Summary: (a) Interpretation of statutes- -Preamble-Scope-Preamble to a statue is, though not an operational part of an enactment but it is a gateway which opens purpose and intent of the Legislature, which necessitated the legislation on the subject and also sheds clear lights on the goals which the Legislator aimed to secure through the introduction of such law-Preamble of a statue therefore holds a pivotal role for the purposes of interpretation in order to dissect true purpose of intent of law. Director General, FIA and others v. Kamran Iqbal and others 2016 SCMR 447; Ms. Tradhol International SA Sociedad Unipersonal v. Ms. Shakarganj Limited 2023 CLD 819; ABWA Knowledge Pvt Ltd and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2021 Lah. 436; Chenab Flour and General Mills and others v. F.O.P through Secretary Revenue Division and others PLD 2021 Lah. 343; Messrs Jet Green (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2021 Lah. 770; M.C.B. v. Adeel Shahbaz and others 2023 CLD 655; Pakistan Tehreek e Insaaf through Asad Umar v. Governor Punjab through Principal Secretary PLD 2023 Lah. 179=PLJ 2023 Lah. 467; Messrs Bahria Town Pvt v. District Consumer Court and others PLJ 2022 Lah. 199, PLD 2022 Lah. 488; F.O.P v. Nasir Munir Ahmed and others 2022 CLC 2072; Additional Registrar Company v. Al-Qaim Textile Mills Ltd 2021 CLD 931; Ch Fayyaz Hussain Wains v. Province of Punjab and others PLD 2022 Lah. 1 and Shaheen Merchant v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2021 PTD 2126 rel. (b) Foundation University Ordinance (LXXXVIII of 2002)- -Ss. 3 & 5-Zakat and Ushr Ordinance (XVIII of 1980), S.24-Deduction of Zakat-Exemption-Charitable institution-Proof-Petitioner / University was aggrieved of deduction of Zakat on its investments made with a financial institution-Plea raised by petitioner / University was that it was a charitable institution and was exempted from deduction of Zakat-Validity-Petitioner / University was established for paramount national interest to establish a center for advancement of education and learning of internationally acknowledged standards to the talented and deserving students of Pakistan-Petitioner / University was neither alleviated institution to the category of a charity nor there existed any operative provision in Foundation University Ordinance, 2002 for its declaration to be a charitable institution-Liability to Zakat was attached to prescribed assets held by a person or institutions defined under the law, subject to only those exemptions, which were expressly provided under S.24 of Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980-Nature and character of petitioner / University, whether statutory, chartered, public service or otherwise, did not by itself create immunity, unless such immunity was grounded in the statute which the petitioner / University had failed to bring on record-Under the law, where the Legislature intended exemption, it had done so explicitly-Absence of such expression must be construed as deliberate-Petitioner / University did not place on record any specific document, nor pointed out any specific provision in its parent statute or in Foundation University Ordinance, 2002 granting exemption from Zakat liability-High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction declined to interfere in the matter as the petitioner / University failed to demonstrate any illegality in the letter issued by authorities holding petitioner / University liable to deduction of Zakat-Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances. Administrator General Zakat, Central Zakat Administration, Islamabad v. Pakistan Insurance Corporation through Secretary and others PLD 2016 SC 448; Liaquat National Hospital v. Province of Sindh and others 2019 SCMR 865 and Pakistan Telecommunication Employees' Trust v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2017 SC 718 ref. Administrator General Zakat, Central Zakat Administration, Islamabad v. Pakistan Insurance Corporation through Secretary and others PLD 2016 SC 448 distinguished. Dates of hearing: 18th November, 2025 and 20th February, 2026.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)- -O. XXIII, R. 1-Withdrawal of suit-Abandoning of part of claim-Right of plaintiff-Scope-Plaintiff has inherent right to abandon a suit or any portion of his claim without seeking prior permission from Court-Such right comes with the caveat that once a suit or a part of it is abandoned, the plaintiff cannot initiate a fresh suit based on the same cause of action-Plaintiff cannot withdraw a suit while simultaneously reserving right to file a fresh suit on the same grounds. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)- -S. 11, O. II, R. 2 & O.XXIII, R.2-Withdrawal of suit-Permission to file fresh suit-Object, purpose and scope-Such permission, when granted by Court, serves to safeguard plaintiff from restrictive effects of Order II, Rule 2 and Section 11, C.P.C. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)- Haji Muhammad Boota and others v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others PLD 2003 SC 979; Quinn v. Leathern (1901) AC 495; Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem 1994 SCMR 2213; Muhammad Shakeel and others v. Additional District Judge and others PLD 2025 SC 572; Balida Kamayya and others v. Paragada Papayya and another AIR 1918 Mad. 1287; Mrs. Afroz Shah and others v. Sabir Qureshi and others PLD 2010 SC 913; Behari Lal Pal v. Srimati Baran Mai Dasi (1894) ILR 17 All 53; Becharam Chowdhuri and others v. Purna Chandra Chatterji and others AIR 1925 Cal. 845; Baisnab Das Mohanta v. Nani Gopal Das and others PLD 1963 Dacca 504; Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co. (2004) 1 SCR 629; Raj Kumar Mahto v. Ram Khelawan Singh AIR 1922 Pat. 44; Haridey Nath Roy v. Ramchandra AIR 1921 Cal. 34; R v. Wilson (1983) 2 SCR 594; Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc. (2001) 2 SCR 460; Alokeshi Banik v. Aftabuddin PLD 1963 Dacca 87 and Syed Muhammad Ali and others v. Syed Dabir Ali and others 2016 SCMR 2164 rel.

Summary: ----Preamble---Scope---Preamble to a statue is, though not an operational part of an enactment but it is a gateway which opens purpose and intent of the Legislature, which necessitated the legislation on the subject and also sheds clear lights on the goals which the Legislator aimed to secure through the introduction of such law---Preamble of a statue therefore holds a pivotal role for the purposes of interpretation in order to dissect true purpose of intent of law. Director General, FIA and others v. Kamran Iqbal and others 2016 SCMR 447; Ms. Tradhol International SA Sociedad Unipersonal v. Ms. Shakarganj Limited 2023 CLD 819; ABWA Knowledge Pvt Ltd and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2021 Lah. 436; Chenab Flour and General Mills and others v. F.O.P through Secretary Revenue Division and others PLD 2021 Lah. 343; Messrs Jet Green (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2021 Lah. 770; M.C.B. v. Adeel Shahbaz and others 2023 CLD 655; Pakistan Tehreek e Insaaf through Asad Umar v. Governor Punjab through Principal Secretary PLD 2023 Lah. 179=PLJ 2023 Lah. 467; Messrs Bahria Town Pvt v. District Consumer Court and others PLJ 2022 Lah. 199, PLD 2022 Lah. 488; F.O.P v. Nasir Munir Ahmed and others 2022 CLC 2072; Additional Registrar Company v. Al-Qaim Textile Mills Ltd 2021 CLD 931; Ch Fayyaz Hussain Wains v. Province of Punjab and others PLD 2022 Lah. 1 and Shaheen Merchant v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2021 PTD 2126 rel. (b) Foundation University Ordinance (LXXXVIII of 2002)--- ----Ss. 3 & 5---Zakat and Ushr Ordinance (XVIII of 1980), S.24---Deduction of Zakat---Exemption---Charitable institution---Proof---Petitioner / University was aggrieved of deduction of Zakat on its investments made with a financial institution---Plea raised by petitioner / University was that it was a charitable institution and was exempted from deduction of Zakat---Validity---Petitioner / University was established for paramount national interest to establish a center for advancement of education and learning of internationally acknowledged standards to the talented and deserving students of Pakistan---Petitioner / University was neither alleviated institution to the category of a charity nor there existed any operative provision in Foundation University Ordinance, 2002 for its declaration to be a charitable institution---Liability to Zakat was attached to prescribed assets held by a person or institutions defined under the law, subject to only those exemptions, which were expressly provided under S.24 of Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980---Nature and character of petitioner / University, whether statutory, chartered, public service or otherwise, did not by itself create immunity, unless such immunity was grounded in the statute which the petitioner / University had failed to bring on record---Under the law, where the Legislature intended exemption, it had done so explicitly---Absence of such expression must be construed as deliberate---Petitioner / University did not place on record any specific document, nor pointed out any specific provision in its parent statute or in Foundation University Ordinance, 2002 granting exemption from Zakat liability---High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction declined to interfere in the matter as the petitioner / University failed to demonstrate any illegality in the letter issued by authorities holding petitioner / University liable to deduction of Zakat---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances. Administrator General Zakat, Central Zakat Administration, Islamabad v. Pakistan Insurance Corporation through Secretary and others PLD 2016 SC 448; Liaquat National Hospital v. Province of Sindh and others 2019 SCMR 865 and Pakistan Telecommunication Employees' Trust v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2017 SC 718 ref. Administrator General Zakat, Central Zakat Administration, Islamabad v. Pakistan Insurance Corporation through Secretary and others PLD 2016 SC 448 distinguished. Sayyid Murtaza Ali Pirzada with Syed Muaz Ali for Petitioner. Barrister Zain Mansoor, Assistant Attorney General for Respondents. Muhammad Irshad, Assistant Advocate General for Respondents. Binyamin Abbasi for Respondent No. 6 / Higher Education Commission. Nisar A. Mujahid, Advocate Supreme Court / Amicus Curiae. Dates of hearing: 18th November, 2025 and 20th February, 2026. (i) to decide teaching method and strategies in order to ensure the most effective educational and training programmes;

