Summary: bail denied --- BackgroundMuhammad Hanif, the petitioner, filed a bail application under Section 497 Cr.P.C. He is accused of being involved in the murder of Shah Alam, which occurred on 07-01-2019, and is documented in FIR No. 02/2019 under Sections 302/109/34 PPC at Police Station City Gilgit. The petitioner and his co-accused, Fazal Haq, allegedly shot Shah Alam at the suspension bridge in Konodas Gilgit and then fled the scene. The motive for the murder was reported to be an old enmity between the parties.----IssuesThe primary issue before the court was whether Muhammad Hanif should be granted bail based on his claim that he was not present at the crime scene at the time of the occurrence.----Holding/Reasoning/OutcomeThe court reviewed the arguments and evidence presented by both parties:Petitioner?s Argument: The petitioner?s counsel argued that Hanif was not present at the scene during the occurrence but was at a hotel with Abdul Shukoor and Muhammad Nazir, who provided affidavits supporting this alibi. Additionally, the Investigating Officer's site plan, based on the complainant?s pointation, did not place Hanif at the scene.Respondent?s Argument: The Dy. Advocate General and the complainant's counsel contended that these arguments had already been raised and dismissed in the previous bail application. Therefore, no new grounds existed for considering another bail application.Court?s Analysis: The court noted that the grounds cited in the current bail petition had been presented during the previous bail application and were either considered or could have been raised at that time. Following the principle that previously considered grounds or grounds available but not raised are deemed to have been rejected, the court found no new basis to grant bail.----Citations/PrecedentsThe principle that previously raised or available grounds are deemed to have been raised and rejected:Previous bail order dated 27-09-2019Based on this reasoning, the court dismissed the bail application and declined the request for bail.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Held: (1) The report was lodged against unknown accused with an inordinate delay. In absence of any plausible explanation, the delay in lodging if FIR was always considered fatal it casted a suspicion on the prosecution story.(2) the chain of events was broken from the very beginning which had gone to the roots of the case.(3) The recoveries/case property was planted, which could not be used as evidence against the accused.(4) conviction must be founded on unimpeachable evidence and certainty of guilt and any doubt the arises in the prosecution case must be resolved in favour of the accused.(5) The positive FSL report could not be taken into consideration being not procured in accordance with law as the prosecution had to ensure safe dispatch of the crime empties and crime weapon to the FSL. Even this piece of evidence is a corroborative one and in case where direct evidence fails, corroborative piece of evidence is of no avail.(5) The positive FSL report could not be taken into consideration being not procured in accordance with law as the prosecution had to ensure safe dispatch of the crime empties and crime weapon to the FSL. Even this piece of evidence is a corroborative one and in cases where direct evidence fails, corroborative piece of evidence is of no avail.(6) Generally, the order of acquittal could not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused was further strengthened by acquittal.(7) of two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted.(8) The learned trial court in the impugned judgment had dealt with each and every aspect of the case which being unexceptional could not be interfered with.

Summary: 1. A witness might be a natural witness to the occurrence, however if he himself does not spontaneously charge any one for the offence and just toe the line of another person whose presence is doubtful on the place of occurrence, then relying on his testimony will be very dangerous for awarding capital punishment, rather the safe course would be to give the benefit of doubt to the accused.2. Disparity Between the times mentioned in medical report and ocular account adversely affect the prosecution case.3. The considerable delay in lodging the report has given an ample opportunity to the complainant, eye witnesses as well as police for preliminary inquiry regarding nomination of the accused.

Summary: According to medical jurisprudence written by Modi and Parikh, the rigor mortis starts developing on dead body after 3 hours of death and completes within 12 hours and remains for next 12 hours, so it means that the time of death was not the same as mentioned in the FIR. This fact is further strengthened by the statement of PW-9 who mentioned time between death and postmortem as 12-15 hours. So by calculation the time of death comes as 11. PM at night, while at that time husband of the deceased lady was with her, as such, in this peculiar situation how accused could murder the deceased lady.

