Summary: [Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (Mitigating Citrcumstances )] The motive is always a double-edged weapon. No doubt, the previous enmity can be a reason for the appellant to commit the alleged crime, but it can equally be a reason for the complainant side to falsely implicate the appellant in the case of a previous grudge.

Summary: The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 guarantees fundamental rights of the citizens in terms of Chapter-I Part-II. Article 24 of the "Constitution" provides a protection of property rights to every citizen. It is clearly evident that a person cannot be deprived of his property in the ordinary circumstances. Law, however, provides a departure and permits to acquire the property of any person for the public purpose and after payment of due compensation as ordained under the relevant law. Article 173 of the "Constitution" bestows power upon the executive to acquire property on behalf of Federal Government or the Provincial Government subject to any Act of the appropriate Legislature. On the strength of above referred constitutional provisions, "Act, 1894" comes into play, which deals with the acquisition of land needed for public purpose and for companies and for determining the amount of compensation to be paid on account of such acquisition. Part-II of the "Act, 1894" deals with the acquisition. Section 4 authorizes the Collector of the District to issue a notification whenever it appears to him that land in any locality is needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a Company. Law is always based on reasonableness and if no time is prescribed under the law for performing an act, it does not mean that the executive should sleep over the matter and put the citizens in agony of waiting the outcome of proceedings resulting into offending their property rights in the garb of acquisition.

Summary: There is no cavil to the fact that prior to the amendment in the Ordinance, all the petitioners were treated as accused of an offence defined in the Ordinance and their custody was also regulated accordingly in the light of provisions contained in the Ordinance ibid. The situation in hand arose, when amendments were introduced in the Ordinance through the National Accountability (Amendment) Act, 2022. Section 5(o) and (s) brought a radical change and on said account, the petitioners became out of the ambit of offenders under the Ordinance as the alleged plundered amount was less than five hundred million rupees as yardstick fixed in sub-section (o) of Section 5. The Ordinance with the amendment since failed to cater the situation, so this ambiguity or lacuna in the law resulted into a quandary for the Accountability Courts on the one hand and on the other, the petitioners were left with no remedy and they were made to wait for something to happen from the Heaven for their future. Life and liberty is one of the cardinal fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Article 9 guarantees security of a person and Article 10 provides safeguards as to arrest and detention. This Court, being the custodian of fundamental rights of the citizens, is bound to ensure protection of their rights not allowing anybody to curtail liberty without due course of law. We are cognizant of the fact that initially when there was no provision in the Ordinance for releasing an accused on bail, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Khan Asfandyar Wali's case (PLD 2001 Supreme Court 607) held as under (Para-197). Even otherwise, no person can be left remediless in any eventuality and more specifically, when the life and liberty is involved.

Summary: The Officer in charge of the relevant Police Station may be under a statutory obligation to register an F.I.R. whenever information disclosing commission of a cognizable offence is provided to him but the provisions of section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. do not make it obligatory for an ex-officio Justice of, the Peace to necessarily or blind-foldedly issue a direction regarding registration of a criminal case whenever a complaint is filed before him in that regard.

Summary: Background: The petitioner, filed a suit for possession of property in Chak No. 121/SB, Tehsil Sillanwali, District Sargodha, which had been allotted to him. The respondents had temporarily occupied part of the land, and the petitioner sought their eviction after they refused to vacate the property. The trial court decreed in favor of the petitioner, but the respondents appealed. The appellate court, relying on a report from a local commission, reversed the trial court's decision. The petitioner challenged this reversal in the Lahore High Court. -----Issues: 1- Was the appellate court justified in relying on the local commission's report in reversing the trial court's decision? ----2- Did the respondents have any legal claim to the disputed land based on the local commission's findings? ----3- Was the petitioner entitled to relief given the previous litigation validating his property allotment? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Relying on the Local Commission's Report: The High Court upheld the appellate court’s decision, noting that the local commission was appointed with the consent of both parties. Since the petitioner had agreed to the commission's appointment and failed to substantiate his objections to the report, the appellate court was justified in relying on it. The court further noted that the report had been duly considered, and the objections were dismissed after due process. --Respondents' Claim to the Land: The court found that, based on the local commission’s findings, the respondents had not encroached upon any part of the petitioner’s land. Therefore, the petitioner’s claim that the respondents were illegal occupants was dismissed. --Petitioner’s Claim for Possession: The court held that while the petitioner’s allotment of Ahata No. 142 was valid, he had not properly demarcated the land to establish any encroachment by the respondents. The court advised the petitioner to seek a formal demarcation if he believed there was an encroachment. The petition was dismissed, but the court granted the petitioner the right to pursue demarcation and further legal action if needed. -----Citations/Precedents: Rana Shamshad Ali Khan v. Province of Punjab (1993 SCMR 1473) Province of Punjab v. Sh. Hassan Ali (PLD 2009 SC 16) General Manager, Azad Kashmir Logging and Sawmills Corporation v. Abdul Rehman (2013 CLC 1473) Iqbal M. Hamzah v. Gillette Pakistan Ltd. (2011 YLR 277) Bhai Khan v. Shakeel (2009 SCMR 594) Wazir Hussain Shah v. Ali Shah (PLD 2011 SC (AJ&K) 25) Mst. Lalan v. Noor Muhammad (1994 SCMR 1771)

Summary: Collateral proceeding is principle of law and thus suit is barred.

