Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Income Tax—Rectification under Section 221 vs. Change of Opinion ----Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, S. 221, S. 122(5A)---Scope of rectification under S. 221 distinguished from reassessment under S. 122(5A)---Taxation Officer rectified the assessment order by disallowing initial depreciation on buildings and plant & machinery, which had been erroneously allowed---Held, that rectification under S. 221 was justified as it addressed an incorrect application of Rule 5(1)(cc) of the Third Schedule of the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, and did not constitute a change of opinion---Appellate Tribunal correctly upheld the rectification order. Cited Case Law: Karachi Development Authority v. Central Board of Revenue and others (2005 PTD 2131) Commissioner of Income-Tax v. M/s National Food Laboratories (1992 SCMR 687) (b) Taxation—Finality of Findings and Reference Jurisdiction ----Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, S. 133(5)---Appellate Tribunal’s findings on factual matters are final unless shown to be perverse or against the record---Held, that findings regarding the installation date of the refinery were based on concrete documentary evidence, including substantial capital investments made after 30.06.2000, and were not open to further scrutiny in reference jurisdiction. Cited Case Law: Messrs F.M.Y. Industries Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner Income Tax (2014 SCMR 907) Pakistan Match Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Assistant Collector, Sales Tax and Central Excise Mardan and others (2019 SCMR 906) (c) Income Tax—Applicability of Res Judicata in Taxation Matters ----Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, S. 221---Doctrine of res judicata in tax proceedings---Previous show-cause notices issued under S. 122(5A) did not result in final adjudication on merits---Held, that mere issuance of notices does not bar tax authorities from issuing fresh notices or exercising rectification powers under S. 221, provided there is an apparent error on record requiring correction. Cited Case Law: DH Travels v. Commissioner Enforcement and others (2018 PTD 657) Pir Bakhsh Represented By His Legal Heirs And Others v. The Chairman, Allotment Committee and others (PLD 1987 Supreme Court 145) (d) Taxation—Requirement of Evidence for Installation of Plant & Machinery ----Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, S. 221---Burden of proof in establishing installation of plant & machinery for initial depreciation---Held, that applicant-company failed to provide conclusive evidence of installation by 30.06.2000, and subsequent capital investments confirmed that the plant was still under construction beyond the cut-off date---Appellate Tribunal’s decision rejecting initial depreciation claim upheld. Disposition: Reference Application No. 545 of 2006 dismissed. High Court upheld the Appellate Tribunal’s ruling that rectification under Section 221 was valid, as it corrected an erroneous allowance of initial depreciation. The refinery was not conclusively installed by 30.06.2000, and the taxpayer’s reliance on res judicata was misplaced.

Summary: The Appellants, Allah Ditta and others, had filed a suit for the specific performance of a registered agreement to sell against the Defendant, the trial court had decreed the suit in favor of the Appellants, and the appellate court had upheld this decision. However, the Defendant filed a Regular Second Appeal (RSA) before the Lahore High Court, which ultimately set aside the previous judgments and dismissed the suit. The court observed that the suit was a straightforward case for specific performance of a registered agreement dated June 26, 1986. The Defendant, who had passed away during the appeal process, had denied the execution and existence of the agreement and the receipt of the sale consideration. However, the court found that the Appellants had proven the existence of the agreement and produced witnesses and the Sub-Registrar who had registered the agreement in their favor. The court noted that the Defendant did not appear to contest the case and only one witness, Muhammad Rafique, was produced but did not face cross-examination. The court deemed the Defendant's denial as futile and unproductive. The trial court had rightfully granted a decree in favor of the Appellants, and this decision was correctly upheld by the appellate court. Regarding the Lahore High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court found that it had erred in considering the agreement as unilateral because it was not signed by the vendee. The court pointed out that one of the vendees had been present before the Sub-Registrar at the time of registration and had signed the registration certificate. Additionally, the judgment cited the precedent set by the Muhammad Sattar v. Tariq Javaid case, which established that non-signing of an agreement by the vendee does not adversely affect their rights. The court rejected the argument that the agreement was against the provisions of the Loans for Agricultural Purposes Act, 1973, as it was not raised by the Respondents in the lower courts. The court found no legal impediment to selling a property under a charge and considered the argument an afterthought. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Lahore High Court's judgment and restoring the judgments and decrees of the trial court and the appellate court. No costs were awarded. The associated Civil Miscellaneous Applications were either dismissed as infructuous or disposed of accordingly.

