Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan—Art. 199—Writ jurisdiction—Enforcement of fundamental rights—Obligations of the State regarding Islamic injunctions and blasphemy laws—Scope and judicial review. The Islamabad High Court examined the alarming issue of blasphemous content disseminated through social media platforms, particularly Facebook, and its implications for Pakistan’s Islamic identity, constitutional obligations, and societal peace. The petitioner invoked constitutional jurisdiction seeking enforcement of State duties to safeguard Islamic tenets, prevent blasphemy, and regulate digital content in accordance with the law. The Court held that under Articles 2-A, 19, 31, and 227 of the Constitution of Pakistan, the State has an explicit obligation to protect the honor of Prophet Muhammad ﷺ, the sanctity of religion, and the moral values of Islamic society. The State’s failure to fulfill these obligations invites judicial scrutiny and appropriate directions to enforce constitutional and statutory mandates. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)—Ss. 295, 295-A, 295-B, 295-C, 296, 298—Blasphemy and offenses against religion—Responsibility of State functionaries to prevent and prosecute such offenses—Directive to law enforcement agencies. The Court directed the Federation of Pakistan, Ministry of Interior, and Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) to take immediate, effective, and coordinated steps to identify and prosecute all individuals involved in the creation, promotion, or dissemination of blasphemous content. Emphasis was laid on the use of available legal instruments, including FIRs, prosecution under Sections 295 to 298 of the Pakistan Penal Code, and collaboration with international stakeholders for evidence and extradition, if necessary. The Court ordered strict enforcement of existing cybercrime and blasphemy laws to prevent exploitation of digital platforms for sacrilegious activities. (c) Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016—Ss. 20, 22, 37—Application to blasphemous content—Regulatory role of Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA)—Judicial oversight and accountability. The Court observed that PTA, under Section 37 of PECA 2016, is empowered to remove or block online content deemed offensive to religious sentiments or repugnant to Islamic values. The authority’s failure to promptly and effectively discharge its statutory functions was taken seriously. The Court directed PTA to establish a special cell dedicated to monitoring and blocking blasphemous content in real time, with a mechanism for public complaints and swift remedial action. (d) International cooperation—Mutual Legal Assistance—Request to international organizations and states to assist Pakistan in curbing blasphemy on global platforms. Recognizing the transnational nature of digital blasphemy, the Court urged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to engage with Facebook, other social media platforms, and international organizations to ensure that such content is restricted or removed in compliance with Pakistan’s legal framework. The Court suggested that failure to cooperate may warrant blocking of the entire platform in Pakistan, as the honor of Prophet Muhammad ﷺ takes precedence over all conveniences of modern communication. (e) Judicial sensitivity—Status of the Holy Prophet Muhammad ﷺ—Expression of reverence and solemnity in judicial reasoning. The Court devoted considerable space to expressing reverence for the finality and sanctity of Prophet Muhammad ﷺ, stating unequivocally that any attack on his honor is the gravest possible offense for Muslims. The judgment reflected a deeply held view that love for the Prophet ﷺ is intrinsic to Islamic faith and Pakistani identity. The Court called for unity among all sects and schools of thought to defend the honor of Prophet Muhammad ﷺ and condemned sectarianism, terrorism, and vigilantism under the guise of religion. (f) Public and institutional responsibilities—Role of citizens, civil society, and media—Call for awareness, unity, and proactive action. The Court invited religious scholars, intellectuals, journalists, and civil society to play their role in preserving religious harmony and countering blasphemous narratives. It emphasized that such an offense cannot be countered by individual action or vigilantism, but must be dealt with through lawful institutional mechanisms. Citizens were urged to lodge complaints with the authorities rather than taking law into their own hands. (g) Orders issued—Institutional coordination—Protective measures—Follow-up directives. FIA and PTA were directed to identify culprits and ensure their arrest, prosecution, and punishment under relevant provisions of law. A dedicated task force was ordered to be constituted for ongoing monitoring and enforcement. Ministry of Foreign Affairs was directed to take diplomatic steps with host countries of social media platforms. Secretary Ministry of Interior was directed to submit periodic compliance reports to the Court. A follow-up hearing was scheduled to assess the progress of implementation. Disposition: Petition allowed with specific and binding directions issued to the Federation, PTA, FIA, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ensure comprehensive implementation of the blasphemy laws and digital content regulations.

