Summary: ----Quote: (1) Concept of outsourcing of tasks through contractor & the Toll Manufacturing (2) Circumvention of labour laws to save money (3) ILO Conventions No.87, 98 & Section 91 of I.R.A., 2012 (4) Sham arrangement for supply of labour with outsource contractor (5) Effect of employer’s control or supervision on contractor employees. ----Background: This case involves a series of civil petitions filed by IFFCO Pakistan (Private) Limited against several respondents, who claimed to be employees of IFFCO and sought recognition as permanent employees with associated benefits. The respondents initially filed petitions before the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 (IRA), arguing that they were not being recognized as permanent employees despite performing duties of a permanent nature. The NIRC ruled in favor of the respondents, a decision that was upheld by the Full Bench of the NIRC and later by the Sindh High Court. IFFCO subsequently sought leave to appeal these decisions in the Supreme Court of Pakistan. ----Issues: 1- Whether the respondents were employees of IFFCO Pakistan or merely contract workers employed by independent contractors. 2- Whether the NIRC had jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter concerning workers allegedly employed through an independent contractor. 3- Whether the agreements between IFFCO and the contractors were genuine or a sham intended to circumvent labor laws. 4- Whether the respondents were entitled to the benefits and rights of permanent employees under the Industrial Relations Act. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions filed by IFFCO Pakistan, refusing leave to appeal. The Court found that the respondents were indeed employees of IFFCO, despite the company's claims that they were employed by independent contractors. The Court based its decision on the following reasoning: Control and Supervision: The respondents were under the direct control and supervision of IFFCO, which provided raw materials and managed their day-to-day activities. The evidence showed that the respondents had been working within IFFCO’s premises for several years, performing duties of a permanent nature. Expired Agreements: The agreements presented by IFFCO as evidence of the respondents' employment through contractors were found to be expired, and no credible evidence was provided to support the claim that these agreements were still in effect. The Court noted that despite the expiry of these agreements, the respondents continued to work for IFFCO, suggesting a direct employment relationship. Sham Agreements: The Court held that the agreements with contractors appeared to be a sham, used as a device to deprive the respondents of their legitimate rights as employees. The Court emphasized that such arrangements should not be allowed to circumvent labor laws and exploit workers. Jurisdiction of NIRC: The Court affirmed that the NIRC had the jurisdiction to hear the case, as the respondents were effectively employees of IFFCO and not merely contract workers. The Supreme Court concluded that the concurrent findings of the NIRC and the Sindh High Court were based on a proper appreciation of the evidence and were not manifestly erroneous or illegal. Therefore, there was no basis for the Supreme Court to interfere with the lower courts' decisions. ----Citations/Precedents: Fauji Fertilizer Company Ltd. vs. National Industrial Relations Commission & others (2013 SCMR 1253): The relationship of employer and employee can exist where an employer retains control over the work of a contractor’s employees. Abdul Ghafoor and others vs. The President National Bank of Pakistan and others (2018 SCMR 157): The Court disallowed the practice of labeling workers as contractors to evade labor laws. Messrs State Oil Company Limited vs. Bakht Siddique and others (2018 SCMR 1181): Employment of workers by a contractor can be deemed a sham if the workers perform permanent duties for the company. Messrs Sui Southern Gas Company Limited vs. Registrar of Trade Unions and others (2020 PLC 153): The Court reaffirmed that workers should not be deprived of their rights under labor laws through sham contracts. The decision reinforces the principle that employers cannot circumvent labor laws through sham arrangements and must recognize and uphold the rights of workers performing permanent duties within their organizations.