Summary: The Appellants, Allah Ditta and others, had filed a suit for the specific performance of a registered agreement to sell against the Defendant, the trial court had decreed the suit in favor of the Appellants, and the appellate court had upheld this decision. However, the Defendant filed a Regular Second Appeal (RSA) before the Lahore High Court, which ultimately set aside the previous judgments and dismissed the suit. The court observed that the suit was a straightforward case for specific performance of a registered agreement dated June 26, 1986. The Defendant, who had passed away during the appeal process, had denied the execution and existence of the agreement and the receipt of the sale consideration. However, the court found that the Appellants had proven the existence of the agreement and produced witnesses and the Sub-Registrar who had registered the agreement in their favor. The court noted that the Defendant did not appear to contest the case and only one witness, Muhammad Rafique, was produced but did not face cross-examination. The court deemed the Defendant's denial as futile and unproductive. The trial court had rightfully granted a decree in favor of the Appellants, and this decision was correctly upheld by the appellate court. Regarding the Lahore High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court found that it had erred in considering the agreement as unilateral because it was not signed by the vendee. The court pointed out that one of the vendees had been present before the Sub-Registrar at the time of registration and had signed the registration certificate. Additionally, the judgment cited the precedent set by the Muhammad Sattar v. Tariq Javaid case, which established that non-signing of an agreement by the vendee does not adversely affect their rights. The court rejected the argument that the agreement was against the provisions of the Loans for Agricultural Purposes Act, 1973, as it was not raised by the Respondents in the lower courts. The court found no legal impediment to selling a property under a charge and considered the argument an afterthought. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Lahore High Court's judgment and restoring the judgments and decrees of the trial court and the appellate court. No costs were awarded. The associated Civil Miscellaneous Applications were either dismissed as infructuous or disposed of accordingly.

Summary: The Appellants, Allah Ditta and others, had filed a suit for the specific performance of a registered agreement to sell against the Defendant, the trial court had decreed the suit in favor of the Appellants, and the appellate court had upheld this decision. However, the Defendant filed a Regular Second Appeal (RSA) before the Lahore High Court, which ultimately set aside the previous judgments and dismissed the suit. The court observed that the suit was a straightforward case for specific performance of a registered agreement dated June 26, 1986. The Defendant, who had passed away during the appeal process, had denied the execution and existence of the agreement and the receipt of the sale consideration. However, the court found that the Appellants had proven the existence of the agreement and produced witnesses and the Sub-Registrar who had registered the agreement in their favor. The court noted that the Defendant did not appear to contest the case and only one witness, Muhammad Rafique, was produced but did not face cross-examination. The court deemed the Defendant's denial as futile and unproductive. The trial court had rightfully granted a decree in favor of the Appellants, and this decision was correctly upheld by the appellate court. Regarding the Lahore High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court found that it had erred in considering the agreement as unilateral because it was not signed by the vendee. The court pointed out that one of the vendees had been present before the Sub-Registrar at the time of registration and had signed the registration certificate. Additionally, the judgment cited the precedent set by the Muhammad Sattar v. Tariq Javaid case, which established that non-signing of an agreement by the vendee does not adversely affect their rights. The court rejected the argument that the agreement was against the provisions of the Loans for Agricultural Purposes Act, 1973, as it was not raised by the Respondents in the lower courts. The court found no legal impediment to selling a property under a charge and considered the argument an afterthought. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Lahore High Court's judgment and restoring the judgments and decrees of the trial court and the appellate court. No costs were awarded. The associated Civil Miscellaneous Applications were either dismissed as infructuous or disposed of accordingly.

Summary: Civil service-------Contract of employment, cancellation of---Scope---Petitioner challenged the cancellationof her contract of employment---Contention of petitioner was that the department wasinformed about her absence due to murder threats by her husband; that her contract wascancelled without issuing any notice and that an opportunity of personal hearing was notprovided---Validity---Application under Ss.22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C., produced by petitionerbefore the department showed that it was filed against certain persons who were causingillegal harassment to her and her husband which apparently contradicted her stance that shehad a threat of murder or dire consequences by her husband---Impugned order reflected thatthe petitioner was afforded an opportunity of hearing which she had duly availed---Chargeslevelled against the petitioner had been proved through concurrent findings of twoauthorities, credibility of which could not be shaken by the petitioner---Constitutionalpetition was dismissed.

