and even thereafter, nonetheless there is no cavil that the petitioners owe FCA component to K-Electric and liable to satisfy this debt. These instant Petitions being devoid of merit are accordingly dismissed.

Summary: Background: This case involves a petitioner who sought remissions for her son, who was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The petitioner’s son and his co-convict were both sentenced to life imprisonment and began serving their sentences on 20.05.2006. The co-convict was released on 07.04.2021 after receiving remissions, while the petitioner’s son remained in prison. The petitioner sought equal treatment, arguing that her son should also benefit from the remissions that led to the release of the co-convict. -----Issues: 1- Can the time spent on bail by the petitioner’s son be considered part of the sentence served? ----2- Is a convicted prisoner entitled to remissions for the period they were on bail? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the time spent on bail by the petitioner’s son could not be considered part of his sentence. According to Rule 35 of the Pakistan Prisons Rules, 1978, any period during which a prisoner is on bail is not counted as part of the sentence unless explicitly stated otherwise. The petitioner’s son was on bail between 21.07.2009 and 05.07.2011, and this time could not be considered as part of the served sentence. The court found that the petitioner’s son was not eligible for the remissions granted to the co-convict. The co-convict was continuously confined without bail and thus qualified for special remissions under various presidential notifications and the 18th Amendment. Since the petitioner’s son was on bail during the relevant period, he did not meet the criteria for these remissions. The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that her son should receive the same remissions as the co-convict, noting that the co-convict remained in jail without bail throughout, while the petitioner’s son was not confined during key periods when the remissions were granted. The petition was dismissed with no merit, and the court ruled that the petitioner’s son was not entitled to remissions for the period he spent on bail. -----Citations/Precedents: Rule 35 of the Pakistan Prisons Rules, 1978 Messrs Lung Fung Chinese Restaurant, Lahore v. Punjab Food Authority and Others (PLD 2021 Supreme Court 684)

Summary: Background: The petitioner challenged the legality of the proceedings initiated by the Punjab Food Authority, which seized 410 bags of whey powder from the petitioner’s dairy farm and fat-rendering unit. The whey powder was claimed by the petitioner to be animal feed, but the Punjab Food Authority seized it under Section 13(3) of the Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011 (amended in 2016), alleging it was adulterated and possibly harmful for human consumption. The petitioner argued that the whey powder was not meant for human consumption, and its seizure was unjustified. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Food Safety Officer (FSO) had the legal authority to seize whey powder, claimed to be animal feed, under the Punjab Food Authority Act? ---2- Whether the sealing of the dairy farm and fat-rendering unit by the FSO was constitutional and legal? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the seizure of the 410 bags of whey powder by the FSO was unjustified and without legal basis. The court found that there was no provision in the Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011, allowing the FSO to seize "animal feed". Additionally, no laboratory tests were conducted to confirm whether the whey powder was adulterated or harmful for human consumption. The court emphasized that if the whey powder was intended for animal feed, it did not fall under the scope of the Food Authority’s jurisdiction regarding human food safety. The court found that the sealing of the premises by the FSO under Section 13(1)(c) of the Punjab Food Authority Act was unconstitutional. Citing a Supreme Court ruling, the court held that the Act did not provide clear guidelines or a remedial mechanism for sealing, and as such, the power of the FSO to seal premises could be applied arbitrarily, violating fundamental rights under Articles 18, 23, and 25 of the Constitution. The court declared the sealing power under Section 13(1)(c) to be unconstitutional and struck down any rules or regulations permitting such actions. The petition was accepted, and the proceedings dated 05.11.2020 were declared ultra vires, illegal, and without legal effect. The court ordered the respondent to return the seized 410 bags of whey powder to the petitioner. -----Citations/Precedents: Messrs Lung Fung Chinese Restaurant, Lahore v. Punjab Food Authority and Others (PLD 2021 Supreme Court 684)