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XXIII, R. 1---Withdrawal of suit---Abandoning of part of claim---Right of plaintiff---Scope---Plaintiff has inherent right to abandon a suit or any portion of his claim without seeking prior permission from Court---Such right comes with the caveat that once a suit or a part of it is abandoned, the plaintiff cannot initiate a fresh suit based on the same cause of action---Plaintiff cannot withdraw a suit while simultaneously reserving right to file a fresh suit on the same grounds. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 11, O. II, R. 2 & O.XXIII, R.2---Withdrawal of suit---Permission to file fresh suit---Object, purpose and scope---Such permission, when granted by Court, serves to safeguard plaintiff from restrictive effects of Order II, Rule 2 and Section 11, C.P.C. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.VI, R. 17 & O.XXIII, R. 2---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54---Suit for declaration and injunction---Judgment passed in suit withdrawn---Effect---Permission to file fresh suit---Court, duty of---Suit filed by appellants / plaintiffs was based upon a judgment and decree passed in an earlier suit which stood withdrawn at appellate stage by the then plaintiffs with permission to file fresh suit---Trial Court as well as High Court had dismissed the suit filed by appellants / plaintiffs on the ground that the judgment relied upon by them was not in existence, as that suit was withdrawn---Validity---Legislative intent governing discretion under Order XXIII, Rule 1(2) is outlined in two scenarios; one in which Court is convinced that a suit would inevitably fail due to some procedural defect, and the other where the Court recognizes sufficient grounds that warrant plaintiff’s ability to initiate a fresh suit concerning either the entirety of the subject matter or a portion of a claim---Clear obligation on Court has been imposed under Order XXIII, Rule 2 (b), C.P.C. to ascertain adequacy of grounds presented for permitting plaintiff to commence new suit regarding the same claim or part of a claim centered on identical cause of action---In fulfilling such duty, Court is mandated by Civil Procedure Code, 1908 to evaluate all pertinent factors, including implications of allowing a party to re-engage in litigation based on the same underlying issues---Such scrutiny becomes increasingly vital when the application is filed at appellate or second appellate stage---If leave is granted in such circumstances, it empowers unsuccessful plaintiff to evade any un-favourable decrees previously rendered against them, essentially allowing a fresh examination of the dispute from a clean slate---Appellants did not provide solid foundation nor presented supplementary documents to demonstrate their ability to establish title without reliance on the judgment passed in earlier suit which stood withdrawn---In absence of such critical material, returning the matter to Trial Court based solely on unsubstantiated assertions of appellants / plaintiffs would serve no practical purpose---Such action would risk creating unnecessary litigation and ultimately undermine the very essence of justice---Supreme Court declined to interfere in concurrent judgments and decree passed by the Courts below dismissing suit and appeal filed by appellants / plaintiffs---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Haji Muhammad Boota and others v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others PLD 2003 SC 979; Quinn v. Leathern (1901) AC 495; Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem 1994 SCMR 2213; Muhammad Shakeel and others v. Additional District Judge and others PLD 2025 SC 572; Balida Kamayya and others v. Paragada Papayya and another AIR 1918 Mad. 1287; Mrs. Afroz Shah and others v. Sabir Qureshi and others PLD 2010 SC 913; Behari Lal Pal v. Srimati Baran Mai Dasi (1894) ILR 17 All 53; Becharam Chowdhuri and others v. Purna Chandra Chatterji and others AIR 1925 Cal. 845; Baisnab Das Mohanta v. Nani Gopal Das and others PLD 1963 Dacca 504; Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co. (2004) 1 SCR 629; Raj Kumar Mahto v. Ram Khelawan Singh AIR 1922 Pat. 44; Haridey Nath Roy v. Ramchandra AIR 1921 Cal. 34; R v. Wilson (1983) 2 SCR 594; Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc. (2001) 2 SCR 460; Alokeshi Banik v. Aftabuddin PLD 1963 Dacca 87 and Syed Muhammad Ali and others v. Syed Dabir Ali and others 2016 SCMR 2164 rel. Syed Qalb-i-Hassan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rafaqat H. Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants. Nemo for Respondents Nos. 1-4 and 6. Shaukat Hussain Raja, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 7. Date of hearing: 20th February, 2026.