Summary: (a) Federal Investigation Agency (Inquiries and Investigations) Rules, 2002--- ----R. 5---Inquiry and Investigation---Jurisdiction of Federal Investigating Agency ('FIA')---Scope---Powers of FIA regarding investigation are duly structured in Federal Investigation Agency (Inquiries and Investigations) Rules, 2002---Federal Investigation Agency can only inquire and investigate certain offences either committed in connection with matters concerning Federal Government or for matters connected therewith. (b) Insurance Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000)--- ----Ss. 121, 122, 124 & 156--- Federal Investigation Agency (Inquiries and Investigations) Rules, 2002, R. 5---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997), S. 20---Dispute between insurance company and insured persons---Inquiry and Investigation---Whether Federal Investigation Agency had jurisdiction in the matter---Petitioner/Insurance company assailed initiation of inquiry proceedings by Federal Investigation Agency ('FIA') on the complaints of respondents/insured persons, pertaining to dispute over insurance amount---Validity---Besides having numerous other functions, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan is also a regulator of business of insurance companies---Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan had taken up the case of respondents/ insured persons with petitioner/company and proceedings for settlement between the parties were in progress while respondents/insured persons were not agreeing to amount which were released to them---If there was any genuine dispute between parties it could be resolved before forums provided under Insurance Ordinance, 2000---Such dispute could not be made a base for proceedings under penal criminal laws---Provisions of Insurance Ordinance, 2000 are special law which has to prevail over general law---Special mechanism has been provided for dealing with offences for contravention of Insurance Ordinance, 2000---High Court quashed inquiry proceedings initiated by FIA as the same was uncalled for and without lawful authority---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. The Murree Brewery Co. Ltd v. Pakistan through the Secretary to Government of Pakistan, Works Division and 2 others PLD 1972 SC 279; Director General, FIA and others v. Kamran Iqbal and others 2016 SCMR 447; Mian Hamza Shahbaz Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1999 PCr.LJ 1584; Pakistan Engineering Company Ltd through Managing Director and 2 others v. Director General, FIA Islamabad, and 3 others 2011 YLR 337; Muhammad Hammad ur Rehman Zafar v. Director, FIA Lahore and another PLD 2022 Lah. 177 and Oxford University Press, Peshawar v. Inayat-ur-Rehman and others 2021 SCMR 321 ref. Ziaullah Khan and 5 others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Interior and others PLD 2022 Pesh. 122; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Commissioner Insurance, SECP and another 2017 CLD 1515 and Saeed Muhammad Shah v. Federal Investigation Agency and others 2017 SCMR 1218 rel. Syed Hamid Ali Shah for Petitioner. Barrister Rahat Ali Khan Nahaqi, Assistant Attorney General, along with Ms. Laila Manan, Sub-Inspector, FIA/ACC, Peshawar. Younas Ali Shah for Respondents Nos. 3-4. Date of hearing: 22nd August, 2024. (g) to take whatever action it can take, and is necessary, in order to enforce and give effect to l [this Act, any administered legislation] or any other law."

