Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ----S. 176, S. 114(4), S. 114(1)---- Issuance of notice to non-resident entity—Home remittance agreement—Digital presence—Jurisdiction under tax law—Obligation to furnish information—Effect— Petitioner, a non-resident U.S.-based entity, engaged in cross-border remittance services through Mobilink Microfinance Bank, was issued notices by the Federal Board of Revenue under S.176 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (ITO), seeking information regarding tax obligations for offshore digital services—Petitioner denied physical or digital presence in Pakistan and relied upon protections under the Pakistan-U.S. Double Taxation Treaty—Subsequent registration with FBR and issuance of National Tax Number followed by notice under S.114(4) for filing tax returns for Tax Year 2019-20 was also challenged—Held, registration under the ITO or issuance of NTN does not amount to coercive action—Commissioner under S.176 is empowered to require information relevant to any tax liability, regardless of prior notice of registration—Petitioner’s refusal to comply with tax notices, without first exhausting statutory remedies under the ITO, was premature—Petitioner failed to demonstrate that efficacious alternative remedies under the tax hierarchy were unavailable—Notice under S.114(4) cannot be equated with final adverse action. Cited Provisions: • Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, Ss. 176, 114(1), 114(4) (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199---- Exercise of writ jurisdiction in revenue matters—Alternate statutory remedies—Maintainability— Petitioner approached the High Court under Art. 199 to challenge the issuance of tax notices and registration under ITO—Held, where statutory remedies are available under the Income Tax Ordinance, constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 cannot be invoked as a substitute for appeal or adjudication within the tax hierarchy—High Court rightly declined to exercise writ jurisdiction in presence of adequate statutory forums—Petitioner failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances justifying direct invocation of constitutional jurisdiction. Cited Case: • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Geofizyka Krakow Pakistan Ltd. 2017 PTD 1526 (c) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ----Intra Court Appeal—Maintainability of direct petition before Supreme Court—Exceptional circumstances— Petitioner challenged judgment of Islamabad High Court directly before Supreme Court without availing remedy of Intra Court Appeal—Held, direct invocation of appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court without first exhausting intra-court remedy permissible only under exceptional circumstances—No such circumstances established in this case—Principle reaffirmed that appellate remedies in the High Court must be availed before approaching Supreme Court. Cited Cases: • Metropole Cinema v. Registrar, Sindh High Court 2014 SCMR 649 • Hub Power Company Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2023 SC 207 Disposition: Leave to appeal declined—Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Art. 199: ----Issuance of Citizenship Certificate—Renunciation of foreign nationality—Direction to decide pending application—Scope— Petitioner, originally a Chinese national, married a Pakistani citizen and was granted Pakistani Citizenship Certificate in 2017—When she applied for a Pakistani passport, it was denied on the ground that she had not yet renounced her Chinese nationality—Petitioner filed application for renunciation before respondent authorities, which remained undecided—Held, High Court directed respondent No.2 to decide petitioner’s renunciation application within 30 days in accordance with law—Parties expressed satisfaction with consensual direction—Writ petition disposed of accordingly. Cited Provisions: Article 199, Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 (b) Immigration & Passport Law: ----Nationality renunciation—Refusal to issue passport—Failure to process renunciation—Obligation of authorities—Scope— Authorities cannot indefinitely delay processing of nationality renunciation where individual has been granted Pakistani citizenship—Failure to act results in infringement of fundamental rights and bureaucratic paralysis—Court invoked constitutional jurisdiction to compel administrative compliance. ----Disposition: Writ Petition disposed of—Direction issued to respondent No.2 to decide petitioner’s application for renunciation of Chinese nationality within 30 days and submit a compliance report to the Registrar's office. "Petitioner is a Chinese national lady who married a Pakistani National, is aggrieved that her case for renunciation and citizenship of Pakistan is not being completed."

