Summary: (Against the judgment dated 03.03.2025 of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeal No. 03(Q)CS of 2024). National Highways and Motorway Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2016--- ----R. 8(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A---Right to cross-examination---Scope---Departmental proceedings---Penalty of dismissal from service---Fair trial---Waiver of right of cross-examination---Scope---Inquiry Officer dispensing with the right to cross-examination without recording reasons---Validity---Where an accused does not specifically refer to his right to cross-examination in a reply to a show-cause notice, that right is not somehow waived---Such right remains intact and it is upon the Inquiry Officer to ensure that such right is told to the accused, properly afforded and if the accused does not wish to proceed with cross-examination, Inquiry Officer is to record the reasons and put that into writing---It is incumbent upon the inquiry officer to ensure that the right is not treated so casually and dispensed away with especially without any reasons recorded in writing---Right remains intact, guaranteed under Art. 10-A of the Constitution even where the accused does not make a request to cross-examine any witness at any point during the investigation process---Right to a proper defence-and, by necessary implication, the right to cross-examine-is a vested and inalienable right of the accused---Article 10-A of the Constitution casts a constitutional canopy over all proceedings, shielding the accused from being left exposed to the harsh glare of arbitrary or one-sided departmental action, as it ensures that no person is condemned unheard and that fairness permeates every stage of the disciplinary process---Order of dismissal from service and judgment of the Tribunal were set aside with a direction to conduct de novo inquiry strictly in accordance with Art. 10-A of the Constitution---Civil petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, in circumstances. Federation of Pakistan through Chairman FBR v. Zahid Malik 2023 SCMR 603; Lyons v. Longford and Westmeath Education and Training Board [2017] IEHC 272; Tariq Khan v. Additional DG, FIA 2025 PLC (C.S.) 467; Ghulam Murtaza Shiekh v. The Chief Minister, Sindh 2024 SCMR 1757 and Usman Ghani v. Chief Post Master, GPO Karachi 2022 SCMR 745 rel. Muhammad Umar Ijaz Gilani, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Raja Shafaqat Khan Abbasi, Deputy Advocate General Pakistan along with Muhammad Asad, DSP, NHMP for Respondents. Date of hearing: 23rd October, 2025.

Summary: The continuous stagnation of a post without upgradation throughout service tenure constitutes a persistent source of frustration for employees. Withdrawal of upgradation in the garb of amending service rules offends Articles 9 and 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, besides being inconsistent with the spirit of a welfare state, especially when no service rules for promotion of employees occupying stagnant posts have been made despite inordinate lapse of more than 06 years. 183ITR (Income Tax Reference) 256746/18 CIR . Vs Ms Al Hamad Cotton Mr. Justice Malik Javid Iqbal Wains 21-10- 2025 2025 LHC 6431

Summary: (a) Service laws----Departmental proceedings----Regular inquiry, necessity of----Imposition of major or minor penalty without inquiry----Effect---Petitioner, serving as Project Incharge in PASSCO, was visited with major penalty of dismissal from service on allegations of abetment in preparation and encashment of forged and fictitious bills, without holding a regular inquiry; High Court, while finding infirmities, merely converted dismissal into compulsory retirement---Held, inquiry is not a mere procedural ritual but the “constitutional heartbeat of fairness” within the disciplinary framework; right to be heard, to confront evidence and to defend oneself is a facet of fundamental rights under Arts. 9, 10A and 14 of the Constitution (life and livelihood, fair trial, dignity) and cannot be bypassed at departmental whim---Disciplinary power exercised without the discipline of inquiry ceases to be lawful authority and degenerates into arbitrariness---No penalty, whether major or minor, may lawfully be imposed upon a civil servant unless he is confronted with specific allegations, given meaningful opportunity to explain, and his defence is adjudged through reasoned consideration after a proper inquiry---Where guilt has never been established through a regular inquiry, no penalty can stand in law. (b) Service laws----Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 (since repealed)----S. 5(4)----Dispensation of inquiry----Scope and conditions---Section 5(4) of the 2000 Ordinance permits dispensation of inquiry only where the competent authority is in possession of “sufficient documentary evidence” or, for reasons recorded in writing, is satisfied that no inquiry is needed---Held, this power is exceptional, to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection; dispensation of inquiry is an exception, not the rule---Courts have consistently interpreted S. 5(4) narrowly and held that where a charge cannot be established without recording evidence or cross-examining witnesses, regular inquiry cannot be dispensed with---Summary procedure is justified only in rare and extraordinary situations where facts are admitted, undisputed or fully borne out from self-authenticating record; where documentary material is disputed or not self-proving (e.g. unverified CCTV footage or documents whose veracity can only be tested by cross-examination), reliance on such material defeats the rationale of dispensation---Competent authority must, before dispensing with inquiry, record detailed reasons reflecting independent application of mind and demonstrate that the evidence relied upon is unimpeachable, self-contained and that no prejudice is caused to the accused officer---Failure to do so offends Art. 10A of the Constitution and vitiates the penalty. Cited Cases: Saad Salam Ansar v. Chief Justice of Sindh High Court, Karachi 2007 SCMR 1726; Member (Administration), FBR