Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Criminal trial----Appreciation of evidence----Contradictions in ocular account, infirm investigation and benefit of doubt----Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302(b); Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898), Ss. 544-A & 382-B---Accused/petitioners were convicted under S.302(b), PPC and sentenced to life imprisonment with compensation under S.544-A, Cr.P.C., their convictions having been upheld by the High Court---Held, on reappraisal of the evidence, the prosecution case was found to be tainted with material doubts and contradictions: the occurrence was a night-time incident but the source of light was neither mentioned in the statements of key witnesses under S.161, Cr.P.C., nor properly secured or verified at the spot; the ocular witnesses admitted that they did not intervene or attempt to overpower the assailants and only raised hue and cry; important witnesses were either related to the complainant or chance witnesses; there were significant contradictions between statements of PWs and their earlier police versions regarding the manner of occurrence, the blows attributed to the accused, the alleged motive and the source of light; the investigation officer did not secure blood-stains from the place of occurrence, did not send blood-stained clothes and hatchets for DNA analysis and admitted that entries regarding deposit of parcels were incomplete; report No.21 did not tally with the complainant’s statement---Cumulatively, these infirmities created serious doubts regarding the reliability of the prosecution case, which had failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt---Benefit of such doubt was extended to the accused, resulting in their acquittal and setting aside of the convictions and sentences recorded by the trial Court and upheld by the High Court. (b) Criminal trial----Night-time occurrence----Source of light not secured or proved----Effect on identification of accused---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302(b); Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898), S.161---Occurrence admittedly took place at about 8:30 p.m.; complainant and eyewitnesses did not mention the source of light in their statements under S.161, Cr.P.C.; draftsman conceded that he had wrongly shown a single bulb in the site plan, which bulb was neither taken into possession by the I.O. nor inspected to confirm whether it was in working order, and even its placement was incorrectly noted---Held, such failure to secure and prove the alleged source of light, coupled with omissions in statements, cast a serious doubt on the identification of the assailants at the crime scene in a night-time occurrence---Reliance in this regard was placed on Muhammad Anwar v. The State (2002 SCMR 1289) wherein non-seizure of the torchlight mentioned in the F.I.R. rendered the night-time identification doubtful, and on Khair Muhammad v. State (2025 SCMR 1599) where benefit of doubt was accorded for not taking into possession the source of light---Following the said principles, non-production and non-verification of the alleged bulb in the present case was treated as a significant circumstance creating doubt in the prosecution story. (c) Criminal trial----Recovery of weapons of offence----Delay in dispatch to PFSA---Non-association of independent witnesses---Mismatch between recovered weapon and recovery memo---Failure to send exhibits for DNA analysis----Effect----Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302(b)---Prosecution case rested, inter alia, on recovery of hatchets at the instance of the accused from Mangla bypass/Rohtas Fort area; the police witnesses admitted that: they did not mention in their S.161, Cr.P.C. statements who had given them information regarding presence of the accused or the exact location on the bypass; recovery was allegedly effected from a thickly populated area with houses and shops nearby yet no independent witness from the village or locality was associated, nor even their names recorded; the top of one recovered hatchet did not match the sketch prepared with the recovery memo and this discrepancy remained unexplained; Register No.19 did not mention date of deposit of the hatchets; the parcels containing the hatchets were dispatched to PFSA only on 15.08.2018, i.e., after about 27 days of occurrence, and PW Moharrar admitted giving no explanation for this delay; the I.O. further admitted that he did not send hatchets and blood-stained clothes for DNA analysis and did not secure blood from the place of occurrence---Held, these lapses seriously undermined the sanctity of the alleged recoveries and chain of custody; in the absence of independent corroboration and with unexplained delay and discrepancies in the description of the weapons, the recovery evidence could not safely be relied upon for sustaining conviction; such infirmities added to the overall doubt in the prosecution case and were resolved in favour of the accused. (d) Criminal trial----Motive---Failure to prove motive, effect when