Summary: Background: The petitioner challenged the judgments and decrees of the Family Court and the Appellate Court, which decreed a suit for recovery of maintenance allowance filed by the respondents (the petitioner's wife and minor daughters). The Family Court had previously closed the petitioner's right to file a written statement, which was upheld by the High Court. The Family Court then decreed the suit for maintenance allowance, which was upheld by the Appellate Court. The petitioner contended that the closure of his right to file a written statement was not justified and that the maintenance allowance was beyond his financial capacity. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Family Court had the authority to close the right to file a written statement of the defendant under the Family Courts Act, 1964. 2- Whether the defendant could still cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses, lead evidence, and take part in arguments even after the right to file a written statement was closed. 3- Whether the maintenance allowance awarded was beyond the financial capacity of the petitioner. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Authority to Close Right to File Written Statement: The Court held that while the Family Courts Act, 1964 does not explicitly provide for closing the right to file a written statement, courts have inherent power to ensure the orderly dispensation of justice. In the case of a defendant's persistent default, Family Courts can make an order similar to Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, striking off the right to file a written statement. This principle was supported by precedents such as "Khalil-ur-Rehman Bhutta v. Razia Naz and another" (1984 CLC 890) and "Fakhar Abbas Versus Additional District Judge Tandlianwala District Faisalabad and 3 others" (2017 CLC Note 22). --Defendant's Rights After Closure: Even after the right to file a written statement is closed, the defendant retains the right to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses, lead evidence to disprove the facts stated in the plaint, and take part in arguments. This was supported by various judgments, including "NATIONAL LOGISTIC CELL (N.L.C.) Versus HAZRAT ALI and others" (2010 SCMR 970) and "MUHAMMAD NADEEM Versus JUDGE FAMILY COURT and 2 others" (2012 CLC 1361). --Maintenance Allowance and Financial Capacity: The court found that the maintenance allowance awarded to the respondents was reasonable given the petitioner's financial status. The petitioner was a Civil Engineer running a construction business with a monthly income exceeding three hundred thousand rupees. The maintenance allowance of Rs.35,000 per month for each minor daughter and Rs.25,000 for the wife was deemed appropriate and justified, considering the educational needs and livelihood expenses of the respondents. The constitutional petition was dismissed. -----Citations/Precedents: "Khalil-ur-Rehman Bhutta v. Razia Naz and another" (1984 CLC 890) "Fakhar Abbas Versus Additional District Judge Tandlianwala District Faisalabad and 3 others" (2017 CLC Note 22) "Muhammad Tabish Naeem Khan Versus Additional District Judge, Lahore and others" (2014 SCMR 1365) "NATIONAL LOGISTIC CELL (N.L.C.) Versus HAZRAT ALI and others" (2010 SCMR 970) "MEHAR and others Versus PROVINCE OF SINDH through DISTRICT GOVERNMENT PLEADER, KHAIRPUR and 4 others" (2020 MLD 371) "Mrs. RUBINA ALI through Special Attorney Versus AYESHA KAMAL through Legal heir and 4 others" (2014 MLD 750) "MUHAMMAD NADEEM Versus JUDGE FAMILY COURT and 2 others" (2012 CLC 1361) "Messrs RAVI ENTERPRISES through Proprietor and another Versus ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN through Provincial Chief and 3 others" (2005 CLD 1425) "Mst. BUSHRA BANG SHIRANI and another Versus MUHAMMAD HASSAN and another" (1992 MLD 1116)