Summary: Background: The appellants were serving as Private Secretaries in BPS-18 and were transferred/appointed as Civil Judges BPS-18 under a 10% quota reserved for departmental promotions. The private respondents were appointed as Civil Judges BPS-18 through initial recruitment. A seniority list issued on 20.11.2012 placed the appellants below the private respondents. The appellants contested this, arguing they should be ranked higher according to the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Civil Servants (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977. ----Issues: 1- Was the seniority list dated 20.11.2012 correctly issued? 2- Should the appellants be ranked senior to the private respondents in the seniority list? 3- Should the promotions based on the impugned seniority list be set aside? ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Seniority List Issue: The court held that the seniority list dated 20.11.2012 lacked legal validity. The seniority should be determined under section 8(2) of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Civil Servants (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977, which states that persons appointed by transfer/promotion shall rank senior to those appointed by initial recruitment if the date of appointment is the same. --Ranking of Appellants: The appellants, appointed as Civil Judges by transfer, should be ranked senior to the private respondents, who were appointed by initial recruitment, as both were appointed on the same date, 27.08.2010. --Promotions Based on Impugned List: The promotions of private respondents based on the final seniority list dated 20.11.2012 were deemed illegal. The appellants should be listed at the top of the seniority list as per the tentative seniority list dated 05.05.2011. Consequently, the promotion orders of the private respondents based on the erroneous seniority list were set aside. ----Citations/Precedents: 1995 PLC 294 2000 SCR 630 1996 SCMR 1017 2006 SCMR 832 2003 PLC 743 2000 PLC 1289 2013 SCR 889 2000 SCR 613 2017 SCR 718 2017 SCR 514 2019 SCR 101 2022 SCR 672 The appeals were accepted, setting aside the impugned seniority list dated 20.11.2012. The appellants were declared senior to the private respondents in the seniority list.

Summary: Background: Muhammad Yousaf Haroon, a Civil Judge BPS-18, was removed from service by the competent authority on July 4, 2011. He challenged his removal, and after a series of appeals, the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu & Kashmir reinstated him, reducing his rank to Civil Judge BPS-18. Despite the Supreme Court's directive, the period from his removal to reinstatement was treated as leave without pay, and his seniority was not properly restored. Haroon filed two service appeals seeking proper recognition of his service period and restoration of his seniority. ----Issues: 1- Whether the period between Haroon's removal and reinstatement should be treated as on duty with all associated benefits. 2- Whether Haroon's seniority as a Civil Judge should be recognized from the date of his reinstatement, considering the previous service period. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Period as On Duty: The court found that the notification treating the period from Haroon's removal to reinstatement as leave without pay was contrary to the Supreme Court's directive. The Supreme Court had reinstated Haroon with a reduction in rank, implying continuous service without any break. Haroon was entitled to all back benefits during the intervening period as there was no evidence of him being gainfully employed elsewhere during that time. --Seniority Restoration: The court held that Haroon should be placed at the top of the seniority list of Civil Judges from the date of his reinstatement. His reduction in rank was not meant to affect his seniority position. The court emphasized that Haroon was not considered for promotions while others, junior to him, were promoted. This was against the principles of natural justice and the relevant service rules. The court directed that Haroon be considered for regular promotion to Senior Civil Judge BPS-19, retrospectively, ensuring his seniority over others who were promoted during his absence. ----Citations/Precedents: Gul Shabir Khatian vs. Chief Secretary/Appellate Authority, Government Sindh, Karachi and 2 others [K.L.R. 2010 Labour & Service cases 91] Established that reinstated civil servants are entitled to back benefits if not gainfully employed elsewhere during the intervening period. Sohail Ahmed Usmani vs. Director General Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority and another [2014 SCMR 1843] Reinstated employees are entitled to back benefits unless proven to be gainfully employed during the period of dismissal. Abdur Rehman vs. Pakistan Railway Police through Inspector-General, Pakistan Railway Police, Pakistan Railway Headquarters, Lahore and 2 others [1996 PLC (C.S.) 1212] Reduction to a lower post without specifying the period means the employee is entitled to be considered for promotion as soon as a vacancy occurs. Tanveer Ahmed Vs. Director-General, Pakistan Public Works Department, Islamabad and 6 others [1994 PLC (C.S) 887] The appellant was entitled to promotion based on seniority-cum-fitness, and the department's failure to consider him at the relevant time was illegal. Mushtaq Ahmed Vs. Khawaja Ejaz Ahmed & 4 others [2009 SCR 537] Seniority is determined by the date of entry into the grade and cannot be altered by temporary promotions. Outcome: The court accepted both appeals, setting aside the notification treating Haroon's period of removal as leave without pay. Haroon was granted all back benefits for the period from July 4, 2011, to June 12, 2014. The court also restored Haroon's seniority, placing him at the top of the list of Civil Judges from the date of his reinstatement, and directed the authorities to consider him for regular promotion to Senior Civil Judge BPS-19. The judgment ensured that Haroon's seniority remained intact in higher grades.