Summary: Background:The petitioner, filed a petition under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, seeking post-arrest bail in connection with FIR No. 145/2024 dated 02.05.2024. The FIR was registered under section 462-J of the Pakistan Penal Code at Police Station FIA, Circle, Gujrat. The petitioner initially filed for bail in the Sessions Court, Gujrat, which was dismissed due to lack of territorial jurisdiction. Subsequently, a similar application in the Additional Sessions Judge, Phalia was also returned on jurisdictional grounds. The petitioner then filed the current petition before the Lahore High Court.----Issues:Determining the territorial jurisdiction for taking cognizance and conducting the trial of the case between the Courts of Gujrat and Phalia.Clarifying the competent Court to entertain and decide the bail application.Establishing whether the place of occurrence or the registration of the case determines the jurisdiction for trial.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The court addressed the jurisdictional ambiguity, concluding that the competent court to take cognizance and conduct the trial is determined by the place of occurrence, not the place where the FIR was registered. The court noted the following points:The FIR was registered at FIA, Circle Gujrat, but the place of occurrence is Pahrianwali, Mandi Bahauddin.Under section 177 of Cr.P.C, the trial should be conducted in the jurisdiction where the offence was committed.Section 462-G (a) PPC specifies that offences relating to electricity should be tried by the Court of Session designated as the Electricity Utilities Court.----Citations/Precedents:Section 2(a), Section 3, and the Preamble of the Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974.Notification dated 08th November 2016, including specific offences under Pakistan Penal Code in the schedule of the FIA Act.Section 177 of Cr.P.C. for determining ordinary place of inquiry and trial.Section 462-G (a) PPC and Schedule-II of Cr.P.C. specifying the Court of Session as the competent court for electricity-related offences.Notification No. 325/JOB(I)/VI.F.6 dated 25.10.2019 by the Lahore High Court authorizing District and Sessions Judges in Punjab to hear cases under Section 462-G (a) of the Criminal Law (Amendments) Act, 2016.Section 185 (1) Cr.P.C. empowering the High Court to decide jurisdictional disputes between subordinate courts.Conclusion:The court decided that the competent court for this case is the Additional Sessions Judge-I, Phalia, designated as the Electricity Utility Court. This court is authorized to take cognizance of the offence, conduct the trial, and entertain bail applications. The petition was disposed of accordingly, and a copy of this order was directed to be sent to all Sessions Judges in Punjab and the Head of the Federal Investigation Agency in Punjab.----Quote: ''When question with respect to taking cognizance and conducting trial of the case between Courts of two districts arises, then it shall be decided by the High Court and the Court in whose territorial jurisdiction place of occurrence is situated, would conduct trial of the case; Inspite of inclusion of any offence in the schedule of F.I.A. Act, 1974, Court established under the parent statute of said offence will conduct trial of the case.''

Summary: Background:This Supreme Court of Pakistan case involves Suo Motu actions and Constitution Petitions concerning allegations of high-handed actions by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) against journalists and the broader implications for freedom of the press and expression. The specific actions under scrutiny involve the abduction and assault of journalists Mr. Absar Alam, Mr. Matiullah Jan, and Mr. Asad Ali Toor, with the incidents leading to FIRs No. 127/2021 and No. 128/2021 lodged at the FIA Cyber Crime Wing, Lahore.----Issues:The adequacy and fairness of the police investigations into the abductions and assaults of the journalists.The procedural integrity in handling the cases, including the gathering and forensic analysis of evidence.The legal and systemic implications for freedom of the press in Pakistan, considering the alleged involvement of law enforcement and possibly higher authorities.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court highlighted multiple failures in the investigation and procedural handling of the cases:Inadequate Investigation: The court noted serious lapses in the investigation, including failure to use geolocation data and other modern investigative techniques to trace the abductors or assailants and the mishandling of evidence such as surveillance footage.Forensic Failures: The court ordered a comprehensive forensic analysis of all available video recordings and stressed the need to investigate all potential leads, such as surveillance from sensitive buildings and national highway cameras.Procedural Incompetence: The court expressed dismay at the police's failure to diligently pursue leads or effectively use resources such as the Safe City Project's cameras or the National Highway Authority's cameras.The court directed a reconstitution of the investigation team, emphasizing the need for competent officers to take over and for the investigative process to be thorough and unbiased. It also highlighted the need for cooperation from all relevant authorities.