Summary: Background: The petitioner, a businessman, filed this writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, seeking two main reliefs: To direct the respondents to stop political protests and the Long March conducted by a political party, which allegedly disrupted the petitioner's business and the general public’s life. To direct the government to designate alternate locations outside cities for future demonstrations and protests to avoid disruption of business and public movement. The petitioner argued that his right to conduct business, as guaranteed under Article 18 of the Constitution, was being infringed due to road blockages caused by the Long March. Additionally, the petition raised concerns about disruptions to public order and free movement, guaranteed under Article 15 of the Constitution. -----Issues: 1- Does the Long March infringe upon the petitioner's constitutional right to free movement and the right to conduct business? ----2- Can the court direct the government to designate alternate locations for protests and demonstrations? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court recognized that protests and processions are protected as a fundamental democratic right under Article 16 of the Constitution. However, it also acknowledged that this right must not infringe on the rights of others, such as the right to free movement (Article 15) and the right to business (Article 18). The court referred to past judgments to emphasize that while citizens have the right to protest, this right ends when it interferes with others’ rights to move freely or conduct business. The court further observed that protests, such as the Long March, that block key roads and motorways can violate the fundamental rights of business owners and the general public. The court referred to previous cases where it had recommended legislation to regulate protests in busy city areas and suggested establishing designated protest zones outside city limits. However, it stopped short of making a new ruling on this issue, suggesting that the petitioner could approach the relevant authorities for action. The petition was disposed of with instructions to the petitioner to apply to the Inspector General of Police (IGP) for relief. The court directed the IGP to address the petitioner's concerns regarding the disruption caused by the protests within one week of receiving the application. -----Citations/Precedents: Mian Ali Asghar v. Government of Punjab (2020 CLC 157) Mian Ali Asghar v. Government of Punjab (2021 MLD 370) Haris Bin Hassan Jang v. Federation of Pakistan (2021 CLC 413) Muhammad Tahir Jamal v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 2020 Lahore 407) Muhammad Umais v. Cantonment Board Rawalpindi (PLD 2022 Lahore 148) M.C.R. (Pvt) Ltd, franchisee of Pizza Hut v. Multan Development Authority (2021 CLD 639) Kamran Murtaza v. Federation of Pakistan (Supreme Court Human Rights Case)

Summary: CONSTITUTION OF PAKISTAN, 1973 (Hindu Panchayat Election)---Hindu Panchayat, is not a 'person' in terms of Article 199(5), therefore no writ of Certiorari or Mandamus can be issued against its office holders, in terms of Article 199(1) (a) supra. Hindu Panchayat, has no status of a public body; therefore, Hindu Panchayat is not a person exercising functions in connection with the affairs of Federation / Province and Local Authority in terms of Article 199(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Constitution.

Summary: Criminal Appeal (Appeal against Acquittal Order, is dismissed . as no role describe in FIR and Identification, delay identification Prada, Place of arrest doubtful.)

Summary: deceased quota----The petitioners sought appointment to ministerial posts on the deceased quota within the Police Department, Government of Sindh, as per Rule 11-A of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974.Mr. Muzafar Ali Dehraj, advocate for the petitioners, argued that the petitioners' fathers, who were serving in the Police Department, passed away during their service periods. The petitioners subsequently applied for appointment on the deceased quota but had not received any decision from the respondent-Police department. Mr. Dehraj relied heavily on Rule 10-A and Rule 11-A of the Sindh Civil Servants Rules, 1974, asserting the entitlement of the petitioners to be considered for suitable posts under the law.Mr. Ali Safdar Depar, Assistant Advocate General, initially resisted the petitions but later conceded that the petitioners' case for appointment on the deceased quota should be referred to the competent authority of the Government of Sindh for consideration under Rule 11-A of the Sindh Civil Servant (Appointment Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974.Consequently, the court disposed of the petitions by instructing the petitioners to submit fresh applications with supporting documents to the Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, by 04.02.2021, for scrutiny and consideration. The Chief Secretary was mandated to provide a decision through a speaking order by 19.02.2021, adhering strictly to the law and prescribed rules, procedures, and policies. If the case for appointment on the deceased quota was approved, offer letters were to be issued to the petitioners, who would then fulfill all legal formalities. If the competent authority did not approve the case, the petitioners could seek remedies through the appropriate legal channels.