Summary: The impugned Notification dated 04.09.2025 issued by Director General (Food) fixing maximum retail price of indigenous wheat under the Punjab Price Control of Essential Commodities Act, 2024 is unconstitutional and unlawful in view of the deregulation plan approved by the Provincial Cabinet vide Policy Notification dated 22.04.2025 which guarantees that no anti-hoarding actions shall be taken against the privately held declared wheat stocks; there shall be no ban on inter-district and inter-provincial movement of wheat; and the Government of the Punjab is only competent to purchase wheat stocks, if required, through open and competitive bidding under the Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014. Therefore, coercive measures against the declared wheat stocks of the Petitioners under anti-hoarding enactments leading to confiscation of wheat stocks and its forced sale to private flour mills are without any lawful authority. 169Writ Petition- Land- Acquisition of Land 4874-20 HAJI MUSHTAQ HUSSAIN SHAH VS SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE ETC Mr. Justice Rasaal Hasan Syed 28- 10- 2025 2025 LHC 7782

Summary: The Punjab Healthcare Commission is duly empowered to regulate and control the pricing of healthcare services rendered by healthcare establishments including diagnostic facilities and laboratories throughout the Province of Punjab. The objections raised to the validity of the Punjab Healthcare Commission (Pricing of Healthcare Services) Regulations, 2023, are thus found to be untenable. 168Writ Petition- Local Government- Price Control 6195-25 MUHAMMAD JAMIL ZAHID VS FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN ETC. Mr. Justice Abid Hussain Chattha 29- 10- 2025 2025 LHC 6200

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----S. 21---Territorial jurisdiction---Objection as to place of suing---Stage for raising objection---Objection to territorial jurisdiction must be taken at the earliest possible opportunity before or at settlement of issues and specifically pleaded---Where no such objection raised before Trial Court, no issue framed and trial concluded on merits, objection cannot be entertained for first time at appellate stage unless consequent failure of justice shown---Defect in territorial jurisdiction treated as technical irregularity after full trial---Appellate Court erred in reversing decree on ground of territorial jurisdiction which was neither pleaded nor raised in memo of appeal nor resulted in any failure of justice. (b) West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 & Family Courts Rules, 1965 ----R. 6---Territorial jurisdiction---Suit for maintenance, dowry articles and gold ornaments---Such claims not falling within proviso relating to dissolution of marriage or dower---Even if question of territorial jurisdiction arguable, same stood waived by failure of respondent to raise objection at trial stage---Proceedings allowed to conclude without demur---Non-suiting wife after full trial held unjustified. (c) Civil procedure ----Framing of issues---Jurisdictional objection---Effect of non-framing---Where jurisdictional objection not raised and no issue framed, parties lead evidence and court decides matter on merits---Jurisdictional plea deemed waived---Such plea cannot subsequently be resurrected at appellate stage. (d) Appellate jurisdiction ----Scope---Appellate Court confined to grounds raised---Appellate Court cannot suo motu introduce and decide a new point of territorial jurisdiction not pleaded, not raised in grounds of appeal and not resulting in failure of justice---Such exercise held legally unsustainable. (e) Administration of justice ----Fair trial---Non-suiting after full trial---Plaint filed, written statement submitted, issues framed, evidence recorded and judgment passed on merits---Setting aside decree on purely technical ground at appellate stage held contrary to settled principles of justice. Cited cases: • Khan Muhammad Tareen v. Nasir and Brother Coal Company 2018 SCMR 2121 • Faqir Muhammad v. Pakistan 2000 SCMR 1312 • Chief Engineer, Hydel (North) and Project Director, WAPDA v. Zafarullah Shah 2003 SCMR 686 Disposition: Petition converted into appeal; appeal allowed; judgment of Islamabad High Court set aside; matter remanded to Appellate Court for decision afresh on merits on the basis of evidence already recorded before the Trial Court.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 –– Ss. 157(2), 168, 180, 181 & 187 –– S.R.O.499(I)/2009 dated 13-06-2009 –– S.R.O.1280(I)/2024 dated 20-08-2024 –– S.R.O.1619(I)/2024 dated 03-10-2024 –– Confiscation of conveyance used for transporting smuggled goods –– Whether a lawfully registered vehicle carrying smuggled goods exclusively can be released on payment of redemption fine after the 2009 SRO and its subsequent amendments –– Scope. Adjudicating officer is empowered under S.181 to offer fine in lieu of confiscation except where the Federal Board of Revenue, under the first proviso, specifies classes of goods/conveyances for which such option shall not be granted –– Through S.R.O.499(I)/2009, the Board expressly withdrew the option of redemption fine in respect of (a) smuggled goods falling under S.2(s), and (b) lawfully registered conveyances used wholly, exclusively, or with false cavities for the carriage of smuggled goods –– The statutory bar created by the SRO divested adjudicating authorities of discretion to release such conveyances –– Subsequent temporary relaxation through S.R.O.1280(I)/2024 for limited categories of first- or second-time seizures not falling under clause (b) did not affect the existing prohibition, and the relaxation stood rescinded by S.R.O.1619(I)/2024 which restored the original and complete prohibition, adding category (ba) –– Held, the statutory embargo remained operative throughout, and confiscation of conveyances used in transportation of smuggled goods is mandatory –– The adjudicating officer, Tribunal, or Board had no jurisdiction to order release on redemption fine of any conveyance falling within SRO 2009 as amended. Cited Case: Bashir Ahmed v. Director, Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation (Customs), FBR, Peshawar (2025 SCMR 684) (b) Customs Act, 1969 –– Ss. 157(2) & 181 –– “Liable to confiscation” –– Whether confers discretion –– Interpretation. The expression “liable to confiscation” in S.157(2) does not confer discretionary authority where the Board has exercised its power under the first proviso to S.181 by issuing a prohibitory notification –– Once discretion is withdrawn through a valid notification, adjudicating or appellate fora cannot invoke S.157(2) to treat confiscation as optional –– The Tribunal’s reasoning that liability to confiscation permitted release on fine was contrary to the statutory framework and to the binding precedent in Bashir Ahmed (supra) –– High Court also erred in treating the post-03.10.2024 notification as merely discretionary rather than restoring and reinforcing the original prohibition. (c) Customs Act, 1969 –– Ss. 168, 180 & 187 –– Burden of proof –– Vehicle carrying only smuggled goods –– Effect. Where a vehicle is intercepted carrying exclusively foreign-origin goods and the driver fails to produce lawful import documents, the burden under S.187 remains undischarged –– The plea that the vehicle was hired public transport does not override the statutory bar created by SRO 2009 –– Upon such recovery, outright confiscation is the only legally permissible course and cannot be substituted by redemption fine. (d) Smuggling –– Vehicle used in transportation of smuggled goods –– Enforcement measures –– Legislative intent. The amendment rescinding earlier relaxation and restoring the complete bar on release of vehicles on redemption fine aims to close a longstanding enforcement loophole that enabled offenders to reclaim transport assets by paying fines –– Legislative policy now mandates permanent removal of such conveyances from circulation to strengthen anti-smuggling enforcement. (e) Customs Appellate Tribunal & High Court –– Jurisdiction –– Failure to apply statutory bar –– Orders without lawful authority. Tribunal and High Court erred in directing release of the vehicle on 40% redemption fine and in construing the amended S.R.O.1619(I)/2024 as non-retrospective and discretionary –– Their interpretations overlooked the continuous operation of SRO 2009 and its amendments –– Orders passed without lawful jurisdiction are liable to be set aside. (f) Result. Petitions converted into appeals and allowed in CPs.2853, 2854 and 3566 of 2025 –– Judgments of the High Court and Customs Appellate Tribunal set aside –– Order-in-Original dated 18.12.2024 directing outright confiscation restored –– CP.3886 of 2025 dismissed; leave refused.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 336-B--Causing itlaf-salahiyyat-i-udw---Bail, refusal of---Allegation against the accused-petitioner was that he threw acid at the complainant, which splashed onto her right arm, causing serious burns, while some of it also fell on her younger sister’s face---Record reflected that the petitioner was specifically nominated in the FIR with a clear and defined role, wherein it was alleged that he threw acid upon the complainant and her sister, resulting in burn injuries---First Information Report was lodged promptly, without any delay, which lent credence to the prosecution's version and negated the possibility of afterthought or deliberation---Medical report issued by hospital confirmed that the injuries sustained by the complainant and her sister were caused by a corrosive substance, thereby corroborating the ocular account---Furthermore, the empty acid bottle allegedly used in the commission of offence was produced by the complainant and the Naqsha-e-Mazroobi was prepared by the Investigating Officer immediately after the occurrence which also corroborated and lent further support to the complainant's version---Offence fell within the prohibitory clause of S.497, Cr.P.C. and was non-bailable in nature---Such like heinous offences involving violence, particularly where the victim had sustained serious burn injuries, the grant of bail was an exception and could only be considered where the prosecution's case appeared inherently doubtful or lacked prima facie corroboration, but such circumstances were not evident in the present case---At this stage, the available evidence, including medical corroboration and recovery of the acid container, sufficiently connected the petitioner with the alleged offence---Contention of the defense regarding non-availability of forensic report or independent witnesses did not, at this preliminary stage, discredit the otherwise consistent ocular and medical evidence, which could only be properly appreciated after recording of evidence at trial---Submission that the case was fabricated due to matrimonial discord also appeared to be a defense plea, which could not be conclusively determined at the bail stage---Petition for bail was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail order---Observations of the Court---Scope---Observations made in bail order are tentative in nature and shall have no bearing on the final determination of guilt or innocence by the Trial Court. Khan Mulk Tarrar, Azeem-ul-Haq Alvi and Ms. Afia Anwar for Petitioner. Rana Hassan Abbas, ADPP for the State. Mansoor Ahmad, Inspector/I.O., P.S. Khanna.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 140A---Local Government---Role---Petitioner was elected Chairman District Council and was aggrieved of authorities excluding him during making of arrangements of Mela in his district---Validity---Exclusion of elected local representatives from decision-making processes at district or municipal level had defeated the purpose of Art.140A of the Constitution---Provincial Government was bound under Art.140A of the Constitution to devolve political, administrative and financial powers to elected Local Government institutions and to ensure their meaningful participation in district administration---All executive officers at district level, including Deputy Commissioner were to ensure that matters concerning local development, planning and service delivery were to be undertaken in consultation with elected District Council and its committees---High Court refrained Provincial Government from taking any action that would curtail, suspend or render ineffective the Constitutionally protected functioning of elected Local Governments---Governance, under the Constitution has been envisioned through public participation and democratic representation at all levels---Local Government institutions are not a concession but a Constitutional command---Will of people, expressed through their elected local representatives must form the foundation of district management and development planning---Any attempt to bypass or marginalize such institutions undermines the democratic fabric and violates Art.140A of the Constitution---High Court further directed the authorities to ensure Constitutional mandate of Local Government in the form of District Council, as envisaged in the Constitution, in letter and spirit by giving lead of making arrangements for Mela in question---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Metropolitan Corporation, Islamabad through Mayor v. Chairman C.D.A. (Capital Development Authority) Islamabad and another PLD 2021 Isl. 144 and Muhammad Razzaq and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2024 Lah. 238 rel. Muhammad Akram Shah for Petitioner. Arbab Nasruminallah, Additional Advocate General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 14th October, 2025.

Summary: If examination-in-chief of a witness has already been recorded and the same is still in existence, then again recording of his examination-in-chief is illegal and void ab-initio therefore liable to be struck off/set-aside.

Summary: Summary pending