Summary: [Civil Procedure Code CPC (O.XXXIX, Rule.1 & 2 Interim Injunction)] In terms of Section 60/62 of the Easement Act it is not vested right of a licensee to enforce the terms of such agreement which in its present form only presents permissible rights i.e terms of agreement as stated therein which could be withdrawn, even without notice in case of a license. Hence in view of that, the plaintiffs right is not matured to enforce rest of the agreed obligation including the tenure of one year. In case the plaintiff is of the view that under the general law it has been unlawfully terminated without assigning any reason,they have already secured it by way of this suit in the shape of recovering damages.

Summary: Suit for specific performance--temporary injunction---The case revolved around a land purchase agreement from 29.04.2016, and the respondents filed a counter suit alleging a breach of the agreement by the petitioners. The petitioners sought a temporary injunction to prevent the respondent from encashing an insurance guarantee provided by them.The Supreme Court, while evaluating the request for temporary injunction, considered the terms of the land purchase agreement and the insurance guarantee. The court noted that the insurance guarantee allowed the respondent to encash it at the first written demand, unconditionally and without requiring confirmation from the petitioners, regardless of whether the agreement had been breached. Therefore, the court concluded that the petitioners did not have a strong case for restraining the respondent from encashing the insurance guarantee pending the resolution of the dispute.Regarding CPLA No.3359 of 2020, which sought to stay the proceedings of the second suit filed by the respondent, the court determined that although some issues were common in both suits, there were additional matters in the second suit that were not present in the first suit. As a result, the court refused to stay the proceedings under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). Instead, it suggested consolidating both suits to avoid conflicting decisions on common issues.In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed both petitions and refused to grant leave for the appeals. The court upheld the judgment of the Islamabad High Court and clarified the application of relevant legal principles in the case.

Summary: The appellant, New College Publications, had initially filed a writ petition, and interim stay was granted. Subsequently, respondents No.2 to 6 filed an application for clarification regarding the stay order, which was modified to allow them to complete the tender process, subject to the final outcome of the writ petition. The appellant challenged the order through an Intra Court Appeal, contending that the order was not interlocutory but final, thus maintaining the appeal under Section 3(3) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. The court, in its analysis, referred to legal precedents Noor Muhammad Lambardar vs. Member (Revenue) etc (2003 SCMR 708),National University of Sciences etc vs. Dayyan Atta Tareen (2011 YLR 1070), Messrs National Security Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Messrs Hoechst Pakistan Ltd. and others (PLD 1990 Supreme Court 709), Messrs Qadoos Brothers vs. Judge Banking Court etc (2018 CLD 88), these precedents helped the Lahore High Court establish a clear understanding of what constitutes an interlocutory order and guided its decision on the maintainability of the appeal in the case at hand. Applying these definitions to the impugned order, the court concluded that since the main lis (matter) was yet to be decided, and substantial proceedings remained pending, the order was indeed interlocutory and did not dispose of the entire case. Consequently, the appeal was deemed not maintainable and was dismissed.

Summary: Appeal Allowed---The appellant is restrained from using its registered trademark "Rami" due to the proceedings before the Registrar of Trademarks initiated by the respondent. The respondent sought an interim injunction against the appellant's use of the trademark while the opposition proceedings were pending. The appellant's counsel argues that the trademark "Rani" had not been in use for a substantial period, while the appellant's trademark "Rami" had been in use since 2008. The counsel also points out that the proceedings before the Registrar were ongoing and that the injunction granted by the Single Judge effectively stymied those proceedings. The respondent's counsel, on the other hand, contends that the appellant's trademark is deceptively similar to theirs and that the appellant's trademark should never have been registered. Ultimately, the Judges concluded that the interim injunction granted by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable. They determine that the order goes beyond preserving the status quo and grants final relief at an interim stage, which is not justifiable. Therefore, they set aside the Impugned Order and revive the application for the determination of the injunction, directing that it be re-evaluated by a learned Single Judge in accordance with the law.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908): ----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2— Interim Injunction—Essential Requirements—Prima Facie Case, Irreparable Loss, and Balance of Inconvenience—Non-Existence of Justiciable Claim—Revisional Jurisdiction of High Court— Petitioner sought permanent and mandatory injunction against alleged illegal construction by private respondents on the ground that it blocked the free passage adjacent to his residence—Interim relief under O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2, C.P.C. was denied by the Civil Judge and affirmed by the Additional District Judge—Both courts relied on report of local commission and written statement of respondent No.7/Cantonment Board, which confirmed that construction was within the old structure and carried out with proper permission—Held, petitioner failed to establish prima facie case, irreparable loss, or balance of inconvenience in his favour—Where factual issues require adjudication through evidence and involve disputed rights, courts are justified in declining injunctive relief—Discretion exercised by lower courts found proper, lawful, and not arbitrary—Petitioner failed to demonstrate grounds warranting interference in revisional jurisdiction. Revision dismissed. (b) Administration of Justice: ----Discretion of Civil Courts in Injunctive Matters—Scope of Interference in Revisional Jurisdiction— Where courts of first and appellate instance have exercised discretion after evaluating evidence, pleadings, and commission reports, High Court in revisional jurisdiction will not ordinarily interfere unless the order is perverse, arbitrary, or without jurisdiction—Mere disagreement with conclusions is insufficient ground for revision—Findings based on local commission and official permissions from relevant authorities carry strong evidentiary value. -----Cited Cases: • Irshad Husain v. Province of Punjab PLD 2003 SC 344 • Pervaiz Hussain v. Arabian Sea Enterprises Ltd. 2007 SCMR 1005 • Marghub Siddiqi v. Hamid Ahmad Khan 1974 SCMR 519 • Mst. Hajran Begum v. Kh. Muhammad Yousaf 2005 MLD 592 (Lahore) • Province of Punjab v. Alamgir PLD 2005 Lahore 401 • Sarwar Ali v. Registrar of Joint Stock Companies 2016 CLC 1090 -----Disposition: Revision dismissed in limine.

Summary: Power to pass orders relating to grant of interim injunction had neither been prohibited nor had been regulated by any provision of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and therefore Banking Court was vested with powers to grant interim relief as regulated by the C.P.C. Grant of interim injunction was a part of the working of the judicial system and no separate or specific provision of law was necessary to empower a court to issue an interim order. Banking Court was not required to wait for decision on an application for leave to defend before passing an order for temporary injunction/interim relief in order to preserve a property as the same would tantamount to putting clog on an inherent power of Banking Court.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ----O.VII, R.11---Interim injunction---Scope of revisional jurisdiction---Plaint rejected while deciding an interim injunction application---Maintainability---Principles of natural justice. A suit for pre-emption and cancellation of a sale deed and agreement-to-sell was filed by the appellant, accompanied by an application for interim injunction. The trial court granted interim relief, subject to conditions. Appeals were filed by both parties before the District Judge, who modified the trial court’s order. A revision petition was then filed before the High Court, challenging the interim injunction order. The High Court, while dismissing the revision petition, rejected the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, CPC. Held, that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by rejecting the plaint in revisional proceedings, as it was seized only with the question of interim injunction. Once a plaint is not rejected at the initial stage, the court must provide an opportunity to the plaintiff to explain its maintainability before making such a decision. Rejecting the plaint during proceedings related to an interlocutory matter amounts to a violation of principles of natural justice and denies the plaintiff a fair hearing. The High Court was obligated to confine itself to the issue of interim injunction rather than addressing the maintainability of the suit. ----Cited Cases: Mushtaq Hussain v. Province of Punjab through Collector Jehlum and 6 others [2003 MLD 109] Nishan Ali v. Sher Muhammad and 3 others [2004 MLD 1909] Zafar Ahmed Ansari v. Auqaf Department through Chief Administrator, Punjab, Lahore and 4 others [1996 CLC 892] ----Disposition: Appeal accepted, impugned judgment set aside, and case remanded to the High Court for fresh decision on the interim injunction, with directions to conclude the matter within one month. Interim injunction to remain in force until the decision of the revision petition by the High Court.

Summary: a) Civil Procedure—Interim Injunctions: ----Order maintaining status quo—Interim injunction granted by the Chief Court in favor of the respondents, restraining the petitioners from dispossessing the respondents from the suit land until the final adjudication of pending civil revisions—Petitioners, contending they were in possession of the land, sought modification of the interim order—Supreme Appellate Court upheld the Chief Court's interim order, finding it well-reasoned and based on the Trial Court's partial decree recognizing the respondent's possession of the land. (b) Possession and Injunctive Relief: ----Protection of possession—Interim relief granted to maintain possession of the suit property pending resolution of the main dispute—Supreme Appellate Court reaffirmed that interference in interim orders is unwarranted unless there is a significant procedural or substantive error—Possession recognized as a critical factor in granting injunctive relief. (c) Appellate Review—Scope of Interim Orders: ----Judicial restraint in interference with interim orders—Supreme Appellate Court declined to modify or overturn the impugned order, emphasizing that interim relief orders, particularly those based on possession, should be preserved to maintain fairness during ongoing litigation. ----Disposition: The petition was converted into an appeal and dismissed. The interim order dated 12.11.2016 passed by the Chief Court was affirmed.

Summary: Background: A cooperative housing scheme filed a civil revision petition challenging the orders of the Civil Judge and Additional District Judge, which dismissed its application for interim injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The petitioner sought an injunction in its suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 05.09.2012 for 20 Kanals and 2 Marlas of land. The petitioner alleged that the respondents had agreed to transfer the land but failed to transfer the entire area. The petitioner also claimed a subsequent agreement dated 12.11.2013 involving additional land, which the respondents denied. -----Issues: 1- Did the learned Courts below err in dismissing the petitioner’s application for interim injunction? -----2- Was there sufficient evidence to support the petitioner’s claim regarding the alleged agreements for sale and transfer of land? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Review of Initial Agreement (05.09.2012): The petitioner had entered into an agreement with the respondents for the sale of 20 Kanals and 2 Marlas of land. Evidence presented in the case, including Mutation No. 967, confirmed that the entire land under the 2012 agreement was transferred to the petitioner. --Alleged Addendum (12.11.2013): The petitioner claimed a subsequent agreement for the sale of additional land. However, none of the respondents were parties to this alleged agreement. No power of attorney or authorization was granted by the respondents to the property dealer (respondent No. 10) for such a transaction. Payments made to respondent No. 10 were not supported by evidence linking the respondents to the alleged agreement. --Interim Injunction: The courts below found no prima facie case for an injunction based on the alleged 2013 agreement. The petitioner failed to establish an enforceable legal right to the additional land. The dismissal of the interim injunction was upheld as the petitioner had not provided sufficient evidence to prove the existence or execution of the 2013 agreement. The civil revision petition was dismissed. The petitioner’s claim regarding the 2013 agreement was left to be established through evidence in the pending suit. -----Citations/Precedents: Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (criteria for granting interim injunctions).

Summary: Dismissed and consequently ad-interim injunction orders granted earlier stand discharged. --- The plaintiff's counsel cited several precedents to support their arguments for injunctive relief and the wrongful termination of Mazhar's employment. However, the defense counsel contested these claims, emphasizing that an employee cannot be imposed upon an unwilling employer, and injunctive relief in such cases is not appropriate according to established legal principles.The court examined the relevant case law and statutes, including the Constitution of Pakistan, the Specific Relief Act, the Companies Ordinance, and the Civil Procedure Code. It concluded that the plaintiff's applications for injunctive relief did not meet the legal requirements for such relief to be granted. The court held that the relationship between the parties was governed by the principle of 'Master and Servant', and wrongful termination claims should be addressed through compensation rather than reinstatement.Additionally, the court considered the plaintiff's contempt application against SECP officials regarding the change in the company's executive structure. The court found no contemptuous disobedience, as the officials acted in compliance with statutory obligations and court orders.Ultimately, all applications filed by the plaintiff were dismissed, and the previously granted ad-interim injunction orders were discharged, affirming the principle that injunctive relief to reinstate an employee in a private organization is not generally granted under Pakistani law.