----Citations/Precedents:National Cyber Crime Investigation Agency (Establishment, Powers and Functions) Rules, 2024: These rules were referenced in relation to the establishment of a dedicated agency to handle cybercrime, which could potentially play a role in investigating crimes against journalists.Prevention of Electronic Crime Act, 2016: This act was mentioned as the legal framework under which the new National Cyber Crime Investigation Agency operates.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure—Cognizance by Magistrate on Negative Report of Investigating Officer (IO):----Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Cr.P.C.), Ss. 173 & 497—Magistrate’s powers to disagree with IO’s report—Requirement of supporting evidenceThe Judicial Magistrate took cognizance against the applicants despite a negative police report, which had placed their names in Column No.2 of the challan. The Supreme Court held that while a Magistrate can disagree with an IO’s findings, such discretion must be exercised judiciously. The Magistrate must rely on incriminating material available in the record—mere allegations in an FIR do not suffice to justify taking cognizance. The absence of forensic or other supporting evidence against the applicants meant the Magistrate erred in law by proceeding against them.----Cited Law:• Cr.P.C., S. 173 (Challan Submission Procedure)• Cr.P.C., S. 497 (Placement of Innocent Accused in Column No.2)(b) Cybercrime—Lack of Evidence Against Accused in Digital Offenses:----Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 (PECA), Ss. 20, 21(d), 24—Forensic examination of mobile phones—Standard of proof in cybercrime casesThe case involved allegations of cyber harassment, blackmail, and sharing of obscene content under PECA 2016. The Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) seized the accused persons’ mobile phones for forensic analysis, but the forensic report found no evidence of the alleged WhatsApp messages or explicit content on the applicants’ devices. The Court ruled that mere accusations without forensic or digital proof do not justify prosecution under PECA 2016.----Cited Law:• Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 (PECA), S. 20 (Malicious Online Content)• PECA, S. 21(d) (Cyber Harassment)• PECA, S. 24 (Cyberstalking and Threats)(c) Criminal Law—Misuse of Criminal Proceedings Against Innocent Parties:----Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Cr.P.C.), Ss. 22-A & 22-B—False implication of accused—Judicial scrutiny of complaintsInitially, the complainant filed a cybercrime complaint against her ex-fiancé (main accused) but later expanded the scope to include his relatives (the applicants). The Court observed that no credible evidence linked the applicants to the alleged offenses, and their names were added without any forensic proof. The Magistrate failed to assess the credibility of the allegations properly. The Court ruled that criminal proceedings should not be used as a tool for personal vendettas and set aside the Magistrate’s order.----Cited Law:• Cr.P.C., Ss. 22-A & 22-B (Powers of Justice of Peace to Register FIRs)• Cr.P.C., S. 173 (Procedure for Challan Submission and Cognizance)(d) Cyber Evidence—Admissibility and Weight of Digital Proof:----Use of WhatsApp messages and screenshots as evidence—Forensic authentication requiredThe complainant presented WhatsApp screenshots to show that one of the accused (Applicant No.5) had threatened her. However, the FIA’s forensic report confirmed that the phone in question belonged to the main accused (Imran), who was using it under the applicant’s name. The Court ruled that screenshots alone do not constitute admissible evidence unless authenticated by forensic analysis. In cybercrime cases, scientific verification is essential before attributing an offense to a specific individual.----Cited Law:• Pakistan Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002 (PETO), S. 3 (Authenticity of Electronic Records)• PECA 2016, S. 20 (Reputation-Damaging Content Must be Proven)(e) Final Judgment—Application Allowed, Applicants Declared Innocent:----Magistrate’s order set aside—Applicants’ names removed from the challan—Liberty to re-add accused if future evidence arisesThe Supreme Court declared the applicants innocent, ruling that the Magistrate’s decision lacked legal justification. However, the prosecution retains the right to re-indict the applicants if new incriminating evidence emerges during trial. The Court warned against frivolous criminal cases and emphasized that criminal law should not be misused to settle personal disputes.----Disposition:Application Allowed—Magistrate’s order set aside—Applicants’ names removed from the challan—Prosecution may reinstate charges if new evidence emerges.

