Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Satisfaction for issuance of an order under section 3 West Pakistan Maintenance of the PublicOrder Ordinance, 1960 by the authority must be objective in nature and not subjective, which issine qua non.

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Arts. 186, 144, 147 & 172 Foreign Investment (Protection and Promotion) Act, 2022 Regulation of Mines and Oilfields and Mineral Development (Government Control) Act, 1948 Public Policy—Negotiated Agreements—Advisory Jurisdiction of Supreme Court—Reko Diq Project Settlement—Validity of Implementation and Definitive Agreements. In a Presidential Reference under Article 186 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court was asked to opine on the validity of the Implementation and Definitive Agreements entered between the Government of Pakistan (GoP), Government of Balochistan (GoB), and Barrick Gold Corporation regarding the Reko Diq mining project. The Court observed that while the disposal of public assets through competitive bidding is the ordinary rule, it is not invariable. Agreements negotiated transparently, supported by law, and justified on rational grounds do not violate the Constitution. The Agreements were reached after extensive negotiations involving international financial, legal, and technical advisors, as well as consultations with relevant stakeholders. The Court held that the agreements do not violate the principles laid down in Abdul Haque Baloch v. Government of Balochistan (PLD 2013 SC 641). The restructured Reko Diq project included a 50% equity share for Barrick, while the remaining 50% was distributed among local entities, including 10% free carried interest and 15% participating interest for the GoB, a 5% royalty for the province, and 25% equity for federal entities. Environmental safeguards, labor protections, and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) measures were adequately addressed in the agreements. ----Disposition: First question answered in the negative; Agreements upheld as valid and constitutional. ----Cited Laws: Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 186, 144, 147 & 172 Foreign Investment (Protection and Promotion) Act, 2022 Regulation of Mines and Oilfields and Mineral Development (Government Control) Act, 1948 ----(b) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Arts. 144 & 147 Foreign Investment (Protection and Promotion) Bill, 2022—Validity and Constitutionality—Legislative Competence of Provincial Assemblies. The Supreme Court addressed whether the proposed Foreign Investment (Protection and Promotion) Bill, 2022 (later enacted as the Foreign Investment (Protection and Promotion) Act, 2022) was valid and constitutional. It held that under Article 144, provincial assemblies are competent to empower Parliament to legislate on provincial matters. Similarly, Article 147 allows provinces to delegate their executive authority to the federal government. The Bill does not fetter parliamentary sovereignty, and exemptions under it align with regulatory frameworks such as those for Export Processing Zones and Special Technology Zones. The Act safeguards labor rights, guarantees minimum wage compliance, and ensures adherence to international mining standards. It also provides a structured legal framework for facilitating foreign investment in large-scale projects. Disposition: Second question answered in the affirmative; Foreign Investment (Protection and Promotion) Act, 2022 upheld as valid and constitutional. ----Cited Laws: Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 144 & 147 Foreign Investment (Protection and Promotion) Act, 2022 (c) Mineral Resources—Provincial Autonomy—Obligations of Federal and Provincial Governments: ----Arts. 172 & 144 The Supreme Court emphasized that mineral resources in a province vest exclusively with the respective provincial government under Article 172 of the Constitution. The federal government’s role is limited to facilitation, coordination, and fulfilling international obligations in collaboration with the concerned province. The Court highlighted the need for sustainable mining practices, adherence to environmental laws, and equitable allocation of proceeds, including consideration for future generations through measures such as Sovereign Wealth Funds. The Court noted that while the Reko Diq settlement was justified under compelling circumstances, future agreements must prioritize transparency, competitive bidding, and expert consultation to avoid similar disputes. ----Disposition: Agreements validated; guidelines provided for future mining agreements. ---Cited Laws: Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 172 & 144 ---Disposition: Presidential Reference answered in the negative for Question 1; the Agreements are valid and constitutional. Presidential Reference answered in the affirmative for Question 2; the Foreign Investment (Protection and Promotion) Act, 2022 is valid and constitutional. ---Cited Case: Abdul Haque Baloch v. Government of Balochistan (PLD 2013 SC 641)

