Summary: The central issue in these petitions is whether these employees are eligible for reinstatement under the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Ordinance, 2009, and the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010, based on specific criteria. The petitioners argued that they were appointed as Area Managers between 1994 and 1996 but were subsequently terminated in 1997 and 1998. They claim that they are entitled to reinstatement under the aforementioned legal provisions. They contended that their appointments as Area Managers were direct and not promotions from other positions within the corporation. Conversely, the respondents argued that the termination cut-off date specified in the Ordinance and Act is from November 1, 1996, to October 12, 1999, and as the petitioners' terminations occurred after November 30, 1996, they do not qualify for reinstatement. The judgment carefully analyzed the relevant provisions of the Ordinance and the Act and finds that the petitioners meet the eligibility criteria for reinstatement. It dismisses the arguments put forth by the respondents regarding the termination cut-off date, promotions, and performance-based termination. The judgment also highlighted instances of similar cases where employees were reinstated under these legal provisions. The judgment rules in favor of the petitioners, directing the respondent Corporation to process their applications and grant them the benefits of the Ordinance and the Act, effectively reinstating them to their former positions.

Summary: The accused was apprehended and charas four kilograms was recovered. The defence plea was that the appellant on the fateful day i.e. 07.11.2009 went to the court where some altercation took place between the appellant and police officials of PS Civil Line, Gujranwala, due to which, they falsely involved the appellant. Neither the appellant had adduced any evidence to show that he had any altercation with police officials nor he named the police officials. As far as contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant is first offender, therefore, he deserves some leniency in awarding the sentence is concerned, from the impugned judgment, it revealed that the learned trial court while taking note of this aspect has already inflicted lesser sentence of four years R.I. Criminal Appeal dismissed.

Summary: Issue: Whether Fauji Sugar Mills was liable to pay excise duty on sugar manufactured, considering the exemptions provided in SROs 455(I)/96 and 456(I)/96, and their subsequent amendments.Holding: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment that Fauji Sugar Mills was not liable for excise duty on the unexported quantity of sugar for the period 1998-1999.Reasoning: The Court found the SROs to be contradictory and irreconcilable regarding the exemption of excise duty on cane sugar. SRO 456, as amended, provided a "Nil" rate of excise duty on cane sugar, overriding the provisions of SRO 455. The Court held that in cases of fiscal statutes, where ambiguity exists, the interpretation must be in favor of the taxpayer. The Court criticized the issuance of ambiguous SROs, urging the Federal Government to provide clear and unambiguous statutory instruments in the future.Key Precedents Cited:Mehran Associates Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1993 PTD 69): Established that fiscal statutes should be construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer in cases of ambiguity.Government of Sindh v. Muhammad Shafi (PLD 2015 Supreme Court 380): Reiterated the principle of interpreting charging sections of fiscal statutes strictly against the revenue and liberally in favor of the taxpayer in case of doubt.Judgment: The appeal was dismissed, with no order as to costs, confirming the High Court's ruling in favor of the taxpayer, Fauji Sugar Mills. The Court emphasized the need for clear and intelligible SROs to avoid misinterpretations and legal disputes.''Whenever the Federal Government in exercise of its powers issues SROs, the same should be intelligible and must not be open to misinterpretation or to more than one meaning. In case of contradictory S.R.Os open to different interpretations, the interpretation favorable to taxpayer would prevail and SRO issued later in time would be applicable.''