v. Mian Khan 2022 PLC (C.S.) 474; Muhammad Abdul Moied v. Government of Pakistan 2010 SCMR 1546; Abdul Sattar v. Pakistan Water and Development Authority 2007 PLC (C.S.) 354; National Bank of Pakistan v. Zahoor Ahmad Mengal 2021 SCMR 144. (c) Service laws----Departmental proceedings----Major and minor penalties----Procedural safeguards----Whether minor penalty can be imposed without regular inquiry---Held, principles governing inquiry apply with equal force whether contemplated penalty is major or minor; distinction between the two relates only to degree of severity, not to existence of procedural safeguards---A minor penalty remains a penalty and carries legal, professional and reputational consequences; to treat it as exempt from inquiry trivializes constitutional guarantees of fairness and due process---No penalty, “howsoever described”, may be imposed without confronting the accused with allegations, affording reasonable opportunity of defence, and deciding the matter through a reasoned order founded on some factual determination emerging from inquiry---Label of “minor” cannot justify dilution of procedural fairness; where punitive action affects dignity, reputation or prospects of advancement of a civil servant, it must pass through the “crucible of inquiry” so that discipline does not become disguised injustice. (d) Constitutional law & international human rights----Arts. 9, 10A & 14, Constitution of Pakistan; Art. 10, Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Art. 14, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights----Fair trial and due process in disciplinary proceedings---Obligations of the State---Held, due process and fair trial in disciplinary proceedings are not only constitutional imperatives under Arts. 9, 10A and 14 but also binding international obligations of Pakistan as signatory to core human rights instruments---Art. 10 of UDHR and Art. 14 of ICCPR envisage a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal in determination of rights and obligations, extending to civil, criminal and disciplinary matters---A meaningful inquiry is the primary procedural instrument for operationalizing these guarantees: it allows the person proceeded against to know the case, confront and test evidence, and present defence---Penalties, whether denominated as minor or major, founded on untested allegations and imposed without inquiry amount to arbitrary deprivation of rights and fall foul of both the constitutional framework and Pakistan’s international commitments---International and comparative jurisprudence recognising pre-decisional hearing and due process rights of public employees is consistent with, and reinforces, this position. Comparative jurisprudence referred: Satyendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2024 SCC 3325; Kulwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab 1990 INSC 278; MP State Agro Industries Development Corporation v. Jahan Khan 2007 INSC 895; Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Gilbert v. Homar 520 U.S. 924 (1997); Ward v. U.S. Postal Service 634 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 179 F.3d 1368 (1999). (e) Administration of justice----Service discipline----Attitude of “let them go to the courts”----Effect on rule of law and institutional functioning---Court noticed a recurring tendency in certain administrative hierarchies to dismiss procedural safeguards on the refrain that aggrieved public servants may seek judicial remedy---Held, such indifference trivializes hardship of civil servants who lack means, resources or social capital to pursue costly and protracted litigation, leaving many to endure unjust penalties in silence---When disciplinary power is exercised without inquiry, it harms not only the individual but corrodes institutional morale, breeds cynicism and burdens courts with avoidable litigation, diverting energies of both public servant and State from constructive service---Supreme Court restated that inquiry is the “cornerstone of the rule of law in service discipline” and a constitutional shield against administrative excess, and that justice within the bureaucracy cannot be reduced to whim of authority. (f) Service laws----Departmental proceedings----Charge of abetment to fraud in forged bills----Dispensation of inquiry by Managing Director PASSCO on plea of “sufficient documentary evidence”----Handwriting expert’s report negating authorship----Facts disputed---Whether summary procedure and major penalty were lawful----Held, allegations against petitioner concerned involvement in scam regarding preparation and encashment of forged and fictitious bills; facts were necessarily disputed and petitioner had denied allegations in reply to show cause; handwriting expert opined that signatures on purchase bill did not tally with petitioner’s admitted signatures---Managing Director PASSCO nonetheless dispensed with inquiry on general assertion of “sufficient documentary evidence and incriminating record” without identifying or establishing such evidence, and proceeded to award major penalty of dismissal---On these facts, there existed no reasonable ground to invoke S. 5(4) 2000 Ordinance; nature of charge clearly required testing of evidence and cross-examination, and case did not fall within limited category where facts are admitted or self-proving---High Court, while noticing handwriting expert’s report, erred in partially accepting writ petition by merely converting dismissal into compulsory retirement, in contravention of established principles requiring setting aside of penalty imposed without regular inquiry---Held, since guilt of petitioner was never established through lawful inquiry, no penalty, whether major or minor, could be imposed; order converting dismissal into compulsory retirement was set aside; petitioner was reinstated into service, with question of back benefits to be determined by department in light of Muhammad Sharif (2021 SCMR 962). Cited Cases: Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Aurangzeb 2025 SCMR 40; Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab 2021 SCMR 962.

