Summary: Principles governing question of refusal or grant of physical remand by Anti Terrorism Court elaborated.

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: (a) Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 (Amended 2022) ----Ss. 2(e), 2(f), 8 & Preamble---Scope and applicability---Cross-organizational harassment---Whether a complaint is maintainable where the complainant and accused belong to different organizations—Held, affirmative—Following the 2022 amendments, the term *“complainant”* substituted *“employee”* in S.8(1), broadening locus standi to include “any person” aggrieved by harassment, irrespective of employment relationship—Purpose of the Act, as reflected in its Preamble, is of wider import, providing protection against harassment to all persons at any workplace, even if they are not employees of that organization—Reliance placed on *Asif Saleem v. Chairman BOG, University of Lahore* (PLD 2019 Lahore 407). (b) Interpretation of Statute ----Liberal and purposive construction---Where the objective of the legislation is social protection and deterrence of workplace harassment, its provisions must be construed broadly to ensure inclusion of non-employees, visitors, trainees, and other categories otherwise exposed to harassment within the workplace environment. (c) Jurisdiction of Ombudsperson ----Non-employee complainants---Maintainability---Even if a non-employee cannot invoke an organization’s internal Inquiry Committee mechanism, S.8 of the Act permits direct recourse to the Ombudsperson—Complaint filed by doctor employed at PIMS against FIA officials held maintainable before Federal Ombudsperson, notwithstanding absence of common employer. (d) Procedural fairness—Forensic examination of evidence ----Independent examination---Where the complainant alleged sexual blackmail by FIA officials, request for independent forensic examination of her mobile phone, excluding FIA’s involvement, found reasonable and allowed to ensure impartiality. (e) Disposition— Application challenging maintainability of complaint dismissed—Complaint held maintainable under the broadened statutory framework post-2022 amendments—Application for independent forensic examination allowed; both parties directed to nominate independent forensic body other than FIA—Case adjourned for further proceedings.

Summary: Background: The petitioner claimed to be a bona fide purchaser in possession of a property in Lahore Cantt. He sought to remove restrictions placed on the property by the Military Estate Officer and to have his name entered in the official records as the lawful owner. The property was originally owned by a respondent who was acquitted of charges of corruption and corrupt practices by the Accountability Court, a decision upheld by the High Court of Balochistan. The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) had appealed against this acquittal to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. ----Issues: 1- Whether the sale of the property during the pendency of NAB's appeal was in violation of Section 23 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. 2- Whether the petitioner could be granted relief given that the NAB had filed a petition before the Supreme Court against the acquittal of the original owner. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Section 23 Violation: The court held that Section 23, which prohibited transfer of property during the pendency of NAB proceedings, applied only while the trial was ongoing. Once the trial concluded with an acquittal, the restriction ceased. Acquittal and Appeal: The court emphasized that an acquittal carries a double presumption of innocence. Without a leave granting or restraining order from the Supreme Court, the acquittal stands, and the original owner’s right to transfer the property is valid. Relief to Petitioner: The court directed the removal of restrictions on the property and ordered the Military Estate Officer to enter the petitioner's name in the official records, provided no restraining order from the Supreme Court is produced. The court allowed the writ petition, directing the removal of restrictions and entry of the petitioner's name in the official records within thirty days unless a restraining order from the Supreme Court is presented. ----Citations/Precedents: Khan Asfandyar Wali and others Vs. Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Division, Islamabad and others (PLD 2001 SC 607) Muhammad Iqbal Khan Noori and others v. National Accountability Bureau and others (PLD 2021 SC 916) Mirza Shaukat Baig and others Vs. Shahid Jamil and others (PLD 2005 SC 530) Mst. Anwar Begum Vs. Akhtar Hussain alias Kaka and 2 others (2017 SCMR 1710) Muhammad Shafi alias Kuddoo Vs. The State and others (2019 SCMR 1045)