Summary: Blocking CNIC ---- (a) Constitution of Pakistan – Arts. 9, 10-A, 15, 25 – Right to identity – Blockage of CNIC – Access to justice – Proclaimed offender stranded abroad – Constitutional safeguards – Scope The petitioner sought directions for unblocking the CNIC of his brother, Muhammad Luqman, who was declared a proclaimed offender in FIR No. 950/2023 under S. 489-F PPC. Luqman, currently in Dubai, was unable to renew his expired passport due to NADRA’s digital impoundment of his CNIC, issued in compliance with an order of the Magistrate. Petitioner contended that a compromise had been effected with the complainant, and Luqman now intends to return and surrender before the court, but his return is obstructed by the CNIC blockage. Held, the right to identity is fundamental and its arbitrary restriction violates the individual’s right to liberty, access to justice, and freedom of movement under Articles 9, 10-A, 15, and 25 of the Constitution. A valid compromise deed was on record, evidencing amicable settlement between parties. Since the accused wished to return and join trial, continuation of CNIC blockage served no lawful purpose and impeded due process. Respondents were directed to forthwith unblock the CNIC to facilitate passport renewal and return to Pakistan. Cited as precedent: PLD 2022 Lahore 756 PLD 2022 Balochistan 73 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) UN Convention on the Rights of the Child Disposition: Petition allowed; NADRA directed to unblock CNIC of Muhammad Luqman.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 203— Superintendence and control of subordinate courts—Scope of administrative powers of Chief Justice of High Court—Petitions filed by the State challenging the order of the Chief Justice of Lahore High Court refusing to transfer Anti-Terrorism Court cases—Held, that the Chief Justice of a High Court, under Art. 203, is entrusted with constitutional authority to supervise all subordinate courts, including Anti-Terrorism Courts—In doing so, the Chief Justice is empowered, and indeed obligated, to act as guardian of judicial independence and insulate subordinate courts from undue executive influence—Any action taken within such constitutional mandate, unless shown to be patently arbitrary or unreasonable, cannot be interfered with by the Supreme Court— Cited Case: • Mehram Ali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 1445 **(b) Judicial Administration— ----Transfer of cases— Scope and discretion—Findings of Administrative and Chief Justices—Reference against Presiding Judge of Anti-Terrorism Court was considered and dismissed by the Administrative Judge—Subsequent transfer application based solely on the filing of that reference, lacking any convincing material, was rightly rejected by the Chief Justice of the High Court—Held, where a reference has been duly considered and dismissed, the mere existence of that reference cannot justify transfer of cases—Judicial officers cannot be penalized without adequate cause or proof. (c) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 203— Judicial independence—Protection of Presiding Judges—Held, that the Chief Justice, as the patris familias of the provincial judiciary, must ensure protection of Presiding Judges from external pressures—The High Court's administrative discretion in declining unwarranted transfers reinforces constitutional values of independence and fairness in judicial proceedings. **(d) Judicial Propriety— ----Adverse and favorable remarks— Judicial commentary on professional conduct—Findings recorded in paras. 8 and 9 of the impugned orders commented on conduct of both judicial officers and State functionaries—Held, such remarks, though serious in tone, are not to be treated as conclusive, binding, or determinative in any subsequent forum—Future scrutiny or evaluation must be carried out independently and strictly in accordance with law—Commendation does not shield judicial officers from scrutiny; criticism does not prejudice executive functionaries. **(e) Constitutional Law— ----Separation of powers—Scope of judicial review over administrative acts of Chief Justice—Held, administrative decisions of a Chief Justice regarding internal judicial affairs are not ordinarily subject to interference unless shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of constitutional or legal mandates—No such infirmity was found in the present matter. Disposition: Petitions disposed of—Supreme Court held that the Chief Justice of Lahore High Court acted within his constitutional mandate under Art. 203—Findings in paras. 