Summary: (a) Service law----National Highways and Motorway Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2016----R.8(2)----Departmental inquiry----Right of cross-examination of witnesses----Failure to afford cross-examination----Effect. Proceedings were initiated against the petitioner, a Patrolling Officer (SI) of NH&MP, under the National Highways and Motorway Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2016, culminating in his dismissal from service, which was upheld in departmental and service appeals. Rule 8(2) of the said Rules expressly entitles the accused officer to cross-examine witnesses produced against him. The record did not show that the petitioner was given any opportunity to cross-examine the four prosecution witnesses; the learned Law Officer was also unable to point out anything in the inquiry report evidencing such opportunity. The plea that the petitioner had not raised this issue in his reply to the show cause notice was repelled on the ground that the right to cross-examination arises directly from the Rules and cannot be deemed waived merely by silence at an earlier stage, particularly when the ground was specifically taken before the Service Tribunal. Denial of cross-examination vitiated the inquiry and the consequent order of dismissal. (b) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.10-A----Right to fair trial and due process----Scope in departmental/disciplinary proceedings----Cross-examination as an integral safeguard. Article 10-A of the Constitution enshrines the right to fair trial and due process as a fundamental right, applicable to all adjudicatory proceedings including departmental inquiries. Fair trial is a composite guarantee comprising several indispensable elements: framing of a clear charge, adequate opportunity to defend, right to lead evidence, and the right to cross-examine witnesses. Each component is essential for adherence to natural justice and constitutional due process. The right to proper defence and, by necessary implication, to cross-examine prosecution witnesses is a vested, inalienable right of the accused employee. Proceedings in which the accused is denied the opportunity to cross-examine cannot meet the constitutional standard of fairness under Article 10-A and are liable to be set aside. (c) Administration of justice----Departmental inquiry----Duty of Inquiry Officer / Inquiry Committee----Whether accused must formally demand cross-examination----Comparative and local jurisprudence. The Court reiterated that cross-examination is an essential safeguard in disciplinary proceedings and that any testimony not subjected to cross-examination lacks comparable probative value. Inquiry Officers/Committees are duty-bound to conduct a fair, comprehensive and even-handed inquiry and to actively ensure compliance with natural justice, including the right of cross-examination. It cannot be held that failure by the accused to specifically demand cross-examination in the reply to show cause amounts to waiver of that right. The Inquiry Officer must inform the accused of this right, afford an effective opportunity to exercise it, and if the accused declines, record the reasons in writing. The right remains intact under Article 10-A even in the absence of a formal request. Comparative reference was made to Lyons v. Longford and Westmeath Education and Training Board [2017] IEHC 272, wherein the Irish High Court held that fair trial requirements, including cross-examination, must be fulfilled regardless of whether the accused makes a formal request; similar principles have been recognised in local jurisprudence. Cited Cases: • Federation of Pakistan through Chairman FBR v. Zahid Malik 2023 SCMR 603 • Raja Muhammad Shahid v. Inspector General of Police 2023 SCMR 1135 • Usman Ghani v. Chief Post Master, GPO Karachi 2022 SCMR 745 • Ghulam Murtaza Sheikh v. The Chief Minister, Sindh 2024 SCMR 1757 • Tariq Khan v. Additional DG, FIA 2025 PLC (C.S.) 467 • Lyons v. Longford and Westmeath Education and Training Board [2017] IEHC 272 Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed; impugned judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal and the dismissal order set aside. Competent authority directed to hold a de novo inquiry strictly in accordance with Article 10-A and R.8(2) of the Rules within two months. Pending conclusion of such inquiry, the petitioner stands reinstated in service; question of back benefits to be determined during the de novo proceedings.