Summary: The reviewing court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A re hearing of the matter is impermissible in law. It constitutes an exception of the general rule that once a Judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. In a nutshell, the power of Review can be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view.

Summary: In such eventuality when the revenue papers of the disputed property remained subject matter of the earlier suit in which Misri Khan actually participated and contested the matter not only in the court of first instance but upto the apex Court of the country, was in the knowledge of such entry and acquiesced by conduct by not challenging the entries of the revenue papers, the petitioners are estopped to sue in disputing the mutation, which was attested in the year, 1937, and was challenged after more than 79 years, in such circumstances, the longstanding entries could not be challenged by the petitioners.it could not be held that limitation would not run. In the circumstances, when MisriKhan remained litigating in respect of the disputed property alongwith contesting respondents but never opted to challenge the inheritance mutation of the year, 1937, for the reason best known to him, he could not be allowed to challenge it as per his own whims and wishes, such suit would be subject to law of limitation.

Summary: The Agnatic heirs may be classified into (i) Agnatic Descendants, (ii) Agnatic Ascendant and (iii)Agnatic Collaterals (Father s Agnatic descendants). They may be depicted in tabular form, where fullbrother is at Serial No.5, as Collateral Descendants of the fatherFull brother ((a)) When there co-exists a full sister,, he takes double portion ((b)) In absence off the sister,, he takes the entire Residue

Summary: The primary issues revolved around the treatment of trust property and the application of the doctrine of cy-pr?s, which allows the court to modify the terms of a charitable trust when the original objectives cannot be fulfilled. The judgment discussed the legal principles governing interim orders, the preservation of the corpus of litigation, and the conditions under which the court may employ the doctrine of cy-pr?s.In HCA 235 of 2009, the court found that the Single Judge's decision regarding the stay applications did not adequately protect the trust property pending the suit's adjudication. Thus, it set aside that part of the impugned order and issued directions to prevent any third-party interests or construction on the property until the suit's final decision.In HCA 239 of 2009, the court upheld the Single Judge's findings regarding the O.VII r.11 Applications, concluding that the plaint was not barred by law and that issues of res judicata, limitations, and the applicability of the Specific Relief Act were addressed appropriately.The judgment concludes with the appeals being resolved accordingly: HCA 235 of 2009 was allowed with specific directions, and HCA 239 of 2009 was dismissed. The learned Single Judge was instructed to proceed with the suit uninfluenced by the High Court's observations.

Summary: The central issue in HCA 235 of 2009 revolved around the trust property's handling and the applicability of the doctrine of cy-pr?s, which allows for the adjustment of trust objectives when the original purpose cannot be fulfilled. The court found the Single Judge's dismissal of Stay Applications problematic, as it failed to preserve the trust property's corpus pending the suit's adjudication, thereby potentially affecting the suit's outcome.In HCA 239 of 2009, the appellants argued that the plaint should have been rejected on grounds of res judicata, limitations set by the Specific Relief Act 1877, and other legal barriers. However, the court upheld the Single Judge's decision, finding no merit in the appellants' arguments and confirming that the issues raised, including limitation, could be addressed post-evidence.The judgment allowed HCA 235 of 2009, setting aside the Single Judge's order regarding the Stay Applications and imposing restrictions to prevent the creation of third-party interests or construction on the trust property until the suit's conclusion. Conversely, HCA 239 of 2009 was dismissed, with the court finding no basis to overturn the Single Judge's decision on the O.VII r.11 Applications.This summary encapsulates the court's reasoning and conclusions on the matters at hand, reflecting the legal principles involved, particularly concerning trust property and procedural law in civil litigation. --- ''The Stay Applications are hereby disposed withdirections that the defendants are restrained from creatingany third party interests in the suit property and barred fromraising any construction thereupon, till the final adjudicationof the Suit.----Dismissed''