Summary: (a) Interpretation of Constitution--- ----Redundancy---Effect should be given to every word, paragraph, clause and article of the Constitution---Redundancy should not be imported thereto. (b) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)--- ----Ss. 4 & 104---Election Rules, 2017, Rr. 92 & 94---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 51(6)(d), 199 & 224---Constitutional petition---Reserved seat, allocation of--- Entitlement---Petitioner was a political party which did not participate in General Elections---Independent returned candidates, backed by another political party which was not allowed to participate in elections by Election Commission of Pakistan, joined the petitioner party---Petitioner party claimed its right to allocation of reserved seats---Validity---Reserved seats for women and non-Muslims under the mandate of Art. 51(6)(d) of the Constitution, were to be allocated amongst the political parties present in National Assembly---Procedure for allocation of such seats has been provided under S. 104 of Elections Act, 2017 and mechanism for its allocation under Rr. 92 & 94 of Election Rules, 2017 respectively---Election Commission was a Constitutional body invested with mandate to conduct elections to Assemblies and to ensure the same was conduced in accordance with the letter of Constitution---It has the jurisdiction under S. 4 of Elections Act, 2017, to issue directions or orders as were necessary for the performance of its functions and duties, including order for doing complete justice in any matter pending before it--- Order of Election Commission of allocating/distributing reserved seats for women and non-Muslims amongst the political parties that were present in Assembly by securing seats through contest was held to be in accordance with the letter of Art. 51 of the Constitution---Petitioner party was not entitled for any share in reserved seats for women, therefore, request for filing list of candidates for reserved seats at a belated stage did not arise---Petitioner party assailed interpretation of S. 104 of Elections Act, 2017 done by Election Commission of Pakistan which was not a substantive provision rather it merely provided a mechanism for effective conduct of election---High Court declined to interfere in allocation of reserved seats--- Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances. Asghar Hussain v. Election Commission of Pakistan PLD 1968 SC 387; The Federal Government v. Ayan Ali and others 2017 SCMR 1179; Messrs Al-Iblagh Limited, Lahore v. The Copyright Board Karachi and others 1985 SCMR 758; LPG Association of Pakistan through Chairman v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Islamabad and others 2009 CLD 1498; District Bar Association, Rawalpindi v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2015 SC 401; Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 416; Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan through President and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Interior Islamabad and others PLD 2023 SC 42 and Abul A'la Maudoodi v. Government of West Pakistan PLD 1964 SC 673 rel. (c) Interpretation of Constitution--- ----Written Constitution---Object, purpose and scope---Written Constitution is an organic document designed and intended to cater needs for all times to come--- Such Constitution is like a living tree, it grows and blossoms with the passage of time in order to keep pace with the growth of the country and its people--- Approach, while interpreting a Constitutional provision, should be dynamic, progressive and oriented with desire to meet a situation or suppress a mischief, which has arisen effectively---Interpretation cannot be narrow and pedantic but Court's effort should be to construe the same broadly, so that it may be able to meet requirements of an ever changing society---General words cannot be construed in isolation but the same are to be construed in the context in whic

Summary: Issues:Whether the SJC conducted an adequate inquiry into the allegations made by Justice Siddiqui to warrant his removal under Article 209 of the Constitution.Whether Justice Siddiqui's removal without a comprehensive inquiry violated his right to due process under Article 10A of the Constitution.The maintainability of the petitions against the SJC's decision under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, considering the bar of jurisdiction stipulated in Article 211.-----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court held that the SJC's process in removing Justice Siddiqui was flawed, lacking a comprehensive inquiry into his allegations, thus violating his right to due process and undermining judicial independence. The court found that the SJC's reliance on the Code of Conduct and other vague standards to judge Justice Siddiqui's conduct was inappropriate without specifying which exact provisions he violated. The court also noted that the SJC failed to consider serious requests from the Chief of Army Staff and the Government of Pakistan to ascertain the veracity of Siddiqui's allegations through a proper legal process. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the SJC's recommendation and the presidential order for Justice Siddiqui's removal. However, since Justice Siddiqui had reached the retirement age for High Court judges in the interim, he could not be reinstated but was entitled to all retirement benefits and privileges.----Citations/Precedents:Article 209 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (regarding the SJC and judicial conduct)Article 10A of the Constitution (regarding the right to a fair trial and due process)Article 184(3) and 211 of the Constitution (regarding the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction and limitations on questioning the removal of judges)Previous cases on judicial independence and the right to due process, such as Justice Qazi Faez Isa v. President of Pakistan and Chief Justice of Pakistan Mr. Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry v. The President of Pakistan