Summary: (a) Service law — Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975 — Dismissal on “involvement in a criminal case” — Acquittal on merits removes substratum — Where departmental proceedings rest solely on the allegation that the civil servant was nominated/implicated in an FIR, and no independent, probeable act of misconduct is alleged or established, the employee’s acquittal in the criminal case extinguishes the very basis of the charge; any penalty founded thereon is legally untenable — Reinstatement ordered. (Muhammad Iqbal v. RPO Sahiwal, 2022 SCMR 1520, applied; also referred: 2024 SCMR 1675; 2023 PLC (C.S.) 267, 884) (b) Departmental vs. criminal proceedings — Distinct domains & standards — Departmental inquiries proceed on preponderance of probability to protect service integrity; criminal trials require proof beyond reasonable doubt to determine penal liability — The pendency/outcome of one does not, per se, control the other; both may run concurrently — Exception: when the only departmental allegation is “involvement in a criminal case”, acquittal on that accusation before the criminal court leaves nothing for the department to prove. (c) Due process & constitutional guarantees — Arts. 10A, 14 & 9 — Dismissal premised merely on FIR nomination, despite acquittal, and without any independent evidentiary finding of misconduct, offends fair trial/due process (Art. 10A), dignity (Art. 14), and the right to livelihood as an incident of life (Art. 9). (d) Inquiry defects — Charge-sheet carried two heads: (i) failure to perform duty appropriately; (ii) involvement in a criminal case — Both inquiries ignored the first head entirely and recommended action only on the second — Reliance solely on criminal implication, without evidence of dereliction, is impermissible; inquiry reports are vitiated for non-application of mind and absence of proof of a standalone misconduct. (e) Limitation — Department’s plea that the service appeal was time-barred was not raised before the Tribunal; in the case’s circumstances, not entertained at this stage. (f) Disposition — Leave granted; petition converted into appeal and allowed — Impugned Tribunal judgment and dismissal order set aside — Petitioner reinstated in service.

Summary: (a) Civil Servants Acts, 1973-74 — Federal & Provincial Service Tribunals Acts ----Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 212; Limitation Act, 1908, Ss. 3, 5 & 29(2); Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1977; Punjab Civil Services Rules (Vol-I), r. 14.21; Sindh Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1980; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1986; Balochistan Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 2013— Service appeal—Departmental appeal barred by limitation—Whether appeal before Service Tribunal competent—Held: Yes. The Service Tribunal is the first independent judicial forum and is statutorily empowered to examine questions of limitation as well as merits. Departmental delay cannot extinguish a civil servant’s statutory right of appeal; the tribunal must itself determine whether “sufficient” or “reasonable” cause existed for delay, review the department’s exercise (or failure) of discretion to condone it, and proceed accordingly. Outright dismissal merely because the departmental appeal was time-barred amounts to abdication of jurisdiction and violates Art. 212(1)-(2). (b) Civil Servants Acts, 1973-74 — Departmental appeals — Power to condone delay — Limitation Act, 1908, S. 5 — Applicability—Held: Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not automatically attracted to departmental proceedings, as S. 29(2)(b) excludes its application unless expressly incorporated; nevertheless, the relevant Rules themselves confer discretion on departmental authorities either to withhold or condone appeals filed out of time on showing of “reasonable cause”. Thus, even under the “withholding” framework (Federal, Punjab) or “condonation” framework (Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan), the department must apply its mind and record reasons before rejecting an appeal as time-barred. (c) Service Tribunals Acts, 1973-74 — Appellate jurisdiction — Scope and duty— Tribunals, as constitutional creatures under Art. 212, exercise appellate and fact-finding powers akin to civil courts; they are obliged to examine legality, factual foundation, and procedural fairness of departmental decisions, including limitation issues. Failure to consider condonation applications or to address limitation constitutes non-exercise of jurisdiction. (d) Case law — Chairman, P.I.A.C. v. Nasim Malik, PLD 1990 SC 951 — per incuriam— Held: The rule derived from PIAC case and followed in later decisions (e.g. Abdul Wahid, 1998 SCMR 882; Anwar Ali Sahto, PLD 2002 SC 101; Razi Uddin, 2004 PLC (CS) 468; Muhammad Aslam, 2007 SCMR 513; Raja Khan, 2011 SCMR 676; Ghulam Shabbir, 2013 PLC (CS) 1087; Muhammad Asif Chatha, 2015 SCMR 165) that an appeal before the Service Tribunal becomes incompetent when the departmental appeal was time-barred, is declared incorrect in law and per incuriam. The PIAC Regulations themselves envisaged condonation (withholding) of delayed appeals; the omission to appreciate this and the relevant statutory framework vitiated that precedent. (e) Sufficient/Reasonable cause — Concept and application— Both expressions are interchangeable; cause must be bona fide, beyond the applicant’s control, and shown with diligence. Mistaken legal advice or negligence ordinarily not enough unless founded on genuine ambiguity. Public authorities must apply limitation rules equitably, treating them as instruments of fairness rather than exclusion. (f) Practice and procedure — Prospective and consequential directions— All pending appeals where dismissal rested solely on departmental limitation to be re-listed and decided on merits after examining sufficiency of cause; past and closed transactions (including disposed review petitions) remain unaffected. PIAC line of cases overruled to this extent. Cited Cases: • Chairman, P.I.A.C. v. Nasim Malik, PLD 1990 SC 951 ( per incuriam ) • Abdul Wahid v. Chairman, C.B.R., 1998 SCMR 882 • Anwar Ali Sahto v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2002 SC 101 • Muhammad Aslam v. WAPDA, 2007 SCMR 513 • Raja Khan v. Manager (Operation) FESCO, 2011 SCMR 676 • Muhammad Asif Chatha v. Chief Secretary Punjab, 2015 SCMR 165 • Khushi Muhammad v. Fazal Bibi, PLD 2016 SC 872 (5-M bench) • Allah Dino v. Muhammad Shah, 2001 SCMR 286 • Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani, 2002 SCMR 1540 • Secretary to Govt. Punjab (Law & Parliamentary Affairs) v. Ali Ahmad Khan, 2025 SCMR 489 • Pakistan Railways v. Muhammad Amin, 2025 SCMR 646 Disposition: Legal question answered in negative—Appeal before Service Tribunal not rendered incompetent merely because departmental appeal was time-barred—Earlier contrary view in PIAC and following cases overruled—All connected matters to proceed individually on merits before competent benches—Past and closed transactions unaffected—Approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Service law — KP Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1989 — r. 10(4) — Deceased/invalid civil servant quota — Whether marriage disqualifies a daughter — Held: No. Rule 10(4) is a benevolent, compensatory measure that extends continuity of livelihood to the family of the deceased/ incapacitated civil servant; the beneficiary-child (son or daughter) is merely the conduit through whom the State recognizes the parent’s service. Marital status of the child is wholly immaterial to the object of the Rule. Administrative “clarifications” excluding married daughters are discriminatory, ultra vires, and without lawful authority. (Zahida Parveen v. Govt. of KPK, PLD 2025 SC 529, followed) (b) Constitutional law — Arts. 14, 25, 27 & 34 — Equality, dignity, non-discrimination & affirmative protection of women — Exclusion of married daughters from Rule 10(4) is founded on outdated stereotypes, violates equality and dignity, and perpetuates patriarchy. Constitution is gender-neutral in rights and, where necessary, favours women by mandating special measures to achieve substantive equality. Marriage neither diminishes a woman’s personhood nor her entitlements under the Constitution. (c) International commitments — CEDAW (ratified 03-12-1996) — Beijing Declaration & Platform for Action, 1995 — Executive instructions that bar women from public employment on grounds of marriage contravene Pakistan’s international commitments to eliminate discrimination and ensure women’s equal participation in economic and public life. Such frameworks, though not all self-executing, carry strong normative weight and inform constitutional interpretation in favour of inclusion. (d) Islamic ethos — Quranic equality & civic participation — In Islamic jurisprudence, the default rule is permissibility absent prohibition; there is no textual or rational basis to exclude women from gainful employment before or after marriage. Islam affirms women’s independent moral agency and participation in public life; patriarchal constructs that treat women as “liabilities” are antithetical to this ethos. (e) Administrative law — Withdrawal of appointment without notice — Due process — Termination of petitioner’s appointment based solely on marital status, and without show-cause or hearing, is void for violating fair trial and due process guarantees (Art. 10A) and for resting on unlawful instructions. (f) Precedent & prospective effect — General Post Office, Islamabad v. Muhammad Jalal, PLD 2024 SC 1276 (striking down r. 10(4)) operates prospectively and does not unsettle past/ subsisting appointments. When this Court declares a circular/clarification ultra vires, the declaration is in rem/erga omnes; authorities must extend its benefit to all similarly placed persons to avoid unequal treatment and multiplicity of litigation. (Govt. of KPK v. Maqsad Hayat, 2023 SCMR 8; Bashir Ahmed Badini, 2022 SCMR 448; WAPDA v. Abdul Ghaffar, 2018 SCMR 380; Hameed Akhtar Niazi, 1996 SCMR 1185, applied) (g) Women’s economic agency — A woman’s choice to work or to provide unpaid care is equally dignified; labeling a married woman as “dependent” or a “liability” is demeaning and constitutionally infirm. The State cannot penalize marriage by disabling access to public employment benefits. (h) Disposition — Impugned Tribunal judgment set aside. Petition converted into appeal and allowed. Department directed to restore petitioner’s appointment as PST with all back benefits, per parity and the rule in Muhammad Sharif v. IGP, Punjab (2021 SCMR 962). Directions reiterated that the struck-down clarifications (21-02-2022 & 28-04-2023) confer no legal effect and must not be relied upon in any current or future cases under r. 10(4).

Summary: (a) Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)--- ----Ss.2(bb) & 33---Punjab Private Security Companies (Regulation and Control) Ordinance, (LXIX of 2002), S.13---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Employees’ Old-Age Benefit (EOB) contributions---Petitioner company engaging security services through independent third-party service provider---Issuance of show cause notice and demand notice, challenge to---Whether the security guards were employees of the beneficiary company or that of the third-party service provider---Whether the petitioner/beneficiary company was liable for ‘EOB’ contributions or the independent third-party service provider---Determination---Briefly, the petitioner company entered into security service agreements with various private security companies for deployment of security guards at its offices and sites---Upon correspondence, the Employees Old-Age Benefits Institution (EOBI) demanded employer and employee contributions in respect of the deployed guards and issued show-cause as well as demand notices, and initiated recovery proceedings, including sealing of the petitioner’s office, leading the petitioner to file a complaint under section 33 of the Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976, which was dismissed by the adjudicating authority---Appellate Authority also held the petitioner liable to pay contributions amounting to Rs. 238,960,800/- for the period July 2004 to June 2010---Issue requiring determination before the High Court “was whether the security guards deployed through independent security companies were to be treated as employees of the petitioner company for the purposes of EOB contributions, and whether the impugned orders and recovery proceedings were legally sustainable?”---Held: Security Companies engaged by the petitioner company were registered in different provinces where the provincial statutes govern the regulatory framework of security companies in their respective jurisdictions---For instance, S. 13 of the Punjab Private Security Companies (Regulation and Control) Ordinance, 2002 delineates a comprehensive regulatory framework governing the employment, supervision and welfare of personnel engaged by a licensed security company---This provision imposed upon the licensee a continuing obligation to ensure the integrity, discipline and lawful conduct of all individuals employed in connection with its operations---Under the existing framework across the provincial jurisdictions, security companies/third-party service providers assumed the unequivocal status of “employers” of their respective security personnel, possessing complete administrative and financial control over them, who were responsible for the employment, hiring, training and equipping of the security guards and provide uniforms, issue arms and ammunition, deploy personnel to various sites, manage work shifts and determine leave schedules---Under the contractual framework the security companies having complete discretion were responsible for hiring, dismissal, payment of wages, and all other benefits due towards the guards under the social security and labor laws and these agreements explicitly set out the responsibility of registration with the Social Security and Employees Old Age Benefits Institution on the Security Companies and established their liability to discharge all legal obligations towards the said guards---Impugned decision imposing the contributions liability upon the petitioner in respect of the security guards at its sites, without first adjudicating the clear and material question of who in fact employed and paid the guards, was legally unsustainable---Security companies, in their capacity as direct employers of the security guards, could not be overlooked in determining liability for Employees Old Age Benefits contributions---Impugned decisions were set aside---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Messers Bolan Mining Enterprises v. Board of Trustees, EOBI and others 2010 SCMR 1573 rel. Nestle Milk Pak Ltd. v. Board of Trustees, EOBI, Karachi, 2005 PLC 19 ref. (b) Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)--- ----S.2(bb)---Workers performing duties through a third-party service provider---Whether these workers to be regarded as employees of the beneficiary company or the third-party service provider---Scope of employment---Term ‘employee’ includes any person engaged