Summary: The judgment ruled that the claim of respondent would have preference over the claim of other decree holders, including the appellant. The dispute revolves around various claims and dues related to a vessel, as well as other legal matters pertaining to the Admiralty Jurisdiction. The appellant contends that the dues of the Port Authority (respondent) do not fall within the Admiralty Jurisdiction of the court. The appellant further argues that respondent's claim should not have priority over the claims of other plaintiffs and the appellant. The appellant presents various legal arguments, including references to relevant cases and statutes. The court examines the arguments presented by both sides. The court also dismisses the appellant's objection to the priority of respondent's claim and provides legal reasoning for its decision, referencing precedents and statutes. The court's judgment ultimately upholds the earlier decree in favor of respondent and dismisses the appellant's challenge. The court finds that the appellant has failed to establish any legal grounds for interference with the lower court's ruling.

Summary: Prima-facie his matter on the subject issue is still subjudice before the learned FST, which is presently not available at Karachi to adjudicate the matter of petitioner. This being the position of the case, we deem it appropriate to direct learned FST to decide the application under Rule 23-A of the Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules 1974 of the petitioner within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of this order in accordance with the law.

Summary: The case revolved around the termination of respondent, who was a skilled worker at the Corporation. He had been arrested in connection with a criminal case while serving as a permanent employee. Consequently, the Corporation terminated his services. The Labour Court deemed the termination to be a result of misconduct due to his absence caused by his arrest, leading to his termination under the relevant Standing Order. In the High Court of Sindh, the judges considered the case and concluded that although respondent No.2's arrest was an admitted fact, it did not exempt the Corporation from following the necessary procedures for termination, as laid out in Section 12(3) of the Standing Order, which required reasons and an inquiry. The Court also noted that there was no evidence to support the Corporation's claim that the position couldn't remain vacant temporarily or permanently. The Court upheld the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal's decision regarding reinstatement but modified the back benefits, limiting them to the period of 25 months during which respondent No.2 was incarcerated. The Court ruled that the Corporation was not responsible for the entire duration of his absence, and any further compensation for that period should be sought from those responsible for the malicious prosecution leading to his arrest. In conclusion, the High Court disposed of the petition and granted limited back benefits to respondent No.2, based on the period of his incarceration, while affirming his reinstatement.

Summary: Background: The petitioner, lodged FIR No. 507/2020 alleging that several individuals, armed with weapons, committed theft at her house, taking goods worth Rs. 1,028,800/-. An investigation was conducted, and initially, the police found the accused guilty. However, after a change of investigation granted by the District Standing Board, the second investigator concluded that the case was false. Consequently, the SHO submitted a cancellation report which the Judicial Magistrate accepted. The petitioner sought annulment of the cancellation order, alleging bias and procedural errors, including the failure to countersign the report by the Superintendent of Police (S.P.). -----Issues: 1- Was the cancellation report properly filed and valid, given the lack of a signature from the S.P.? -----2- Did the Judicial Magistrate err by not hearing the petitioner before accepting the cancellation report? -----3- Was there procedural unfairness in the handling of the investigation, especially considering the pending application for a second change of investigation? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Validity of the Cancellation Report: The court held that the absence of the S.P.'s signature on the cancellation report violated Rule 24.7 of the Police Rules, 1934, making the submission of the report without lawful authority. The rule was determined to be mandatory, requiring the S.P.'s involvement to ensure proper oversight of the investigation's conclusion. --Right to a Hearing: Although the law does not explicitly mandate a hearing for the complainant during the cancellation of an FIR, the court reasoned that under Article 10A of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to a fair trial and due process, the petitioner had a right to be informed and heard before the Judicial Magistrate decided on the cancellation report. The failure to provide this right rendered the magistrate's order procedurally unfair. --Procedural Fairness: The court noted that the petitioner had applied for a second change of investigation, and the application was pending before the Regional Standing Board. The Judicial Magistrate failed to consider this and proceeded with the cancellation, which was premature and unjustified. The court emphasized that the Magistrate must carefully evaluate all relevant facts, including pending applications, before making a decision. The court set aside the Impugned Order and remanded the case back to the Judicial Magistrate for a fresh decision after the petitioner's application for a second investigation change is resolved. -----Citations/Precedents: Wazir v. The State (PLD 1962 (W.P) Lahore 405) Bahadur and another v. The State and another (PLD 1985 SC 62) Province of the Punjab through Conservator of Forest, Faisalabad, and others v. Javed Iqbal (2021 SCMR 328) Khizer Hayat and others v. Inspector-General of Police (Punjab), Lahore and others (PLD 2005 Lahore 470) Faisal Sultan v. EDO (Education) and others (2011 PLC (C.S) 419) Shabbir Ahmed v. Kiran Khursheed and others (2012 CLC 1236)