Summary: ----Issues:Whether the non-attestation of nomination papers by the Jail Superintendent, in spite of a court order, was a valid ground for rejection.Whether the legibility of the CNIC copy and the absence of the husband's Statement of Assets and Liabilitie

Summary: Next date of hearing 29th April 2024 ---- BackgroundThe case involves multiple civil petitions and applications related to the use of land in the Margalla Hills National Park, specifically focusing on the lease agreements and commercial activities, such as the operation of restaurants, within the National Park. The central parties include the Monal Group of Companies, which operates a restaurant in the National Park, the Capital Development Authority (CDA), the Islamabad Wildlife Management Board, and various government and defense departments. The primary issue revolves around the legality of the lease agreements, the permissible use of the National Park under the Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance, 1979, and the conservation of the park's natural resources.----Issues:The validity of the lease agreement dated 30 September 2019 between the Monal Group of Companies and the Remount, Veterinary and Farms Directorate.Compliance with the Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance, 1979, and the Islamabad Capital Territory (Zoning) Regulations, 1992, regarding commercial activities in the Margalla Hills National Park.The broader environmental and conservation concerns associated with commercial activities in the National Park.-----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court of Pakistan raised concerns about the validity of the lease agreement between the Monal Group and the Directorate, highlighting that the Directorate, being not a legal entity, could not have executed the agreement, rendering it void. The Court emphasized the legal provisions that restrict commercial activities in the National Park, pointing out violations and environmental degradation due to such activities. Directions were given to various parties, including CDA and the Islamabad Wildlife Management Board, to submit detailed reports and proposals for the conservation of the National Park and the regulation of commercial activities within its bounds. The Court stressed the importance of preserving the National Park and the necessity for all parties to propose solutions for restoring its integrity.-----Citations/Precedents:Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance, 1979, specifically Section 21, which prohibits setting up and running restaurants in the Margalla Hills National Park.Islamabad Capital Territory (Zoning) Regulations, 1992, specifically Regulation 4(3)(b), which stipulates that no change in land use is permissible in the National Park except for projects related to conservation, preservation, afforestation, and recreation.Previous rulings and legal interpretations by the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the Fundamental Right to life (Article 9 of the Constitution), emphasizing access to parks and natural resources as part of living a meaningful life. To come up on 29th April 2024

Summary: Background: The review petitions were filed by four individuals challenging the Supreme Court's judgment dated 8 November 2018. The judgment had declared the appointment of Mr. Qasmi as Director and later Managing Director (MD) of Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV) as illegal, and sought to recover Rs.197,867,491 from the petitioners for losses allegedly caused to PTV during Mr. Qasmi’s tenure. ----Issues: 1- Whether the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution was properly invoked in this case. 2- Whether the purported financial loss to PTV, as determined in the original judgment, was accurate and legally justified. 3- Whether the petitioners were rightly held responsible for the alleged financial loss, and whether any corruption, nepotism, or personal financial gain was proven against them. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court allowed the review petitions and set aside its earlier judgment. The Court held that: --Misapplication of Article 184(3): The Court found that invoking its original jurisdiction under Article 184(3), which requires the matter to involve fundamental rights of public importance, was questionable in this case. The emoluments paid to a single individual (Mr. Qasmi) did not justify the application of this extraordinary power. --Inaccurate Loss Calculation: The Court determined that the earlier judgment's calculation of the loss suffered by PTV (Rs.197,867,491) was arbitrary and factually incorrect. Mr. Qasmi's actual earnings during his tenure amounted to Rs.35,806,452, which was only slightly higher than the salary paid to his predecessor, and could be justified considering inflation. There was no evidence that Mr. Qasmi caused any financial loss to PTV, nor was it fair to assume that his program’s air time led to lost revenue. --Lack of Corruption or Nepotism Evidence: The Court found no evidence suggesting corruption, nepotism, or personal financial gain by Mr. Qasmi or the other petitioners (then Information Minister Pervaiz Rasheed, Finance Minister Ishaq Dar, and Secretary to the Prime Minister Fawad Hassan Fawad). As such, holding them liable for the purported loss and seeking recovery from them lacked legal justification. As a result, the Court recalled its previous judgment, concluding that the financial liabilities imposed on the petitioners were baseless and not supported by the facts or the law. ----Citations/Precedents: Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court).