Summary: ''The western corner of the suit property merely touching the southern corner of the purported pre-emptor's land would not meet the requirement of the two properties being "adjacent" to each other in terms of the explanation to section 6 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991.'' --- Issue: Whether the respondent had established his right to pre-emption as a co-owner (shafi sharik), participant in special rights attached to the property (shafi khalit), or adjacent landowner (shafi jar) under section 6 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991.Holding: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Lahore High Court, and restored the judgment of the appellate court, thereby dismissing the pre-emption suit filed by the respondent.Reasoning: The Supreme Court found that the respondent had not established his right as shafi sharik, as there was no evidence to show co-ownership in the property. The Court also ruled that the respondent did not qualify as shafi jar because the properties were not "adjacent" in the legal sense required by the Act, citing the case of Muhammad Ayub v. Hazrat Mansha as precedent. Furthermore, the respondent's claim as shafi khalit was rejected because the main Jhang-Sargodha Road, accessible by both lands, could not be categorized as a "right of passage," and the respondent failed to establish a "right of water or right of irrigation" connected to his land. The Court also corrected the trial court's error regarding the sale price, affirming the sale mutation's stated price of Rs.190,000, dismissing the respondent's unsubstantiated claim of a lower price. The Supreme Court held that there was no basis for the High Court to invoke its revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as there was no illegality, material irregularity, or significant defect in the appellate court's judgment.Key Precedents Cited:Muhammad Ayub v. Hazrat Mansha (2006 MLD 1001): Clarified the requirement for land to be considered "adjacent" for the purposes of pre-emption.Subhanuddin v. Pir Ghulam (PLD 2015 Supreme Court 69): Addressed the issue of unsubstantiated claims regarding the sale price in pre-emption suits.

Summary: (a) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974): ----Ss. 43(2-A) & 44----Elevation of Judges to High Court----Requirement of consultation----Maintainability of writ of quo-warranto----Petition challenging the appointment of respondents as Judges of the High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir on the ground that consultation required under S. 43(2-A) of the Interim Constitution Act, 1974 was not duly conducted----Held, consultation process was completed before the issuance of notification, and both consultees/authorities were consistent in their stand----Even if any irregularity in the process of consultation occurred, it was an act of the appointing authority and not a ground to declare the appointments illegal----Petitioners failed to establish that respondents were not holding office under lawful authority. (b) Constitutional Law----Quo-warranto: ----Issuance of writ of quo-warranto----Necessity to prove unlawful occupation of office----Petitioners were not required to be aggrieved persons in a writ of quo-warranto, but they had to establish that the respondents were holding office without lawful authority----Held, burden to prove that appointment was illegal rested on the petitioners, which they failed to discharge----Court found that the appointment process had been conducted as per constitutional provisions and no illegality was found in the impugned notification----Petition was dismissed. (c) Laches----Delay in filing writ petition: ----Unexplained delay of over four years in challenging appointments----Petitioners had been appearing before the respondent Judges without raising any objection----Court held that inordinate delay without plausible explanation militated against the bona fides of the petitioners----Writ of quo-warranto cannot be issued as a matter of course where laches and questionable intent are evident. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984): ----Art. 87(2)----Filing of certified copies of impugned notification----Maintainability of writ petition----Petitioners failed to annex certified copies of the impugned notification with the writ petition as required under law----Held, under Art. 87(2) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, read with Rule 32(2) of the AJK High Court Procedure Rules, 1984, such a petition was not maintainable----Petition dismissed on this ground alone. (e) Independence of Judiciary: ----Appointment of Judges----Judicial impartiality----Court held that the petitioners had failed to establish any mala fide in the appointment of the respondents----The mere fact that the petitioners had appeared before the respondents as lawyers for several years without raising objections indicated that their petition lacked bona fides----Petition appeared to be vexatious rather than aimed at upholding the rule of law. ----Cited Cases: Muhammad Rafiq & Others v. Muhammad Pervaiz & Others [2005 SCMR 128] Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan [PLD 2009 Kar. 408] PLD 1993 SC (AJK) 12 Ghulam Mustafa v. AJK Govt. & Others [1991 MLD 2681] P.L. Lakhanpal v. Ajit Nath Ray, Chief Justice of India & Others [AIR 1975 Delhi 66] Masud ul Hassan v. Khadim Hussain [PLD 1963 SC 203] M. Manohar Reddy & Anr v. Union of India & Ors [AIR 2013 SC 795] S.P. Gupta & Others v. President of India & Others [AIR 1982 SC 149] ----Disposition: Writ petition dismissed in limine due to non-maintainability, laches, lack of bona fides, and failure to establish unlawful occupation of office.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.