for wages or otherwise, whether employed directly by the principal employer or through any other person acting on his behalf---Likewise, the expression “employer”, when used in relation to an industry or establishment, is sufficiently wide to encompass any person, who employs a person either directly or through an intermediary or contractor---When these definitions are harmoniously construed, it unequivocally follows that the workers performing duties through a contractor, agent, or any such intermediary, whose services are availed by any establishment, fall within the purview of the term “employee” for the purposes of statutory contribution. Hamza Siddiqui for Petitioner. Khurram Mahmood Qureshi for Respondents Nos.1 to 3. Assisted by Muhammad Yahya Khan Niazi. Date of hearing: 16th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act (XII of 2006)- -Ss. 4 & 13(4)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A-Show-cause notice-Requirement of minimum contents, non-fulfillment of-Fundamental right of fair trial, violation of-Award of punishment not provided under the law-Effect-Withdrawal of promotion/selection grade and recovery after retirement-Validity-Show cause notice depicted that neither the detail of commission of act or omission was provided, nor the proposed penalty or recommendations were provided in the notice-No provision of the PEEDA Act was provided under which petitioner was liable to be penalized upon proving of charges-Strict compliance of requirements was vital to avoid violation of principles of natural justice, as it would not only frustrate the requirement of giving him a reasonable opportunity to put up a defence but also amount to violation of his fundamental right to fair trial-Statutory ingredients must appear on face of notice and in absence of requisite allegations, the notice was void for vagueness-Neither inquiry officer inquired the signing authority of the order which granted promotion and selection grade, nor members of DPC were inquired, which depicted how proceedings were solely revolving against petitioner only and not in any other direction, that was a blatant violation of fair trial and ultimately principles of natural justice-Punishment to lower scale awarded to petitioner was for serving employees and not retired employees under PEEDA Act, thus, no recovery could be effected, as being penal it required a finding that petitioner’s act or omission caused a quantified loss to exchequer after due inquiry and fair opportunity, however, no such finding existed, thus, retrospective deprivation and recovery of benefits long enjoyed on higher post was disallowed by Supreme Court-Withdrawal of promotion/selection grade and recovery under Section 4(1)(c) of PEEDA Act were declared without lawful authority and of no legal effect-Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, in circumstances. Sana Ullah Sani v. Secretary Education Schools 2024 SCMR 80; Muhammad Arshad v. Deputy District Food, Multan 2025 SCP 227; Noor Ahmed v. Province of East Pakistan PLD 1962 Dacca 533; Faridsons Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1961 SC 537; Chief Commissioner, Karachi v. Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrik PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 45; Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works 143 ER 414; Russel v. Russel 14 Ch D 471; Noor Ahmed v. Province of East Pakistan PLD 1964 Dacca 546; Lakhu Sarkar v. Government of East Pakistan PLD 1964 Dacca 217; Muhammad Abdus Salam v. District Council, Rajshahi PLD 1964 Dacca 554 and Assistant Collector Customs v. Khyber Electric Lamp 2001 SCMR 838 rel. (b) Maxim- -Audi alteram partem’-Application-Maxim-audi alteram partem-applies with full vigour to administrative action affecting rights and it also applies to judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies-Where a statute is silent, the justice of the common law supplies the omission of the legislature and the right of hearing has to be read in that statute. Mall Syare Residents Association v. Mall Developers PLD 1997 Kar. 1 rel. (c) Locus poenitentiae, doctrine of- -Scope-Once an administrative decision has taken legal effect, conferred benefits, and been acted upon for years, it cannot ordinarily be withdrawn to the detriment of the beneficiary unless illegality or want of competence in the original grant is shown. Mst. Basharat Jehan v. Director-General, FGEI (C/Q) 2015 SCMR 1418; Government of the Punjab v. Aamir Junaid 2015 SCMR 74; Federation of Pakistan v. Flt Lt Farrukh Rashid (R) 2008 SCMR 544 and Engineer-in-Chief v. Jalaluddin PLD 1992 SC 207 rel. (d) Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act (XII of 2006)- -Ss. 2(n) & 4-Penalties not provided under the law-Power of competent authority to award a penalty-Scope-Even if the misconduct is proved under the PEEDA Act, the competent authority is not empowered to award a punishment different to what is prescribed under the law. Shams-ur-Rahman v. Military Accountant General 2020 SCMR 188 rel. Assistance by: Muhammad Subhan Malik, (Judicial Law Clerk).