Summary: Background: This case involves a dispute arising from a penalty imposed under telecommunication regulations, as enforced by a governmental authority responsible for telecommunication oversight. The appellant, a telecommunication company, was issued a show cause notice regarding outstanding annual charges for numbers allocated in a previous fiscal year, along with a penalty under certain regulatory provisions. The appellant contested the order, claiming that the penalty and demand for payment were unlawful, without authority, and inconsistent with the conditions of their license. -----Issues: 1- Does the telecommunication authority have the power to impose penalties or liabilities under the contested regulations, considering the statutory limitations of its authority? -----2- Are the regulations used to impose penalties on the appellant consistent with the enabling Act? -----3- Can retrospective regulatory provisions create liabilities or impose penalties for actions occurring before their enactment? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court found that the regulation imposing penalties exceeded the scope of the authority’s powers as defined by the telecommunication Act. Specifically: The power to make rules and regulations under the Act did not extend to imposing financial penalties not explicitly authorized by the legislature. Imposing penalties through regulation without express legislative support was inconsistent with statutory limits and thus ultra vires (beyond the powers granted by) the Act. Delegated legislation (such as rules or regulations) cannot override or conflict with the parent statute. As a result, the court deemed the penalty provision in the regulation void and inoperative. The appeal was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside, with instructions for the authority to reconsider the matter according to the law. -----Citations/Precedents: PLD 2014 SC 389 (Suo Motu Case No.11 of 2011) PLD 2011 SC 619 (Suo Motu Case No.13 of 2009) 2013 SCMR 642 (ZTBL vs. Said Rehman) 1985 SCMR 365 (Ziauddin vs. Punjab Local Government) PLD 1995 SC 423 (Multiline Associates vs. Ardeshire Cowasjee) 2005 SCMR 186 (Khawaja Ahmad Hassan vs. Government of Punjab) 2010 SCMR 1437 (Tehsil Nazim TMA Okara vs. Abbas Ali) 2007 SCMR 307 (Raja Hamayun Sarfraz Khan vs. Noor Muhammad) 2001 SCMR 838 (Assistant Collector Customs vs. Khyber Electric Lamps) PLD 2005 SC 842 (Khyber Tractors Pvt. Ltd. vs. Pakistan through M/O Finance, Revenue and Economic Affairs, Islamabad)

Summary: Background: The case involves an appeal against an enforcement order issued by the telecommunications regulatory authority to a private service company. The appellant had been granted a license under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, for providing services across Pakistan. This license imposed obligations, including the payment of annual regulatory dues and a Radio Frequency Spectrum Fee (spectrum fee), with late fees calculated at 2% per month. The appellant argued that the spectrum fee was not payable as the spectrum was unused during the specified period, citing economic hardships and requesting relaxation in payment terms. -----Issues: 1- Is the spectrum fee payable only if the allocated spectrum is used? -----2- Is the late payment fee independent or contingent upon Regulation 23(7) of the 2006 Regulations? -----3- Can the appeal be deemed competent if a valid Board Resolution was not appended at the time of filing? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Spectrum Fee Obligation: The court held that the spectrum fee applies upon allocation of the spectrum as it is a scarce state-owned resource. Its use is not a condition for payment, and fees are required regardless of whether the licensee earns revenue from it. --Late Payment Fee: The late payment fee stipulated in the license (Clause 4.2.3) is binding, as the appellant agreed to these terms when accepting the license. Thus, the late fee is enforceable independently of the 2006 Regulations, rendering the appellant’s argument about the regulatory provisions irrelevant. --Competency of Appeal: The appeal was deemed incompetent. The court ruled that an appeal by a corporation must be backed by a valid Board Resolution authorizing the filing, and this must be submitted within the statutory limitation period. Subsequent ratification does not cure the defect of an initially unauthorized filing. -----Citations/Precedents: Mian Ejaz Shafi v. Federation of Pakistan [PLD 1997 Karachi 604] Rahimullah Khan v. Government of N.-W.F.P. [1990 CLC 550] Telecard Limited v. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority [2014 CLD 415] Messrs Razo (Pvt.) Limited v. Karachi City Region Employees Old Age Benefit Institution [2005 CLD 1208] Qarman Construction (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Saleemullah [2008 CLD 239] American Life Insurance Company v. Sindh Employees Social Security Institution [2009 CLD 1329] WAPDA v. Messers Ghulam Rasool & Co. (Pvt) Ltd. [2005 MLD 1165] Sirajuddin Paracha v. Mehboob Ellahi [PLD 1997 SC 276] Khan Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot v. Messers Ghulam Nabi Corporation Ltd [PLD 1971 SC 550] Pakcom Limited v. Federation of Pakistan [PLD 2011 SC 44] Pak Telecom Limited v. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority [PLD 2014 SC 478] Government of Pakistan v. Premier Sugar Mills [PLD 1991 Lahore 381] Dr. S.M. Rab v. National Refinery Ltd [PLD 2005 Karachi 478] Abdul Rahim v. United Bank Ltd of Pakistan [PLD 1997 Karachi 62]