Summary: Bail denied ---- The accused sought bail after arrest in a case involving offenses under Sections 21 and 24 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016. The allegation against him was that he unlawfully captured, recorded, and transmitted objectionable pictures of the complainant, and shared them with her family members, including her father and husband, via WhatsApp. Additionally, the petitioner posted these images on Facebook, causing significant harm to the complainant's modesty. ---- Issues: 1) Whether the petitioner was entitled to bail based on the argument that the offense does not fall under the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Cr.P.C. --2) Whether sufficient evidence existed to support the denial of bail. ---3) Whether the trial court should grant bail while the trial is ongoing. ---- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Bail Denied: The court held that although the offenses did not fall under the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C., bail could still be refused based on the seriousness of the crime and the available evidence. Sufficient Evidence: The court found that the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) had gathered sufficient incriminating evidence, including a technical analysis expert report, proving the petitioner's involvement in the crime. No Leniency: The court emphasized the seriousness of such crimes, highlighting how the dissemination of objectionable pictures leads to lifelong stigma for victims and sometimes results in suicide. It ruled that individuals committing such offenses are not entitled to leniency. Trial in Progress: Since the trial was in progress and the investigation had been completed, the court ruled that it was inappropriate to grant bail at this stage, following established legal precedents. --- Citations/Precedents: Irfan Sarwar v. The State (2022 PCr.LJ Note 71) Afzaal Ahmed v. The State (2003 SCMR 573) Muhammad Siddique v. Imtiaz Begum and others (2002 SCMR 442) Haji Muhammad Nazir and others v. The State (2008 SCMR 807) 2020 PCr.LJ 1652 2018 PCr.LJ 408 2018 PCr.LJ 1667 2018 YLR 329 Rehmat Ullah v. The State (2011 SCMR 1332)

Summary: Cypher Case Detailed Judgement ---- U/S 5 & 9 OF THE OFFICIAL SECRET ACT, 1923,READ WITH SECTION 34 PPCP.S FIA/CTW ISLAMABAD ---- Issues Presented:Whether the actions of Imran Khan and the co-accused constituted a breach of the Official Secrets Act, 1923.The implications of such a breach on national security and diplomatic relations, given the nature of the disclosed information.Judgment and Reasoning:Guilt Establishment:The court found the accused guilty, emphasizing their deliberate actions in mishandling the classified document. It was determined that the disclosure was not accidental or incidental but was a calculated act that jeopardized national security and diplomatic relations.Defense Arguments Rejection:The defense's narrative was rejected as it was considered an afterthought designed to deflect from the gravity of the accusations. The court noted the lack of substantial evidence or credible argumentation from the defense to counter the charges.Legal Precedents and Citations:The court relied on several precedents to underscore the sanctity of state secrets and the grave consequences of their unauthorized disclosure. Cases cited included:State vs. A.Q. Khan (2004): Highlighted the paramount importance of protecting national security information and established guidelines for handling classified materials.Government of Pakistan vs. General (Retd) Pervez Musharraf (2019): Reiterated the principles regarding the duty of government officials to uphold confidentiality and the legal ramifications of failing to do so.The court also referenced international legal principles on state secrets, drawing parallels with the Espionage Act in the United States and the Official Secrets Act in the United Kingdom, to contextualize the gravity of the offense within a global framework.Legal Doctrines Applied:Doctrine of State Necessity: Applied to emphasize the necessity of protecting state secrets for national security.Doctrine of Public Trust: The accused were found to have violated the public trust vested in them by their official positions, compromising the integrity of state functions ---- Conclusion:The court concluded that the actions of Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi and Shah Mehmood Qureshi constituted a clear and direct violation of the OSA, warranting conviction. The judgment underscored the critical nature of safeguarding state secrets and the severe consequences of failing to do so. The court dismissed the defense's claims as unfounded and emphasized the need for stringent adherence to laws protecting national security, it was also noted that defence used tactics to delay the trial, including frequent changes in legal counsel and a failure to cross-examine witnesses.