8 and 9 of the impugned orders clarified as non-binding and non-prejudicial in future proceedings—Transfer requests by the State found meritless and correctly denied—Administrative action not interfered with.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908) ----O.XVII, R. 3—Failure to produce evidence—Consequence—Discretion of court—Scope— Where a party, after having been granted time for producing evidence with a clear warning that it was the last opportunity, fails to appear or adduce evidence, the trial court is empowered under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. to decide the suit on merits—Such discretion must be exercised strictly where there is persistent non-compliance and disregard for court orders—Adjournments granted without reasonable cause do not warrant further indulgence. Cited Cases: Rana Tanveer Khan v. Naseer-ud-Din (2015 SCMR 1401) Moon Enterprises CNG Station v. SNGPL (2020 SCMR 300) Duniya Gul v. Niaz Muhammad (PLD 2024 SC 672) Lutfullah Virk v. Muhammad Aslam Sheikh (PLD 2024 SC 887) (b) Principles of Civil Litigation ----Adjournments—Abuse of court process—Judicial discretion—Litigant conduct— A party cannot be allowed to treat litigation as an open-ended process to entangle rivals and delay final adjudication—Repeated defaults and misuse of adjournments constitute an abuse of process—Courts are duty-bound to ensure that trials are concluded without undue delay and in accordance with procedural law. (c) High Court Rules and Orders ----Volume I, Chapter 1-H, Rule 15—Adjournments for evidence—Costs not a substitute for good cause— Courts are reminded that merely offering to pay costs is not a valid ground for adjournment—Where adjournments are sought without sufficient cause, especially after issuance of a last opportunity, courts are not obliged to grant further time—Rule encourages enforcement of discipline and timely disposal of suits. (d) Judicial Efficiency & Discipline ----Litigant indolence—Repeated warnings ignored—Effect— Where a party repeatedly fails to heed court orders and warnings to lead evidence, despite being cautioned about consequences, it cannot later seek equitable relief—Courts must protect the judicial process from manipulation and uphold procedural integrity—Law favours the vigilant, not the indolent. (e) Constitutional Jurisdiction ----Art. 185(3) of the Constitution—Leave to appeal—Refusal— Petition under Article 185(3) was filed against dismissal of a pre-emption suit where plaintiff failed to lead evidence despite repeated opportunities—Supreme Court held that the lower courts acted within jurisdiction under procedural law and no miscarriage of justice was found—Leave to appeal was refused. ----Disposition: Leave to appeal refused—Petition dismissed—Order of High Court and concurrent findings of courts below affirmed—Repeated failure to produce evidence despite multiple adjournments and warnings justified closure of right to lead evidence under O.XVII, R.3, C.P.C.—Law must be applied strictly to discourage misuse and delay in the judicial process.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)— Art. 138 — Delegation of public functions — Scope — Private entities cannot be conferred public functions of Provincial Government — Validity of Stamp Act amendments tested against constitutional principles.Held, power to perform public functions (e.g., examination, impounding of instruments under Stamp Act) can only be conferred on public officers subordinate to the Provincial Government in terms of Article 138; attempt to extend these functions to private entities (insurance companies, housing societies, real estate brokers, etc.) by expanding definition of "public office" under S.2(22A) of Stamp Act is unconstitutional and contrary to principles enunciated in Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 2016 SC 808).(b) Stamp Act, 1899— Ss. 2(22A), 2(22B), 33, 35, 73 — Definition of 'public office' and its implications — Power of Stamp Auditor to inspect records — Scope — Petitioners held not to fall within 'public office' definition post-2021 amendment — Stamp audit notices declared ultra vires.Court held that the 2021 amendment to the Stamp Act deliberately omitted “companies registered under Companies Act, 1913” from the definition of ‘public office’, evidencing legislative intent to exclude such companies from stamp audit jurisdiction. Hence, audit notices issued to insurance companies (petitioners) were unconstitutional and beyond the powers of the Chief Inspector of Stamps.(c) Interpretation of Statutes— Legislative omission — Effect — Intent of legislature inferred from omission of specific words in amended statute.Omission of phrase “a body registered under the Companies Act, 1913” from S.2(22A) of Stamp Act (post-2021 amendment) shows legislative intent to exclude such companies from the purview of ‘public office’ — Any inclusion by interpretation would amount to rewriting statute and violate settled principles of interpretation.Referenced: Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts by Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner.(d) Administrative Law— Judicial review — Ultra vires action by public authority — Audit notices by Chief Inspector of Stamps to insurance companies — Legality.Held, Chief Inspector of Stamps acted without lawful authority in issuing notices for inspection and audit of insurance company records, as neither the Audit Rules nor the 1899 Act (post-2021) permitted such jurisdiction over private, federally regulated insurance companies.(e) West Pakistan Stamp Inspection and Audit Rules, 1949— Applicability — Stamp audit scope limited to government departments listed in Appendix II — Petitioners not included — Notices declared illegal.Audit Rules do not empower Stamp Auditors to inspect accounts of private insurance companies; such entities not listed in Appendix II. Thus, no lawful jurisdiction to compel audit of petitioners.Disposition:Petitions allowed.Definition of 'public office' (S.2(22A)) and 'public officer' (S.2(22B)) declared unconstitutional to the extent of inclusion of private entities.Impugned notices held without lawful authority and of no legal effect.

Summary: (a) Constitutional Law – Articles 142, 138, Fourth Schedule, Item 29 & 59 – Legislative competence – Taxation of trans-provincial insurance companies – Stamp duty – ConstitutionalityPetitioners, trans-provincial insurance companies regulated by federal law, challenged the jurisdiction of the Province of Punjab to levy or collect stamp duty under the Stamp Act, 1899 on insurance policies. The Court held that the business of insurance is exclusively regulated under federal law as per Item 29 and 59 of the Federal Legislative List. Imposition of stamp duty on such insurance companies by the provincial government violated Articles 141, 142 and the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution. The impugned notices issued under Section 73 of the Stamp Act were ultra vires and unconstitutional.→ Sui Southern Gas Co. Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2018 SCMR 802) relied upon.(b) Constitutional Law – Article 138 – Delegation of public functions – Delegation to private entities – Scope and limitationThe Court observed that public functions, including impounding of instruments and collection of stamp duties, can only be delegated to public officers under Article 138 of the Constitution. The inclusion of private entities such as commercial concerns and companies within the definition of “public office” under Section 2(22A) of the Stamp Act, 1899 was held unconstitutional. Such delegation of public functions to private bodies was contrary to constitutional jurisprudence laid down in Mustafa Impex v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2016 SC 808).(c) Statutory Interpretation – Stamp Act, 1899 – Section 2(22A), Section 73 – Audit Rules – Omission of companies from definition of “public office”The Court held that the 2021 amendment to Section 2(22A) of the Stamp Act, which omitted “a body registered under the Companies Act, 1913,” from the definition of “public office,” indicated legislative intent to exclude private companies such as petitioners from audit jurisdiction. The impugned notices, which directed the companies to undergo audit under Section 73, were issued without lawful authority.(d) Provincial Legislation – Stamp duty audit – West Pakistan Stamp Inspection and Audit Rules, 1949 – ScopeUnder Rule 7 of the Audit Rules and Appendix II, only specified public offices such as courts, government departments, and official receivers fall within the audit domain. Private insurance companies were not listed. The stamp auditors appointed by the Board of Revenue lacked legal mandate to audit petitioners’ records.(e) DispositionPetitions allowed. The definition of “public office” under Section 2(22A) of the Stamp Act, 1899, to the extent it included private bodies, declared unconstitutional. Notices issued by the Chief Inspector of Stamps were declared without lawful authority and struck down.