Summary: (On appeal against Judgment dated 15.03.2022 passed in S.A. No. 1251 of 2019). (a) Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act (XII of 2006)--- ----Ss. 4 & 13(4)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A---Show-cause notice---Requirement of minimum contents, non-fulfillment of---Fundamental right of fair trial, violation of---Award of punishment not provided under the law---Effect---Withdrawal of promotion/selection grade and recovery after retirement---Validity---Show cause notice depicted that neither the detail of commission of act or omission was provided, nor the proposed penalty or recommendations were provided in the notice---No provision of the PEEDA Act was provided under which petitioner was liable to be penalized upon proving of charges---Strict compliance of requirements was vital to avoid violation of principles of natural justice, as it would not only frustrate the requirement of giving him a reasonable opportunity to put up a defence but also amount to violation of his fundamental right to fair trial---Statutory ingredients must appear on face of notice and in absence of requisite allegations, the notice was void for vagueness---Neither inquiry officer inquired the signing authority of the order which granted promotion and selection grade, nor members of DPC were inquired, which depicted how proceedings were solely revolving against petitioner only and not in any other direction, that was a blatant violation of fair trial and ultimately principles of natural justice---Punishment to lower scale awarded to petitioner was for serving employees and not retired employees under PEEDA Act, thus, no recovery could be effected, as being penal it required a finding that petitioner’s act or omission caused a quantified loss to exchequer after due inquiry and fair opportunity, however, no such finding existed, thus, retrospective deprivation and recovery of benefits long enjoyed on higher post was disallowed by Supreme Court---Withdrawal of promotion/selection grade and recovery under Section 4(1)(c) of PEEDA Act were declared without lawful authority and of no legal effect---Petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal and allowed, in circumstances. Sana Ullah Sani v. Secretary Education Schools 2024 SCMR 80; Muhammad Arshad v. Deputy District Food, Multan 2025 SCP 227; Noor Ahmed v. Province of East Pakistan PLD 1962 Dacca 533; Faridsons Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1961 SC 537; Chief Commissioner, Karachi v. Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrik PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 45; Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works 143 ER 414; Russel v. Russel 14 Ch D 471; Noor Ahmed v. Province of East Pakistan PLD 1964 Dacca 546; Lakhu Sarkar v. Government of East Pakistan PLD 1964 Dacca 217; Muhammad Abdus Salam v. District Council, Rajshahi PLD 1964 Dacca 554 and Assistant Collector Customs v. Khyber Electric Lamp 2001 SCMR 838 rel. (b) Maxim--- ----“Audi alteram partem’---Application---Maxim “audi alteram partem” applies with full vigour to administrative action affecting rights and it also applies to judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies---Where a statute is silent, the justice of the common law supplies the omission of the legislature and the right of hearing has to be read in that statute. Mall Syare Residents Association v. Mall Developers PLD 1997 Kar. 1 rel. (c) Locus poenitentiae, doctrine of--- ----Scope---Once an administrative decision has taken legal effect, conferred benefits, and been acted upon for years, it cannot ordinarily be withdrawn to the detriment of the beneficiary unless illegality or want of competence in the original grant is shown. Mst. Basharat Jehan v. Director-General, FGEI (C/Q) 2015 SCMR 1418; Government of the Punjab v. Aamir Junaid 2015 SCMR 74; Federation of Pakistan v. Flt Lt Farrukh Rashid (R) 2008 SCMR 544 and Engineer-in-Chief v. Jalaluddin PLD 1992 SC 207 rel. (d) Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act (XII of 2006)--- ----Ss. 2(n) & 4---Penalties not provided under the law---Power of competent authority to award a penalty---Scope---Even if the misconduct is proved under the PEEDA Act, the competent authority is not empowered to award a punishment different to what is prescribed under the law. Shams-ur-Rahman v. Military Accountant General 2020 SCMR 188 rel. Abdul Rehman Khan Lashari, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Khalid Masood Ghani, A.A.G, Punjab for Respondents. Assistance by: Muhammad Subhan Malik, (Judicial Law Clerk). Date of hearing: 15th October, 2025.