other evidence is already doubtful---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302(b)---Prosecution alleged a prior altercation between one of the accused and the deceased as motive but the complainant and witnesses admitted during trial that they did not furnish any evidence regarding the alleged motive and some witnesses even expressed lack of knowledge about any prior altercation; complainant also did not mention the reason for altercation as motive in his earlier statement---Trial Court as well as High Court had already disbelieved the motive while still maintaining conviction on other material---Held, in circumstances where the prosecution had itself failed to substantiate the motive set up by it and where independent and investigative evidence also suffered from serious defects, nothing remained to buttress the prosecution version; failure to prove motive, when viewed alongside other discrepancies and doubts, further weakened the prosecution case and reinforced the conclusion that conviction could not be maintained. (e) Criminal trial----Standard of proof----Extent and nature of “reasonable doubt” necessary for acquittal---Single reasonable doubt sufficient----Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302(b)---Held, prosecution is bound to stand on its own legs and must prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt; where, on appraisal of evidence, doubts arise which are reasonable and not imaginary or fanciful, the accused is entitled to benefit of such doubt as a matter of right and not of concession---It is not necessary that there be multiple infirmities or numerous doubtful circumstances; even a single reasonable doubt in the prosecution case is sufficient to entitle the accused to acquittal---Reliance was placed on Ahmed Ali and another v. The State (2023 SCMR 781), in which this Court reiterated that the slightest reasonable doubt would warrant acquittal, and on a consistent line of precedents including Tajamal Hussain v. The State (2022 SCMR 1567), Sajjad Hussain v. The State (2022 SCMR 1540), Abdul Ghafoor v. The State (2022 SCMR 1527), Kashif Ali v. The State (2022 SCMR 1515), Muhammad Ashraf v. The State (2022 SCMR 1328), Khalid Mehmood v. The State (2022 SCMR 1148), Muhammad Sami Ullah v. The State (2022 SCMR 998), Bashir Muhammad Khan v. The State (2022 SCMR 986), The State v. Ahmed Omer Sheikh (2021 SCMR 873), Najaf Ali Shah v. The State (2021 SCMR 736), Muhammad Imran v. The State (2020 SCMR 857), Abdul Jabbar v. The State (2019 SCMR 129), Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State (PLD 2019 SC 64), Hashim Qasim v. The State (2017 SCMR 986), Muhammad Mansha v. The State (2018 SCMR 772), Muhammad Zaman v. The State (2014 SCMR 749), Khalid Mehmood v. The State (2011 SCMR 664), Muhammad Akram v. The State (2009 SCMR 230), Faheem Ahmed Farooqui v. The State (2008 SCMR 1572), Ghulam Qadir v. The State (2008 SCMR 1221) and Tariq Pervaiz v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345). (f) Criminal procedure----Petition for leave to appeal converted into appeal---Acquittal on benefit of doubt---Effect on connected miscellaneous application---Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898)---Criminal petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal; for reasons of doubts and infirmities in the prosecution case, appeal was allowed; convictions and sentences recorded by trial Court and maintained by High Court were set aside and appellants were acquitted of the charge by extending benefit of doubt; it was directed that, if not required in any other case, they be released forthwith---Connected Criminal Misc. Application was not pressed by learned counsel and was dismissed as not pressed.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497---Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997), S.91, Sr. No. (3)(c)----Possession of contraband charas weighing 1500 grams---Post-arrest bail, grant of---Non-conclusion of trial for considerable period---Delay not attributed to accused---Although the petitioner was named in the FIR, however, he was behind the bars for more than last one year and two months without any material progress in the trial---Report of Trial Court reflected that it was the prosecution which contributed to the delay in the conclusion of the trial as on several occasions prosecution witnesses were not in attendance---The guilt of the petitioner would be determined by the Trial Court after recording of evidence---Petitioner had been in custody since the time of his arrest---Investigation had been completed and his physical custody was no longer required by the investigating agency for further probe---Petitioner had no previous conviction to his discredit, and his continued incarceration would serve no useful purpose---Petitioner was admitted to bail after arrest, is in circumstances. Sagheer Ahmed v. The State and another 2024 SCMR 913 and Abbas Raza v. The State 2020 SCMR 1859 ref. Shahid Rafiq Mayo for Petitioner. Abdul Samad, Additional Prosecutor General with Muhammad Zahid SI along with police record.