Summary: The petitioner, a mobile service provider, had received a show cause notice from PTA in 2008, demanding an annual spectrum administrative fee (ASAF) based on the 2004 Mobile Cellular Policy. The petitioner argued that it was not obligated to pay ASAF during the existence of its license issued in 1998.The key issues revolved around the interpretation of the license terms, the Mobile Cellular Policy of 2004, and PTA's authority to unilaterally impose ASAF on the petitioner. The petitioner contended that ASAF was not part of their original license terms and should not be retroactively applied. The petitioner also questioned PTA's authority to modify the license terms without consent and claimed that the ASAF was not meant for the "use" of frequency spectrum but for administrative expenses.Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, emphasizing that ASAF was a separate charge not covered by the existing license issued in 1998. The Court held that PTA lacked the authority to impose ASAF unilaterally and that any modifications to the license should have been negotiated with the petitioner. The Court also clarified the distinction between the "use" of frequency spectrum and its "administration," affirming that ASAF was not applicable to existing licensees who had not opted for the Mobile Cellular Policy. The decision overturned the earlier rulings of the Islamabad High Court and allowed the petitioner's appeal.Citations and Precedents:Pakistan Telecommunication (Reorganization) Act, 1996: The Act that established the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) and outlined its regulatory powers.Mobile Cellular Policy 2004: The policy issued by the Federal Government in 2004, which introduced the concept of the Annual Spectrum Administrative Fee (ASAF) and sought to bring mobile service providers under its purview.Clause 2.4 of the License: A clause in the petitioner's license specifying the licensee's obligation to pay charges for the use of frequency spectrum.Section 22 of the Act: The statutory provision that outlines the process for modifying a license, including the requirement for consent between the licensee and PTA and the option to seek judicial intervention.Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan: The constitutional provision relating to equality and non-discrimination. The Court considered whether the imposition of ASAF constituted discrimination under this article.

Summary: The appellant's counsel argued that the appellant's initial appointment was for four years and was later extended for another four years. However, before the expiration of the extended term, the appellant was suspended through an impugned notification dated 29.4.2011. The appellant contended that the suspension was illegal because it violated Section 3(5) of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, which stated that a member of the Authority may only be removed from office after an inquiry by the Federal Public Service Commission. The appellant claimed that no such inquiry was conducted, and no show cause notice or charge sheet was served. The High Court examined the available material and notifications. It found that previous notifications clearly indicated that the appellant's appointment after the date of superannuation was on a contract basis. The impugned notification showed that the appellant had been placed under suspension. The court concluded that since the appellant's appointment was on a contract basis for a specific period, it could be terminated without assigning a reason. The court also noted that the appointment on a contract basis did not confer a vested right, and the final decision regarding the appellant's status was yet to be taken. Considering these factors, the learned Single Judge in Chamber correctly determined that the appellant's appointment was on a contract basis, and the impugned judgment dismissing the constitutional petition was justified. The court found no impropriety, illegality, irregularity, or infirmity in the impugned judgment and dismissed the intra-court appeal at the initial stage.

Summary: Considering that the matter of the validity of the rules and regulations had already been decided by this Court and was pending before the Supreme Court, the Court stated that no interference could be made. The Court referred to previous cases to support this position. The Court found no illegality in the impugned judgment and concluded that the writ petition had been rightly dismissed. The appellant's contention that subsequent amendments to Section 57(2) of the law made the present writ petition different was rejected by the Court. The Court noted that the appellant had also challenged the validity of the rules and regulations in the previous writ petition, in which the validity of the Access Promotion Rules, 2004 had been upheld. The Court further stated that a writ petition does not lie against a show cause notice, citing a relevant case. Therefore, the Court found no merits in the appeal and dismissed it at the outset (in limine).

