Summary: Application for temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was rightly declined by the Courts below since challenge to the power of the Board of Directors of MEPCO to amend Rule 14(2) of the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Conduct Rules, 1978 and the power of Chief Executive Officer, MEPCO to grant NOCs to the private Respondents to contest the election of the Management Committee of WAPDA Employees Cooperative Housing Society Limited Multan shall be decided after recording of evidence. Even otherwise, eligibility of the contesting candidates is required to be scrutinized under the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 read with Cooperative Societies Rules, 1927 and Model Election Rules adopted by the Society. 86Civil Revision 1591622.3000-

Summary: Mere pleading of 'Benami' cannot bar civil suit: Misapplication of section 43 of The Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 2017 set aside. Writ petition allowed. 136Regular First Appeal (R.F.A) (Final Decree) 78871/24 Muhammad Anwaar Anjum & 1 Other Vs Muhammad Shakeel Sattar Mr. Justice Khalid Ishaq 17- 11- 2025 2025 LHC 6875

Summary: CMA: S.19 Appeal under intellectual property Act by plaint of permanent Injunction and trademark suit against refusal of the tribunal to grant temporary injunction. (a) Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 –– ---- S. 40 – Trade mark infringement – Exclusive right to use registered trade mark – Interim injunction – Appellant, the registered proprietor of the trade mark "Kohinoor Fair Price Shop", sought to restrain the respondent from using the name "Kohinoor Fabrics", alleging trade mark infringement – Trial court dismissed interim relief application without examining the statutory requirements under S. 40 of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 – Held, under S. 40, infringement is established when a mark identical or deceptively similar to a registered trade mark is used in trade without authorization – The trial court failed to consider whether the respondent’s use of the word "Kohinoor" created deception or was detrimental to the appellant’s registered trade mark – Matter required adjudication under the legal framework of the 2001 Ordinance, rather than the repealed Trade Marks Act, 1940 – Impugned order set aside, and interim relief application remanded for fresh decision in accordance with the relevant law. (b) Intellectual Property Law – Prior User vs. Registered Proprietor –– ---- Trade mark rights – Prior user of an unregistered trade mark cannot claim superiority over a registered proprietor – Appellant relied on Pioneer Cement Ltd. v. Fecto Cement Ltd. (2013 CLD 201), affirming that a registered proprietor holds exclusive rights to use the mark – Respondent claimed prior use of the name "Kohinoor Fabrics", arguing that "Kohinoor" is a generic term – Held, while prior use may be a defense in passing-off actions, it does not override the statutory protection granted to a registered trade mark holder – Matter required determination of whether respondent’s use of "Kohinoor" created likelihood of confusion under trade mark laws. (c) Passing Off and Likelihood of Confusion –– ---- Elements of passing off – Respondent argued that "Kohinoor" was a general name and not identical to the appellant’s registered mark "Kohinoor Fair Price Shop" – Held, likelihood of confusion must be assessed considering overall similarity, trade channels, and consumer perception – The Supreme Court in Messrs Tabaq Restaurant v. Messrs Tabaq Restaurant (1987 SCMR 1090) discussed passing-off actions, holding that infringement may arise even if an identical trade mark is not used, provided confusion is likely – Matter required detailed inquiry into deceptive similarity and unfair advantage. (d) Judicial Review of Trade Mark Infringement –– ---- Failure to apply relevant law – The trial court relied on 1987 SCMR 1090, which pertained to the repealed Trade Marks Act, 1940, and failed to apply S. 40 of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 – The Sindh High Court in Soneri Travel and Tours Ltd. v. Soneri Bank Ltd. (2011 CLD 193) emphasized that trade mark infringement must be assessed under modern trade mark principles – Held, trial court’s approach was legally flawed, and interim relief application should have been decided in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions. Disposition: ---- Appeal allowed – Impugned order dated 06.05.2024 set aside – Application for interim relief reinstated and remanded to the trial court for decision in accordance with the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001.