Summary: The employees of District Health Authority as well as District Education Authority are public servants, thus, constitution petition is not maintainable in view of bar contained in Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973----A group of interconnected petitions involving employees from the Health and Education Departments challenges various employment-related decisions. These decisions include transfer/posting orders, disciplinary proceedings, and deputations. The central issue pertains to the impact of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013, which led to the establishment of the District Education Authority and District Health Authority. The petitioners contend that their employment status underwent a transformation due to the creation of these authorities, resulting in what they claim are unlawful transfers. The respondents invoke Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan, asserting immunity from legal challenges pertaining to civil service matters. The court delves into the intricate legal landscape and emphasizes that the establishment of the District Education Authority and District Health Authority under the Act of 2013 did not fundamentally change the civil servant status of the petitioners. To support this stance, notably the case of Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation and Abdul Rahim v. Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (1992 SCMR 2113). Underlining the absolute and inflexible nature of the bar imposed by Article 212 of the Constitution, the court asserted that civil courts are prohibited from entertaining matters related to civil service terms and conditions. In reliance on this constitutional provision and the cited legal precedents, the court dismisses all connected petitions. The court relied on established legal principles to affirm that the establishment of new authorities did not bring about a change in the civil servant status of the petitioners. Consequently, the court invokes the absolute bar under Article 212 of the Constitution to dismissed the petitions, drawing on a robust foundation of legal reliance.

Summary: Facts:The petitioner, Sajjad Ahmad Khan, sought specific performance based on an oral sale agreement with Respondent No. 1, Mohammad Saleem Alvi, for a property transaction agreed upon in 1991-1992. The agreement involved a total consideration of Rs. 3,37,500, out of which Rs. 2,71,000 was paid in advance. Despite the advance payment and handing over of physical possession, the respondent failed to execute the sale deed, leading the petitioner to file a suit, which was initially decreed ex-parte in his favor in 1997. However, subsequent legal complications involving Respondent No. 2 (a subsequent vendee) and Respondent No. 3 (the son of Respondent No. 2) led to the setting aside of the ex-parte decree and the dismissal of the petitioner's suit for specific performance by both the trial court and the appellate court. The High Court upheld these dismissals, prompting the petitioner to appeal to the Supreme Court.(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- S. 12(2) --- Specific performance of contract --- Oral agreement to sell --- Admissibility of oral contracts under law --- Subsequent vendees and sham transactions --- Effect --- Petitioner filed a suit for specific performance of an oral sale agreement which was decreed ex parte but was later set aside upon an application under S. 12(2), C.P.C. filed by the subsequent vendee --- Petitioner had entered into an oral agreement to sell on or before 6th August, 1991, which was later formalized through a written agreement (Ex-PW-2/1), signed on 16th February, 1992 --- Consideration was partially paid through multiple receipts, and possession was delivered to the petitioner --- Respondents claimed that Respondent No.1 had already sold the suit property to Respondent No.2 via an agreement dated 11th February, 1992, and subsequently transferred the property to Respondent No.3 --- However, Respondent No.1 later entered into another compromise agreement with Respondent No.2, resulting in a decree in favor of Respondent No.2, followed by a power of attorney and subsequent transfer of the suit property to Respondent No.3 --- Held, that Respondent No.3's suit for possession itself confirmed that possession was with the petitioner --- Despite concurrent findings by the trial court, appellate court, and High Court dismissing the petitioner’s suit for specific performance, Supreme Court found that the findings were based on misreading and non-reading of material evidence --- Supreme Court, therefore, decreed the suit for specific performance in favor of the petitioner and set aside the lower courts’ concurrent findings. Cited Cases: Abdul Hameed v. Jahangir Khan (Civil Petition No. 3097/2015 & Civil Appeal No. 1074/2015) Muhammad Sattar v. Tariq Javaid (2017 SCMR 98) (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ---- Art. 79 --- Proof of written agreements --- Non-production of attesting witness --- Whether fatal to the case --- Held, that non-production of one of the attesting witnesses of the written sale agreement (Ex-PW-2/1) was not a bar to its proof under Art. 79, Q.S.O., 1984, where overwhelming evidence supported the existence of the agreement --- Respondent No.1, despite alleging that his signatures were forged, neither pursued criminal proceedings nor filed a civil suit to challenge the agreement --- Notary Public’s attestation of the agreement remained unshaken, and oral testimony of the petitioner and witnesses confirmed the execution of the agreement --- Moreover, the second attesting witness was unavailable as he was residing abroad --- Supreme Court observed that insistence on strict compliance with Art. 79, in such circumstances, amounted to technicality rather than substantial justice, especially when the agreement had been proved through other cogent evidence. (c) Administration of Justice ---- Concurrent findings of fact --- Misreading and non-reading of evidence --- Effect --- Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the petitioner’s suit by three lower courts was a result of misreading and non-reading of material evidence, as well as misapplication of the law --- Court exercised appellate jurisdiction to rectify the miscarriage of justice. (d) Specific Performance of Contract ---- Relief --- Equity and conduct of parties --- Subsequent sham transactions --- Effect on petitioner’s rights --- Held, that Respondent No.1’s conduct in executing multiple agreements and power of attorney in favor of subsequent vendees indicated mala fides --- Supreme Court decreed the suit for specific performance in favor of the petitioner, directing him to deposit the balance consideration of Rs.66,500/- in the trial court within 60 days --- Sham transactions between Respondents No.1, 2, and 3 were declared null and void, ensuring that the petitioner’s rights under the original agreement remained unaffected. Disposition: Appeal allowed. Judgment of the High Court and concurrent findings of lower courts set aside. Suit for specific performance decreed in favor of the petitioner. Subsequent sale transactions declared void.