Summary: Merged orders 2024 ---- These cases emerged from complaints filed by a group of journalists, including the then President of the Press Association of the Supreme Court, Mr. Amjad Nazir Bhatti. The complaints highlighted a disturbing trend of journalists being attacked and abducted, with allegations that these serious offenses were not being adequately investigated by the authorities.The bench noted that the matter had not been listed for a hearing for a considerable period. Upon reviewing the current status, Chief Justice Isa recognized that Mian Aqeel Afzal had succeeded Mr. Bhatti as President of the Association and expressed his intention to pursue the matter further. Similarly, ex-President Mr. Abdul Qayyum Siddiqui and another signatory, Mr. Amir Mir, represented by Mr. Jehangir Khan Jadoon, also affirmed their desire to continue with the case. However, Mr. Asad Ali Toor, one of the original complainants, chose not to pursue the matter further, despite confirming the accuracy of the attack on him but lamenting the lack of a thorough investigation into his FIR.The Court was particularly concerned about the allegations that journalists, including Asad Ali Toor, Matiullah Jan, Imran Shafqat, and Amir Mir, were targets of abduction and assault, with inadequate investigative follow-up. There were alarming claims that the assailants in Mr. Toor's case had identified themselves as members of an intelligence agency, suggesting possible state involvement or complicity in these incidents.In response to these grave allegations, the Court directed the Attorney-General to submit detailed, separate reports on the status of police investigations for each incident, specifically inquiring whether any charges had been framed. This directive aims to ensure accountability and transparency in the investigation process, with a two-week deadline set for the submission of these reports.Adding another layer of concern, the Court addressed complaints about the Federal Investigating Agency (FIA) issuing notices to journalists on grounds that allegedly involved maligning the judiciary. This action had sparked fears among journalists of potential arrests for attending FIA offices. The Attorney-General provided assurances that honest criticism of judicial decisions would not be criminalized and promised no coercive actions would be undertaken against journalists in such contexts.The Court also reflected on the broader implications of these incidents for press freedom in Pakistan, invoking a precedent that underscored the vital role of journalists in a democratic society PLD 2019 SC 318. The judgment cited the founder of Pakistan, emphasizing the need for journalists to be responsible, independent, and fearless in their critique of government and policy.The involvement of the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) was solicited to provide assistance in this matter concerning fundamental rights, highlighting the legal community's role in safeguarding press freedom and the rule of law.The hearing is set to continue on January 30, 2024, marking a critical juncture in Pakistan's ongoing struggle to protect journalists and uphold the principles of freedom of expression and the rule of law in the face of challenges that threaten these foundational democratic values.

Summary: Bail granted ---- Grant of statutory bail if the delay in the conclusion of the trial is due to the act of the Court. --- the petitioner, sought leave to appeal against the mentioned order, which denied his second post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 11 PECA, 2016, along with various other sections at the FIA Cybercrime Reporting Centre, Police Station FIA Cybercrime Wing, Lahore.According to the crime report, the petitioner was accused of disseminating content through WhatsApp/SMS using a mobile network, and material was later recovered from his residence during a raid. the Supreme Court considered the petitioner's request for statutory bail in light of constitutional guarantees under Article 4, 9, and 10A of the Constitution. The court emphasized that these constitutional provisions underpin the accused's right to protection under the law, entitlement to a fair trial, and due process, making the right to bail under the third proviso to Section 497 CrPC not merely statutory but constitutionally secured. The court cited relevant precedents, including Fida Hussain v. State, PLD 2002 SC 46; Sher Ahmed v. State, 1995 SCMR 1944; Zahir Hussain Shah v. State, PLD 1995 SC 49; and Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2012 SC 642.Moreover, the court underscored that an accused may be denied statutory bail only when it can be demonstrated that their actions or omissions were aimed at intentionally prolonging the trial through a calculated pattern of seeking adjournments without justifiable reasons during significant trial proceedings. It emphasized that a mere tally of adjournment requests is insufficient to warrant bail denial.Furthermore, the petitioner's trial had been suspended by the High Court due to a pending Criminal Revision, causing the statutory period of delay exceeding two years to elapse. Crucially, this delay primarily resulted from the High Court's repeated relisting of the case and was not attributable to any fault on the petitioner's part.The court advised that while the High Court retains the authority to stay or suspend criminal trial proceedings, such actions should be exercised cautiously and should ensure the expedited resolution of the case after granting injunctive relief.