Summary: The National Command Authority Foundation (NCAF) entered into an agreement with Sheikh Sarosh Iftikhar, a land developer, for the purchase of land. The agreement was made on 09.02.2021, involving a land purchase of 751 Kanal and 77 square feet for a total consideration of Rs.550 million. An earnest money of Rs.50 million was paid by Iftikhar, along with post-dated cheques for the remaining amount. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Iftikhar invoked the force majeure clause and requested an extension for payment. NCAF terminated the contract on 23.08.2021, leading Iftikhar to file a petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and an application for a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.). The Civil Judge Class-I, Rawalpindi, allowed both applications on 19.07.2023. NCAF appealed the decision.----Issues:Whether the application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, was justifiable despite the admitted default in payment by the respondent.Whether the force majeure clause invoked by the respondent rendered the contract void.Whether the temporary injunction was appropriately granted pending arbitration.-----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal and the revision petition, affirming the decision to refer the matter to arbitration and grant the temporary injunction.----Application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940:The Court found that the existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties justified the application under Section 20. The dispute, including the default in payment and the invocation of the force majeure clause, was deemed appropriate for arbitration.The Court emphasized that questions regarding the reasons for default and the applicability of force majeure are to be determined by the arbitrator, not the Court.---Force Majeure Clause:The Court held that the invocation of the force majeure clause by the respondent did not render the contract void. This issue, like others, was to be addressed by the arbitrator as per the arbitration clause in the agreement.----Temporary Injunction:The temporary injunction was justified to preserve the subject matter of the dispute pending arbitration. The Court noted that the respondent had already deposited the remaining sale consideration as required.The Court found that the respondent had shown a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and potential irreparable loss, meeting the requirements for a temporary injunction.----Citations/Precedents:Lahore Stock Exchange Limited vs. Fredrick J. Whyte Group (Pakistan) Ltd. and others (PLD 1990 Supreme Court 48)Sezai Turkes Feyzi Akkaya Construction Company, Lahore through Project Director vs. Messrs Crescent Services, Lahore and another (1997 SCMR 1928)Messrs Sadat Business Group Ltd. vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and another (2013 CLD 1451)BNP (Pvt.) Limited vs. Collier International Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited (2016 CLC 1772)Industrial Fabrication Company through M.D. vs. Managing Director, Pak American Fertilizer Limited (PLD 2015 Supreme Court 154)Abdul Waheed vs. Additional District Judge and others (PLD 2021 Lahore 453)Samsons Group of Companies vs. Panther Developers and others (2022 CLD 932)Messrs Petrosin Products (Pvt.) Limited through Representative and others vs. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Privatization Commission of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 3 others (2000 MLD 785)-----Summary:The Lahore High Court upheld the Civil Judge?s decision to refer the dispute to arbitration and grant a temporary injunction, reinforcing the principle that arbitration clauses must be honored, and disputes arising from such agreements should be resolved through arbitration. The Court emphasized that contractual disputes, including those involving force majeure claims, should be addressed by arbitrators as specified in the agreement, ensuring that the judicial process does not preempt the arbitration mechanism.

Summary: Background: An appeal was filed under Section 114 of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, against an order passed by the Intellectual Property Tribunal, Lahore. The respondent instituted a suit claiming to be the bona fide owner and prior user of the trademark "SAMSARA" or "SAMSARA by Khadija Batool." The respondent alleged that the registration and use of the mark "SAMSARA Couture House (Pvt.) Limited" by the appellants infringed her rights. The Tribunal granted an interim injunction restraining the appellants from using the disputed mark. ----Issues: 1- Whether the respondent has established a prima facie case of prior use and goodwill of the trademark "SAMSARA." 2- Whether the requirements for granting an interim injunction, such as prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss, are met. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court found that the respondent did not provide sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of prior use and goodwill of the trademark "SAMSARA." The documents provided by the respondent, including invoices and Facebook pages, need to be verified during the trial. The court noted that the partnership agreement between the parties, which is undisputed, indicates that the business name "SAMSARA" was agreed upon by both parties, with no mention of prior use by the respondent. The court concluded that the three necessary elements for granting an interim injunction (prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss) were not co-existing in this case. The order of the Intellectual Property Tribunal was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. The Tribunal was directed to decide the suit on its merits within five months. ----Citations/Precedents: Messrs Unique School vs. Messrs Unique Group of Institutions, 2015 CLD 1297 Pioneer Cement Limited through Company Secretary vs. Fecto Cement Limited through Chief Executive Officer and 3 others, 2013 CLD 201 Qadeer Ahmed vs. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, The Trade Marks Registry and another, 1999 YLR 96 Muhammad Kashan vs. Coca Cola Export Corporation through Chief Executive Officer and 3 others, 2015 CLD 1513 Yaqoob vs. Additional Settlement Commissioner, Karachi and 2 others, 1973 SCMR 116 Kohinoor Soap and Detergents (Private) Ltd through Chief Executive of the Company vs. Basra Soap Factory and 4 others, 2002 CLD 1223, Karachi

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure—Temporary Injunction: —Grant of interim relief—Requirements of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss—Effect of failure to establish these elements. The petitioner sought a temporary injunction to restrain the respondent from alienating disputed land, based on an unregistered document titled Tasdeeq Nama. The Court held that for interim relief to be granted, the petitioner must establish a prima facie case, demonstrate that the balance of convenience lies in their favor, and prove that irreparable loss would occur if relief is denied. As the document lacked essential details such as Khasra numbers, total land area, and proof of possession, the Court ruled that the petitioner had failed to establish these necessary elements, warranting the dismissal of the injunction. Reliance was placed on Mst. Rasheed Bibi v. Muhammad Arshad (2020 MLD 1875) and Mubarak Mai v. Additional District Judge, Khanewal (2020 YLR 1875). (b) Specific Performance & Property Law: —Claim based on an unregistered agreement—Necessity of proving validity through evidence. The petitioner’s claim was based on an informal, unregistered document that had never been presented before revenue authorities for transfer of ownership. The Court reiterated that where a claim requires proof through evidence, a prima facie case cannot be presumed. The burden was on the petitioner to substantiate the authenticity of the Tasdeeq Nama, and in its absence, the grant of interim relief was unjustified. (c) Injunctions in Property Disputes: —Claims requiring substantial evidence—When interim relief should be withheld. The Court reaffirmed that where a party’s claim is contingent on proving a disputed document’s validity, interim relief should not be granted. The precedent in Mst. Rasheed Bibi was cited to emphasize that an unregistered document without supporting entries in the revenue record weakens the petitioner’s case, making the denial of an injunction appropriate. (d) Judicial Review—Scope of High Court’s interference in interim relief orders: —When findings of lower courts are not to be disturbed. The appellate court’s refusal to grant a temporary injunction was upheld, as no jurisdictional defect or illegality was found in its reasoning. The High Court reiterated that concurrent findings of fact should not be interfered with unless they are perverse or based on misreading of evidence. ----Disposition: Civil revision dismissed. Order refusing temporary injunction upheld.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act, 1877: ---Ss. 12, 21(a), 21(b), and 56(f)--- Specific performance of contract---Works contract---Temporary injunction---Relief in damages--- The appellant sought specific performance of a works contract for constructing a gas processing facility, despite the termination of the contract by the respondent due to delays. Held, the contract was not specifically enforceable as the performance could be compensated in damages under S. 21(a), Specific Relief Act, 1877. The contract entailed intricate details requiring continuous supervision by the court, barring specific performance under S. 21(b). Consequently, injunctive relief against the respondent was barred under S. 56(f). Damages remained the appropriate remedy. ----Cited Cases: Bolan Beverages (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pepsico Inc. (2004 CLD 1530) Pakistan Associated Construction Ltd. v. Asif H. Kazi (1986 SCMR 820) (b) Easements Act, 1882: ---Ss. 60, 62(c), (f), and 63--- Revocation of license---Termination of contract---Possession of project site--- The appellant’s possession of the project site was as a licensee under the works contract, which was terminated. Held, the license was deemed revoked under Ss. 62(c) and 62(f) of the Easements Act, 1882. The appellant could retain possession for a reasonable time under S. 63 only to vacate the site, not perpetuate its possession. (c) Arbitration and contractual disputes---Assessment of works---Burden of proof--- An independent third-party engineering firm (NESPAK) conducted an assessment of the works completed by the appellant under court supervision. Held, such assessments satisfy the requirement of gathering evidence for claims of damages. The appellant's demand for further technical audits was unnecessary and unjustified. Burden of proving damages remains on the appellant. ----Disposition: Appeals dismissed; interim order vacated.

Summary: Background: The petitioners filed a suit for declaration and cancellation of mutation No. 47 dated 20.11.1966 concerning a land dispute. They claimed that the land was given to the respondents' fathers for cultivation during the Dogra Regime, which they only became aware of in February 2018. An application for a temporary injunction was filed, and a status quo order was issued, which was later vacated by the trial court on 17.03.2021. The petitioners' appeal to the District Judge Kotli was dismissed on 30.09.2021, leading to the filing of this revision petition. ----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioners complied with the mandatory requirement of attaching the necessary documents with the revision petition as per Section 115 (1) CPC. 2- Whether the trial court and appellate court correctly rejected the petitioners' application for a temporary injunction and declared the suit as time-barred. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court found that the petitioners did not comply with the mandatory requirement of attaching the necessary documents with the revision petition as per Section 115 (1) CPC. This failure was considered a fatal defect, sufficient for the dismissal of the revision petition. The court noted that the basic ingredients necessary for the issuance of a status quo order were not found in the petitioners' suit. Both the trial court and the appellate court acted within their jurisdiction and did not commit any material irregularities. As a result, the revision petition was dismissed due to non-compliance with procedural requirements and the failure to establish the necessary grounds for the issuance of a status quo order. ----Citations/Precedents: Province of Pakistan v. Ikram-ul-Haq [1986 SCMR 1994] M. Arshad Sultan v. PM of Pakistan [PLD 1996 SC 77] Abdul Haq Khan v. Azad Govt. [2016 SCR 51] Ghiasul Haq v. Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir [PLD 1980 SC (AJ&K) 5] Azad Government v. Barrister Adnan Nawaz Khan [2020 SCR 591] Jammu & Kashmir Tehrik Ammal Party v. Azad State of Jammu and Kashmir [PLD 1985 AJ&K 95] PLD 1995 Pes 135 1987 CLC 2337 1995 MLD 1149 2018 CLC 814 2009 CLC 940 SC AJ&K PLD 1986 SC 65 PLD 1982 SC 6 PLD 1986 AJ&K 228

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ----S. 115----Revisional jurisdiction----Concurrent findings of fact----High Court cannot interfere with concurrent findings of the lower courts unless there is a material irregularity, misreading, or non-reading of evidence----Both the trial court and appellate court held that the petitioner failed to establish an arguable case or balance of convenience in his favor----No legal or factual error warranting interference was found. Cited Cases: Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain 2014 SCMR 1469 (b) Transfer of Property & Revenue Laws ----Mutation----Presumption of correctness----Registered mutation (No. 774) in favor of the respondent was duly recorded in the revenue record without any written condition regarding re-transfer of land upon repayment of loan----In absence of a clear contractual stipulation in the mutation, respondent’s ownership is presumed valid unless proven otherwise. Cited Cases: Muhammad Akram v. Altaf Ahmed 2018 SCMR 1300 (c) Injunction & Equitable Relief ----Order XXXIX, Rules 1 & 2, C.P.C.----Temporary injunction----Grant of injunction requires prima facie case, balance of convenience, and likelihood of irreparable loss----Petitioner failed to establish an arguable case as the mutation showed absolute transfer without conditions----No irreparable loss as petitioner could reclaim land if he succeeded in the main suit----Trial court and appellate court correctly refused injunction. Cited Cases: Government of Sindh v. Muhammad Shafi 2022 SCMR 1 (d) Specific Performance & Contractual Obligations ----Alleged conditional transfer----Burden of proof----Petitioner claimed that mutation was conditional upon repayment of loan but failed to provide documentary evidence----Revenue record did not support petitioner’s contention----In civil cases, burden lies on the party asserting a claim to prove it with credible evidence. Cited Cases: Muhammad Nawaz v. Sakhi Muhammad 2021 SCMR 615 Disposition: Revision petition dismissed. High Court upheld the concurrent findings of lower courts. Temporary injunction rightly refused.

Summary: 1. Specific Relief Act, 1877—Temporary Injunction—License versus Lease (a) Concession Agreement—Nature and enforceability --- A Concession Agreement granting exclusive rights to carry out a project does not constitute a lease if it fails to transfer rights in rem or exclusive possession of the property. Instead, it amounts to a revocable license under the Easements Act, 1882. --- A license cannot be specifically enforced as per Section 21(d) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and an injunction cannot be granted under Section 56(f). (b) Temporary injunction—Grant prerequisites --- To secure a temporary injunction, the applicant must demonstrate: (i) A prima facie case; (ii) Irreparable harm; and (iii) Balance of convenience in their favor. --- In this case, the petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case as the Concession Agreement lacked exclusive possession or a transfer of property rights. (c) Implied termination of license --- Revocation of a license may occur implicitly through actions inconsistent with the agreement, such as granting possession to a third party. 2. Easements Act, 1882—Revocability of License --- Section 60 of the Easements Act, 1882, establishes that a license is revocable unless it is coupled with a transfer of property or involves work of a permanent character executed by the licensee. --- Expenses incurred for preparatory work, such as surveys, do not qualify as works of a permanent character. 3. Necessary and proper parties in legal proceedings --- Failure to implead a party (e.g., IMEX Associates) whose rights may be adversely affected by the relief sought renders the case incomplete. An injunction impacting such a party’s rights cannot be granted in their absence. 4. Arbitration and concurrent litigation --- Issues concerning possession and the validity of third-party agreements are pending arbitration. An injunction during arbitration proceedings is unnecessary, as arbitral awards can address the rights and claims of the petitioner and respondent adequately. Disposition The writ petition was dismissed as the petitioner: (i) failed to establish a prima facie case due to the revocable nature of the license; (ii) did not demonstrate irreparable harm since damages could suffice; (iii) lacked balance of convenience, as public interest required ongoing operations by IMEX Associates; and (iv) failed to implead a necessary party (IMEX Associates). Case Citations Sharif Ullah Khan v. Pakistan International Airlines Limited (2023 CLC 372) Abdullah Bhai and others v. Ahmad Din (PLD 1964 SC 106) Ali Asghar v. Raja M. Asghar (2021 CLC 1348) Muhammad Tobria v. The Board of Trustee (2021 YLR 2278) Held The petition seeking an interim injunction was dismissed. Arbitration remains the appropriate forum to resolve disputes regarding possession and validity of agreements. Temporary injunctions cannot be granted where the legal and equitable requirements are unmet.