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -Ss. 161 & 497(2)-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 38, 39 & 40-Confession made by accused before the police-Such confession is not admissible. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -S. 497(2)-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Further inquiry-Scope-Further inquiry is a question which must have some nexus with the result of the case for which a tentative assessment of the material on record is to be considered for reaching a just conclusion-It pre-supposes the tentative assessment which may create doubt with respect to the involvement of the accused in the crime. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -S. 497-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Principles-Expression reasonable grounds used in section 497, Cr.P.C-Meaning- -Expression "reasonable grounds" as contained under section 497, Cr.P.C., necessitates the prosecution to show that it is in possession of sufficient material or evidence to demonstrate that accused had committed an offence falling within the prohibitory limb of section 497, Cr.P.C.-However for seeking the concession of bail, the accused person has to show that the material or evidence collected during investigation against him creates reasonable doubt or suspicion in the prosecution case-While deciding bail applications, it is the foremost duty of the Courts to apply judicious mind tentatively for reaching the just and proper conclusion regarding whether reasonable grounds are made out or not to enlarge the accused on bail, and the expression 'reasonable grounds' signifies and corresponds to the grounds which are legally rational, acceptable in evidence and attractive to the judicial mind, as opposed to being imaginative, fallacious and/or presumptuous-Whenever reasonable doubt ascends with regard to the involvement of an accused person in the crime or about the certainty or probability of the prosecution case and the evidence proposed to be produced in support of the charge in Court during trial, the accused should not be deprived of the benefit of bail and it would be better to keep him on bail than in jail. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -S. 497-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Bail-Principles-Principle that prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt-Said principle applies at all stages including the pre-trial stage, and even at the time of deciding whether the accused is entitled to bail or not. Altaf Khan, Additional A.G., Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Ziarat Gul, SI, Mardan for the State. Respondent No. 1 in Person.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----First Sched., Art. 120---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 8, 39, 42 & 54---Transactions of mutations---Filing of suit for declaration, cancellation, possession and permanent injunction after 36/40 years---Delay in challenging the transactions/mutations---Plea of knowledge about mutations four months prior to filing the suit---Failure of the appellants to prove such plea---Effect---Dismissal of suit---Validity---All the transactions/mutations, though duly entered in the revenue record from 1971 till the filing of the suit, were not timely challenged---Predecessor of the plaintiffs had been alive for number of years but they did not challenge the transactions particularly mutations in respect of which the suit was filed by the appellants in the year 2020---Under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, (Act) a suit to challenge the mutation can be filed within six years from the date of attestation of mutation while the appellants filed the suit after more than 36/40 years from the date of mutations which on the face of it was barred by time---Plea of the appellants that they allegedly acquired knowledge of the mutations under challenge four months before the filing of the suit, the same was belied by the evidence on record---It was evident from the record beyond any doubt that appellants and their predecessors had the knowledge of transactions and mutations right from the beginning but filed the suit after 36/40 years, thus, hadfailed to file suit within six years in terms of Art. 120 of the Act, therefore, the suit was hopelessly barred by time---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. Wahid Bakhsh through legal heirs and another v. Ghulam Muhammad through Legal heirs PLD 1990 Lah. 193; Ashiq Muhammad and others v. Mst. Sugran 2023 SCMR 1171; Agha Syed Mushtaque Ali Shah v. Mst. Bibi Gul Jan and others 2016 SCMR 910 and Mst. Rabia Gul and others v. Muhammad Janan and others 2022 SCMR 1009 rel. (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 8, 39, 42 & 54---Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S.42(1)---Transfer of Property Act (V of 1882), S. 54---Transactions of mutations---Filing of a time barred suit for declaration, cancellation, possession and permanent injunction---Failure of real owner/predecessor-in-interest of claimants in his life time to challenge such mutations despite having knowledge thereof---Effect---Locus standi of successors to challenge such transactions/mutations---Scope---Where the real owner of the property who could have a cause of action to file the litigation or commence the proceedings or to