Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 496-A---Enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a woman---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegations against the petitioner were that he enticed away the wife of the complainant for the purpose of committing fornication---Perusal of the record revealed that the alleged abductee returned home on 22.3.2025 and recorded her statement under S.164, Cr.P.C, before the Magistrate on 26.3.2025, wherein, she did not mention that she was enticed or abducted by the accused for the purpose of illicit activities---Section 496-A, PPC, criminalizes the enticement or concealment of a married woman with intent that she may have illicit intercourse---Central ingredient was not merely the abduction or unlawful confinement but the specific intent for illicit intercourse, which must be positively asserted or inferred from evidence---In the present case, although the abductee had narrated that she was taken away and detained against her will yet she had not alleged that she was taken with the intent of illicit relations, nor had she made any accusation that would attract the penal provisions of S.496-A, P.P.C---Accused was arrested by the police on 27.02.2025 and the complainant wife returned home on 22.3.2025, while her statement under S.164, Cr.P.C, was recorded on 26.3.2025, with a 4-day delay---Notably, the Magistrate did not summon the accused from jail to provide him an opportunity to cross -examine abductee as required by S.164 (1A), Cr.P.C.---Therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of case, such statement of the complainant's wife might not influence/ affect bail---Record did not provide information about the whereabouts of the complainant's wife from 27.02.2025 (accused's arrest) to March 22, 2025 (her return home)---Similarly, wife's statement under S.164 Cr.P.C was recorded 04 days after she returned home, but the record lacked any explanation or justification for such delay---Given the lack of information about the wife's whereabouts from 27.02.2025 to 22.03.2025, combined with the unexplained delay in filing the FIR and recording her statement under S.164, Cr.P.C, without following S.164 (1A), Cr.P.C, her statement could not be relied upon for bail decision without a plausible explanation being offered during the trial---Thus, a case of further inquiry within the meaning of S.497(2), Cr.P.C, was made out in favour of petitioner---Bail application was allowed, in circumstances. Inam Ullah Khan Wazir for Petitioner. Mehboob Ali Khan for Respondent. Najeeb Ullah Khan, A.A.G. for the State. Date of hearing: 21st April, 2025.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(2)---Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997), 9(c)---Possession of narcotic substance---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegation against the applicant was that he was found in possession of 1100-grams charas---Admitted fact on record that the brother of applicant had filed an application under S.491, Cr.P.C, alleging illegal detention of applicant at Police Station, however, the same was dismissed due to non-recovery of the applicant in the raid, proceeding conducted by the Magistrate---One more shocking thing was that the SHO of the Police Station who had produced copy of instant FIR before the Court on 08.03.2025 and on the basis of said FIR, the application under S.491, Cr.P.C, moved by his brother was dismissed---Now question arose how the SHO of concerned Police Station knew that applicant was arrested by SHO of other police station, meaning thereby the SHO Police Station concerned had taken away accused and then handed over/shifted his custody to SHO of other Police Station, who subsequently implicated the applicant in this case by foisting contraband---Hence, the defence plea was quite reasonable and carried weight---Surprisingly, a person hailing from a town was booked by SHO, Police Station, which stations was at quite different part of the province; hence, it did not apply to a prudent mind that a person, who had no previous CRO could travel such a long distance along with meager quantity of contraband---Documentary evidence adduced reflected that the police had extended their helping hand to the opponents of the applicant and thereby involved him in that false case by foisting contraband upon him--- No independent person was shown to have witnessed the alleged recovery, though the place of recovery was said to be busy area of the town---Further, the police also failed to make video recordings/ take photographs of the search, seizure and arrest---Applicant was in jail since the date of his arrest--- Section 9(1) of the Act provided punishment with imprisonment up-to fourteen years and not less than nine years for possessing, importing, or exporting and trafficking 'charas' in contravention of Ss. 6, 7 & 8 of the Act, for more than 1000 grams and up-to 4999 grams in quantity---At bail stage lesser punishment was to be considered---Quantum of punishment could only be decided by the trial Court after recording pro and contra evidence at trial---No previous record showing involvement of the applicant in any crime of the like nature had been placed---In such circumstances, the case of the applicant was squarely fell within the purview of further enquiry, as contemplated by S.51(2) of the Act, read with S.497(2), Cr.P.C.---Bail application was allowed accordingly. Zahid Sarfaraz Gill v. The State 2024 SCMR 934 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail orders---Observations of the Court---Scope---Observations made in the bail orders are tentative in nature, which should not prejudice the case of either party at trial. Muhammad Afzal Jagirani for Applicant. Ali Anwar Kandhro, Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh for the State. Date of hearing: 21st April, 2025. Order Muhammad Saleem Jessar, J .--- By way of instant application, applicant Muhammad Awais son of Abdul Qayoom Makrani Baloch seeks his release on post arrest bail in Crime No.10 of 2025 registered at P.S Ghouspur, District Kashmore at Kandhkot, for offence under Section 9(c) of CNS, Act, 1997 (duly amended in the year 2022). The applicant filed bail before the Court below, which by way of order dated 17.03.2025 was declined; hence, this application. 2. According to the case of prosecution, on 07.03.2025, at about 4.30 p.m., a police party of Ghouspur Police Station under the supervision of complainant ASI Shoukat Ali Bangulani, during patrolling, apprehended accused Muhammad Awais near Darri Stop situated on Indus Highway Road and was found in possession of Charas weighing 1100 grams lying in a black shopper, together with two currency notes of Rs.100/- and four of Rs.50/-, total Rs.400/-, from the side pocket of his shirt. To such effect, instant FIR was registered on behalf of the State. 3. Learned Counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant belongs to Baloch Parra, near SLD Cotton Factory, Mirpurkhas, wherefrom he was apprehended by SHO PS Gharibabad of Mirpurkhas on 05.03.2025; therefore, his brother namely Ayoub filed an application under section 491, Cr.P.C (Cr. Misc. Appln. No.60/2025) before the Court of Sessions Judge, Mirpurkhas; however, upon the surprise visit paid by Civil Judge and JM-III, Mirpurkhas the applicant was not found confined at PS Gharibabad of Mirpurkhas and such application was dismissed by way of order dated 08.3.2025 and later the applicant was booked by the SHO PS Ghouspur in this crime. Learned Counsel next submits that actually the applicant has been made victim by his in-laws, having residence in Kashmore District, over the matrimonial issues. As far as alleged contraband is concerned, according to learned Counsel, same has been foisted upon the applicant by the police at the behest of his in-laws and further that the quantity shown recovered from his possession being 1100 grams is a meager one; hence, requires further enquiry. 4. On the other hand, Learned Addl. P.G., after going through the record, does not oppose the application in hand. 5. It is an admitted fact on record that the brother of applicant, namely, Ayoub had filed an application under section 491, Cr.P.C before the Court of Sessions Judge, Mirpurkhas, alleging illegal detention of applicant at PS Gharibabad of Mirpurkhas; however, the same was dismissed due to non-recovery of the applicant in the raid conducted by the Magistrate. One thing more shocking is the SHO PS Gharibabad, Mirpurkhas, had produced copy of instant FIR before the Court of Sessions Judge, Mirpurkhas on 08.03.2025 and on the basis of said FIR, the application under section 491, Cr.P.C moved by his brother was dismissed. Now question arises how the SHO PS Gharibabad knew that applicant was arrested by Ghouspur police, meaning thereby the SHO PS Gharibabad had taken away him and then handed over/shifted his custody to SHO PS Ghouspur, who subsequently implicated the applicant in this case by foisting contraband. Hence, the defence plea is quite reasonable and carries weight. It is quite surprising that a person hailing from Mirpurkhas town was booked by SHO PS Ghouspur, which stations at quite different part of the province; hence, it does not apply to a prudent mind that a person, who has no previous CRO can travel such a long distance along with meager quantity of contraband. The documentary evidence adduced reflects that the police have extended their helping hand to the opponents of the applicant and thereby involved him in this false case by foisting contraband upon him. No independent person is shown to have witnessed the alleged recovery, though the place of recovery viz., Darri Stop is said to be busy area of Ghouspur town. Further, the police also failed to make video recordings/take photographs of the search, seizure and arrest as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the reported case of Zahid Sarfaraz Gill v. The State (2024 SCMR 934). The applicant is in jail since the date of his arrest. Section 9(1) of the Act provides punishment with imprisonment up-to fourteen years and not less than nine years for possessing, importing, or exporting and trafficking 'charas' in contravention of Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Act, for more than 1000 grams and up-to 4999 grams in quantity. It is settled principle of law that at bail stage lesser punishment is to be considered. The quantum of punishment could only be decided by the trial Court after recording pro and contra evidence at trial. No previous record showing involvement of the applicant in any crime of the like nature has been placed. In such circumstances, the case of the applicant in my humble view squarely falls within the purview of further enquiry, as contemplated by Section 51 (2) of the Act, read with Section 497(2), Cr.P.C. 6. Accordingly and in view of above, instant bail application is allowed. Resultantly, applicant Muhammad Awais Makrani is directed to be released on bail subject to furnishing his solvent surety in the sum of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) and P.R. Bond in the like amount to the satisfaction of learned trial Court. 7. The above observations are tentative in nature, which shall not prejudice the case of either party at trial. JK/M-43/Sindh Application allowed.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 489-F---Dishonestly issuing a cheque---Bail, refusal of---Allegation against the applicant-accused was that he received Rs. 1,204,600/- from the complainant on the pretext that he would get a loan of Rs. three crore approved from his bank and thereafter handed over to him a forged and bogus letter of bank of an amount of 2.5 crore---Complainant demanded his amount back, the petitioner issued cheque, which on presentation was dishonoured on account of dormant account---Offence under S.489-F, P.P.C.,does not attract the prohibitory clause contained in S.497 of Cr.P.C and bail is normally allowed in such like cases, but at the same time it is not a rule of universal application that bail should be allowed in each and every case not falling within prohibitory clause---Each case has to be seen in the light of its own peculiar circumstances---Court may refuse the bail to an accused even in the cases not falling within the embargo, if exceptional circumstances of the case so require---Petitioner deprived the complainant of an amount of Rs.1,204,600/- showing him rose garden that he shall get loan of 3 crore approved for him from the Bank and thereafter handed over to him a forged and bogus letter of the bank and on failure issued the cheque---Modus operandi adopted by the accused/petitioner was meaningful and a question mark, which did not permit to exercise discretion in his favour---Thus, the bail petition having no force was dismissed, in circumstances. Shamil Ahmad v. The State 2009 SCMR 174 and Amir Sheikh v. The State 2012 YLR 2136 rel. Mian Sohail Anwar for Petitioner. Amjad Javed, Deputy Prosecutor General along with Nabi Ahmad, S.I for the State. Ch. Muhammad Imran Rafique for the Complainant. Order Tanveer Ahmad Sheikh, J .--- The petitioner (Muhammad Mudasir Syed), being arrayed as an accused in case FIR No. 162 of 2025, dated 24.01.2025 registered with police Station Nau Lakha, District Lahore for offence under Section 489-F, P.P.C, seeks his post arrest bail, after the same was refused by the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore, vide order dated 07.03.2025. 2. According to the FIR Shabbir (complainant) was running business in the name and style "Shabbir Engineering" and having friendship with Shakil Ahmad, who is a banker. Shakeel Ahmad introduced Muhammad Mudasir Syed (petitioner) to complainant as a banker. Muhammad Mudasir Syed stated that he may get approve loan of three crore from Alflah Bank for improving his business and obtained Rs.1,204,600/- as expenses for documentation. After some time petitioner handed over a bogus letter of Bank Alflah valuing 2.5 crore, which on confirmation was found to be bogus. When the complainant demanded his amount back, the petitioner issued a cheque No. CA-010058586, dated 05.04.2024 of Rs.1,204,600/-, which on presentation was dishonoured on account of dormant account. 3. After hearing learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for complainant, learned Deputy District Public Prosecutor and perusal of record it was observed by me that petitioner (Muhammad Mudasir Syed) received Rs.1,204,600/- from the complainant on the pretext that he would get a loan of rupees three crore approved from his Bank Alflah and thereafter handed over to him a forged and bogus letter of Bank Alflah of an amount of 2.5 crore. Issuance of cheque and dishonourment of the same was a fact, which could not be dislodged. Petitioner claimed that his old cheque was already lying with his friend Shakeel which the complainant misused in connivance with his friend Shakeel, but failed to substantiate the above plea with cogent material. Prima facie involvement of petitioner in the crime could not be ruled out. There was nothing to suggest that case was requiring further inquiry. 4. I am fully conscious of the fact that offence under Section 489-F, P.P.C was not attracting the prohibitory clause contained under Section 497 of Cr.P.C and bail is normally allowed in such like cases, but at the same time the Honourable Superior Courts were pleased to hold in plethora of the judgments that it is not a rule of universal application that bail should be allowed in each and every case not falling within prohibitory clause. Each case has to be seen in the light of its own peculiar circumstances. The Court may refuse the bail to an accused even in the cases not falling within the embargo, if exceptional circumstances of the case so require. If any reference in this regard is required that can be had from 'Shamil Ahmad v. The State' (2009 SCMR 174), 'Amir Sheikh v. The State' (2012 YLR 2136). Petitioner deprived the complainant of an amount of Rs.1,204,600/- showing him rose garden that he shall get loan of 3 crore approved for him from the Bank and thereafter handed over to him a forged and bogus letter of the bank and on failure issued the cheque. Modus operandi adopted by the accused/petitioner was meaningful and a question mark, which does not permit me to exercise my discretion in his favour. 5. For the reasons recorded supra, the present petition has no force, hence, dismissed. JK/M-71/L Petition dismissed.

Summary: Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)--- ----S. 124(2)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLVI, R. 1---Reference referred to the High Court---Maintainability---Matter to be adjudicated by Trial Court being subject to appeal---Effect---Insurance Tribunal sent Reference under O. XLVI, R. 1, C.P.C., seeking multiple guidelines qua certain points---Held: Reference is made to High Court under O. XLVI, R. 1, C.P.C., which provision shows that where before or on hearing of a suit or appeal certain material question of law, usage having force of law, arises or points embosomed significant doubts in which "decree is not subject to appeal", the Court trying the lis drawing up a statement of facts along with its own opinion may send a Reference to High Court and absence of said traits which are condition precedent shatter the very maintainability of the Reference---In the present case, the claim has been filed under Insurance Ordinance, 2000, before the Insurance Tribunal and against any decision / decree likely to be rendered by the Tribunal a manifest remedy of appeal is provided under S. 124(2) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, as such instant Reference wears no sanction of law---Thus, from the conjoint reading of O. XLVI, R.1, C.P.C. and S.124(2) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, it is clear that the very Reference is not maintainable---As instant Reference under O. XLVI, R. 1, C.P.C., is held as not maintainable, as such there is no need to answer the points raised therein---Instant Reference was returned to the Insurance Tribunal for further proceedings---Reference was disposed of accordingly. Barju Biswal v. Kanja Behari Mahapatra AIR 1931 Patna 353 and Mukanda v. Birdychand AIR 1953 Hyd. 271 ref. Muhammad Tufail Khokhar for Petitioner. Gulzar Ahmad Khan for Respondent. Ahmad Farooq, Amicus Curiae. Date of hearing: 21st April, 2025.

Summary: (a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----Ss. 5 & 20---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)---Eviction petition---Oral tenancy, proof of---Relationship of landlord and tenant, denial of---Proof---Jurisdiction of the Rent Controller---Scope---Respondent No.1 (alleged to be a tenant) claimed that he never remained in possession of the suit property---Copy of rent agreement was not produced by the petitioner (claiming to be a landlady)---The petitioner claimed that her father (purportedly the landlord) had rented out the suit property to the father of respondent No.1 (purportedly the tenant) through an oral agreement in 1988---After predecessor-in-interest of both parties passed away, the respondent allegedly continued as tenant but defaulted on rent, and subsequently, an ex-parte eviction order was passed against him---The respondent challenged the order under S. 12(2), C.P.C., denying any landlord-tenant relationship claiming that he never remained in possession of the property---Respondent's application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. was dismissed against which he filed civil revision which was allowed, constraining the petitioner (daughter of the purported landlord) to file the present Constitutional petition---The central issue for adjudication was "whether a relationship of landlord and tenant had been established on record in the proceedings culminating in the eviction order passed by the rent controller"?---Held: In the absence of written agreement the burden fell on the party asserting the relationship to prove the same by adducing compelling and unimpeachable evidence from which the court could infer such relationship on the principle of the preponderance of probabilities---Establishment of relationship in absence of written agreement must be supported by a high threshold of evidence---In the present matter, prima facie, the petitioner (successor-in-interest of purported landlord) had not discharged that burden---No rent agreement, receipt, or any other document were produced in order to establish a landlord-tenant relationship---There can be verbal/oral tenancy also but in order to establish such tenancy an evidence of very high standard is required, from which the facts of tenancy is established on the principle of preponderance of probabilities---The Rent Controller had allowed the application only on the ground that no rebuttal had been offered in response to the tenancy claim---However, respondent No. 1 (purported tenant) in the application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. had denied the existence of relationship of landlord-tenant between the parties and called into question the maintainability of the entire proceedings---Since there was serious dispute regarding relationship between the parties and the petitioner had not produced any documentary evidence in order to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, it was imperative for the Rent Controller to decide the application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. as per directions given in the impugned order and then proceed further---No irregularity or infirmity in the impugned order was pointed out---Rent Controller was directed to decide application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. expeditiously---Constitutional petition being devoid of merits was dismissed, in circumstance. Hafeezuddin and 2 others v. Badaruddin and 2 others PLD 2003 Karachi 444 ref. (b) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----Ss. 5 & 20---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)---Application under S. 12(2) C.P.C.