Summary: Background: This appeal, presided over by Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Mr. Justice Irfan Saadat Khan, originated from a decision made by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad (Karachi Bench). The appellant, challenged the Tribunal?s judgment dismissing his appeal regarding promotional procedures within the Pakistan Public Works Department (PWD). ---Issues: 1- Whether the Federal Service Tribunal erred in not considering the appellant's previous service in the National Highways & Motorways Police for his promotion from Assistant Executive Engineer (BS-17) to Executive Engineer (BS-18) despite it being relevant under the applicable service rules. 2- The proper application of Statutory Instruction No.157 and the relevance of the appellant's successful departmental examination results for promotion. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court of Pakistan, after reviewing the arguments and the legal provisions involved, concluded that the Federal Service Tribunal failed to adequately consider essential elements of the case. Key issues included the incorrect assumption that the appellant's prior service was non-countable due to a perceived resignation rather than a transfer through proper channels, and the dismissal of departmental exam results pertinent to his promotion eligibility.The Court noted discrepancies in how the Tribunal handled the appellant's cumulative service duration across different government departments, which should have been recognized for promotion purposes as per the Establishment Code (2013 Edition), Statutory Instruction No.157. The Tribunal also neglected to address whether the appellant's earlier service could contribute to his eligibility for future promotions, a significant oversight given its impact on his career trajectory.Given these findings, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, and remanded the case for a fresh decision. The Tribunal was instructed to reevaluate the appeal strictly in accordance with the law and to deliver a decision within three months. ----Citations/Precedents: Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973Statutory Instruction No. 157Establishment Code (2013 Edition)Services Tribunal Act, 1973Usman Ghani vs. Chief Post Master, GPO, Karachi (2022 SCMR 745)

Summary: Background:Ayesha Maqsood, the petitioner, filed a petition against the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission (KPPSC) and others, challenging the rejection of her candidature for the position of Headmistress in the Elementary & Secondary Education Department. Despite qualifying in the written test, her application was rejected for not claiming a B.Ed. degree in her online application. The petitioner had appealed this decision, which was dismissed, leading her to seek redress from the Peshawar High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan.-----Issues:The core issue revolves around the application of Regulation 8(a) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission Regulations, 2017, particularly whether the petitioner's candidature should be rejected for not claiming a B.Ed. degree in her online application, given the subsequent amendment to Regulation 8(a) which removed the punitive clause related to incomplete or incorrect applications.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The court held in favor of the petitioner, allowing the writ petition and setting aside the impugned rejection notice. The judgment was influenced by the amendment to Regulation 8(a), which removed the clause that mandated rejection for incomplete or incorrect applications. The court directed the respondents to reconsider the petitioner's candidature in accordance with the law and rules. If she meets the eligibility criteria, she should be allowed to compete for the position on merit.-----Citations/Precedents:PLD 2006 Supreme Court 472 (Imtiaz Ahmed and others Vs. Punjab Public Service Commission) established that amended rules prevail over former ones and that no one has a vested right to be governed by a particular set of rules.PLD 2015 Lahore 34 (Messrs Habib Rafiq Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Government of Punjab) further supported the principle that amendments polish and groom laws, making the amended law applicable.PLD 1997 Quetta 69 (Khudadai Dad alias Mama Vs. State) and 1997 SLC 500 (Sarwar Khan Vs. Muhammad Azam Khan) were referenced to underline that amended regulations supersede previous ones and should be applied in new cases.Various judgments of the Peshawar High Court (WP No. 3539-P/2023, 2482-P/2012, 4273-P/2020, 2919-P/2023, 1415-M/2022, 115-P/2021) and the Supreme Court of Pakistan (Civil Petition No. 511-P/2013 and Civil Petition No. 115-P/2021) were cited where similar issues were addressed but were distinguished from the current case due to the amendment in Regulation 8(a).