Summary: (a) Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman under the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2019 The High Court examined the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) under the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2019, concluding that the Ombudsman lacks the authority to seal property pending adjudication. While the Ombudsman may order attachment to prevent alienation of property, the concept of sealing a property depriving owners of its use is beyond statutory powers. Consequently, the order for sealing the disputed property was set aside, while the attachment order remained in force. (b) Trichotomy of Powers – Judicial, Executive & Legislative Authority The Constitution of Pakistan (Article 175) upholds the principle of trichotomy of powers, ensuring that adjudicatory functions are confined to the judiciary. The Court held that delegating parallel judicial functions to an executive body such as the Ombudsman violates constitutional principles. The Ombudsman, being part of the executive limb, cannot be granted adjudicatory powers akin to civil courts. Reference was made to Mehram Ali v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 1445) and Liaqat Hussain v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1999 SC 504), which affirm that courts established under Article 175 alone hold judicial authority. (c) Partition of Joint Property – Ombudsman’s Limitations The Court identified a lacuna in the 2019 Act, which does not specify a mechanism for partitioning jointly owned property among co-owners. Unlike civil courts that follow Order 20 Rule 18 CPC for partition and appoint commissioners where necessary, the Act lacks any procedural framework for such adjudication. The High Court clarified that the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction applies only when a woman is illegally deprived of her property, not in cases of joint ownership disputes requiring formal partition proceedings. (d) Parallel Proceedings – Civil Court vs. Ombudsman Where a civil suit for partition is pending, the Ombudsman must abstain from exercising jurisdiction to avoid conflicting decisions. The Court held that the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2019, to the extent that it allows intervention in matters already sub judice before civil courts, contradicts constitutional principles. In light of Shahid Nabi Malik v. Chief Election Commissioner (PLD 1997 SC 32), civil courts have exclusive jurisdiction over property disputes, and Ombudsman cannot interfere once judicial proceedings are initiated. (e) Ombudsman – Non-Adversarial Role in Executive Oversight Relying on international jurisprudence, including British Columbia Development Corporation v. Friedmann (1984 SCC 121, Canada) and Durga Hotel Complex v. Reserve Bank of India (AIR 2007 SC 1467), the Court emphasized that Ombudsman institutions are non-adversarial, investigative bodies intended to oversee executive mal-administration, not to function as courts. (f) Interim Relief in Partition Disputes The High Court reaffirmed that in partition suits, courts can issue interim injunctions to prevent alienation or change in property status, but should not pass orders that unnecessarily disrupt possession and business operations. The Ombudsman’s order sealing the property was deemed harsh and beyond legal authority, particularly as tenants occupied part of the disputed property. (g) Legislative Recommendation – Need for a Structured Partition Law The Court observed that women’s inheritance rights are often violated through legal loopholes and prolonged litigation. It urged the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government to enact a comprehensive law similar to the Punjab Partition of Immovable Property Act, 2012, to streamline inheritance disputes and prevent abuse of legal processes. Reference was made to Ghulam Qasim v. Mst. Razia Begum (PLD 2021 SC 812), where the Supreme Court lamented the systematic deprivation of women’s inheritance rights through fraudulent tactics. (h) Disposition Ombudsman’s sealing order set aside as illegal. Attachment order upheld to prevent alienation pending adjudication. Ombudsman barred from exercising jurisdiction in partition matters already pending before civil courts. Provincial legislature urged to pass inheritance protection laws ensuring fair partition of women’s property rights.