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S. 115—Revision—Concurrent findings of subordinate Courts—Doctrine of election—Invocation of Civil Court jurisdiction after exhausting statutory remedies—ImpermissibilityAppellants, after filing declarations under MLR 115 and pursuing appellate remedies under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1977, challenged the resumption of excess land before the Civil Court through suits for declaration and possession. Supreme Court held that once statutory remedies under the Land Reforms Act had been fully exhausted, a subsequent attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of Civil Court on the same cause of action was barred under the doctrine of election. A litigant must elect one of the available legal remedies and cannot pursue parallel or successive recourses for the same grievance. Revisional Court rightly reversed the judgments of the Civil Courts, which had entertained barred claims—Appeals dismissed.Cited Case:• Trading Corporation of Pakistan v. Devan Sugar Mills Ltd. PLD 2018 SC 828(b) Land Reforms Regulation, 1977 (Act II of 1977)—S. 6 & S. 9—Declaration of excess land—Effect of failure to surrender—Self-executory provisions—Vesting of land in Government—Retrospective applicability—ScopeUnder S. 6 of the 1977 Act, any transfer or encumbrance of land by a holder exceeding prescribed land limits was void, and such land vested in the State. The appellants failed to appear before the Deputy Land Commissioner, leading to resumption of excess land. Supreme Court held that the relevant provisions of the 1977 Act were self-executory and operated automatically once landholdings in excess were established. The Court further held that the landmark Qazalbash Waqf case applied prospectively, and actions for land resumption taken prior to 23.03.1990 were unaffected. There was no jurisdictional defect in the Deputy Land Commissioner’s orders, and subsequent suits were a collateral challenge to valid executive action—No relief granted.Cited Case:• Government of Pakistan v. Qazalbash Waqf 1993 SCMR 1697(c) Land Reforms—Possession suits—Claim of part ownership without specific performance—Plea of oral payment—No legal title or enforceable right—EffectRespondents in Civil Court claimed rights in resumed land on the basis of alleged payments made to the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants. Supreme Court held that even if such payment had occurred, mere contribution of consideration without a registered transfer or specific performance did not vest any title in law. In absence of a suit for specific performance or refund of amount, no legal claim could be enforced. Revisional Court rightly disregarded oral and unsubstantiated claims—Ownership remained validly with declarants prior to resumption.(d) Constitutional jurisdiction—Alternative remedy—Civil suit—Jurisdictional bar—Land reforms adjudicationWhere a statutory framework under special legislation provides appellate and review mechanisms, Civil Courts are excluded from entertaining disputes on the same subject unless jurisdictional defect, mala fide, or fraud is shown. Appellants failed to demonstrate any such ground. The bar was properly invoked by the High Court. Revisional Court’s intervention under S. 115 CPC was justified, as the judgments of the lower Courts suffered from material legal error by entertaining claims barred by election and jurisdiction.

Summary: Where to establish a claim, evidence is required to be recorded, prima facie case cannot be assumed in favour of petitioner especially when he is yet to establish his right to hold possession of suit property or be transferred its ownership, which already vests in respondents, who are owners of the property, instead of petitioner, who is stated to be a tenant of respondents and his claim is based on mere agreement to sell which has been denied by the other side. Agreement to sell does not create any title but gives only a right to petitioner to claim specific performance of contract, if he can prove the said agreement as valid by refuting the claim of respondents that it was a forged and fabricated document. Besides, balance of convenience tilts in favour of respondents, owners of the property and not the petitioner, holder of disputed agreement to sell, as by grant of interim relief the respondents are likely to suffer more than what the petitioner would suffer if interim relief is refused. 647Civil Revision- Civil Revision (Against Decree)- Suit for Declaration 24-25 MUHAMMAD RAFIQUE VS MST. SURIYA BIBI Mr. Justice Anwaar Hussain 12- 03- 2025 2025 LHC 1180 PLJ 2025 Lahore 552 (Multan Bench, Multan)