---Maintainability---Powers available to the Rent Controller---Objection regarding maintainability of application under S. 12(2) C.P.C. in light of S. 20 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979---Validity---Bar under S. 20 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 is not absolute and the Rent Controller in an appropriate case may invoke the provisions of the C.P.C.---Moreover, equitable principle of C.P.C. can be invoked by the Rent Controller. Mst. Fehmida Begum v. Muhammad Khalid and another 1992 SCMR 1908 and Ismail v. Subedar Gul Inayat Shah PLD 1991 SC 997 rel. (c) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----S. 20---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)---Question of jurisdiction to be addressed at the outset---Principle---Relationship of landlord and tenant, denial of---Where the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller is questioned on the point that no relationship of landlord and tenant exists, the question of jurisdiction has to be addressed first before proceeding to the merits of the case. Mst. Fehmida Begum v. Muhammad Khalid and another 1992 SCMR 1908 and Ismail v. Subedar Gul Inayat Shah PLD 1991 SC 997 rel. Attorney Yameen Ali Khoso in person for Petitioner. Abdul Mujeeb Shaikh for Respondent No. 1. Shaharyar Awan, Assistant Advocate General, Sindh for Respondents Nos. 2 to 4. Date of hearing: 3rd March, 2025.

Summary: (Writ Petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan) 1. Plaintiff challenged the general power of attorney executed in favour of the defendant by claiming it to be fraudulent document and also sought cancellation of the registered deed executed in 2016 on the basis of said power of attorney. Defendant filed application for rejection of plaintiff under Order VII rule 11 CPC which was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that matter requires recording of evidence; and this order of the trial court was maintained by the revisional court. Still aggrieved, defendant filed constitutional petition before High Court. --- Held --- After the execution of impugned registered deed, the plaintiff instituted a guardianship petition seeking guardianship of her minor in the year 2018. Said petition was filed through the same general attorney and she in the witness box as AW-5 in the said petition endorsed his status as her attorney. Plaintiff also revoked the power of attorney in the year 2019 and in the body of revocation deed she herself admitted that she had appointed the defendant as her general attorney. Thus, there is no need to record evidence as plaint does not disclose any contestable cause of action. 2. While deciding the fate of plaint within the purview of Order VII Rule 11 CPC only contents of the plaint are required to be looked into but the other material on its own intrinsic value can also be considered along with the averments made in the plaint. 2002 SCMR 338 relied. 3. In case the plaintiff conceals any material fact in the plaint, which if brought before the court the plaintiff would have been out of the court for having no cause of action, and such a fact if disclosed by defendant, the same can also be pondered upon judiciously and plaintiff should not be allowed to grind the other party into a false and frivolous litigation. 4. In case where suit is not permitted by necessary implication of law in the sense that a positive prohibit can be spelt out of the legal provisions, the Court has got an inherent jurisdiction to reject the plaint at any stage of trial and in such a situation, formalities should be avoided to reject it, thus, provisions of Rule 11 of the Order VII are not exhaustive. The Court in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction can nip the frivolous litigation in the bud when on account of some legal impediments full fledged trial will be a futile exercise. 2014 SCMR 513 relied. (The constitutional petition filed by defendant was allowed and the plaint was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC)