Summary: (a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----Ss.11, 28 & 31(3)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.115---Agreement for Package-2, ‘Orange line metro train project’---Arbitration clause---Reference to arbitral tribunal---Application for bifurcation/separate adjudication of multiple sub-claims, dismissal of---Interlocutory order of arbitral tribunal---Challenge before the civil court, legality of---Judicial non-interference in ongoing arbitration---Scope---Expiry of initial arbitral period (four months where contract silent)---Effect---Order passed after expiry but before formal enlargement of time---Enlargement of time by court for making award, powers of---Where such enlargement is granted after statutory time-limit---Legality---Retrospective operation of enlargement of time---Scope---Facts: Lahore Development Authority (LDA) and respondent executed a contract for Package-2 of the Orange Line Metro Train Project containing an arbitration clause; upon disputes, arbitration proceedings commenced before an arbitral tribunal where the respondent filed multiple sub-claims, and LDA applied to the tribunal for separation/bifurcation and separate adjudication of each sub-claim; the tribunal dismissed that application, LDA challenged the said order before the civil court, which dismissed the challenge and affirmed the tribunal’s decision, leading the LDA to file present civil revision petition before the High Court---Issues:---(i) “Whether an interlocutory/procedural order of an arbitral tribunal (refusing bifurcation of sub-claims) was independently amenable to challenge before the civil court?”;(ii) “Whether the tribunal’s order, made after expiry of the initial arbitral period but before formal enlargement of time by court, was legally sustainable?”; and (iii) Whether petitioner’s application for separation and individual adjudication of sub-claims was rightly dismissed?”---Held: As regards issue (i); there was no independent substantive right to challenge each interlocutory or procedural order passed by the arbitral tribunal---The legislature’s deliberate omission of such a right in the Act of 1940 underscored the principle that the arbitral tribunal was considered to be the master of its own procedure, particularly where it was composed of technical experts best suited to manage complex factual and procedural issues---Thus, the petitioner’s application for separation of sub-claims constituted a challenge to the tribunal’s case management discretion, which was not permissible under the Act---As per the principle of judicial non-intervention, arbitration had to proceed without interruption or judicial oversight of interlocutory matters---The application filed by the petitioner before the civil court challenging the arbitral tribunal’s order dated was thus not maintainable and was rightly dismissed---Consequently, the present civil revision, being an extension of the same challenge, was also not maintainable---As regards issue (ii); where the extension in time was granted by court after the expiry of the original period but before the making of the award, the order operated retrospectively, thereby validating the proceedings conducted beyond the original time limit---Similarly, where the extension was granted after the making of the award, it encompassed the situation where the award was rendered after the expiry of time and the subsequent enlargement by the Court related back, rendering the award valid as if made within the extended period---In such circumstances, there could be no doubt that the extension of time operated retrospectively---As regards issue (iii); while subscribing to the principle of minimal judicial intervention in arbitral proceedings, High Court observed that the expert arbitral tribunal was the master of its own procedure---In the absence of any allegation of bias, violation of the principles of natural justice, or a demonstrable and grave prejudice that could not otherwise be compensated, a court should be loath to interfere with such procedural determinations---Therefore, on the merits of the application itself, High Court found no compelling reason to substitute its own view for that of the expert arbitrators---Impugned order was passed in accordance with law---Present civil revision petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Messrs National Construction Co. v. WAPDA PLD 1987 SC 461 and Civil Aviation Authority, Karachi v. KIST Consultants (Pvt.) Ltd. Lahore 1998 SCMR 2393 ref. (b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----S.11---Arbitral tribunal---Interlocutory / procedural order---Challenge before civil court---Permissibility---Whether an interlocutory order passed by an arbitral tribunal, which does not finally determine the rights of the parties, is amenable to challenge before a civil court---Permitting parties to approach civil courts to challenge every procedural or interlocutory order passed by a arbitral tribunal would defeat the very object of arbitration, opening the floodgates for recalcitrant parties to delay proceedings and