Summary: (a) Civil Procedure—Temporary Injunction: —Grant of interim relief—Requirements of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss—Effect of failure to establish these elements. The petitioner sought a temporary injunction to restrain the respondent from alienating disputed land, based on an unregistered document titled Tasdeeq Nama. The Court held that for interim relief to be granted, the petitioner must establish a prima facie case, demonstrate that the balance of convenience lies in their favor, and prove that irreparable loss would occur if relief is denied. As the document lacked essential details such as Khasra numbers, total land area, and proof of possession, the Court ruled that the petitioner had failed to establish these necessary elements, warranting the dismissal of the injunction. Reliance was placed on Mst. Rasheed Bibi v. Muhammad Arshad (2020 MLD 1875) and Mubarak Mai v. Additional District Judge, Khanewal (2020 YLR 1875). (b) Specific Performance & Property Law: —Claim based on an unregistered agreement—Necessity of proving validity through evidence. The petitioner’s claim was based on an informal, unregistered document that had never been presented before revenue authorities for transfer of ownership. The Court reiterated that where a claim requires proof through evidence, a prima facie case cannot be presumed. The burden was on the petitioner to substantiate the authenticity of the Tasdeeq Nama, and in its absence, the grant of interim relief was unjustified. (c) Injunctions in Property Disputes: —Claims requiring substantial evidence—When interim relief should be withheld. The Court reaffirmed that where a party’s claim is contingent on proving a disputed document’s validity, interim relief should not be granted. The precedent in Mst. Rasheed Bibi was cited to emphasize that an unregistered document without supporting entries in the revenue record weakens the petitioner’s case, making the denial of an injunction appropriate. (d) Judicial Review—Scope of High Court’s interference in interim relief orders: —When findings of lower courts are not to be disturbed. The appellate court’s refusal to grant a temporary injunction was upheld, as no jurisdictional defect or illegality was found in its reasoning. The High Court reiterated that concurrent findings of fact should not be interfered with unless they are perverse or based on misreading of evidence. ----Disposition: Civil revision dismissed. Order refusing temporary injunction upheld.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act, 1877: ---Ss. 12, 21(a), 21(b), and 56(f)--- Specific performance of contract---Works contract---Temporary injunction---Relief in damages--- The appellant sought specific performance of a works contract for constructing a gas processing facility, despite the termination of the contract by the respondent due to delays. Held, the contract was not specifically enforceable as the performance could be compensated in damages under S. 21(a), Specific Relief Act, 1877. The contract entailed intricate details requiring continuous supervision by the court, barring specific performance under S. 21(b). Consequently, injunctive relief against the respondent was barred under S. 56(f). Damages remained the appropriate remedy. ----Cited Cases: Bolan Beverages (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pepsico Inc. (2004 CLD 1530) Pakistan Associated Construction Ltd. v. Asif H. Kazi (1986 SCMR 820) (b) Easements Act, 1882: ---Ss. 60, 62(c), (f), and 63--- Revocation of license---Termination of contract---Possession of project site--- The appellant’s possession of the project site was as a licensee under the works contract, which was terminated. Held, the license was deemed revoked under Ss. 62(c) and 62(f) of the Easements Act, 1882. The appellant could retain possession for a reasonable time under S. 63 only to vacate the site, not perpetuate its possession. (c) Arbitration and contractual disputes---Assessment of works---Burden of proof--- An independent third-party engineering firm (NESPAK) conducted an assessment of the works completed by the appellant under court supervision. Held, such assessments satisfy the requirement of gathering evidence for claims of damages. The appellant's demand for further technical audits was unnecessary and unjustified. Burden of proving damages remains on the appellant. ----Disposition: Appeals dismissed; interim order vacated.

Summary: (a) Bank Guarantees – Nature and Enforceability: ----Performance Guarantee and Mobilization Guarantee Bank guarantees, including performance and mobilization guarantees, are autonomous contracts and must be enforced according to their terms, independent of the underlying contract between the parties. Payment under such guarantees is unconditional and does not require the resolution of disputes between the principal and the beneficiary. The court emphasized the application of the "rule of strict compliance" for letters of demand made under bank guarantees, as reiterated in Shipyard K. Damen International v. Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Ltd. (PLD 2003 SC 191) and EFU General Insurance Ltd. v. Zhongxing Telecom Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. (PLD 2022 SC 809). Exceptions to this rule include fraud or special equities; however, neither was pleaded in the present case. (b) Exceptions to Non-Interference with Bank Guarantees: ----Fraud and Special Equities The court held that interference with bank guarantees is limited to cases where fraud or special equities exist. Fraud must be explicitly pleaded under Order VI, Rule 4, C.P.C., and proven with clear evidence. The plaintiff in this case neither pleaded fraud nor demonstrated special equities to restrain the encashment of bank guarantees. (c) Compliance with Demand Terms under Bank Guarantees: ----Strict and Substantial Compliance The letters of demand issued by the beneficiary (Defendant No.1) complied with the terms of the guarantees. The court observed that the wording used in the demands, though not identical to the prescribed text in the guarantees, fulfilled the requirement of "strict compliance" as per Zhongxing. Even under the doctrine of substantial compliance, the demands were valid and enforceable. (d) Injunction against Encashment of Bank Guarantees: ----Temporary Injunction – Grant or Refusal The plaintiff’s request for a temporary injunction to restrain encashment of the guarantees was dismissed. The court found no prima facie case, irreparable harm, or balance of convenience in favor of the plaintiff. Disputes regarding breach of the underlying contract did not justify interference with the guarantees. (e) Role of Arbitrator and Dispute Resolution: ----Pending Arbitration and Disputes The court reiterated that pending arbitration or disputes between parties under the underlying contract do not affect the enforceability of unconditional bank guarantees. Arbitration proceedings and claims for compensation can proceed independently without staying the guarantees. -----Disposition: C.M.A. No. 8430/2022 was dismissed. The court upheld the enforceability of the bank guarantees, affirming the principles of non-interference and strict compliance. -----Cited Cases: • Shipyard K. Damen International v. Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Ltd. (PLD 2003 SC 191) • EFU General Insurance Ltd. v. Zhongxing Telecom Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. (PLD 2022 SC 809) • National Construction Ltd. v. Aiwan-e-Iqbal Authority (PLD 1994 SC 311) • National Grid Company v. Government of Pakistan (1999 SCMR 2367) • Sazco (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Askari Commercia

Summary: Background: The petitioners filed a suit for declaration and cancellation of mutation No. 47 dated 20.11.1966 concerning a land dispute. They claimed that the land was given to the respondents' fathers for cultivation during the Dogra Regime, which they only became aware of in February 2018. An application for a temporary injunction was filed, and a status quo order was issued, which was later vacated by the trial court on 17.03.2021. The petitioners' appeal to the District Judge Kotli was dismissed on 30.09.2021, leading to the filing of this revision petition. ----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioners complied with the mandatory requirement of attaching the necessary documents with the revision petition as per Section 115 (1) CPC. 2- Whether the trial court and appellate court correctly rejected the petitioners' application for a temporary injunction and declared the suit as time-barred. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court found that the petitioners did not comply with the mandatory requirement of attaching the necessary documents with the revision petition as per Section 115 (1) CPC. This failure was considered a fatal defect, sufficient for the dismissal of the revision petition. The court noted that the basic ingredients necessary for the issuance of a status quo order were not found in the petitioners' suit. Both the trial court and the appellate court acted within their jurisdiction and did not commit any material irregularities. As a result, the revision petition was dismissed due to non-compliance with procedural requirements and the failure to establish the necessary grounds for the issuance of a status quo order. ----Citations/Precedents: Province of Pakistan v. Ikram-ul-Haq [1986 SCMR 1994] M. Arshad Sultan v. PM of Pakistan [PLD 1996 SC 77] Abdul Haq Khan v. Azad Govt. [2016 SCR 51] Ghiasul Haq v. Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir [PLD 1980 SC (AJ&K) 5] Azad Government v. Barrister Adnan Nawaz Khan [2020 SCR 591] Jammu & Kashmir Tehrik Ammal Party v. Azad State of Jammu and Kashmir [PLD 1985 AJ&K 95] PLD 1995 Pes 135 1987 CLC 2337 1995 MLD 1149 2018 CLC 814 2009 CLC 940 SC AJ&K PLD 1986 SC 65 PLD 1982 SC 6 PLD 1986 AJ&K 228

Summary: Background: The petitioners filed a suit for declaration, separate possession through partition, recovery of mesne profit, and injunction. During the proceedings, the petitioners requested to summon records from the Inland Revenue Department, which was initially allowed by the trial court. The respondent, not a party to the original suit, invoked Section 216 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, claiming privilege to prevent the production of the requested records. The trial court dismissed the respondent's application, but the respondent successfully appealed to the Additional District Judge, who set aside the trial court's order. The petitioners then challenged this decision in the Lahore High Court. ----Issues: 1- Whether the Inland Revenue Department can be compelled to produce tax records in civil court proceedings. 2- The interpretation of Section 216 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, concerning the confidentiality of tax records and the exceptions to this confidentiality. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, upholding the decision of the revisional court, which had set aside the trial court's order for the production of tax records. The court reasoned that: Section 216 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, imposes a confidentiality obligation on tax records and restricts their disclosure even in court proceedings. Subsection (2) explicitly bars any court from requiring a public servant to produce tax records, except as provided within the Ordinance. Subsection (4) allows for the production of certain documents before a court but cannot be interpreted in isolation from the broader confidentiality protections in subsections (1) and (2). The revisional court was correct in setting aside the trial court's order as the trial court did not properly consider the statutory confidentiality obligations. ----Citations/Precedents: Mrs. Khalida Azhar v. Viqar Rustam Bakhshi and others (2009 PTD 1694)

Summary: Background: The appellants filed two civil appeals challenging the judgment and decree of the District Judge Muzaffarabad, who had remanded the case back to the Senior Civil Judge for a fresh decision. The original suit was for declaration and perpetual injunction concerning a house and land that were allegedly sold through a disputed agreement. The plaintiffs claimed ownership and sought to annul subsequent agreements made by the defendants, which they alleged were based on fraud and forgery. The trial court had rejected the suit under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC, but the District Judge overturned this decision and ordered a retrial. ----Issues: 1- Whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs disclosed a cause of action and should proceed. 2- Whether the disputed agreements to sell and the subsequent mutations in the revenue records were valid. 3- Whether the trial court correctly applied Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC to reject the suit. 4- Whether the remand order by the District Judge was justified. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The High Court upheld the decision of the District Judge to remand the case for a fresh decision by the trial court. The court found that the suit disclosed a cause of action that needed to be adjudicated on its merits. It also noted that civil courts have jurisdiction over disputes involving adverse entries in revenue records and the grant of permanent injunctions. The court emphasized that the trial court should address all relevant issues, including the validity of the disputed agreements and mutations, and proceed with the trial expeditiously. Both civil appeals were dismissed, and the decision of the District Judge to remand the case for a fresh decision by the trial court was upheld. The trial court was directed to expedite the proceedings and adjudicate the matter in accordance with the law. ----Citations/Precedents Maqsood Mir Vs. Department of Revenue & others [2015 SCR 929] M. Akbar Vs. Kh. Fateh Mohammad [2000 SCR 211] Ghulam Rasool Vs. Hadyat-Ullah [1987 MLD 35] Ghulab Butt & 2 others Vs. Mir Abdul Ghani [2009 SCR 382] Nazar Mohammad Vs. Khurshid Ahmed (Civil Appeal No.91 of 2009, decided on 02.12.2011) The court also referenced several other cases to establish the principle that civil courts have jurisdiction over suits for declaration and permanent injunction and that the trial court's initial dismissal under Order 7 Rule 11 was inappropriate.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908: ----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2 – Injunction – Prima Facie Case – Irreparable Loss – Balance of Convenience The respondents sought an injunction to restrain the petitioner from interfering in the affairs of the Christian Hospital, Quetta. The appellate court overturned the trial court's decision rejecting the injunction application. The High Court emphasized that an injunction under O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2, CPC, requires the establishment of three essential conditions: (i) a prima facie case, (ii) irreparable loss or injury if the injunction is refused, and (iii) balance of convenience in favor of the applicant. The respondents failed to meet these conditions, as no evidence showed irreparable injury or that the balance of convenience lay in their favor. Reliance was placed on established principles of injunction law. (b) Governance and Management of Christian Hospital, Quetta – Authority of Board of Management: The governance of the Christian Hospital, Quetta, is regulated by a constitution established under the Board of Management. The Board is responsible for strategic decisions, personnel management, and staff appointments or terminations. The Bishop, though holding a senior position, does not have unilateral authority to retire or remove personnel without following the procedures set out in the constitution. The issuance of a retirement letter to the petitioner by the Bishop exceeded his lawful authority and violated the constitutional provisions governing the hospital's management. (c) Master-Servant Relationship – Absence of Evidence: The appellate court's finding of a master-servant relationship between the petitioner and respondents was not supported by any documentary evidence. On the contrary, the hospital operates under its own constitution, which grants the Board of Management authority over appointments, terminations, and staff discipline. The absence of specific retirement age provisions further undermines the respondents' case. (d) Legal Standing and Status Quo: The petitioner had been performing his duties as Medical Director without objection before the dispute arose. The respondents failed to establish any cogent reason for restraining him from performing his official duties. The principle of status quo ante favors the petitioner, as no legal or procedural basis existed for his removal or interference in his role. ----Disposition: The revision petition was allowed. The order of the appellate court dated 02.05.2023 was set aside, and the order of the trial court dated 07.12.2022 rejecting the injunction application was upheld. The petitioner was restored to his position, and the respondents were restrained from interfering in his lawful duties as per the governing constitution of Christian Hospital, Quetta.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ----S. 115----Revisional jurisdiction----Concurrent findings of fact----High Court cannot interfere with concurrent findings of the lower courts unless there is a material irregularity, misreading, or non-reading of evidence----Both the trial court and appellate court held that the petitioner failed to establish an arguable case or balance of convenience in his favor----No legal or factual error warranting interference was found. Cited Cases: Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain 2014 SCMR 1469 (b) Transfer of Property & Revenue Laws ----Mutation----Presumption of correctness----Registered mutation (No. 774) in favor of the respondent was duly recorded in the revenue record without any written condition regarding re-transfer of land upon repayment of loan----In absence of a clear contractual stipulation in the mutation, respondent’s ownership is presumed valid unless proven otherwise. Cited Cases: Muhammad Akram v. Altaf Ahmed 2018 SCMR 1300 (c) Injunction & Equitable Relief ----Order XXXIX, Rules 1 & 2, C.P.C.----Temporary injunction----Grant of injunction requires prima facie case, balance of convenience, and likelihood of irreparable loss----Petitioner failed to establish an arguable case as the mutation showed absolute transfer without conditions----No irreparable loss as petitioner could reclaim land if he succeeded in the main suit----Trial court and appellate court correctly refused injunction. Cited Cases: Government of Sindh v. Muhammad Shafi 2022 SCMR 1 (d) Specific Performance & Contractual Obligations ----Alleged conditional transfer----Burden of proof----Petitioner claimed that mutation was conditional upon repayment of loan but failed to provide documentary evidence----Revenue record did not support petitioner’s contention----In civil cases, burden lies on the party asserting a claim to prove it with credible evidence. Cited Cases: Muhammad Nawaz v. Sakhi Muhammad 2021 SCMR 615 Disposition: Revision petition dismissed. High Court upheld the concurrent findings of lower courts. Temporary injunction rightly refused.

Summary: Background: Petitioners, as co-owners of a suit property, filed a suit for permanent injunction against Mehboob Khan (deceased), represented by his legal heirs, seeking protection of their proprietary and possessory rights. The respondents filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to dismiss the suit on the grounds that it was barred by law and not maintainable. The trial court accepted the application and dismissed the suit, a decision that was upheld by the Additional District Judge on appeal. The petitioners then filed a revision petition under Section 115 of the CPC. ----Issues: Whether a suit for injunction simpliciter can be instituted by a co-owner/co-sharer without seeking partition. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Precedent and Legal Principles: The court reviewed relevant case law, including Ali Gohar Khan v. Sher Ayaz (1989 SCMR 130), Akhtar Nawaz Khan v. Danial Khan (NLR 1995 SCJ 169), Muhammad Rafiq v. Sardar (2004 SCMR 1036), and others, establishing that a co-sharer cannot change the nature of joint property or raise construction without the consent of other co-sharers. --Suit for Injunction by Co-owner: The court held that a co-owner can file a suit for injunction to protect their rights if another co-owner attempts to change the nature of the property or threaten their possessory rights. This suit is maintainable without necessarily seeking partition first. --Incorrect Application of Law: The trial court and the appellate court erred in dismissing the suit as not maintainable under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. The revision petition was allowed. The orders of the trial court and appellate court were set aside. The suit was reinstated and directed to be decided afresh by the Senior Civil Judge (Civil Division), Rawalpindi, or any other competent court. ----Citations/Precedents: Ali Gohar Khan v. Sher Ayaz (1989 SCMR 130) Akhtar Nawaz Khan v. Danial Khan (NLR 1995 SCJ 169) Muhammad Rafiq v. Sardar (2004 SCMR 1036) Ashiq Hussain v. Prof. Muhammad Aslam (2004 MLD 1844) Fazal v. Ghulam Muhammad (2003 SCMR 999) Mst. Roshan Ara Begum v. Muhammad Banaras (2016 YLR 1300) Mst. Sanobar Sultan v. Obaidullah Khan (PLD 2009 SC 71)

Summary: Background: The appellant filed a civil appeal against the judgments and decrees passed by the learned District Judge Sehnsa on 18.11.2015 and the learned Civil Judge Sehnsa on 30.06.2015. The appellant sought a decree for perpetual injunction, claiming ownership and possession of land under khasra No.662 measuring 2 kanals 10 marlas, situated in Islamabad Tehsil Sehnsa. The appellant contended that the respondents were interfering with his land and causing damage by extracting and breaking stones nearby. The respondents, however, claimed that the land in question was Shamilat Deh land, in which they were co-sharers, and denied any unlawful interference. ----Issues: 1- Whether the land in question (khasra No.662) was privately owned by the appellant or Shamilat Deh land. 2- Whether the respondents were causing damage to the appellant's property by their activities. 3- Whether the appellant was entitled to a decree for perpetual injunction against the respondents. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Nature of the Land: The court found that the land under khasra No.662 was Shamilat Deh, and the appellant did not provide any proof of legal partition of the Shamilat Deh land. Therefore, the appellant's claim of exclusive ownership and possession was not substantiated. --Activities of the Respondents: The court observed that the respondents were breaking stones on their own land (khasra No.703) for construction purposes. There was a marked distance between the appellant's land and the respondents' land, separated by a walking track/passage (Gehl). The court concluded that the appellant's property was not in danger due to the respondents' activities. --Perpetual Injunction: The court held that no decree for perpetual injunction could be passed in favor of the appellant since the land was Shamilat Deh, and the respondents were co-sharers. The court also noted that the appellant did not suffer any irreparable loss due to the respondents' activities. The appeal was dismissed. The court upheld the judgments of the lower courts, concluding that the appellant's land was Shamilat Deh, and the respondents' activities did not endanger the appellant's property. The appellant failed to prove exclusive ownership or the need for a perpetual injunction. Each party was ordered to bear their own costs. ----Citations/Precedents: Aurangzeb & 04 others V. Muhammad Ayub & another [2017 SCR 464]: No decree for perpetual injunction can be passed in favor of an individual regarding Shamilat Deh land without proof of legal partition. Muhammad Muneer & another V. Naveed Khalid [2019 SCR 394]: Concurrent findings by two courts on questions of fact generally do not call for interference.