Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 337-A(i), 337-F(iii), 148 & 149---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, shajjah-i-khafifah, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Bail, grant of---Rule of consistency---Petitioner (accused) was charged that he along with his co-accused made firing upon the complainant party, due to which three persons sustained fire arm injuries---Perusal of record revealed that five persons had been charged by complainant in the FIR for commission of offence, out of which petitioner and a co-accused had been assigned role of causing firearm injuries to two persons---One victim had sustained injuries on his right leg from alleged firing of petitioner, which was non-vital part of the body coupled with the fact that petitioner had not repeated fire shots, which showed that petitioner had no intention to kill the injured therefore mens rea of petitioner at the time of commission of offence could best be determined by Trial Court after recording prosecution evidence---No crime weapon had been recovered from immediate possession of petitioner or at his instance and pointation---Co-accused to whom similar role of causing firearm injuries to the other injured was attributed, had already been released on bail by Judicial Magistrate, therefore, petitioner having been assigned identical role as that of co-accused, was also entitled to concession of bail on the plea of principle of consistency---Nothing was on record regarding previous conviction or involvement of petitioner in similar offences, and he was behind the bars since his arrest and was no more required by the investigation agency for further interrogation---Bail petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497---Bail---Tentative assessment--- Scope---Observations made in the bail order are based on tentative assessment of material available on record of the case, which should not influence the mind of Trial Court in any manner at the time of trial. Zia-ur-Rehman Tajik for Petitioner. Bilal Khan A.A.G. for the State. Nemo for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 16th September, 2024.

Summary: (Appeal against the judgment dated 27.03.2024 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in W.P. No. 3377-P of 2023). (a) State Life Employees (Service) Regulations, 1973--- ----Regln. 20---Employee of State Life Insurance Corporation---Change in date of birth sought close to retirement---Permissibility---It is obligatory for any employee to intimate his correct date of birth and to produce confirmatory documentary evidence at the time when the first entry is made in the service record which cannot be altered, except in the case of a clerical error, because the date of birth once recorded at the time of joining service is deemed to be final and thereafter no alteration in the date of birth is permissible---It is an admitted position that in the original National Identity Card (CNIC), the year of birth of the respondent (employee) was 1964, while in the CNIC prepared on 12.11.2002, again his date of birth was 22.09.1964---Even in his Passport his date of birth was 22.09.1964---However, the respondent was issued his new CNIC on 03.03.2023, wherein his date of birth was shown as 22.09.1966---Employer-Corporation had issued a circular, wherein it was categorically mentioned that certain employees are placing a representation for the correction in the date of birth after having completed a number of years of service, therefore, it was announced by means of the aforesaid circular that no change in the date of birth will be made if it is not requested within 2 years of the date of initial appointment---Respondent himself relied upon this circular---Record reflects that the respondent first applied for the correction of his date of birth in the official record vide application dated 17.03.2023 on the basis of his matriculation certificate issued in 1983, but no justification was shown in the application as to why he himself mentioned his date of birth as 22.09.1964 when he was appointed by the petitioner's company---It is also incomprehensible that even when he applied for a CNIC in 2002, why at that time the correction was not applied, and even in his passport, issued in 2010, he maintained the same date of birth---Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside and writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court was dismissed. Manzar Zahoor v. Lyari Development Authority and another 2022 SCMR 1305 = 2022 PLC (C.S) 1128 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Change in date of birth sought by an employee of a Government Corporation---Constitutional petition filed by employee before the High Court---Maintainability---Extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is envisioned predominantly for affording an express remedy where the unlawfulness and impropriety of the action of an executive or other governmental authority could be substantiated without any inquiry---Expression "adequate remedy" signifies an effectual, accessible, advantageous and expeditious remedy---In the case in hand, the remedy of filing civil suit was an appropriate and alternate remedy as remedium juris which was more convenient, beneficial, and effective---Controverted ` questions of fact, adjudication on which is possible only after obtaining all types of evidence in power and possession of parties, can be determined only by the courts having plenary jurisdiction in the matter, and on such ground the constitutional petition filed by the employee was incompetent. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary Civil Secretariat, Peshawar and others v. Shah Faisal Wahab and others 2023 SCMR 1642; Special Secretary-II (Law and Order), Home and Tribal Affairs Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and others v. Fayyaz Dawar 2023 SCMR 1442 and State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. PLD 1983 SC 280 ref. Malik Jawwad Khalid, Advocate Supreme Court and Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners. Noor Muhammad, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (through video link at Peshawar). Date of hearing: 16th September, 2024.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 02.07.2010 passed by Lahore High Court at Lahore in W.Ps. Nos.10329 of 2005 and 8274 of 2005). Per Amin-ud-Din Khan, J.; Yahya Afridi, J. agreeing; Ayesha A. Malik, J. dissenting. (a) Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----Ss. 39 & 42---Mutation entries---Scope--- Any entry available in the revenue record unless it is substituted through a valid entry by the decree of any court or valid attestation of mutation of correction of any rights in the land remains in the field---Simultaneously if once it is found that the entries have been unlawfully changed, it shall be deemed that the old entries would continue. Karamat Hussain and others v. Natho Khan and others 2007 CLC 1391 ref. (b) West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation (MLR No. 64 of 1959)--- ----Para. No. 22---Shamlat Deh land---Ala Maaliks and Adna Maaliks, concepts of--- Interpretation of the judgments rendered in the cases of "Ladhoo v. B.O.R." (1991 MLD 99), and "Ladhoo v. B.O.R" in C.Ps. Nos.823 and 824-L of 1990---Appellants were Adna Maaliks who held possession over land in_the Shamlat Deh -- Appellants challenged mutation entries and orders of the revenue officers whereby the land in their possession was not recorded as under their ownership consequent to West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation (MLR No. 64 of 1959) [ "MLR-64"]---Case of appellants was based on the implementation of the High Court judgment reported as Ladhoo v. B.O.R." (1991 MLD 99), and the Supreme Court judgment "Ladhoo v. B.O.R" in C.Ps. Nos.823 and 824-L of 1990, wherein they claimed that their rights as Adna Maaliks having possession in the Shamilat Deh had been recognized and upheld in terms of MLR 64 and Notification dated 3 rd March, 1960 issued by the West Pakistan Land Commission under the MLR-64 ("1960 Notification")---Respondents were Ala Maaliks, who claimed a superior right in the Shamlat Deh on the basis of their proprietary rights in the village, meaning thatthey claimed proportionate ownership in the Shamlat Deh according to their proprietorship in the village---Respondents relied on the Hasab Rasad Khewat and the Wajib-ul-Arz to justify their entitlement to proprietary rights in the Shamlat Deh---[ Per Amin-ud-Din Khan, J. [Majority view]: Appellants were unable to state what their status over suit land (Shamlat Deh land) was except that they were in possession and cultivating the Shamlat land---It did not create any right in favour of appellants if they were in possession of Shamlat land---It seemed that appellants who were previously Aala Maalik or under the Aala Maalik, wanted to grab Shamlat land on the plea that they were in possession--- Without any right or valid entrance upon the Shamlat land they cannot claim any right---Concept of Aala Maalik was no more in existence after promulgation of West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation (MLR No. 64 of 1959) [ "MLR-64"]---It was admitted by the appellants that they were not recorded Aala Khud Adna Maalik or Adna Maalik in the village proprietary land---Through the decision of case titled "Ladhoo v. B.O.R" reported as 1991 MLD 99 and order of dismissal of C.Ps. Nos. 823 and 824-L of 1990 by the Supreme Court no rights were created in favour of the present appellants---For determination of rights in the Shamlat Deh the benchmark as well as formula for grant of rights is on the basis of entitlement of a person in the malkiyat khata; whatever rights he was holding on the basis of said rights he is entitled to get land in the Shamlat Deh---Person who has absolutely no rights in the malkiyat khata, he cannot be granted any right in the Shamlat Deh khata---No right had been created in favour of the appellants by the MLR-64 nor they could show that any right had been created in their favour---Wrong picture of the judgment passed by the