challenge the act or document against his interest remained alive for number of years but despite having knowledge of the transactions never raised any claim qua the property or challenged the documents of sale in respect of property, or raised the objection which was being attempted to be raised by his successors, this is not permissible as the successors will have no locus standi to question the validity of those transactions---High Court affirmed the view taken by the trial court to the effect that the suit was barred by time, principle of acquiescence, waiver and estoppel and that the appellants had no locus standi or cause of action to file the suit. Mst. Faheeman Begum (deceased) through L.Rs. and others v. Islam-ud-Din (deceased) through L.Rs. 2023 SCMR 1402 and Muhammad Rustam and another v. Mst. Makhan Jan and others 2013 SCMR 299 rel. Ch. Muhammad Gulnawaz Goraya for Appellant. Tahrim Iqbal Butt, Assistant Advocate General with Naveed Haider, Assistant Commissioner, Muhammad Safdar Rana, Naib Tehsildar and Khurshid Ahmad Patwari Halqa, Gujranwala for Respondents Nos. 1 to 3, 11 and 12. Syed Muhammad Usman Tirmazi for Respondents Nos. 4 to 8 and 10. Ex parte for Respondents Nos. 9 and 13 to 16. Date of hearing: 23rd October, 2023. RASAAL HASAN SYED, J.--- This appeal is directed against judgment and decree dated 03.12.2021 of the learned Civil Judge, Gujranwala whereby appellants' suit for declaration, cancellation, possession and injunctive relief was dismissed.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: ----Ss. 540, 345(2), 337 & 338---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b) & 34---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 23---Calling an acquitted co-accused as a prosecution witness---Legality---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Compromise made with co-accused on the condition that he would testify against accused---Legality---Application of the petitioner, sought recalling of the acquitted accused as a prosecution witness was dismissed by the Trial Court---Validity---Accused "PK" was arrested who had confessed his guilt before the Investigating Officer and disclosed that "MI" was his co-accused and they both committed qatl-i-amd of the deceased---On such disclosure, the respondent No.2 was arrested who also confessed to the charged offence---Both the accused were sent to face the trial where they were indicted; they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial---In the course of trial, the accused "PK" compounded the offence with the complainant/ petitioner---Trial Court accepted the application made under S.345 (2), Cr.P.C and acquitted the accused "PK"---Allegedly, the acquitted accused had confessed his guilt before the Investigating Officer; therefore, he being a participator of the qatl-i-amd of the deceased was an eye witness, as such, he was competent witness---Participator of offence becomes a competent witness when he is tendered pardon under Ss. 337 & 338, Cr.P.C.---Even otherwise, the admission of guilt before the Investigating Officer of an accused is not relevant under Arts. 38 & 39 Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, therefore, evidence of such witness is inadmissible---Disclosure of any accused is not admissible in evidence against a co-accused---Since the prosecution could not place reliance on the confession of accused made before the police, therefore, the prosecution could not be allowed to produce such piece of evidence before the Trial Court against the co-accused/ respondent No.2---Perusal of record inferred that the petitioner had compromised the offence with the acquitted accused on the condition that he would give testimony against the respondent No.2, because the petitioner had not mentioned any reason of compromise with the acquitted accused in his application made under S.540, Cr.P.C.---If such practice is allowed to prevail, then, the same will result in mockery of law and the complainant/prosecution will be at liberty to pick and choose between the accused persons and compromise the case with an accused of his choice so as to bring him as his witness and punish an accused, he wisked to get punished---Such nature of compromises would defeat the provisions of Ss. 337 & 338, Cr.P.C., therefore, same are void under S. 23 of the Contract Act, 1877, to the extent of calling acquitted accused as a prosecution witness---Since, the prosecution had not resorted to the provisions of Ss. 337, 338 or S.494, Cr.P.C., for offering pardon to the accused "PK" during the investigation or trial nor had withdrawn prosecution against him, therefore, the said accused could not be called as a prosecution witness under S.540, Cr.P.C.