Summary: The High Court could not suspend or strike down the show cause notices in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under section 7(1) of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996 ("the Act"). The High Court's appellate jurisdiction under the Act commences once there was a decision or order, however, there wasn't any in the present case.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act (XVII of 1996): ---Ss. 4(l), 5, 8(2), 20 & 21--- Issuance of Long Distance International (LDI) license---Scope of regulatory authority and procedural compliance---Petitioner challenged the grant of an LDI license to Respondent No.4, alleging that the license was issued without adherence to policy directives, public notice, or open auction, thereby violating statutory provisions, directives, and principles of transparency. ---Held, under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) has the exclusive authority to grant licenses for telecommunication services. The 2003 Deregulation Policy, though subject to review after five years, remained effective as it was not formally rescinded. PTA acted within its statutory authority, and no legal requirement existed for conducting an open auction for LDI licenses. ---Held further, the petitioner's claims of mala fide, discrimination, and lack of transparency were unsubstantiated. All procedural and codal formalities were duly observed in granting the LDI license to Respondent No.4. The petitioner, already holding an LDI license, failed to establish itself as an affected or interested party, rendering the petition devoid of merit. (b) Constitutional Jurisdiction: ---Art. 199--- Maintainability of writ petition---Scope of judicial review---Petitioner invoked constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199, seeking cancellation of the LDI license granted to Respondent No.4. ---Held, constitutional jurisdiction is not a substitute for statutory remedies or a forum for speculative claims. The petitioner failed to demonstrate any violation of constitutional rights or statutory provisions warranting judicial interference. The court does not intervene in the domain of a regulatory authority unless there is evidence of mala fide, lack of jurisdiction, or procedural impropriety. In this case, no exceptional circumstances were established. (c) Transparency and Procedural Compliance: Regulatory decisions---Burden of proof in allegations of mala fide or favoritism---Petitioner alleged favoritism in the grant of the LDI license, citing arbitrary actions and non-compliance with policy directives. ---Held, mere allegations without substantive evidence are insufficient to challenge the actions of a regulatory authority. The grant of the LDI license to Respondent No.4 was found to be lawful, transparent, and in compliance with applicable policies and regulations. ----Disposition: Writ Petitions Nos. 904 and 1204 of 2014 were dismissed with no order as to costs. The court found no merit in the petitions, affirming that the issuance of the LDI license adhered to legal and procedural requirements.

Summary: 23, 7(1) of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Reorganization) Act, 1996----The case at hand revolves around the jurisdiction of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (P.T.A.) to issue an enforcement order against a licensee, specifically the appellant, for alleged violations related to call masking and inaccurate reporting of incoming international telephony service. The legal analysis primarily focuses on the interplay between relevant statutory provisions, regulations, and the appellant's actions.At the core of the dispute lies the appellant's alleged contravention of Rule 12 of the Pakistan Telecommunication Rules, 2004, and Regulation 11 of the Pakistan Telecommunication Regulations, 2005. These provisions mandate licensees to provide accurate information regarding the total minutes of incoming international telephony service to the P.T.A. The appellant is accused of underreporting these minutes, creating a discrepancy in the reported Call Data Records (CDRs).The appellant contends that the P.T.A. lacks jurisdiction due to the pendency of arbitration proceedings with another party, P.T.C.L., arising from an interconnection agreement. However, the court underscores that the P.T.A.'s regulatory functions, as stipulated in the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996, do encompass overseeing compliance with telecommunications rules and regulations.Addressing the appellant's argument that the P.T.A. had no jurisdiction to decide disputes arising from interconnection agreements, the court clarifies that while the dispute resolution mechanism is a part of the interconnection agreement, it doesn't restrict the P.T.A.'s regulatory authority. The court maintains that the P.T.A.'s role includes curbing unlawful practices such as call masking and ensuring licensees adhere to regulations, irrespective of contractual disputes.The court also highlights Rule 5(1) of the 2004 Rules, which mandates licensees to pay Access Promotion Contribution (APC) to the Universal Service Fund (USF) based on the monthly volume of incoming international telephony service. This underscores the P.T.A.'s authority to address discrepancies in reported minutes, as it directly impacts regulatory charges.The court further examines the legality of the P.T.A.'s enforcement order, considering whether the Chairman and one Member had the authority to issue such an order in the absence of the full "Authority" as defined in the Act. Relying on Section 3(10) of the Act, the court asserts that the absence of a Member does not invalidate the order.In conclusion, the court asserts that the P.T.A. does have the jurisdiction to issue an enforcement order in cases of alleged violations, regardless of the pendency of arbitration proceedings. The appellant's contentions are analyzed within the framework of relevant statutory provisions, regulatory powers, and the P.T.A.'s role in ensuring compliance and preventing regulatory breaches.