transforming the arbitrator into a trial court and the Civil Court into a court of first appeal for every minor procedural decision---The scheme of the Act of 1940 reveals no provision granting a right to challenge interlocutory order---If, however, a party is genuinely aggrieved by an arbitrator’s conduct, such as undue delay, partiality or biased procedure, the appropriate remedy lies under S. 11 of the Act of 1940, which empowers the Court to remove an arbitrator or umpire in certain circumstances---Arbitration, as a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), provides a speedy, efficient and cost-effective substitute for conventional and often protracted litigation---Particularly in commercial and complex disputes, arbitration is preferred due to its procedural flexibility, technical expertise and finality---Accordingly, if a party alleges misconduct, undue delay or procedural impropriety, it may invoke the provisions of S. 11 ibid for removal of the arbitrator. Injum Aqeel v. Latif Muhammad Chaudhry and others 2023 SCMR 1361 rel. (c) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----S.28 & First Sched. Para 3---Arbitral tribunal---Power of court to enlarge time for making award---Situation where no time-frame is provided---Scope---In the contract between the parties where the arbitration clause does not specify the time-frame for completion of arbitration proceedings, para 3 of first Schedule of Arbitration Act, 1940 shall come into play which shows that a period of four months is prescribed for making the award, which commences either from the date the arbitrator enters upon the reference or from the date he is called upon to act by notice in writing---The court possesses the discretion to enlarge the time for making an award “from time to time.” (d) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)--- ----S.28---Arbitral award beyond prescribed time, issuing of---Enlargement of time by court---Where such enlargement is granted after statutory time-limit---Order passed after expiry but before formal enlargement of time---Legality---Retrospective validation---Scope---Where award was given by arbitrator beyond period of limitation either prescribed by Arbitration Act itself or any rules or bye-laws or provided in agreement by which parties were governed, same could be extended by court either before or after giving of award as court had unfettered discretion under S. 28 of the Act to extend period of limitation---Moreover, extension of time granted under S. 28 of the Arbitration Act would operate retrospectively. Province of Sindh and 4 others v. Waseem Construction Co.' 1991 CLC 66 and Messrs Everest Corporation v. Messrs Dacca Mercantile Company, Karachi and 4 others 1993 MLD 1303 ref. (e) Estoppel--- ----Principle---A party cannot approbate and reprobate---A party cannot participate in proceedings or hold its peace while awaiting a potential favourable outcome and then, upon an adverse ruling, opportunistically challenge the very jurisdiction it had tacitly affirmed. WAPDA and another v. Messrs Khanzada Muhammad Abdul Haque Khan Khattak and Company PLD 1990 SC 359 rel. Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation v. Messrs Sheikh Muhammad Latif and another 1999 M L D 2773 ref. Sahabzada Muzaffar Ali for Petitioner. Bakhtawar Bilal Soofi for Respondent No.1. M. Waleed Waheed Ch., Registrar of Arbitral Tribunal, in person. Date of hearing: 14th October, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Service matters ---- Civil servants in Pakistan Railways ---- Advance increments for higher qualification ---- Scope of departmental and general incentive schemes---- Respondent, serving as Accounts Officer in Audit Department of Pakistan Railways, obtained LLB degree (1992) and claimed two advance increments under (i) “Incentive Scheme for Railways Officers and Subordinates” dated 22.01.1966, and (ii) Office Memorandum dated 08.07.1996 regarding “Grant of Advance Increments to Employees Drawing Pay in BPS-16” (General Scheme, 1996)----Department rejected claim on ground that Scheme, 1966 stood abolished w.e.f. 01.12.2001; Federal Service Tribunal, however, granted benefit under Scheme, 1966----Held, per record, Scheme, 1966 did not extend to officers of the Audit Department at all and no benefit thereunder had been notified for that cadre; Tribunal thus erred in importing Audit Department into the scheme and in granting increments to respondent----Benefit under Scheme, 1966 set aside. (b) Service matters ---- Advance increments for additional qualification ---- General Scheme, 1996 requiring M.A. / M.Sc. ---- LLB degree not covered---- General Scheme, 1996 specifically provided two advance increments for employees in BPS-16 on acquiring M.A. or M.Sc. qualification----Respondent, holding LLB degree, sought to invoke the scheme by arguing that LLB was equivalent to M.A.----Held, scheme neither mentioned LLB nor contained any facilitation clause for treating “equivalent” degrees as falling within its ambit; no judicial warrant existed to expand language of scheme so as to include LLB within M.A./M.Sc. category----Respondent therefore did not qualify for advance increments under General Scheme, 1996. (c) Service matters ---- Remand to Tribunal or lower forum ---- Nature, limits and proper use of remand power---- High Court / appellate forum noticed that the Tribunal had not addressed respondent’s alternate claim under General Scheme, 1996----Held, “remand” is not an automatic or default judicial reflex; it is a corrective tool to be deployed only where material facts remain undetermined, essential evidence is lacking, or procedural fairness has been impaired so that the appellate court cannot itself do complete justice----Where factual matrix is complete, issues are purely legal, or record enables final adjudication, appellate court ought to decide matter itself rather than remand, in line with principle of judicial economy and constitutional command of expeditious justice under Art. 37(d) of the Constitution----In present case, record was complete and question purely legal; Court therefore declined to remand and decided respondent’s entitlement on merits. (d) Constitutional law ---- Institutional autonomy and judicial restraint in policy domain ---- Service incentive schemes and allowances ---- Question arose whether Court could “read in” LLB as equivalent to M.A. for purposes of General Scheme, 1996, though scheme itself contained no such provision----Held, institutional autonomy is a vital facet of constitutional governance; policy choices in framing incentive schemes and determining eligible qualifications fall within executive/administrative domain (e.g. Pakistan Railways, Finance Division)----Courts must interpret schemes as framed, ensuring legality and rationality, but cannot recast, extend or re-engineer them to confer benefits not contemplated by the competent authority----To judicially import equivalence where scheme is silent would amount to judicial legislation and undermine institutional autonomy----Unless a constitutional or statutory command is violated, Court cannot compel grant of a benefit not provided in the governing framework. (e) Service matters ---- Equivalence of LLB with Master’s degree for pay / incentive purposes ---- Consistency with prior case-law---- Respondent’s counsel argued that LLB should be treated as equivalent to M.A. and thus brought within General Scheme, 1996----Held, Supreme Court has already held that LLB is not equivalent to a Master’s degree for such service/financial benefits; reference made to order dated 17.02.2022 in CPLA No.262 of 2018 (Government through Secretary Finance, Finance Division (Regulation Wing), Islamabad v. Manzoor Qadir, Assistant Director (Mails) and others) and order dated 13.03.2018 in CPLA No.65 of 2017 (The Secretary Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad v. Hakim Ali Soomro and others)----Present Bench followed the said view and declined to treat LLB as equivalent to M.A. for purposes of advance increments. (f) Service matters ---- Wrongly granted monetary benefits ---- Recovery and departmental magnanimity ---- Effect on precedent---- Following Tribunal’s impugned judgment, respondent had already received advance increments aggregating to Rs.75,000/- ---- Supreme Court held respondent not entitled to such increments under either Scheme, 1966 or General Scheme, 1996, yet Additional Secretary, Pakistan Railways stated that Department, in the circumstances of this particular case, did not intend to recover said amount----Held, such waiver reflected departmental grace and magnanimity but could not be treated or cited as precedent in any other matter----Petitions were converted into appeals, allowed, impugned judgment of Tribunal set aside, and respondent’s claim to advance increments finally dismissed.

Summary: The impugned Notification dated 04.09.2025 issued by Director General (Food) fixing maximum retail price of indigenous wheat under the Punjab Price Control of Essential Commodities Act, 2024 is unconstitutional and unlawful in view of the deregulation plan approved by the Provincial Cabinet vide Policy Notification dated 22.04.2025 which guarantees that no anti-hoarding actions shall be taken against the privately held declared wheat stocks; there shall be no ban on inter-district and inter-provincial movement of wheat; and the Government of the Punjab is only competent to purchase wheat stocks, if required, through open and competitive bidding under the Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014. Therefore, coercive measures against the declared wheat stocks of the Petitioners under anti-hoarding enactments leading to confiscation of wheat stocks and its forced sale to private flour mills are without any lawful authority.

Summary: The Punjab Healthcare Commission is duly empowered to regulate and control the pricing of healthcare services rendered by healthcare establishments including diagnostic facilities and laboratories throughout the Province of Punjab. The objections raised to the validity of the Punjab Healthcare Commission (Pricing of Healthcare Services) Regulations, 2023, are thus found to be untenable.