Summary: Background:This case involves a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, presented by Syed Zain Muntazar Mehdi (Petitioner) against Mst. Sara Naqvi and others (Respondents). The petition challenges the judgments of the lower courts, which upheld the family court's decision granting the respondent recovery of maintenance, dowry articles, and delivery expenses. The petitioner contends that the decisions of the lower courts suffer from misreading and non-reading of material evidence, particularly ignoring his financial incapacity to meet the maintenance demands set by the courts.----Issues:Whether the maintenance awarded to the respondent and their children was excessive considering the petitioner's financial status.Whether the judgments by the lower courts were valid for consideration under a constitutional petition.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Lahore High Court dismissed the constitutional petition, affirming the decisions of the lower courts. The court found that:The petitioner's arguments regarding his financial status and the excessive nature of the maintenance were insufficient to overturn the findings of the lower courts.The evidence provided by the petitioner, including his salary slip, was deemed inadequate to challenge the established maintenance claims effectively.The court emphasized that findings of fact by a competent court exercising lawful jurisdiction cannot be revisited in writ jurisdiction unless there is a legal infirmity or a jurisdictional error causing a serious miscarriage of justice, which was not evident in this case.-----Citations/Precedents:Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 - Allows for constitutional petitions but limits interference with factual findings of lower courts unless exceptional circumstances exist.Supreme Court decisions on maintenance obligations underline that such obligations are not only legal but also moral and religious, and must be fulfilled unless there is compelling evidence to the contrary.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973: ----Arts. 9, 155 Public Trust Doctrine—Water as State Property—Constitutional Framework—Water is a fundamental natural resource governed by the Public Trust Doctrine, which obligates the State to safeguard it for public welfare. Articles 9 and 155 of the Constitution ensure water is treated as a vital element of life and state property. The doctrine mandates sustainable management and equitable access to water resources for present and future generations, emphasizing public interest over private exploitation. (b) Islamabad Capital Territory Local Government Act, 2015: ----Secs. 88, 121, Fourth Schedule, Ninth Schedule Regulation of water supply and extraction—Licensing regime—The Act enables local governments to regulate water extraction and supply through licenses and impose fees and taxes for commercial water usage. The Municipal Corporation Islamabad (MCI) is responsible for developing a licensing mechanism to regulate private water hydrants, ensuring equitable distribution and preventing over-extraction. The Act emphasizes community welfare and sustainable use of water resources. (c) Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960: ----Secs. 11, 12, 15 CDA’s jurisdiction over water resources and municipal functions—The Ordinance empowers the CDA to regulate the planning, development, and utilization of water resources within Islamabad. Municipal functions, including water supply, have been transferred to local governments under the Local Government Act, 2015. Coordination between the CDA and MCI is essential for effective water resource management. (d) Environmental Protection Laws: ----Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997 Sustainable groundwater management—Environmental compliance—Unregulated extraction of groundwater by commercial entities poses severe environmental risks, including depletion of water tables and ecological imbalance. Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency (Pak-EPA) has taken measures to curb unauthorized water extraction, emphasizing compliance with environmental standards and public safety. Environmental impact assessments are necessary before granting licenses for commercial water extraction. (e) Public Trust Doctrine: ----International and local precedents The doctrine of public trust, recognized globally, views natural resources, including water, as shared assets managed by the State for public benefit. Courts in Pakistan have upheld this principle, emphasizing equitable access, environmental conservation, and regulatory oversight to prevent exploitation. Notable cases include Sindh Institute of Urology and Transplantation v. Nestle Milkpak Limited (2005 CLC 424) and Moulvi Iqbal Haider v. CDA (PLD 2006 SC 394), which reinforced water as a public trust resource. ----Disposition The petitions were disposed of with the following directives: The Federal Government must decide on MCI's proposed tax and licensing regime for water supply within 45 days. The MCI must notify and implement the licensing mechanism within 15 days of approval. Interim permissions for water supply operations may be granted for up to 45 days, subject to restrictions and guarantees, after which they will stand canceled automatically. Regulatory measures must include environmental impact assessments, public objections, and restrictions on excessive water extraction.