Summary: Bail denied----Background: The petitioner, sought post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 354/2023, registered at Police Station FIA, Gujranwala, for offenses under section 18 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979, section 6 of the Passport Act, 1974, and sections 34/109 PPC. The case arose from a raid conducted by the Federal Investigating Agency (FIA) on a house in Gujranwala, where the petitioner was allegedly found with counterfeit travel documents and equipment used for human trafficking. ----Issues: 1- Whether the FIA conducted the raid lawfully, without a search and seizure warrant. 2- Whether the involvement of local inhabitants was necessary during the raid. 3- Whether the petitioner was falsely implicated and the actual culprits were released. 4- Whether the offenses under section 18 of the Emigration Ordinance and section 6 of the Passport Act were applicable to the facts of the case. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Lawfulness of the Raid: The court acknowledged that the raid was conducted based on urgent source information at 3:30 a.m. when no court was available to issue a search warrant. The urgency of the situation justified the procedural irregularities or illegalities in the process. The court held that unless the petitioner could demonstrate during the trial that the actions caused him serious prejudice, the raid would not be invalidated. ---Involvement of Local Inhabitants: The petitioner argued that the FIA violated section 103 Cr.P.C. by not involving local inhabitants in the raid. The court noted that police witnesses are as credible as any other witness unless they have animosity towards the accused. The petitioner was advised to show cause at the trial why the proceedings could not be relied upon. ---False Implication: The petitioner claimed innocence, stating he was not arrested at the scene and was made a scapegoat. The prosecution maintained that the petitioner was caught red-handed. The court found that prima facie, the evidence satisfied the ingredients of the offenses under the Emigration Ordinance and the Passport Act. ---Applicability of Offenses: The court determined that section 18 of the Emigration Ordinance, which falls under the prohibitory clause of section 497 Cr.P.C., was applicable given the nature of the crime. Additionally, the petitioner had a previous conviction under the same section, indicating a repeat offense. The court dismissed the bail application, citing that the petitioner failed to make a case for bail and the offenses charged were substantiated by the evidence presented. The petitioner was remanded to custody pending trial. ----Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Azam v. The State (PLD 1996 SC 67) Muhammad Hanif v. The State (2003 SCMR 1237) Riaz Ahmad alias Raju v. The State (2004 SCMR 988) Naseer Ahmad v. The State (2004 SCMR 1361) Zafar v. The State (2008 SCMR 1254) Najib Rahim v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2017 Sindh 53) Justice Qazi Faez Isa and others v. President of Pakistan and others (PLD 2022 SC 119) Fida Jan v. The State (2001 SCMR 36) State through A.-G, Sindh, Karachi v. Hemjoo (2003 SCMR 881) Arshad Mahmood v. The State (PLD 2008 SC 376) Syed Zulfiqar Shah v. The State (2022 SCMR 1450)

Summary: ICA in W.P. 2363/2023 Police/FIA Matter Supr. Vech. (SB), [ Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed- VS -SHO, P.S. Kohsar, Islamabad etc. ] Background: The appellant filed an Intra Court Appeal (ICA) challenging the order dated 03.08.2023, passed by the learned Single Judge of the Islamabad High Court. The appellant's writ petition, seeking the return of two seized vehicles, was dismissed on the grounds that the appellant was avoiding arrest. The vehicles were seized during a police raid conducted on 31.05.2023 at the appellant’s residence in connection with an FIR registered on 10.05.2023. The appellant was nominated later in the case through a supplementary statement dated 28.05.2023 under section 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), and his vehicles were seized under section 550 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). -----Issues: 1- Whether the seizure of the appellant’s vehicles under section 550 Cr.P.C. was lawful. 2- Whether the appellant’s vehicles were involved in the commission of any offense mentioned in the FIR. 3- Whether the appellant is entitled to the return of the seized vehicles despite avoiding arrest. Whether the impugned order by the learned Single Judge was justified in dismissing the appellant’s writ petition. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Islamabad High Court allowed the appellant’s appeal, holding that the seizure of the vehicles was unlawful. The vehicles were not involved in the commission of the alleged offense, and there was no legal justification for their seizure under section 550 Cr.P.C. The court noted that the vehicles were parked at the appellant’s residence during the raid, and there was no mention of their use in the FIR or supplementary statement. The police seized the vehicles without following the proper procedure, including initiating proceedings under sections 87 and 88 Cr.P.C. for the attachment of property. The court concluded that the seizure was done to pressure the appellant into surrendering, which was not legally permissible. The court ordered the return of the vehicles and set aside the earlier order passed by the Single Judge. -----Citations/Precedents: The Murree Brewery Co. Ltd. v. Pakistan (PLD 1971 SC 279) Farzand Raza Naqvi and others v. Muhammad Din and others (2004 SCMR 400) Dr. Akhtar Hassan Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (2012 SCMR 455) Town Committee, Ghakkar Mandi v. Authority under the Payment of Wages Act (PLD 2002 SC 452) Chief Engineer, A.E.B. v. Commissioner for Workman’s Compensation Authority (2000 PLC (CS) 1082) FIA through Director General v. Syed Hamid Ali Shah and others (PLD 2023 SC 265)