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XX, R. 18---Suit for partition of property and separate possession of share---Preliminary decree---Mandatory declaration of shares---Supreme Court held that in a suit for partition, Court must adhere to procedure under Order XX, Rule 18, C.P.C. while issuing preliminary decree---Preliminary decree is meant to ascertain and declare shares of parties and to give further necessary directions for subsequent proceedings---It does not itself effect physical division of property among co-sharers; actual partition is carried out at final decree stage after inquiry in accordance with directions contained in preliminary decree---In present case, preliminary decree issued by Trial Court suffered from material irregularity because shares of parties were not specified or clarified---Such procedural shortcoming was overlooked by First Appellate Court and High Court, undermining validity of preliminary decree. (b) Partition---- ----Partial partition---Not maintainable---Co-owner’s right in every inch of joint holding---Supreme Court held that suit for partial partition is not maintainable---A co-owner cannot selectively choose and claim share in more valuable portions of joint property while excluding portions of lesser value---Every co-owner has ownership rights over every inch of joint holding corresponding to his share---Entire property corpus must be aggregated into a common pool under supervision of Court so that each co-owner receives allotted share fairly, keeping in view relative value, area, location and nature of properties---Allowing partition of only one selected property from joint estate would cause discrimination and inequity among co-sharers. Cited Cases: • Chandi Shah v. Barbara Shaha and others AIR 1930 Lahore 286 • Jan Muhammad and another v. Abdur Rashid and 5 others 1993 SCMR 1463 (c) Partition---- ----Joint family estate consisting of multiple properties---Family settlement alleged---Duty of Court to verify entire property corpus---Dispute related to estate left by deceased father of parties, allegedly comprising four houses---Petitioner consistently maintained that late father owned four distinct properties divided equally among three sons through family partition/family settlement, while respondent sought partition only of disputed house in petitioner’s possession---Supreme Court held that Trial Court failed to verify family settlement, description of each property, prior partition, status of disputed house, and improvements made to disputed house---Earlier High Court judgment in first round of litigation had specifically observed that these matters were to be determined when partition proceedings were initiated---Failure to examine such essential matters rendered preliminary decree fundamentally untenable. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XX, R. 18---Partition proceedings---Preliminary decree and final decree---Distinct stages---Supreme Court explained that partition suit proceeds in phases---At preliminary decree stage, Court determines and declares rights/shares of parties and may issue necessary directions---At final decree stage, actual division is carried out after inquiry in accordance with preliminary decree---Where partition or separation cannot conveniently be carried out without further inquiry, Court must first pass proper preliminary decree declaring rights of all interested parties---Trial Court erred by allowing partition to proceed only in respect of disputed property without first determining overall estate, shares and status of other properties. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Material irregularity in preliminary decree---High Court’s failure to correct error---Trial Court issued preliminary decree in favour of respondent No.1 and First Appellate Court maintained same---High Court dismissed revision, holding that respondent No.1 had right to select any property from estate for partition---Supreme Court held that such reasoning contravened settled principles governing partition and partial partition---Preliminary decree was marred by misinterpretation, oversight of evidence and misapplication of legal principles---High Court ought to have reversed decree and remanded matter for comprehensive reassessment of all issues. (f) Earlier litigation---- ----Findings in previous round of litigation---Effect in subsequent partition suit---In earlier suit for injunction, High Court had noticed uncertainty regarding whether petitioner intended to raise construction on ancestral land or purchased land and had held that description of houses, prior partition of ancestral property, status of additional land and improvements would be determined once partition proceedings were initiated---Supreme Court held that in subsequent partition suit, Trial Court and High Court failed to take those observations into account and proceeded only on disputed house---Such omission resulted in incomplete and legally defective adjudication. Disposition: Petition was converted into appeal and allowed; judgments and decrees of Courts below were set aside; matter was remanded to Trial Court to decide suit afresh in accordance with law, after taking into account observations of Supreme Court regarding declaration of shares, entire property corpus, family settlement, status of other properties and non-maintainability of partial partition; no order as to costs.