Summary: Background:Mian Shabir Asmail, an advocate of the Lahore High Court, filed a constitutional petition challenging the validity of section 232(2) of the Election Act, 2017, which limits disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution to a maximum of five years. The petitioner argued that this provision is unconstitutional as it conflicts with the Supreme Court's rulings in the Sami Ullah Baloch case and others, which interpreted disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) as permanent.-----Issues:Whether section 232(2) of the Election Act, 2017, which limits the duration of disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution to five years, is ultra vires and unconstitutional.The interpretation and application of Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution in light of the Supreme Court's previous rulings, especially considering the Fundamental Rights enshrined in the Constitution.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Supreme Court, in a subsequent judgment (Hamza Rasheed Khan v. Election Appellate Tribunal, Lahore High Court, Lahore and others), had overruled its previous decision in the Sami Ullah Baloch case. The Court found that Article 62(1)(f) does not inherently entail a lifetime disqualification and that the Constitution does not authorize the judiciary to rewrite laws or insert provisions into them. The Court also emphasized the importance of Fundamental Rights, particularly Article 17(2), which entails the right to participate in the political process. Consequently, section 232(2) of the Election Act, 2017, was found not to be in derogation of Fundamental Rights or inconsistent with the Constitution.----Citations/Precedents:Sami Ullah Baloch v. Abdul Karim Nausherwani (PLD 2018 SC 405): Initially interpreted Article 62(1)(f) disqualifications as permanent.Hamza Rasheed Khan v. Election Appellate Tribunal, Lahore High Court, Lahore and others: Overruled the decision in Sami Ullah Baloch, clarifying that Article 62(1)(f) does not impose a lifetime disqualification and emphasizing the separation of powers between the judiciary and legislature.Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan: Recognized the right to contest elections as a Fundamental Right under Article 17(2) of the Constitution.Javed Jabbar v. Federation of Pakistan: Affirmed the significance of Fundamental Rights in the political participation of citizens.Election Commission v. Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaf: Highlighted the fundamental nature of the right to form political parties and participate in elections under Article 17(2).Dr. Mobashir Hassan case: Noted that Article 62(1)(f) is not self-executory and requires legislative action to be implemented.Ishaq Khan Khakwani case: Raised questions about the procedural aspects and implications of disqualifications under Article 62(1)(f).

Summary: Issues:Whether an appeal under Section 14 of the Family Courts Act 1964 is maintainable against an order of the Guardian Judge/Family Court refusing interim custody.The interpretation and application of Section 14 of the Family Courts Act 1964 in relation to Section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890.The legality of the lower courts' decisions regarding the interim custody of the minor daughter.-----Outcome:The High Court held that an appeal under Section 14 of the Family Courts Act 1964 is maintainable against an order of the Guardian Judge/Family Court refusing interim custody. The Court interpreted Section 14 to encompass decisions regarding guardianship issues, including interim orders, notwithstanding Section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890. The impugned order of the District Judge Khyber was set aside, and the petitioner's appeal was deemed pending for further proceedings.-----Holding:The Court interpreted Section 14 of the Family Courts Act 1964 liberally to include appeals against decisions or orders of the Family Court, including interim orders related to guardianship issues.The Court emphasized the overriding effect of the Family Courts Act 1964 in matters pertaining to guardianship, even if not specifically mentioned in Section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890.The appeal of the petitioner was deemed maintainable, and the impugned order of the District Judge Khyber was set aside, directing further proceedings in accordance with the law.-----Citations/Precedents:Ms. Quratulain Aleem Vs Muhammad Rehsn Khan (2006 YLR 2604)Mst. Shsbeena Younas Vs Additional Disttict Judse, Lahore (PLD 2023, Lahore 453)Mst. Eram Raza and 2 others Vs Sved Mutaqi Muhammad Ali snd another (2018 MLD 727)Shazia Akbar Vs Maqsood Ahmad and snother (2012 YLR 2266)Tqssadaq Nswaz Vs Masood Iobsl Usmani and others (PlD 2018 Lahore 830)

Summary: Background:Azka Wahid challenged the definition of 'child' in the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 (amended by the Punjab Child Marriage Restraint Amendment Act, 2015), particularly section 2(a) and (b), on the grounds that it violates the equality clause in the Constitution of Pakistan.-----Issues:Whether the definition of 'child' in the 1929 Act, which distinguishes between males and females for marriageable age, is unconstitutional.Whether the government is empowered to prescribe a minimum age for marriage.-----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The court struck down the portion of section 2(a) of the 1929 Act that sets different marriageable ages for males and females as unconstitutional, as it violates the equality clause (Article 25) of the Constitution. The court reasoned that while medical science supports different ages of puberty for males and females, this does not justify different legal ages for marriage. The government is empowered to set a minimum age for marriage, and doing so is within its constitutional powers. The court directed the Government of Punjab to issue and publish a revised version of the 1929 Act in accordance with the judgment.-----Citations/Precedents:Reference to Islamic jurisprudence on the age of puberty.UNICEF data on child marriage in Pakistan.Article 35 of the Constitution, which mandates state protection for marriage, family, mothers, and children, supporting the legislation against child marriage.Article 25(1) of the Constitution, which mandates equality before the law and prohibits discrimination based on sex.The decision reflects principles of affirmative action, acknowledging special provisions for the protection of women and children but emphasizing that such provisions should not lead to discrimination.----Conclusion: The court emphasized the detrimental effects of child marriage on education, health, and the socioeconomic status of girls, supporting the legislative intent to prevent child marriage. The judgment aligns with constitutional mandates to protect children and women and ensures equal treatment before the law, irrespective of gender.