High Court reported as 1991 MLD 99 was shown to the Supreme Court---Distribution of Shamlat land upon the proprietary body of village was a rule under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 and wajib-ul-arz also supported the distribution of Shamlat land in accordance with the ownership of the whole proprietary body of the village---In accordance with para 6 of 1960 Notification distribution of Shamlat land was upon two categories only i.e. Adna Maaliks and Ala Khud Adna Maalik and none was entitled for grant of land on the basis of possession only---If anyone was in possession on the Shamlat land without having any right in the proprietorship khata, he had absolutely no right for grant of Shamlat land---The aforementioned two categories create the proprietary body of the village, therefore, they were entitled for distribution of Shamlat land in proportionate with their proprietorship---Appeals were dismissed]---[Per Ayesha A. Malik, J. [Minority view]: High Court judgment reported as Ladhoo v. B.O.R." (1991 MLD 99) ("1990 HC Judgment") and the Supreme Court judgment "Ladhoo v. B.O.R." in C.Ps. Nos.823 and 824-L of 1990 ("1991 SC Judgment") both concluded that the revenue authorities did not commit any illegality in removing the names of Ala Maaliks from column No.3 of the Jamabandi for the year 1945-46 in which they were reflected as owners---This fact alone was enough to show that the rights of Adna Maaliks consequent to MLR 64 and the 1960 Notification had to be recognized, in that, the revenue record had to translate the possessory rights of Adna Maaliks into their proprietary rights---Revenue record showed that the possession of Adna Maaliks in the Shamlat Deh had not been challenged---Secondly, the available records did not reflect that Ala Maaliks had, at any time, challenged MLR 64 or the 1960 Notification; to the contrary, they repeatedly sought exclusive possession in the Shamlat Deh as against Ala-khud-Adna and Adna Maaliks, which were denied by the Supreme Court---Hence, both the '1990 HC Judgment' and '1991 SC Judgment' recognized the rights of Adna Maaliks and clarified that even where there were no Adna Maaliks under Ala Maaliks, Ala Maaliks could not claim ownership in the Shamlat Deh on account of MLR-64---Furthermore, as per the revenue record and the Jamabandis relied upon, Adna Maaliks did have possession in the Shamlat Deh; therefore, they were entitled to proprietary rights over the land in their possession consequent to MLR 64---There were no superior rights for Ala Maaliks and any claim on the basis of Ala Maalikat stood terminated after MLR-64---Where a person was entered in the revenue record as Ala Maalik as well as Ala-khud-Adna Maalik, they could retain that land as Adna Maalik but not as Ala Maalik---Only time they could retain their title as Ala Maaliks was when there was no Adna Maalik under them---Proprietary rights of Adna Maaliks as on 03.03.1960 was based on MLR 64 and any excess land in their possession for which they claimed proprietary right had to be based on some grant, lease, inheritance or lawful manner involving proper transfer of title in their favour---In the event that there was extra land with no legal backing and subject to Clause 6(d) of the 1960 Notification, an order must be passed to that effect and the land would resume in favour of the government---Appellant's proprietorship claim on the basis of possession was backed by law and in accordance with the judgments of the Supreme Court---Appeals were allowed and impugned judgment was set aside.] Ladhoo v. B.O.R. 1991 MLD 99 distinguished. Khanan v. Fateh Sher 1993 SCMR 1578 ref. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 185 & 199---Litigation before the High Court and Supreme Court under Article 199 and Article 185 of the Constitution respectively---Creation of a right in favour of one of the parties---Scope---Without any existing right the High Court or the Supreme Court cannot create a new right in favour of any party before the Court. For the Appellants: Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record/Advocate Supreme Court (in Civil Appeal No.936 of 2012). Syed Ali Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court and Syeda B.H. Shah, Advocate-on-Record (in Civil Appeal No.937 of 2012). Muhammad Akram Sheikh, Senior Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Syed Fazaz Raza, Advocate and Sheikh Mehmood Ahmed, Advocate-on-Record (in Civil Appeal No.938 of 2012). For the Respondents: Barrister Umer Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court along with Muhammad Ikram Ch., Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Malik Noor Muhammad Awan, Advocate Supreme Court, Maulvi Anwar ul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record. For Respondent/Government: Muhammad Baleegh-uz-Zaman, Addl. A.G., Punjab along with Malik Abdul Waheed, Member Consolidation and Jamshed Gulzar, Tehsildar. Research and assistance by: Miss Maira Hassan, Law Clerk. Dates of hearing: 13th, 14th, 15th, 20th, 26th February and 2nd May, 2024.

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984) –----Art. 126---Ownership and possession---Burden of proof---Petitioners claimed ownership of unsettled land through an unregistered contract of sale dated 02 April 2011, while respondents asserted possession under an earlier contract dated 08 September 2003---Neither party had a registered deed or revenue entry establishing ownership---Petitioners failed to plead or prove their possession, while respondents established long-standing possession as hereditary tenants and later as purchasers---Article 126 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, places the burden on the petitioners to disprove the respondents' ownership claim, which they failed to do---Possession serves as prima facie evidence of ownership---Petitioners’ failure to prove possessory title rendered their claim untenable.Cited Case: Ameena v. Kulsoom Begum PLD 1983 Karachi 200(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) –----Ss. 42 & 54---Equitable relief---Clean hands doctrine---Petitioners sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the respondents despite failing to disclose material facts, including the respondents’ possession of the subject land and an earlier arbitration decision against them---Petitioners, by concealing these facts, failed to meet the standard of coming to the court with clean hands, a prerequisite for equitable relief under Sections 42 and 54 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877---Discretionary relief was rightly denied by the courts below.Cited Case: Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh 2007 SCMR 1446(c) Arbitration Act (X of 1940) –----S. 32---Bar on suits regarding arbitrated matters---Petitioners had previously submitted to arbitration before a religious scholar, Mufti Gul Hassan, who ruled against them---Despite participating in the arbitration process and accepting its jurisdiction, petitioners failed to disclose the arbitral decision in their plaint---Suit was barred under Section 32 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, as disputes resolved through arbitration cannot be re-litigated---Petitioners' attempt to bypass the arbitral decision was an abuse of process.(d) Civil Procedure-------Court fees---Deficiency in payment---Petitioners did not seek possession or cancellation of respondents’ sale contract in their plaint and failed to meet the court fee requirement despite adverse findings from the lower courts---Deficiency in court fee remained uncured before both the Trial and Appellate Courts, further weakening the maintainability of the suit.----Disposition: Civil revision petition dismissed; concurrent findings of subordinate courts upheld.

Summary: Background: The case involves a dispute over the recorded date of birth of Muhammad Nisar, an Area Manager at the State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan, and its implications on his retirement. Muhammad Nisar claimed his date of birth as 22.09.1966, which would extend his retirement date to 21.09.2026, contrary to the Corporation’s records, which indicated 22.09.1964, setting his retirement for 30.06.2024. He filed a writ petition with the Peshawar High Court, which ruled in his favor. The petitioners, the Executive Director of State Life and others, challenged this ruling in the Supreme Court of Pakistan. ------- Issues: ------- 1) Whether the correction of the respondent's date of birth in the service record was legally permissible given the time lapse since his initial appointment. ------- 2) Whether the writ petition was competent, considering the involvement of disputed facts better suited for resolution in civil court. ------- 3) Whether the Corporation was a necessary party to the proceedings, and the non-joinder of the Corporation rendered the writ petition defective. ------- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court held that the respondent’s claim for the correction of his date of birth was not tenable under the Corporation’s circular of 23.06.2015, which barred such changes after two years of appointment. It was noted that the respondent consistently maintained the same date of birth in official records (CNIC and passport) until 2023, creating a factual controversy unsuitable for resolution in writ jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that the Corporation, as the juristic employer, was a necessary party, and its non-joinder rendered the petition procedurally defective. The Court ruled that the respondent had an alternate remedy through civil litigation, where evidence could be recorded to resolve factual disputes. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the High Court judgment was set aside, and the writ petition was dismissed. ------- Citations/Precedents: Manzar Zahoor Vs. Lyari Development Authority and another (2022 SCMR 1305 = 2022 PLC (C.S) 1128): Procedures for correction of date of birth in service records. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Vs. Shah Faisal Wahab and others (2023 SCMR 1642): Limitations of writ jurisdiction in cases involving disputed facts. Special Secretary-II (Law and Order), Home and Tribal Affairs Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Vs. Fayyaz Dawar (2023 SCMR 1442): Adequate remedies in cases requiring factual determinations. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan Vs. Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. (PLD 1983 SC 280): Scope of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution.

Summary: Background: The petitioner was arrested in connection with FIR No. 79/2024, alleging violations under Sections 23, 27(1), and 27(4) of the Drugs Act, 1976, read with Section 27 of the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan (DRAP) Act, 2012. The prosecution claimed that the petitioner and co-accused illegally traded unregistered and spurious drugs. Following an inspection by the Drug Controller in coordination with the FIA, ten varieties of therapeutic goods were seized, leading to the FIR's registration. -----Issues: 1- Whether the FIR and subsequent proceedings were lawfully initiated, considering the procedural requirements under the Drugs Act and DRAP Act. ----2- Whether the lack of a show cause notice and hearing under Rule 5(3) of the Drug Rules invalidated the FIR and subsequent actions. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court quashed FIR No. 79/2024 and ordered the petitioner’s release, reasoning that: The Drugs Act and DRAP Act establish a procedural framework mandating that suspected violations be referred to the Provincial or District Quality Control Board (DQCB) for review before initiating prosecution. This process includes issuing a show cause notice and providing the accused with an opportunity for a hearing under Rule 5(3) of the Drugs Rules. The court found that these procedural requirements were not followed in this case, rendering the proceedings coram non judice and without lawful authority. As such, the court remitted the matter to the DQCB for denovo proceedings, directing them to issue a show cause notice and conduct a hearing in accordance with Rule 5(3) of the Drugs Rules. -----Citations/Precedents: Chairman, National Accountability Bureau v. Nisar Ahmed Pathan (PLD 2022 SC 475) Province of Punjab v. M/s Flow Pharmaceuticals (Pvt) Ltd. (2021, unreported) Muhammad Anwar and others v. Mst. Ilyas Begum and others (PLD 2013 SC 255) Syed Raza Hussain Bukhari v. The State and others (PLD 2022 SC 743) FIA through Director General v. Syed Hamid Ali Shah and others (PLD 2023 SC 265) Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others (PLD 1973 SC 236) Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza and others v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue (2014 SCMR 914)

Summary: Background: The case originates from an FIR registered under sections 302, 201, 109, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) at a police station in District Faisalabad. The appellant and three unknown individuals were accused of firing upon the deceased, resulting in his death. One co-accused was acquitted after trial, while the appellant absconded for several years before being arrested in 2006. During the investigation, a pistol was recovered on the appellant's pointation, which was allegedly used in the crime. The trial court convicted the appellant under section 302(b) PPC, sentencing him to death. The conviction was upheld by the High Court on appeal, prompting a petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. -----Issues: 1- Was the conviction of the appellant under section 302(b) PPC justified based on the evidence presented? -----2- Could the appellant's role in the murder be sufficiently distinguished from the co-accused, especially given the acquittal of one co-accused? -----3- Was the awarding of capital punishment justified under the circumstances, including the appellant's prolonged detention? -----4- Could the absence of corroborative forensic evidence for the weapon recovered cast doubt on the appellant's guilt? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court found several key shortcomings in the prosecution's case. Firstly, the delay in filing the FIR was unexplained, weakening the motive and intention attributed to the appellant. The only eyewitness’s testimony did not establish that the murder was premeditated, and the medical report suggested there might have been a scuffle. Additionally, the prosecution failed to link the recovered pistol to the crime, as no forensic report corroborated its use. The Court ruled that the death sentence was unjustified due to mitigating factors, including the appellant's extended imprisonment and the lack of evidence proving premeditated intent. The Court also considered the delay in judicial proceedings and the appellant's prolonged detention, particularly his time in the death cell. Based on these factors, the Supreme Court set aside the death sentence and replaced it with life imprisonment under section 302(b) PPC, considering the time the appellant had already served. ------Citations/Precedents: Ghulam Shabbir v. The State (Cri.R.P. 103/2017) PLD 2013 SC 793

Summary: Background: In this case, the appellant was involved in a shooting incident on May 10, 2002, resulting in the deaths of two individuals. An FIR was lodged against the appellant and three others under sections 302 and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). After absconding for four years, the appellant was arrested on May 25, 2006. He was tried and convicted under section 302(b) PPC and sentenced to death by the Trial Court in January 2008. The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence. The appellant then filed a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. -----Issues: 1- Whether the appellant’s death sentence was justified based on the evidence provided, particularly when multiple assailants were involved. -----2- Whether the delay in trial and the prolonged incarceration in a death cell warranted mitigation of the death sentence. -----3- Whether there was any premeditation in the commission of the crime or if the occurrence happened suddenly, affecting the culpability of the appellant. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court found that the prosecution successfully proved that the appellant, along with others, was involved in the firing that caused the deaths of two individuals. However, the court held that it could not be determined with certainty that the appellant alone was responsible for causing fatal injuries. The Court noted several mitigating factors: The incident occurred without premeditation, during a sudden free fight without any established motive. The appellant had been incarcerated since 2006 and had already spent over eleven years in a death cell, a period comparable to a life sentence under Pakistani law. The weapon recovery evidence was inconsequential, as it was inconsistent and not properly sent for forensic testing. In light of these factors, the Court held that imposing the death sentence was not justified and reduced the sentence to life imprisonment on two counts, with the sentences to run concurrently. The appellant was also granted the benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C., which allows for remission in the sentence. -----Citations/Precedents: Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) Section 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) Ghulam Shabbir v. The State (CrI.R.P. 103/2017)

Summary: Background: The appellants challenged the dismissal of their writ petitions regarding proprietary rights over land in "Shamlat Deh." They argued that their rights, based on prior judgments, entitled them to possession of the land. The appellants contested the mutations of land sanctioned by the revenue authorities, asserting these were against their established rights from the earlier court decisions. ----Issues: 1- Whether the mutations sanctioned by the revenue authorities were lawful. 2- Whether the appellants' rights to the land, as claimed based on prior judgments, were properly recognized by the revenue authorities. 3- Whether the land in question, being part of "Shamlat Deh," should be distributed based on possession or the village proprietary body. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to thoroughly examine the issues raised, especially the interpretation of earlier judgments ("Ladhoo vs. B.O.R." cases). The Court sought clarity on whether the land, part of Shamlat Deh, could be distributed based on possession or village proprietary rights. The revenue authorities’ decisions were challenged for allegedly disregarding the legal precedents and the village proprietary system. The Court also highlighted the need to examine how the earlier High Court and Supreme Court judgments were implemented by the revenue authorities. The case was allowed to proceed with further documents to be submitted by both parties, and the final determination of mesne profits was deferred until the conclusion of the case. ----vCitations/Precedents: Ladhoo vs. B.O.R. (1991 MLD 99) Ladhoo vs. B.O.R. in CP. No.823 and 824-L of 1990 Judgment of Lahore High Court dated 29-07-1990 Supreme Court of Pakistan judgment dated 01-04-1991