Summary: Acquittal ---- Background:Shaban Akhtar, along with his brother Ahsan Akhtar (later acquitted), was tried and convicted by the Special Judge Anti Terrorism Court in Sargodha on charges including abduction for ransom and homicide. The initial sentence was death on three counts, along with compensation, fines, and additional sentences. However, the Lahore High Court later acquitted Ahsan Akhtar and modified Shaban Akhtar's sentence to life imprisonment. Both the convict and the complainant appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Pakistan, leading to a combined judgment for both appeals.-----Issues:The credibility and sufficiency of the evidence linking Shaban Akhtar to the crime, especially in light of his co-accused brother's acquittal.The failure of the prosecution to present forensic evidence establishing a digital link between the cell phone handset recovered from Akhtar and the SIM cards produced by the complainant, which were alleged to be used in the ransom demand.The reliability of the "last seen" evidence provided by a witness named Sajjad Ahmad, deemed partisan by the defense.----Holding/Reasoning:The Supreme Court found several issues with the prosecution's case, leading to the decision to acquit Shaban Akhtar:The lack of digital or forensic evidence connecting the appellant to the crime, especially given the availability of such evidence, which could have conclusively established telephonic communication related to the ransom demand.The timing and sequence of events, as presented by the prosecution, did not align with the estimated time of the child's death provided by the medical officer, creating inconsistencies in the prosecution's narrative.The "last seen" evidence was deemed unreliable, particularly as it was provided belatedly by a witness who was potentially inducted based on a misplaced suspicion.The acquittal of Akhtar's brother, Ahsan Akhtar, on the same set of evidence, posed a significant challenge to maintaining Shaban Akhtar's conviction, as it reflected a possible alternate view that could not be ignored.Given these considerations, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence did not meet the standard of "proof beyond doubt" required for a criminal conviction. As a result, Shaban Akhtar was acquitted of the charges and ordered to be released unless needed for other cases. Consequently, the related criminal petition filed by the complainant was dismissed.----Citations/Precedents:The judgment did not explicitly cite previous cases or legal precedents but focused on evaluating the evidence's credibility and sufficiency presented during the trial and the appeals process. The principle of "proof beyond doubt" and the inconsistencies in the prosecution's narrative were central to the Court's reasoning.

Summary: Background:The case involves multiple applications: CMAs 7617/2019, CMAs 2012/2020, and CMA 1878/2020. These applications were filed by the Advocate General for Sindh, the Attorney General for Pakistan, and the Malir Development Authority, respectively. The primary issue revolves around the disbursement and utilization of funds deposited by Bahria Town, along with accrued profit/markup, under the supervision of a high-powered commission.---Issues:How should the funds deposited by Bahria Town, along with the accrued profit/markup, be utilized?Who should be members of the commission overseeing the disbursement of funds?---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The court decided that a high-powered commission should oversee the disbursement of funds. The commission would be chaired by a retired Judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan from Sindh and comprise voting and non-voting members. The voting members would include nominees from various authorities and distinguished individuals, while non-voting members would consist of officials designated by virtue of their offices. The commission's decisions would be subject to the approval of the Implementation Bench of the Court. Detailed provisions regarding the commission's composition, functioning, and scope were outlined in an annex to the order. All applications were disposed of in accordance with these terms.