Summary: Background: The plaintiff filed a civil suit under Section 9 CPC against the Tax Department, challenging a Show Cause Notice dated 15.01.2024 issued under Section 11(2) & (3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The notice alleged that the plaintiff was liable to pay Rs. 59,712,503. The plaintiff sought an interim injunction against the tax authorities. ----Issues: 1- Whether the plaintiff's suit against the tax authorities is maintainable without depositing 50% of the disputed tax amount as per the Supreme Court's directives in Searle IV Solution (Pvt.) Ltd and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (2018 SCMR 1444). 2- Whether the plaintiff can challenge a show cause notice directly in the High Court without first availing the remedy before the adjudicating and appellate authorities. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Compliance with Supreme Court's Directives: The court emphasized that according to the Supreme Court's judgment in Searle IV Solution, civil suits arising from actions/orders of tax authorities must be sparingly entertained and should only proceed if the plaintiff deposits at least 50% of the calculated tax amount. The plaintiff failed to comply with this directive. ---Challenging Show Cause Notices: The court held that challenging a show cause notice directly in the High Court without first going through the adjudicating and appellate authorities is generally discouraged. The court noted that the plaintiff should have raised their legal issues with the respondents first. The court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Jehangir Khan Tareen (2022 SCMR 92), which stressed the importance of allowing the concerned authorities to handle show cause notices and discouraged court interference at this stage. The court dismissed the suit as not maintainable due to the plaintiff's failure to deposit 50% of the disputed tax amount and because the suit prematurely challenged a show cause notice without exhausting available remedies. The pending applications were also dismissed. ----Citations/Precedents: Searle IV Solution (Pvt.) Ltd and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (2018 SCMR 1444) Jehangir Khan Tareen (2022 SCMR 92) Indus Motor Company Limited v. Pakistan (Order dated 13.02.2023 in C. P. No. D-5003/2019)

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) – O. XXXIX, R. 1 & 2: Temporary injunction – Principles for grant – Judicial discretion – Scope of appellate interference. The trial court dismissed the application for an injunction filed by the respondent on the grounds that Addendum-IV to the Gas Sale Purchase Agreement (GSPA) explicitly stated that the arrangement would continue only until the re-auction process was completed. The appellate court overturned this decision without providing sound reasoning or proper application of the settled principles for granting temporary injunctions, namely: (1) prima facie case, (2) balance of convenience, and (3) irreparable loss. The appellate court’s decision lacked assessment of the contractual terms and failed to demonstrate how these three conditions were met. ----Cited Case: Roomi Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Stafford Miller Ltd. (2005 CLD 1805) Hadmor Productions Ltd. v. Hamilton ([1983] 1 A.C. 191) Garden Cottage Ltd. v. Milk Marketing Board ([1984] 1 A.C. 130) (b) Contract Law – Addendum-IV to Gas Sale Purchase Agreement (GSPA): Contractual obligations – Defined term – Continuation till re-auction process – No perpetual right conferred. The Addendum-IV explicitly specified that the gas supply arrangement would remain effective only until the re-auction process was completed. The respondent's claim of having a right to a 5-year extension or reservoir life under the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) was found to be misconceived, as the SOP merely outlined internal guidelines for the applicant and did not confer any legal rights on the respondent. Furthermore, the respondent’s participation in the re-auction proceedings estopped it from challenging the procurement process. ----Cited Case: Flare Gas Utilization Guidelines 2016 (SRO 107(I)/2017) (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) – S. 56 (d) & (f): Injunction – Bar under Specific Relief Act – Agreement limiting rights to auction process. The injunction sought by the respondent was barred under Sections 56(d) and (f) of the Specific Relief Act, which restricts injunctions where the contractual terms explicitly limit rights to a specific condition—in this case, the completion of the re-auction process. The appellate court failed to account for these statutory restrictions while granting the temporary injunction. (d) Judicial Discretion – Scope of Appellate Review: Interference with trial court discretion – Parameters for appellate court review. The appellate court is not to reassess the material and substitute its own discretion unless the trial court’s decision is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or based on a misunderstanding of law or evidence. In this case, the appellate court failed to adhere to these principles, resulting in an erroneous decision. ----Cited Cases: Roomi Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Stafford Miller Ltd. (2005 CLD 1805) Hadmor Productions Ltd. v. Hamilton ([1983] 1 A.C. 191) Garden Cottage Ltd. v. Milk Marketing Board ([1984] 1 A.C. 130) ---Disposition: The revision application was allowed, and the impugned order of the appellate court granting temporary injunction was set aside. The trial court's earlier decision to refuse the injunction was upheld.

Summary: Background: The appellant, a government authority, filed an appeal challenging the order of a civil court that granted an interim injunction restraining the encashment of a performance guarantee issued by an insurance company on behalf of the respondent contractor. The dispute arose from a contract for the widening and strengthening of a highway. The contractor failed to meet deadlines despite multiple warnings, leading the appellant to terminate the contract and request the encashment of the performance guarantee. -----Issues: 1- Whether the interim injunction against the encashment of the performance guarantee was justified. -----2- Whether the terms of the performance guarantee allowed the appellant to seek its encashment without further adjudication. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Islamabad High Court set aside the civil court’s order, ruling that the performance guarantee was an autonomous and irrevocable contract enforceable on its own terms. Performance guarantees are independent contracts, separate from the underlying disputes of the principal contract. The terms of the guarantee clearly allowed the appellant to seek encashment upon a declaration of default without requiring proof of default or an adjudicatory process. The civil court erred in failing to examine the terms of the performance guarantee and the appellant’s right to encash it. Any disputes regarding the contractor’s performance or the appellant's entitlement to the guarantee amount should be resolved through the contract’s dispute resolution mechanisms. The appeal was allowed, and the interim injunction restraining the encashment of the performance guarantee was dismissed. -----Citations/Precedents: Sambo Construction Co. Ltd. v. Laraib Energy Ltd. (2021 CLC 1914) Montage Design Build v. Republic of Tajikistan (2015 CLD 8) Standard Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pakistan (2010 SCMR 524) Shipyard K. Damen International v. Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Ltd. (PLD 2003 SC 191) Pak Consulting & Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pakistan Steel Mills (2002 SCMR 1781) National Construction Ltd. v. Aiwan-e-Iqbal Authority (PLD 1994 SC 311) Pakistan Real Estate Investment and Management Company Private Limited v. M/s Sky Blue Builders (2021 CLD 518) Husein Industries Ltd. v. Sui Southern Gas Co. Ltd. (PLD 2020 Sindh 551) Shipyard K. Damen International v. Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Ltd. (2003 CLD 1) Sirafi Trading Establishment v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. (1984 CLC 381)

Summary: (a) Property Law – Title and Possession: ----Registered Title – Prima Facie Ownership – Specific Performance In cases involving conflicting claims over immovable property, a registered title holds primacy unless canceled through proper legal proceedings. The plaintiff (M. Punjwani) held a registered sub-lease and mutation in his favor, which was not disputed by any legal proceeding challenging its validity. The defendant (MK Khan), claiming rights under purported sale agreements, failed to establish a prima facie title as the agreements neither conferred ownership nor justified possession or rental arrangements. (b) Specific Performance – Limitation and Delay: ----Sale Agreements – Delay in Seeking Relief – Evidence of Consideration The defendant (MK Khan) sought specific performance of alleged sale agreements dated 10-12-2019 but failed to justify the delay of nearly five years in filing the suit. Furthermore, the absence of financial instruments corroborating consideration and the non-disclosure of material facts, including tenancy agreements with his wife as a tenant, weakened his case. (c) Tenancy Agreements – Validity in Absence of Title: ----Authority to Lease – Concealment of Tenancy Information The court observed that tenancy agreements executed by MK Khan, in the absence of title or contractual authority under the purported sale agreements, lacked legal standing. The non-disclosure of his wife as one of the tenants during court proceedings was considered a material concealment undermining his case. (d) Appointment of Receiver – Principles and Grounds: ----Preservation of Property – Risk of Dissipation – Equitable Relief The court appointed a receiver under Order XL, Rule 1, C.P.C., emphasizing the need to preserve the property pending litigation. The appointment was justified based on the following principles: Protection of property from waste, mismanagement, or further dissipation. Prevention of third-party rights being unlawfully created. Maintenance of status quo during litigation. The court relied on precedents, including Saeed ur Rehman and Asadullah Mirbahar, reiterating that a receiver acts as an officer of the court, maintaining the property for the eventual successful litigant without determining ownership rights at this stage. (e) Interim Injunction – Grounds for Rejection: ----Prima Facie Case – Balance of Convenience – Irreparable Harm The defendant (MK Khan) failed to establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience, or irreparable harm necessary for granting interim relief. As he was not in possession of the suit property, the injunction sought to restrain interference in his possession was deemed legally unsustainable. ----Disposition: C.M.A. No. 3820/2024 in Suit 211/2024: Dismissed, as MK Khan failed to demonstrate title, bona fide possession, or grounds for interim relief. C.M.A. No. 18975/2023 in Suit 1921/2023: Allowed. The Nazir of the Court was appointed as the receiver to take exclusive possession of the suit property, seal it, and preserve it pending final adjudication. ----Directions to Authorities: Pakistan Defence Officers' Housing Authority (DHA) and Sub-Registrar Clifton Town were instructed to record the court’s order in property records and ensure no alienation occurs without court approval. ----Cited Cases: Saeed ur Rehman v. Asadullah Mirbahar Zamir Ahmed Khan Lala Roshan Lal v. Ch. Muhammad Afzal (PLD 1949 Lah. 60) Owen v. Homan (94 RR 516) ----Disposition: C.M.A. No. 3820/2024: Dismissed C.M.A. No. 18975/2023: Allowed

Summary: Background: An appeal was filed under Section 114 of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, against an order passed by the Intellectual Property Tribunal, Lahore. The respondent instituted a suit claiming to be the bona fide owner and prior user of the trademark "SAMSARA" or "SAMSARA by Khadija Batool." The respondent alleged that the registration and use of the mark "SAMSARA Couture House (Pvt.) Limited" by the appellants infringed her rights. The Tribunal granted an interim injunction restraining the appellants from using the disputed mark. ----Issues: 1- Whether the respondent has established a prima facie case of prior use and goodwill of the trademark "SAMSARA." 2- Whether the requirements for granting an interim injunction, such as prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss, are met. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court found that the respondent did not provide sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of prior use and goodwill of the trademark "SAMSARA." The documents provided by the respondent, including invoices and Facebook pages, need to be verified during the trial. The court noted that the partnership agreement between the parties, which is undisputed, indicates that the business name "SAMSARA" was agreed upon by both parties, with no mention of prior use by the respondent. The court concluded that the three necessary elements for granting an interim injunction (prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss) were not co-existing in this case. The order of the Intellectual Property Tribunal was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. The Tribunal was directed to decide the suit on its merits within five months. ----Citations/Precedents: Messrs Unique School vs. Messrs Unique Group of Institutions, 2015 CLD 1297 Pioneer Cement Limited through Company Secretary vs. Fecto Cement Limited through Chief Executive Officer and 3 others, 2013 CLD 201 Qadeer Ahmed vs. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, The Trade Marks Registry and another, 1999 YLR 96 Muhammad Kashan vs. Coca Cola Export Corporation through Chief Executive Officer and 3 others, 2015 CLD 1513 Yaqoob vs. Additional Settlement Commissioner, Karachi and 2 others, 1973 SCMR 116 Kohinoor Soap and Detergents (Private) Ltd through Chief Executive of the Company vs. Basra Soap Factory and 4 others, 2002 CLD 1223, Karachi

Summary: Background: The appellant filed an appeal against an order dismissing his application for an interim injunction in a suit for declaration, cancellation of ownership, and recovery of possession through partition. The appellant and the respondents are real brothers, and the appellant claimed that the properties in question were purchased with funds contributed by all brothers but registered in the name of respondent No. 1. The appellant sought an interim injunction to prevent respondent No. 1 from altering or alienating the properties. ----Issues: 1- Whether the appellant is entitled to an interim injunction to restrain respondent No. 1 from changing the character or alienating the properties in question. 2- Whether the properties were purchased jointly by the brothers with the funds provided by them and if respondent No. 1 is merely an ostensible/benami owner. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the appellant is not entitled to an interim injunction at this stage. The following reasons were provided: The appellant has the burden of proving that the properties were purchased with joint funds and that respondent No. 1 is an ostensible/benami owner. This burden must be discharged through cogent evidence. The appellant needs to demonstrate the motive for the benami transaction, the source of funds, possession of the properties, conduct of the parties regarding the properties, and possession of title documents. The affidavit dated 20.10.2004, relied upon by the appellant, was yet to be produced in evidence and its veracity was yet to be determined. There was no documentation or averment in the suit to substantiate the joint contribution of funds for the purchase of the properties. The superior courts have generally been reluctant to grant interim injunctions in suits seeking declarations of benami ownership. The doctrine of lis pendens adequately protects the appellant during the pendency of the suit. As a result, the appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs, and the trial court was instructed to proceed with the suit uninfluenced by the observations made in the appeal judgment. ----Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Ali Vs. Mahnga Khan (2004 SCMR 1111) Mst. Haleema Vs. Muhammad Kassam (1999 MLD 2934) Muhammad Ibrahim Vs. Mst. Naseem Khushi (2009 MLD 1031) Khurram Zafar Vs. Mst. Sarah (2021 YLR 91)

Summary: Grant of ad-interim injunction without issuing of notice: Undoubtedly, the Court has the power to issue ad-interim injunction in consonance with the above reproduced order and the principle laid down in the case of Gaisuddin Ahmed versus Province of East Pakistan and Others (PLD 1966 DACCA 163) where it was held that the Appellate Court below has given no reason for coming to such a decision except a reference to a decision of this Court in the case of Dr. Ahad Ali Khan v. Enayetullah Mandal (P L D 1964 Dacca 624). In that case it was held that the Court had no jurisdiction to pass such an ad interim injunction under the provisions of Order XXXIX, rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Ordinance IX of 1961. The amended provisions of Order XXXIX, rule 3, of the said Code read as follows:"3. The Court shall in all cases, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party: But in order to get such a discretionary relief the petitioner is required to show a good prima facie case for grant of relief through ad interim order. The petitioner could not point out exceptional circumstances for grant of ad interim injunction without issuing notice to respondents. In order to dispense with the notice, the petitioner was required to place before the Court special circumstances over and above to prima facie case but the case which requires recording of evidence could never be considered a good subject for ad interim injunction.

Summary: (a) Essential ingredients under Order 39 Rule 2 C.P.C for the grant of temporary injunctioni.e. a prima facie case, balance of inconvenience and irreparable loss.

Summary: Background: The petitioners, filed a writ petition challenging the dismissal of their application under Order XXXIX, Rule 2(3), C.P.C., by the Civil Judge, Islamabad-West (Respondent No. 3) and the subsequent dismissal of their appeal by the Additional District Judge, Islamabad-West (Respondent No. 2). The petitioners alleged that Respondent No. 1 violated an ad-interim injunction by renting out shops and raising illegal constructions on the suit property. ----Issues: 1- Whether the ad-interim injunction granted on 05.12.2019 and confirmed on 28.01.2021 remained in effect beyond six months without extension. 2- Whether the actions of Respondent No. 1 constituted a violation of the injunction order. Whether the lower courts erred in dismissing the petitioners' application under Order XXXIX, Rule 2(3), C.P.C. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Validity of the Injunction: The ad-interim injunction granted on 05.12.2019 and confirmed on 28.01.2021 had a validity period of six months as per Order XXXIX, Rule 2B, C.P.C. The court found no evidence that the injunction was extended beyond the six-month period. Consequently, the injunction ceased to have effect on 27.07.2021. ---Alleged Violation by Respondent No. 1: The petitioners alleged that Respondent No. 1 violated the injunction by renting out shops and raising illegal constructions. However, Respondent No. 1 contended that only repair work was carried out due to damage from heavy rainfall and that no new construction was undertaken. This stance was supported by an affidavit and was not rebutted by the petitioners. The court noted that the specific language of the injunction order restrained the respondents from alienating the suit property but did not address construction or repairs explicitly. Given the lack of evidence of any illegal construction and the absence of an extension of the injunction, the court found no violation of the injunction order. ---Dismissal of Application Under Order XXXIX, Rule 2(3), C.P.C.: The court upheld the lower courts' decisions, noting that without an active injunction in place at the time of the alleged contempt, there was no basis for contempt proceedings. The dismissal of the application under Order XXXIX, Rule 2(3), C.P.C. was therefore deemed appropriate. -----Citations/Precedents: Government of Pakistan v. Dr. M. Akbar Rajput, 2011 SCMR 1298: Defined 'status quo' as maintaining the situation that existed before a certain event. Syed Muhammad Shah Jehan Shah v. Fazal-ur-Rehman, 1996 CLC 1572 (Peshawar): Established that temporary injunctions automatically expire after six months unless extended by the court. Raja Talat Mahmood v. Ismat Ehtishamul Haq, 1999 SCMR 2215: Clarified that temporary injunctions expire after six months under Order XXXIX, Rule 2B, C.P.C. District Collector, Bannu v. Muhammad Subhan, 2008 CLC 1568 (Peshawar): Reiterated that temporary injunctions must be extended with recorded reasons and reported to the High Court. Muhammad Zahid Naseem Adil v. Muhammad Shafi, 2007 YLR 2190 (Lahore): Confirmed that unextended injunctions cease to exist after six months. Messrs Pfizer Pakistan Limited v. Pharma Plus International, 2022 CLC 1298 (Peshawar): Emphasized the automatic expiration of temporary injunctions after six months without extension.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42, 54 & 55---Suit fordeclaration, mandatory and permanent injunction---Interim injunction, grant of---Scope---Petitioner assailed the concurrent dismissal of his application under O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2,C.P.C.---Validity---Petitioner was seeking stay to the extent of property mentioned in theplaint, which as per his contention, was recorded in his favour as inherited property andseparate (Tatima) also existed, inquiry conducted on the application of the petitioner inrevenue hierarchy, prima facie was in favour of the petitioner---No justification before thefora below to reject the request of petitioner for grant of ad-interim stay, as prima facie, thepetitioner had made out a case in his favour---Impugned orders passed by the courts belowwere set aside and the application so filed by the petitioner was allowed.