Summary: (a) Constitutional Jurisdiction—Writ of Certiorari Scope and limitations—Supervisory versus appellate jurisdiction. The High Court, in exercising its writ jurisdiction, acts in a supervisory rather than appellate capacity. Certiorari is available to correct errors of jurisdiction, illegality, or violations of natural justice but not for reviewing findings of fact by subordinate courts or tribunals. Cited Cases: Amjad Khan v. Muhammad Irshad (Deceased) through LRs (2020 SCMR 2155) Chairman NAB v. Muhammad Usman (PLD 2018 SC 28) Shajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique (PLD 2007 SC 45). Disposition: Petition dismissed; findings of fact by Justice of Peace upheld. (b) Abuse of Court Process—Filing of Multiple Petitions False affidavits, misrepresentation, and concealment of facts. The petitioner’s repetitive filings under Section 22-A/B Cr.P.C., despite the dismissal of earlier petitions and concealment of pending cases, amounted to abuse of the judicial process. Filing false affidavits and certificates to mislead courts constitutes fraud and misrepresentation. Disposition: Petition dismissed with costs of Rs. 500,000; referral for criminal proceedings initiated. (c) Equitable Relief—Clean Hands Doctrine Prerequisite for invoking constitutional jurisdiction. A petitioner seeking discretionary relief under Article 199 of the Constitution must approach the court with clean hands. Misrepresentation, fraud, and concealment of facts disqualify a litigant from obtaining such relief. Cited Cases: Shafqatullah v. District and Sessions Judge, Nowshera (2001 SCMR 274) Manzoor Hussain v. Muhammad Siddique (2000 CLC 623). Disposition: Relief denied; petitioner forfeited equitable relief by filing false claims. (d) Judicial Costs and Deterrence Imposition of costs to deter misuse of judicial process. Courts must impose significant costs to discourage reprehensible and contemptuous conduct by litigants who abuse judicial processes, thereby protecting bona fide litigants and preserving judicial integrity. Disposition: Costs of Rs. 500,000 imposed on the petitioner; future caution emphasized. (e) Criminal Proceedings for Misrepresentation Referral to Sessions Judge for initiating criminal proceedings. The petitioner’s filing of false affidavits, certificates, and concealment of material facts before the courts led to the referral of the matter to the Sessions Judge for initiating criminal proceedings under relevant provisions of law. Disposition: Referral made; report required within six months.

Summary: Azam Swati has been arrested by FIA. Seeks direction upon the Interior secretary to compile data regarding all FIRs lodged against him regarding the same occurrences. (FIR No. 185/2022 dated 26.11.2022 U/s 20 of PECA 2016 r/w 131,500,501,505,109 PPC P.S. FIA Cyber Crime Reporting Centre, Islamabad) --- Background: In W.P. No. 4441 of 2022, Muhammad Azam Khan Swati petitioned for information on pending cases against him in Sindh and Balochistan related to the same occurrence of social media tweets against the Armed Forces of Pakistan. Swati sought directions for the Federation of Pakistan to provide this information, claiming it as his fundamental right for defense. ----Issues: 1) Whether Swati has a legal right to seek information on pending cases against him in other provinces. 2) Whether the Federal Government is obligated to provide such information. 3) Application of Articles 149 and 10-A of the Constitution in this context. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ----Legal Right to Information: The court held that there is no legal right for an individual to seek such information under Article 149 or the Rules of Business, 1973. Article 10-A provides the right to a fair trial but does not mandate the provision of information about pending cases. Federal Government's Obligation: The court found no obligation on the Federal Government to obtain information for the petitioner. Article 149 and Rules of Business: The court noted that these provisions empower the Federal Government to issue general directions, not specific to individuals seeking information about pending cases. -----Outcome: The petition was disposed of, with the court advising Swati to seek remedies in the relevant provincial jurisdictions (Sindh and Balochistan). The court suggested the development of a national system to link all police stations to manage information on FIRs, referencing the principles laid down in Sughran Bibi’s case. -----Citations/Precedents: The State of Pakistan v. Mehrajuddin [PLD 1959 SC 147] Fazal-E-Haq v. The State [PLD 1960 SC 295] Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali v. Chief Settlement Commission [PLD 1973 SC 236] Masudul Hassan v. Khadim Hussain [PLD 1963 SC 203] Mst. Sughran Bibi v. The State [PLD 2018 SC 595] Sh. Ihsanul Haq Piracha v. Mr. Wasim Sajjad [PLD 1986 SC 200]

Summary: Background:M/s A.K Tariq Foundry and other petitioners, who are registered limited companies, partnerships, and sole proprietors with manufacturing units in the erstwhile Provincial Administered Tribal Area (PATA) and Federal Administered Tribal Area (FATA), challenged the imposition of sales tax on their electricity supply post the 25th Constitutional Amendment. This amendment merged FATA and PATA into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, thus extending the federal fiscal and tax regimes to these areas. The petitioners contested the discriminatory treatment and exclusions under Entry No. 152 of the Sixth Schedule to the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which exempted certain industries from sales tax on electricity supply while excluding steel, ghee, and cooking oil industries, and industries established after May 31, 2018.