Summary: Civil Revision Held: (i) The decisive question which needs to be determined is whether the petitioner qualified as a denied candidate or otherwise. Before this question is addressed, it would be pertinent to mention that denied candidates were those who, despite falling within the orbit of selection, were denied appointment solely on the ground of holding a PTC from AIOU. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to substantiate that he was amongst those who merited appointment, but was wrongly denied appointment due to the aforesaid policy. However, the petitioner failed to produce any substantive evidence to show that he fell within the category of denied candidates. Though, his name appears at Serial No.38 of the interview list (Ex.PW-1/2), however, mere inclusion of a candidate’s name in the interview list is not sufficient to establish that he had secured a position within the orbit of selection. (ii) The record further reveals that pursuant to the earlier judgments, contempt of Court petitions were filed, where an inquiry was initiated, culminating in the preparation of a list comprising 59 denied candidates. The petitioner’s name does not appear in the said list. (iii) The record further reveals that a list was prepared by the respondent-department, and an opportunity of filing appeals was afforded to the denied candidates, with 22.08.2006 as the last date for submission of appeals. Subsequently, the appeals filed by the candidates were decided on 24.08.2006. The denied candidates were interviewed on 26.07.2006. The petitioner’s name was not mentioned in the interview list. If at all the petitioner had, in fact, any case, he would have filed the suit within six years after the aforesaid process was completed. Nevertheless, the petitioner did not do so, rather he instituted the suit in the year 2018, which was hopelessly time barred as per Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. (CR dismissed)

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 496-A---Enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a woman---bail grant of--- Section 496-A PPC criminalizes the enticement or concealment of a married woman with intent that she may have illicit intercourse. The central ingredient is not merely the abduction or unlawful confinement but the specific intent for illicit intercourse, which must be positively asserted or inferred from evidence. In the present case, although the abductee has narrated that she was taken away and detained against her will yet she has not alleged that she was taken with the intent of illicit relations, nor has she made any accusation that would attract the penal provisions of Section 496-A PPC. 164 Cr.P.C---The accused was arrested by the police on 27.02.2025 and the complainant wife returned home on 22.3.2025, while her statement under section 164 Cr.P.C was recorded on 26.3.2025, with a 4-days delay. Notably, the Magistrate did not summon the accused from jail to provide him an opportunity to cross-examine her as required by section 164 (1A) Cr.P.C. Therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of case, such statement of the complainant’s wife may not influence/affect bail. The record does not provide information about the whereabouts of the complainant’s wife from 27.02.2025 (accused’s arrest) to March 22, 2025 (her return home). Similarly, wife’s statement under section 164 Cr.P.C was recorded 04 days after she returned home, but the record lacks any explanation or justification for such delay. Given the lack of information about the wife’s whereabouts from 27.02.2025 to 22.03.2025, combined with the unexplained delay in filing the FIR and recording her statement under section 164 Cr.P.C (without following section 164 (1A) Cr.P.C her statement cannot be relied upon for bail decisions without a plausible explanation being offered during the trial.

Summary: Bail denied ----- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- S. 489-F; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ---- Ss. 497 & 498 ---- Cheque issued towards repayment of fraudulently obtained amount --- Dishonour on account of dormant account --- Bail, refusal of --- Scope --- Petitioner was alleged to have received Rs. 1,204,600/- from the complainant on the pretext of arranging a business loan of Rs. 3 crore from Bank Alflah and later issued a cheque in the same amount, which was dishonoured --- A forged letter purporting to be from the bank was also handed over to the complainant --- Petitioner claimed the cheque was misused by the complainant and his friend (Shakeel), but failed to support this claim with any cogent material --- Held, issuance and dishonour of the cheque was admitted --- Offence under S. 489-F PPC did not fall under prohibitory clause of S. 497 Cr.P.C., but superior courts have consistently held that even in such cases bail may be refused if exceptional circumstances exist --- Modus operandi of petitioner involving deception, forgery, and abuse of trust warranted denial of relief --- Bail declined. Cited Cases: • Shameel Ahmad v. The State (2009 SCMR 174) • Amir Sheikh v. The State (2012 YLR 2136)