Summary: C.P.L.A. No. 3744 of 2023 (Against order dated 01.08.2023 passed by the High Court of Sindh at Karachi in Civil Revision Application No. S-139 of 2022). And C.M.A. No. 6730 of 2024 (Stay). Civil Procedure Cod e (V of 1908)- -S.51-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)-Execution of money decree-Blocking of CNIC of judgment debtor, challenge to-Powers of Executing Court, scope of-Whether deprivation of civil identity was permissible in execution of a money decree?-Brief facts were that the petitioner, being a judgment debtor under a money decree passed in a summary suit in favour of respondent No.1, faced execution proceedings wherein the Executing Court ordered the blocking of his Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) until he furnished surety for the decretal amount; this order was upheld by the High Court in revision, leading the petitioner to approach the Supreme Court by filing of the present petition for leave to appeal-The central issue requiring determination was-whether, in execution of a money decree, the Executing Court possessed lawful jurisdiction under Section 51 of the C.P.C. to direct the blocking of a judgment debtor’s CNIC as a mode of execution?-Held: The decree in the present case was simply a money decree on a summary chapter suit-Such a decree required or made permissible execution by blocking the CNIC of the judgment debtor by resort to Section 51(e)-One might as well then (for instance) also allow the Executing Court to order the blocking of utilities (such as electricity, water etc.) from the residence or workplace of a judgment debtor for execution of a money decree-While a robust approach could certainly be taken to ensure execution it could not be so muscular (especially in the exercise of a general power of the nature conferred by clause (e) as essentially depriving the judgment debtor of an essential aspect of living-Leave petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, in circumstances. Kafeel Ahmed Abbasi, Additional A.G. for Sindh (via video-link, Karachi). Munawar Iqbal Duggal, Additional A.G.P. for the Federation.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 51---Execution of decree---Modes of execution---Money decree---Blocking CNIC of judgment debtor---Executing Court’s jurisdiction---Executing Court ordered blocking of judgment debtor’s CNIC until surety for decretal amount was furnished; High Court maintained order, treating CNIC blockage as a step towards execution of lawful decree---Supreme Court held that S.51, C.P.C. provides modes for execution of decrees and although clause (e) gives flexibility to execute decree “in such other manner as the nature of the relief granted may require”, such general power cannot be stretched so far that execution order loses contact with statutory provision---In case of simple money decree passed in summary suit, execution by blocking CNIC of judgment debtor was not permissible under S.51(e), C.P.C. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 51(e)---General mode of execution---Scope and limits---Supreme Court held that clause (e) of S.51, C.P.C. confers necessary flexibility and latitude upon executing Court to ensure decree is satisfied, but such power remains controlled by nature of relief granted and statutory framework---Robust approach may be adopted to secure execution, but it cannot become so excessive that it deprives judgment debtor of essential aspects of ordinary life---Blocking CNIC for execution of money decree would be akin to permitting executing Court to block utilities such as electricity or water at residence or workplace of judgment debtor, which is not contemplated by execution law. (c) Constitutional / civil rights---- ----CNIC---Essential document for ordinary life---Blocking CNIC in civil execution proceedings---Supreme Court observed that CNIC is not a luxury or mere statutory requirement; in present times, it is essential for carrying on normal way of life in ordinary course---Curtailing a judgment debtor from access to CNIC for execution of money decree is not proper exercise of discretion or statutory power---High Court erred in concluding that blocking CNIC was permissible discretionary step towards execution. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXI, R. 117 as inserted in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa---Power to block CNIC for compelling attendance/execution---Applicability outside Khyber Pakhtunkhwa---Supreme Court noticed that Peshawar High Court had inserted O.XXI, R.117 in C.P.C. as applicable in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, expressly permitting blockage of CNIC as mode of compelling judgment debtor’s attendance or completing execution proceedings---Court reserved opinion on constitutional or legal validity of such provision for appropriate case---However, said provision applies only in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and not in Sindh---Existence of such express provision shows that, absent specific statutory/rule-based authority, no such power can be implied into executing Court’s discretion or general execution provisions. (e) Execution proceedings---- ----Money decree---Judgment debtor’s CNIC blocked until surety furnished---Order without lawful basis---Executing Court had no jurisdiction to order blocking of CNIC of judgment debtor as a step towards execution of simple money decree---High Court’s refusal to interfere with such order was legally unsustainable---Order of CNIC blockage could not be justified under S.51(e), C.P.C. or any implied execution power. Disposition: Leave petition was converted into appeal and allowed; order of High Court of Sindh at Karachi dated 01.08.2023, which had upheld executing Court’s direction for blocking petitioner/judgment debtor’s CNIC, was set aside; Supreme Court held that no jurisdiction vested in executing Court in Sindh to block CNIC of judgment debtor for execution of simple money decree.

Summary: (a) Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)---- ----S. 7---Determination of fair rent---Exclusive jurisdiction of Rent Controller---High Court while hearing appeal against dismissal of ejectment application enhanced rent from Rs.7,000 to Rs.70,000 per month---Supreme Court held that S.7 of Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 confers exclusive jurisdiction upon Controller to determine fair rent after application, inquiry and evidence---While hearing appeal against dismissal of ejectment application, High Court could affirm, reverse, set aside or modify findings of Controller, but could not assume original jurisdiction of Controller for fixation of fair rent---Appellate forum cannot exercise original jurisdiction unless expressly conferred by statute---Fixation of enhanced rent by High Court was without lawful authority and contrary to S.7 of the Act. (b) Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)---- ----S. 7---Fair rent---Pleadings, issue and evidence---High Court’s enhancement of rent beyond controversy before it---Respondent-landlord had sought eviction on grounds of bona fide personal need and subletting; fixation of fair rent was neither pleaded nor framed as an issue nor supported by evidence---Rent Controller dismissed ejectment application but enhanced rent to Rs.7,000 per month---High Court upheld finding that landlord failed to establish bona fide personal need or subletting, yet enhanced rent to Rs.70,000 per month---Supreme Court held that High Court exceeded pleadings and acted without lawful authority, as no party had sought fixation of fair rent, no issue had been framed and no evidence had been led on such point. (c) Rent law---- ----Ejectment application---Bona fide personal need and subletting---Failure to prove grounds---Respondent-landlord’s original ejectment application was based on bona fide personal use/occupation and subletting---Rent Controller negatived both grounds after recording evidence, and High Court also held that landlord was not entitled to eviction because he failed to establish either ground---Supreme Court noted that once eviction grounds failed, High Court could not indirectly create a new foundation by enhancing rent in an appeal arising from dismissal of ejectment application. (d) Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)---- ----S. 17(9)---Eviction for default---Artificial default created through unlawful rent enhancement---Effect---Landlord filed fresh eviction application alleging that tenant failed to pay post-enhancement rent fixed by High Court---Rent Controller invoked S.17(9) and ordered eviction, which High Court maintained---Supreme Court held that second ejectment order was wholly founded upon illegal fixation of rent by High Court---Where foundation is unlawful, superstructure built upon it cannot stand---Since rent enhancement order was void, alleged default was artificial and subsequent eviction order lacked lawful foundation; any possession taken under such eviction order was also void. Cited Cases: • Yousuf Ali v. Mohammad Aslam Zia PLD 1958 SC (Pak) 104 • Executive District Officer (Education), Rawalpindi v. Mohammad Younas 2007 SCMR 1835 • Rehmatullah and others v. Saleh Khan and others 2007 SCMR 729 (e) Appellate jurisdiction---- ----Rent appeal---Limits of appellate authority---Original jurisdiction not exercisable by appellate Court unless statute permits---Supreme Court held that appellate forum, while deciding appeal against ejectment order, cannot assume original jurisdiction for determination of fair rent unless statute expressly confers such power---High Court’s jurisdiction in appeal was confined to legality of Controller’s order dismissing ejectment application; it could not independently