---Issues:1. Whether the exclusion of certain industries from the sales tax exemption under Entry No. 152 of the Sixth Schedule to the Sales Tax Act, 1990, violates Articles 18 and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan.2. Whether the legislative classification and sub-classification for tax exemption purposes are constitutionally permissible.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:Exclusion from Sales Tax Exemption:The Court examined whether the exclusion of steel, ghee, and cooking oil industries, as well as industries established after May 31, 2018, from the sales tax exemption on electricity supply violated the principles of equality and non-discrimination enshrined in Articles 18 and 25 of the Constitution.The Court held that the exclusion of industries established after May 31, 2018, created an unreasonable classification. Industries established before and after this date operated in the same market and faced similar conditions. Therefore, denying tax exemptions based solely on the establishment date was discriminatory and violated Article 25.Legislative Classification and Sub-Classification:The Court recognized that while the legislature has the authority to classify and differentiate between various classes of taxpayers, such classification must be based on an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the objective sought to be achieved.The Court found that the exclusion of steel, ghee, and cooking oil industries from the tax exemption was not arbitrary or unreasonable. These industries were treated as a separate class, and the differentiation was deemed constitutionally valid as it did not constitute discriminatory treatment under the established legal principles.The Court declared Entry No. 152 of the Sixth Schedule to the Sales Tax Act, 1990, as ultra vires to the extent that it discriminated against industries based on their establishment date. However, the exclusion of steel, ghee, and cooking oil industries from the tax exemption was upheld.----Citations/Precedents:Commissioner of Income Tax, Peshawar Vs. Gul Cooking Oil and Vegetable Ghee (Pvt) Ltd (2008 PTD 169)Affirmed the exemption of FATA and PATA industries from income tax and sales tax before the 25th Constitutional Amendment.Taj Packages Company (Pvt). Ltd Vs. Government of Pakistan (2016 PTD 203)Confirmed the immunity of goods imported for consumption in FATA from sales tax.Pakistan through Chairman FBR Vs. Hazrat Hussain (2018 SCMR 939)Reiterated the exemption of FATA industries from federal taxes.M/s Lucky Cement Ltd Vs. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2022 SCMR 1961)Discussed the principles of non-discrimination and equality in the context of tax laws.Pakcom Ltd Vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2011 SC 44)Highlighted the principles of equal protection under the law.Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills LTD Vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1997 SC 582)Elaborated on the legislative authority to classify for tax purposes and the constitutional limits on such classification.

Summary: [Powers of declaratory judgments under Article 184 of the Constitution in the dispute between any two or more Governments. The object of Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C is to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved between the necessary and proper parties.] (Not Approved for Reporting) The case involves a dispute over land acquisition and boundaries between the Province of Punjab and Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT). The Administrator of ICT had constituted new revenue estates in Islamabad, located at the boundary of Rawalpindi and Islamabad Districts. The Military Estate Officer of Rawalpindi Circle required land in Mouza Ojri Kalan, which was later de-notified within the District Islamabad. However, land acquisition proceedings were initiated for the same land, and two notifications were issued under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3111/2018 claimed exclusive ownership of the land and sought determination of compensation. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 341/2019 sought derequisition/release of their land. Both petitions were disposed of by the Lahore High Court with certain directions. The present judgment is an appeal against the Lahore High Court's order. The Additional Advocate General argued that the order ignored important legal aspects and misread the documents on record. The Supreme Court examined the impugned order and noted that certain parties were deleted from the array of respondents with the consent of the parties. The petitioners' counsel requested the court to direct the remaining respondents to initiate further action in accordance with previous judgments. The court directed the FOP through the Ministry of Defence to initiate the matter afresh with the Land Acquisition Collector, Rawalpindi, within two months. The Province of Punjab, through its District Collector, Rawalpindi, filed the present appeal challenging the order. The Supreme Court observed that the Province of Punjab did not object when their names were initially struck off from the respondents' list. The court also referred to a previous judgment related to the collection of property tax, where the High Court held that the subject area fell within the territorial limits of District Rawalpindi. The Supreme Court concluded that there were crucial issues related to boundaries and territorial limits between Punjab and ICT. The Lahore High Court's order was not challenged by the FOP or the petitioners before the High Court. The court found no reason to interfere with the impugned order and dismissed the appeal.