Summary: (a) Gilgit-Baltistan Civil Servants Act, 2011 (GB Civil Servants Act) – Section 9: Frequent Transfers of Civil Servants – Violation of Rights Alleged – Administrative Discretion Appeal challenging the frequent transfers of a civil servant under Notification No. SO(S)-1-2(5)/2023 dated 18 February 2024, transferring the appellant from Assistant Commissioner Danyore to Assistant Commissioner Shigar on administrative grounds and in public interest. Held: Section 9 of the GB Civil Servants Act, 2011, stipulates that every civil servant is liable to serve anywhere within or outside the province as directed by competent authorities. The transfer and posting of government servants are administrative matters falling within the executive domain and cannot be interfered with unless mala fide, bias, or violation of law is established. The court found no evidence of mala fide intent or arbitrariness in the appellant’s transfer orders. Transfer orders are not an infringement of the fundamental rights of civil servants, who have no vested right to remain in a specific post or location. Precedents emphasized the non-justiciable nature of transfer orders unless exceptional circumstances exist. Appeal dismissed as meritless. -----Cited Cases: Chief Election Commissioner GB v. Muhammad Qadeer 2021 GBLR 110 PLD 1995 SC 530(b) Anita Turab v. Federation of Pakistan Muhammad Sajjad v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2021 SCMR 1064 Dr. Imtiaz Ellahi Piracha v. Government of Punjab 2004 PLC (C.S.) 705 Dr. Muhammad Saleem v. Government of Balochistan 2023 SCMR 2119 = 2024 PLC (C.S.) 77 Disposition: Appeal dismissed. The tribunal upheld the administrative discretion of the respondents, ruling that the transfer orders were lawful and not arbitrary.

Summary: PLJ 2024 TrC (Services) 22 [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal Peshawar] Present Kalim Arshad Khan Chairman and Salah - ud - Din Member (Judicial) MUHAMMAD ARSHAD KHAN SST BPS - 16 (General) GMS - - Appellant versus SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA EDUCATION (ESE) DEPARTMENT PESHAWAR and anothers - - Respondents Service Appeal No 1395 of 2019 decided on 732023 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal Act 1974 (I of 1974) - - - - - - S 4 - - Appellant was serving as PHST - - Quota for promotion - - DPC meeting - - Deferment of petitioner for promotion - - Appellant was exonerated in inquiry - - Appellant was promoted with immediate effect and not from date of deferment - - Appeal for antedated promotion with all back benefits - - Rejected - - Entitlement for promotion - - Direction to - - The respondents admit factum of entitlement of appellant for promotion when his juniors were promoted but contend that because of non - production of service book he could not get promotion on due date - - Appellant was not treated in accordance with law and he was made to suffer for none of his fault directing respondents to give effect to promotion of appellant to post of SST from 2572017 that is date of his deferment when his juniors were promoted and he was not - - Appeal allowed [Pp 24 26] B C D E Deferment - - - - - - Deferment is not a punishment rather a temporary halt because of some deficiency - - The deficiency may be because of employee and it may be because of department - - In either case when deficiency is removed employee had to get his due from date of entitlement along with resultant benefits [P 24] A 2018 PLC (CS) N 170 2020 PLC (CS) 826 2018 PLC (CS) (Note) 126 ref Mr Taimur Ali Khan Advocate for Appellant Mr Naseer - ud - Din Shah Assistant Advocate General for RespondentsJudgement Result:Appeal allowed

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Suit for recovery decreed---Execution application also allowed---Defendant then assailing decree by way of filing constitutional petition---Maxim “ubi jus ubi remedium”---Principle of exhaustion of remedies---Scope---Term “adequate remedy”---Scope---Petitioner /defendant impugned judgment and decree passed in a summary suit under O.XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2, C.P.C., 1908, against which an appeal laid to the High Court, within thirty days of the passing of a judgment---The legal maxim “ubi jus ubi remedium” (wherever there is a right, there is a remedy) establishes a fundamental legal principle, affirming that an individual has a lawful entitlement to a concomitant recourse to initiate legal proceedings in a court unless the court's jurisdiction is precluded---According to the rule of jurisdictive prudence, the courts usually show restraint with the directions to the parties first to take the recourse of an alternate and / or equally effective mechanism and framework of remedy provided, rather than to take departure to surpass or circumvent such remedy---Goal behind adopting said remedies is to constrain issues falling within the jurisdiction of an appellate court to be solely adjudicated before that forum---Any endeavor to bypass or evade these designated forums is deemed impermissible, as mandated by the provisions of Art.199(1) of the Constitution---Where an adequate forum available to the petitioner in the shape of an appeal is not exhausted, the principle of exhaustion of remedies imposes a restriction on a litigant, prohibiting him from seeking a remedy in the constitutional jurisdiction---The exceptional jurisdiction conferred by Art.199 of the Constitution is fundamentally designed to provide a specific remedy when the illegality and impropriety of an action by an Executive or other Governmental authority can be demonstrated without protracted inquiry---The term “adequate remedy” denotes a remedy that is effective, attainable, accessible, advantageous, and expeditious---Petitioner had an effective remedy for filing an appeal, but he missed the bus without any reasonable and lawful excuse---The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies dictates that a litigant must not pursue a remedy in a different court or jurisdiction until the remedy prescribed by law has been fully exhausted---The writ jurisdiction of the High Court should not serve as the exclusive recourse or remedy for rectifying the wrongs, distress, and sufferings endured by a party, especially when an equally efficacious, alternative and adequate remedy is available under the law---Said principle is grounded in the notion that the litigant should not be inclined to bypass or disregard the provisions enshrined in the pertinent statute, which delineates specific procedures for challenging the impugned action---Proceedings under Art.199 of the Constitution are oriented towards enforcing a right rather than establishing a legal right---Therefore, the right asserted by the petitioner must not only be clear and complete but straightforward and there must be an actual infringement of that right---The aims and objectives of Art.199 of the Constitution are to promote justice, safeguard rights, rectify any injustice or excessive exercise of jurisdiction by lower courts and correct procedural illegality or irregularity that might have adversely affected a case---Petitioner failed to bring his case within the said criteria---Constitutional petition filed by the defendant / judgment-debtor, being misconceived, was dismissed in limine. Government of Punjab through the Secretary, Schools Education Department, Lahore and others v. Abdur Rehman and others 2022 SCMR 25 and Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib and others 2011 SCMR 1813 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---High Court, jurisdiction of---Constitutional and appellate jurisdiction---Distinction---With constitutional jurisdiction, the Court cannot act as an appellate court, reviewing the decision for accuracy and deciding on the correct course of action or order to be made---Constitutional petitions are distinct from appeals, which are considered as a continuation of a trial/suit---The High Court does not have the authority to perform the duties of a Civil Court since its writ jurisdiction is distinct from its regular civil court powers---The only purpose of the High Court’s jurisdiction is to rectify any mistake made by the lower body when exercising its jurisdiction, which differs from an action applied under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908---The High Court is not a court of fact and will not question disputed facts and re-appreciate evidence by itself; it cannot sit as a Court of Appeal---The jurisdiction of the High Court is just remedial, not a cloak of appeal disguised to scrutinize every subject in depth---The High Court has no jurisdiction to consider the correctness of the decision, except-in writ of certiorari, especially when illegality and irregularity are apparent in the impugned judgment, but it cannot go either into review of evidence or appreciating the same as in the constitutional jurisdiction the court cannot sit as a court of appeal---The constitutional and appellate jurisdictions are completely distinct and different in nature, scope and consequences---The constitutional jurisdiction can be invoked to question the legality of laws, regulations, or Governmental acts and enforcement of fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution, and it is to be filed when there is an infringement of constitutional rights, which is sometimes called a writ petition or a petition for a constitutional remedy under Art.199 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of a statute or executive or tribunal orders on the grounds that it infringes upon the petitioner's Constitutional rights---Conversely, an appeal is a procedural as well as substantive right which allows one party to file an appeal before a higher court to reconsider a judgment made by a lower court. AIR 1952 SC 192 ref. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Principle of laches or staleness---Applicability---Petitioner impugned judgment and decree by filing the present petition after a lapse of more than two years and ten months, therefore, the same was hopelessly barred by the doctrine of laches---There is no exception to the rule that the petition is not to be entertained if there is a delay in seeking the remedy of appeal beyond the period of limitation provided by the statute---Petitioner delayed unreasonably in approaching this /High Court in a writ petition; the principle of laches or staleness applied to the present case---Notably, he application of laches depends on each case's specific circumstances and the court's discretion---The discretionary powers are to be exercised on the sound principle of justice and equity, which was missing in the present case---A court, operating in equity, concerned with fairness and justice, will decline to provide assistance of remedy to legal claims that have become stale or inactive over time---If a petitioner has not promptly asserted his legal rights and acquiesced or remained passive for a significant duration, the court may deem the claim “stale”---In such cases, the court may refuse to intervene or grant relief due to the petitioner's prolonged procrastination and lack of timely asserting his rights---This principle highlights the importance of diligence and prompt legal action to seek equitable remedies---Constitutional petition filed by the defendant / judgment-debtor, being misconceived, was dismissed in limine. Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 14, Chapters 641-642, specifically Monographs 1181 82 ref. Abdul Mueed Shaikh for Petitioner. Date of hearing: 19th March, 2024.

Summary: REGIONAL POLICE OFFICER and another-Respondents (Against the order dated 01.09.2020 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No.2313 of 2020). Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975- -Rr. 14 & 12 [as it existed prior to being amended by Notification No.6206-EXEC-II dated 16th of March, 2023, issued by the Provincial Police Officer]-Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974), S. 21-Police official-Dismissal from service-Departmental appeal, filing of-Limitation-Notwithstanding Rule 14 of the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, where no time period for filing an appeal has been provided, the time frame specified under section 21 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, is to be followed, which is sixty days.

Summary: Background:The petitioner, Ali Raza, a constable in the Punjab Police, was dismissed from service on charges of inefficiency and misconduct, including involvement in criminal cases. The disciplinary proceedings were initiated under the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975, and the dismissal order was issued on March 8, 2019. Raza's departmental appeal was filed on December 26, 2019, but was rejected as time-barred on March 14, 2020. His subsequent service appeal was also dismissed by the Punjab Service Tribunal on September 1, 2020, on similar grounds. Raza contended that the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975, do not specify a time limit for filing appeals, relying on a precedent set in the case of Tahira Paras.-----Issues:The central issue was whether an appeal could be dismissed due to lapse of time when the governing rules do not specify a deadline for filing such appeals.-----Holding/Reasoning:The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that despite the absence of a specified deadline in the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975, the appeal was correctly dismissed as time-barred by applying the 60-day limit under Section 21 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. The Court found the petitioner's appeal to be significantly late, filed nine months and 18 days after the original order. The Court also deemed the reliance on the Tahira Paras case as misplaced, labeling it as per incuriam (decided without regard to the law) since it overlooked the applicable provision in the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. Additionally, the Court dismissed the petitioner's argument regarding the delay in receiving the punishment order, considering it an afterthought and not entertained at the appellate stage or before the Tribunal.-----Citations/Precedents:Raja Khan v. Manager, Faisalabad Electricity Supply Company (WAPDA) [2011 PLC(CS) 856]Muhammad Aslam v. WAPDA and others [2007 SCMR 513]NED University of Technology v. Ashfaq Hussain Shah [2006 SCMR 453]Chairman, PIA and others v. Naseem Malik [PLD 1990 SC 951]Tahira Paras v. Chief Traffic Officer, Lahore [C.P.2477-L/2019] (Referred but found per incuriam)Police Authority for Huddersfield v. Watson [(1947) K.B. 842] (Referenced in the context of administrative authority and discipline)