determine fair rent without application, inquiry and evidence before competent Rent Controller. (f) Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)---- ----Ss. 7 & 17(9)---Original rent to continue until lawful revision---Restoration of possession---Since High Court’s order enhancing rent and subsequent eviction order were illegal, void and unsustainable, parties were directed to remain bound by original rent until revised by competent forum in accordance with S.7 of the Act---Possession was ordered to be restored forthwith to tenant if taken pursuant to eviction order passed by Controller. (g) Civil Procedure Code / Injunction proceedings---- ----Ad-interim order---Temporary injunction application pending before Trial Court---No interference by Supreme Court---In connected Civil Petition No.4867 of 2024, petitioner had challenged ad-interim order through appeal and revision, both unsuccessful---High Court, while dismissing revision, directed Trial Court to decide application for interim relief/temporary injunction strictly in accordance with law and expeditiously---Supreme Court found no illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional defect calling for interference; leave was declined. Disposition: Civil Petitions No.4036 of 2022 and 1860 of 2024 were converted into appeals and allowed; orders/judgments of lower fora relating to rent enhancement and subsequent eviction were set aside; parties were directed to remain bound by original rent until revised by competent forum under S.7 of Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963; possession was ordered to be restored forthwith to petitioner-tenant if taken pursuant to eviction order; connected CMA stood disposed of. Civil Petition No.4867 of 2024 was dismissed and leave declined; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----S. 42---Declaratory suit---Recruitment process---Candidate failing minimum eligibility threshold---No vested right---Respondents were excluded from merit lists for recruitment to posts of Primary School Teachers after failing to obtain minimum 40% marks in NTS test prescribed by recruitment policy dated 16.10.2017---Supreme Court held that declaratory decree can only be granted where plaintiff establishes an existing legal character or vested legal right which has been denied or threatened---S.42 does not permit adjudication of abstract questions or creation of rights where none exist---A candidate in competitive recruitment process has only right to fair, equal and non-discriminatory consideration, but no vested right to appointment or inclusion in merit list unless eligibility criteria are fulfilled---Failure to meet prescribed minimum marks extinguished even limited expectancy of consideration. (b) Recruitment policy---- ----Minimum qualifying marks in NTS test---Condition precedent for eligibility---Recruitment policy dated 16.10.2017 expressly provided that obtaining minimum 40% marks in NTS test was mandatory, otherwise candidate would not be eligible for post---Supreme Court held that requirement was unambiguous and left no room for departure---Courts below erred in disregarding express mandate of 2017 policy and relying upon earlier policy dated 30.04.2014, which had removed previous 50% marks requirement---Governing policy at relevant time was 2017 policy, and candidates who failed to secure 40% marks were ineligible for inclusion in merit list. (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----S. 42---Suit based on mere expectation---Not maintainable---Respondents’ claim was founded upon anticipation of inclusion in merit list despite failure to meet prescribed threshold---Supreme Court held that declaratory suit cannot be based on mere expectation or disagreement with policy; it must involve infringement of a subsisting right---Claim for inclusion despite non-fulfilment of criteria was, in substance, challenge to recruitment policy itself---Unless such policy was shown to be ultra vires, beyond authority of competent forum, or violative of constitutional guarantees, no enforceable legal right arose in favour of respondents. (d) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Rules of Business, 1985---- ----R. 5(1)---Departmental policy---Competence of Minister---Recruitment standards---High Court had observed that directions issued by Provincial Minister regarding 40% marks requirement had no legal effect---Supreme Court held that under R.5(1) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Rules of Business, 1985, framing of departmental policy falls within competence of Minister---Recruitment criteria emanated from policy framed by competent authority---In absence of finding that policy was ultra vires, beyond authority, or unconstitutional, prescription of minimum qualifying marks fell within domain of executive policy. (e) Constitutional jurisdiction / judicial