---Criminal revision petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Rafiullah v. 11th Additional District and Sessions Judge (West) Karachi and others 2020 MLD 942; Wasiullah v. Ali Mohseen and 2 others 2016 PCr.LJ 1124; Siddiqullah v. The State and another PLD 2009 Pesh. 1; Malik Muhammad Younas and another v. Umer Hayat and another 1998 MLD 1195; Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. The State PLD 2009 SC 814; Mst. Rabia Bibi v. Additional Sessions Judge and 3 others PLD 2020 Lahore 690 and Abdur Rashid and another v. The State 1970 PCr.LJ 722 ref. Abdur Rashid and another v. The State 1970 PCr.LJ 722 rel. Akbar Khan Kakar and Ghulam Wali Achakzai for Petitioner. Fazal-ur-Rehman State Counsel for Respondent No.1 and Taimoor Shah Kakar for Respondent No.2. Date of hearing: 16th October, 2023.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ---- S. 302(b)/34--- Qatl-e-amd---Benefit of doubt---Appellant was convicted of murder under S. 302(b)/34, P.P.C., and sentenced to life imprisonment based on his alleged judicial confession---No eyewitness to the crime was presented, nor was there any "last seen" evidence---No recovery of weapon or any other material evidence linked the appellant to the crime---Judicial confession was later retracted, raising concerns about its voluntariness and reliability---Court held that conviction could not be sustained solely on the basis of a retracted confession without independent corroboration---Appellant acquitted on the benefit of doubt---Reliance placed on Muhammad Ismail v. The State (2017 SCMR 898) and Fazal Rehman v. The State (PLD 2004 SC 250). (b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)--- ---- Ss. 6(1)(b), 7(1)(a), 7(2)---Conviction under ATA---Retraction of confession---Lack of corroborative evidence---Prosecution alleged that the murder was committed to create terror, thus falling within the ambit of terrorism under ATA, 1997---Appellant was convicted under S. 6(1)(b) for an act allegedly designed to create fear in society---However, prosecution failed to prove that the crime was committed with the specific intent to spread terror---Retracted confession of the appellant was the only evidence against him, which lacked credibility and was not corroborated by any independent evidence---Court acquitted the appellant of all charges under the Anti-Terrorism Act due to insufficient evidence---Reliance placed on Dadullah v. The State (2015 SCMR 856) and Muhammad Ehsan v. The State (2006 SCMR 1857). (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984)--- ---- Art. 37, 38, 79---Judicial confession---Retracted confession---Evidentiary value---Court reiterated that a retracted confession can form the basis of conviction only if it is proved to be voluntary and truthful, and is corroborated by independent evidence---Confession of the appellant contained extensive details of multiple crimes spanning several years, including specific dates and names, which raised concerns about its authenticity---Court found it highly improbable that the appellant would recall such details from memory without external influence, suggesting coercion or inducement---Absence of corroborating evidence further weakened the prosecution's case, making reliance on the confession unsafe---Reliance placed on Muhammad Amin v. The State (PLD 2006 SC 219) and State v. Minhun alias Gul Hassan (PLD 1964 SC 813). (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ---- S. 342---Statement of accused---Burden of proof---Court held that once an accused retracts his confession and denies the charges, the burden shifts back to the prosecution to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt---Mere presence of a confession, later retracted, does not relieve the prosecution from proving its case with independent evidence---In the absence of forensic, ballistic, or eyewitness evidence linking the appellant to the crime, the court found that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of proof---Reliance placed on Sardar Bibi v. Munir Ahmed (2017 SCMR 344) and Riaz Ahmed v. The State (2010 SCMR 846). (e) Criminal trial--- ---- Benefit of doubt---Rule of prudence---Court reaffirmed that if a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind, the benefit must be given to the accused as a matter of right, not grace---Conviction must be based on unimpeachable evidence, and in the presence of significant doubts, an acquittal is warranted---Court held that reliance on a confession, without corroborative evidence, was insufficient to sustain a conviction, particularly when doubts existed regarding its voluntariness---Appellant was acquitted due to lack of evidence linking him to the crime---Reliance placed on Muhammad Mansha v. The State (2018 SCMR 772) and Wazir Muhammad v. The State (1992 SCMR 1134). ----Disposition: Appeal allowed---Conviction and sentence set aside---Appellant acquitted on benefit of doubt and ordered to be released unless required in another case. ----Cited Cases: Muhammad Ismail v. The State (2017 SCMR 898) Fazal Rehman v. The State (PLD 2004 SC 250) Dadullah v. The State (2015 SCMR 856) Muhammad Ehsan v. The State (2006 SCMR 1857) Muhammad Amin v. The State (PLD 2006 SC 219) State v. Minhun alias Gul Hassan (PLD 1964 SC 813) Sardar Bibi v. Munir Ahmed (2017 SCMR 344) Riaz Ahmed v. The State (2010 SCMR 846) Muhammad Mansha v. The State (2018 SCMR 772) Wazir Muhammad v. The State (1992 SCMR 1134)