review---- ----Recruitment policy---Executive domain---Limited scope of Court interference---Supreme Court held that where competent authority is empowered to frame policy relating to recruitment standards, such policy carries executive authority---Courts ordinarily refrain from interfering with such policy unless it is shown to be unconstitutional, ultra vires, beyond authority of competent forum, mala fide, or violative of constitutional guarantees---Courts below erred in substituting their view for express eligibility criterion prescribed by competent authority. (f) Estoppel---- ----Recruitment process---Candidate participating without protest---Challenge after failure---Respondents participated in recruitment process with full knowledge of prescribed 40% NTS qualifying threshold and raised challenge only after failing to secure required marks---Supreme Court held that candidate who voluntarily enters selection process under known terms cannot, after being unsuccessful, challenge criteria---Such conduct attracts doctrines of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence---Respondents were estopped from disputing eligibility requirements after participation without protest. (g) Civil litigation---- ----Declaratory suit versus constitutional challenge---Recruitment policy---Proper remedy---Supreme Court held that in absence of pre-existing legal right, declaratory suit under S.42 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 was not maintainable---Mere dissatisfaction with recruitment policy did not confer enforceable civil claim---Proper remedy, if any, was to challenge vires of policy through appropriate constitutional proceedings, not to seek declaration for inclusion in merit list despite failure to meet eligibility condition. Disposition: Petitions were converted into appeals and allowed; consolidated judgment of Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench dated 23.09.2024, along with concurrent judgments and decrees of Trial Court and Appellate Court, were set aside; respondents’ suits seeking inclusion in PST merit lists despite failure to secure minimum 40% NTS marks stood dismissed; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Anti-Money Laundering Act (VII of 2010)- -Ss. 8 & 23-Provisional attachment order-Interim order-Appeal-Maintainability-Appellant was aggrieved of provisional attachment order passed by Trial Court, against which High Court did grant any interim relief-Plea raised by authorities was that appeal against provisional attachment order was not maintainable as order of High Court was an interim order-Validity-Order of attachment under Section 8 of Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 was otherwise final for the taxpayer whose all immovable and moveable properties, including bank accounts were attached without providing any opportunity of being heard, in consequence whereof, the entire business had come to an halt-No other remedy was provided under Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 except to challenge the same by filing appeal under Section 23 of Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010-Matter fell within the exceptions to exercise discretion under Article 185(3) of the Constitution to obliviate miscarriage of justice-Supreme Court suspended operation of order of attachment of properties, passed by Trial Court, till final decision of appeal pending before High Court-Appeal was allowed. Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation-FBR, through its Director and others v. Taj International (Pvt) Ltd and others (PLD 2025 SC 633 rel. (b) Anti-Money Laundering Act (VII of 2010)- -S.23-Words-final-and-order of Court-Effect-Legislature has used word-final-with decision whereas such word has not been used with-order of the Court-There is no distinction of interim order or final order for the purposes of filing an appeal under Section 23 of Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010. (c) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art.185(3)-Petition for leave to appeal-Interim order-Principle-In exceptional circumstances involving flagrant violation of law, wrongful exercise of jurisdiction or manifest grave injustice, an aggrieved party can approach Supreme Court in terms of Article 185(3) of the Constitution with the request to set aside even an interim order falling within the category of such exceptions. Khawaja Adnan Zafar v. Hina Bashir and others 2024 SCMR 1295; Attiq ur Rehman v. Sh. Tahir Mehmood and others 2023 SCMR 501; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Energy (Power Division), Islamabad and others v. Shafiq ul Hassan and others 2020 SCMR 2119 and Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and others v. Muhammad Zaman Khan and others 1997 SCMR 1508 rel. Assisted by: Ms. Zainab Bashir, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan.