Summary: Principles governing question of refusal or grant of physical remand by Anti Terrorism Court elaborated.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: ----Ss. 5, 6, 30, 72, 73 & 84---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII---Suit for recovery on the basis of negotiable instruments (nine cheques)---Pre-requisites---Presentment of cheque before the bank---Seven out of nine claimed cheques (cheques-in-question) not having been presented before the bank, were produced by the respondent/plaintiff in his statement recorded before the Trial Court--- Trial Court decreed recovery of whole amount regarding nine cheques-- -Validity---Record reveals that appellant/defendant in his written statement denied the factum of outstanding amount, and that the respondent/plaintiff through a representative of concerned branch of the Bank, being one of his (plaintiff's) witnesses, only succeeded to produce(get exhibited) two cheques (amounting to Rs. 5 lac each) issued by the appellant/respondent which were dishonored; the remaining seven cheques (cheques-in-question) were produced by the respondent/plaintiff in his statement recorded before the Trial Court---Admittedly, there was no evidence on record produced by the plaintiff for presentment of the cheques-in-question to the concerned branch of the Bank---Section 5 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, ('the Act 1881') defines "bill of exchange" and section 6 of the Act 1881 defines "cheque" as a bill of exchange drawn on specified banker and not expressed to be payable otherwise than on demand---It appears that dishonor by non-acceptance or non-payment gives rise to an immediate right to recourse against the drawer of the bill of exchange---Section 68 of the Act 1881 deals with all negotiable instruments including cheques while S. 73 of the Act 1881deals with the cheque and provides the time of presentment and its consequence; this section further provides that a cheque must be presented for payment within reasonable time after its delivery to the holder---It is the mandate of the Act 1881 that all negotiable instrument should be presented for payment within a reasonable time---According to section 72 of the Act 1881, the drawer of the cheque is the principle debtor and he cannot avoid his liability towards the holder except in case of non-presentment of a cheque within a reasonable time---Sections 72 & 84 of the Act 1881 stipulate that unless a cheque is presented for payment within a reasonable time of its issue no right to recover the amount would accrue---Presentment of a cheque, being a bill of exchange, is a condition precedent in order for a payee to charge the drawer/maker of a cheque; thus, for filing suit under O. XXXVII, C.P.C. based on a cheque, it is necessary to present the said cheque to the bank, as presentment under the provisions of the Act 1881 is the cause of action, in a suit based upon such an instrument---In the present case, admittedly there was no evidence of presentment of the seven cheques (in-question) having been exhibited/produced by the plaintiff in his statement before the Trial Court to the concerned branch of the Bank, therefore, to the said extent suit of the respondent/plaintiff under O. XXXVII, C.P.C., was not maintainable, however to the extent of two cheques duly exhibited [total amount of Rs.10,00,000/- (ten lac only)], the impugned judgment was maintained---High Court set-aside impugned judgment/ decree to the extent of said seven cheques and suit to that extent filed by the respondent/plaintiff was dismissed---However, impugned judgment/ decree to the extent of two duly exhibited cheques was maintained---Appeal filed by the defendant, was partly allowed. National Bank of Pakistan v. Shahyar Textile Mills Ltd. 2003 CLD 1370; Al-Hamd Edible Oil Industries (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive v. Syed Waseem Hyder 2008 CLC 1578 and Khalifa Azhar Mumtaz v. Ghulam Akbar 2014 CLC 1448 ref. Rehmatullah Barech for Appellant. Mian Badar Munir for Respondent. Date of hearing: 18th October, 2023.

Summary: ----Ss. 5, 6, 30, 72, 73 & 84---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXVII---Suit for recovery on the basis of negotiable instruments (nine cheques)---Pre-requisites---Presentment of cheque before the bank---Seven out of nine claimed cheques (cheques-in-question) not having been presented before the bank, were produced by the respondent/plaintiff in his statement recorded before the Trial Court--- Trial Court decreed recovery of whole amount regarding nine cheques-- -Validity---Record reveals that appellant/defendant in his written statement denied the factum of outstanding amount, and that the respondent/plaintiff through a representative of concerned branch of the Bank, being one of his (plaintiff's) witnesses, only succeeded to produce(get exhibited) two cheques (amounting to Rs. 5 lac each) issued by the appellant/respondent which were dishonored; the remaining seven cheques (cheques-in-question) were produced by the respondent/plaintiff in his statement recorded before the Trial Court---Admittedly, there was no evidence on record produced by the plaintiff for presentment of the cheques-in-question to the concerned branch of the Bank---Section 5 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, ('the Act 1881') defines "bill of exchange" and section 6 of the Act 1881 defines "cheque" as a bill of exchange drawn on specified banker and not expressed to be payable otherwise than on demand---It appears that dishonor by non-acceptance or non-payment gives rise to an immediate right to recourse against the drawer of the bill of exchange---Section 68 of the Act 1881 deals with all negotiable instruments including cheques while S. 73 of the Act 1881deals with the cheque and provides the time of presentment and its consequence; this section further provides that a cheque must be presented for payment within reasonable time after its delivery to the holder---It is the mandate of the Act 1881 that all negotiable instrument should be presented for payment within a reasonable time---According to section 72 of the Act 1881, the drawer of the cheque is the principle debtor and he cannot avoid his liability towards the holder except in case of non-presentment of a cheque within a reasonable time---Sections 72 & 84 of the Act 1881 stipulate that unless a cheque is presented for payment within a reasonable time of its issue no right to recover the amount would accrue---Presentment of a cheque, being a bill of exchange, is a condition precedent in order for a payee to charge the drawer/maker of a cheque; thus, for filing suit under O. XXXVII, C.P.C. based on a cheque, it is necessary to present the said cheque to the bank, as presentment under the provisions of the Act 1881 is the cause of action, in a suit based upon such an instrument---In the present case, admittedly there was no evidence of presentment of the seven cheques (in-question) having been exhibited/produced by the plaintiff in his statement before the Trial Court to the concerned branch of the Bank, therefore, to the said extent suit of the respondent/plaintiff under O. XXXVII, C.P.C., was not maintainable, however to the extent of two cheques duly exhibited [total amount of Rs.10,00,000/- (ten lac only)], the impugned judgment was maintained---High Court set-aside impugned judgment/ decree to the extent of said seven cheques and suit to that extent filed by the respondent/plaintiff was dismissed---However, impugned judgment/ decree to the extent of two duly exhibited cheques was maintained---Appeal filed by the defendant, was partly allowed. National Bank of Pakistan v. Shahyar Textile Mills Ltd. 2003 CLD 1370; Al-Hamd Edible Oil Industries (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive v. Syed Waseem Hyder 2008 CLC 1578 and Khalifa Azhar Mumtaz v. Ghulam Akbar 2014 CLC 1448 ref. Rehmatullah Barech for Appellant. Mian Badar Munir for Respondent. Date of hearing: 18th October, 2023.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 ----Ss. 2(e), 2(f), 6, & 8 Maintainability of harassment complaint—Complainant, a doctor, alleged sexual harassment by officials of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA)—Accused No. 3 challenged the complaint on the grounds that the Complainant and the Accused worked in different organizations, arguing that the Act applies only within the same organization—Complainant argued that 2022 Amendments to the Act broadened the definition of workplace and complainant, allowing cross-organizational complaints—Ombudsperson held that the Act now covers harassment at any workplace, regardless of employment relationship, and dismissed the challenge. (b) Definition and Scope of Complainant and Employee ----S. 2(e) & 2(f)—Post-2022 Amendments, the term complainant is broader than employee, encompassing anyone aggrieved by harassment, not just those employed—Non-employees can directly approach the Ombudsperson, providing broader protection against harassment. (c) Forensic Examination of Evidence ----Second application by Accused No. 3 for forensic examination of the Complainant's phone allowed—Complainant agreed to the forensic examination by an independent body other than FIA—Both parties directed to propose independent bodies for the examination at the next hearing. Disposition: Application challenging complaint maintainability dismissed; second application for forensic examination allowed with conditions.

Summary: (a) Judicial Officers—Permission for Higher Education Abroad—Discretionary Power of Authority —The grant of permission for judicial officers to pursue a Master's Degree in Law from a foreign university is not an absolute right but a discretionary power vested in the competent authority—No statutory provision or established policy mandates approval in every case—The discretion must be exercised judiciously based on the specific circumstances of each case—Judicial officers seeking such permission must provide adequate justification, academic achievements, relevance of studies to judicial duties, and a clear plan for financing their studies—Failure to satisfy these requirements may result in rejection of the request. (b) Discrimination—Allegation of Unequal Treatment—Burden of Proof —An allegation of discrimination requires solid evidence demonstrating disparate treatment in identical circumstances—In the present case, the appellant failed to establish any prima facie evidence of discrimination, as the denial of permission was based on reasonable grounds, including insufficient justification for pursuing foreign education and the scarcity of judicial officers to manage caseloads. (c) Service Law—Grant of Leave and Study Permissions—Scope of Judicial Review —Grant of study leave or permission for higher education abroad is not a matter of right but a privilege—The authority has discretion to approve or deny such requests based on institutional requirements, administrative exigencies, and merit of each case—Courts generally refrain from interfering with such administrative decisions unless there is a clear case of mala fide intent, arbitrary exercise of discretion, or violation of established procedures. (d) Relevance of Higher Education to Official Duties—Justification Required —A judicial officer seeking permission for foreign higher education must demonstrate the relevance of the proposed degree to their official duties, how it contributes to their professional growth, and how it benefits the judiciary—Mere eligibility or desire to pursue foreign education does not create an obligation for the authority to grant permission. (e) Leave Cannot Be Claimed as a Right—Administrative Discretion —The principle that leave cannot be claimed as a matter of right applies equally to permissions for pursuing higher education abroad—Authorities are empowered to postpone, curtail, or revoke such permissions based on service exigencies and other administrative priorities. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Permission for pursuing a Master's Degree in Law from a foreign university was lawfully denied. The appellant may reapply at an appropriate stage with adequate justification and compliance with the required criteria.

Summary: (a) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (Section 19, 23)—Joint Investigation Team (JIT)—Formation and Legality—Scope of Judicial Review ----Under Section 19(1) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (ATA), the government is empowered to constitute a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) for investigating offenses under the Act—The phrase "if the Government deems necessary" implies a discretionary administrative act, which must, however, align with principles of fairness and legality—JITs are an accepted mechanism in complex criminal investigations, especially where cross-agency coordination and specialized expertise are required—Judicial review of the formation of a JIT is limited to cases where mala fide intent or colorable exercise of authority is apparent—The Court observed that the formation of the JIT in the present case was legally sound and procedurally valid, dismissing allegations of bias against specific JIT members. (b) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 (Article 199)—Writ Jurisdiction—Maintainability in Criminal Investigations—Alternative Remedies ----A writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution challenging an investigation or JIT proceedings is maintainable only if the petitioner demonstrates that the formation or operation of the JIT is patently illegal, mala fide, or without jurisdiction—Ordinarily, the High Court refrains from interfering in ongoing investigations, especially when an alternative remedy under Section 23 of ATA (transfer of cases from Anti-Terrorism Court) is available—The doctrine of ripeness dictates that courts should avoid adjudicating theoretical or abstract disputes—However, where fundamental rights are alleged to be violated or the statutory process is abused, judicial intervention may be warranted. (c) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (Section 7)—Applicability—Mens Rea and Actus Reus Requirements ----The Supreme Court in Ghulam Hussain v. The State (PLD 2020 SC 61) established that an act can be classified as terrorism only when both mens rea (intent or purpose) and actus reus (criminal act) requirements are fulfilled—The court observed that mere gravity of an offense or public unrest resulting from it does not automatically qualify it as terrorism—The JIT is tasked with determining, based on evidence, whether the conditions of Section 7 of ATA are met—At the investigation stage, courts must allow investigating agencies to perform their duties without undue interference. (d) Administrative Authority and Oversight—Provincial Cabinet Approval ----Under Rule 25 of the Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011, any decision involving significant administrative or legal action must have Cabinet approval—The Court reviewed the official records and found that the formation of the JIT was duly approved by the Caretaker Cabinet and the Standing Committee on Law and Order—Minor ambiguities in language or drafting of the notification did not affect its validity. (e) Prosecutor General Punjab—Role, Powers, and Independence ----The Prosecutor General Punjab, under the Punjab Criminal Prosecution Service (Constitution, Functions, and Powers) Act, 2006, enjoys administrative and operational independence in managing prosecution services—While the Prosecutor General must act in coordination with the Provincial Government, he is not obligated to follow government instructions in prosecutorial decision-making—The Threshold Test, used to decide whether sufficient evidence exists to justify prosecution, should only be applied after meaningful progress in investigation and availability of key evidence, especially in complex terrorism cases. (f) Judicial Interference in Investigation—Limits and Guidelines ----The High Court reiterated the principle established in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed (AIR 1945 PC 18) and subsequent Pakistani case law that courts should not interfere in ongoing investigations unless there is clear evidence of mala fide intent, jurisdictional error, or abuse of process—The investigation must be allowed to conclude, and the Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) retains the authority to determine the applicability of Section 7 of the ATA based on evidence. ------Disposition: Writ petitions dismissed. Formation of JIT upheld as legal and valid. Federal Government directed to frame rules regulating JITs under Section 35 of ATA within two months. The role of the Prosecutor General clarified as independent in prosecutorial decisions, with emphasis on adherence to the Code of Conduct for prosecutors.

Summary: (a) Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 ----Ss. 3, 4 & 5—Non-payment of Salaries and Gratuity—Entitlement Under the Wage Board Award—Ex-Parte Proceedings—Scope—The petitioner, a former employee of the respondent newspaper establishment, filed a petition claiming unpaid salaries for five months and gratuity for five years of service—The respondent establishment failed to appear or provide any rebuttal despite repeated notices and was proceeded against ex-parte—Held, the petitioner successfully established his claim through an affidavit and supporting documents—Under the provisions of the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973, employees are entitled to unpaid salaries and gratuity if the employer defaults on their obligations—The Tribunal accepted the petitioner’s claims, directing the respondent to pay PKR 350,000/- as unpaid salaries and gratuity within thirty days. (b) Labour and Employment Law ----Failure to Comply with Wage Board Award—Employer's Obligation—An employer is obligated to comply with the provisions of the Wage Board Awards applicable to newspaper employees—Failure to honor salary increments and gratuity payments amounts to a violation of statutory obligations—In the present case, despite repeated reminders and legal notices, the employer failed to fulfill their statutory obligations, justifying the Tribunal’s order in favor of the petitioner. (c) Ex-Parte Proceedings ----Effect of Non-Appearance Before Tribunal—If a respondent, despite repeated notices, fails to appear or present their case, the Tribunal is justified in proceeding ex-parte—In the absence of rebuttal or any defense, the petitioner’s claims, supported by an affidavit and relevant evidence, are deemed established—The Tribunal rightly proceeded ex-parte against the respondent establishment and passed the order based on available evidence. (d) Administration of Justice ----Timely Payment of Wages and Gratuity—Employer's Responsibility—Ensuring timely payment of wages and gratuity is a fundamental obligation of employers under labor laws—Failure to fulfill such obligations not only violates statutory provisions but also results in financial and emotional distress to employees—The Tribunal emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory obligations for fair labor practices. Disposition: Petition allowed—Respondent directed to pay PKR 350,000/- to the petitioner within thirty (30) days—Compliance report to be submitted to the Registrar of the Tribunal—Office directed to send certified copies of the order to the parties via UMS (Urgent Mail Service).

Summary: (a) Insurance Ordinance, 2000: ----Sections 12(1)(d) & (e), 12(4), 12(5)(a), 45(6), and 156---Maintenance of records by insurance companies---Penalty for non-compliance---Inspection revealed violations, including improper record maintenance, failure to provide complete data and claims, and unauthorized relocation of records without Board approval---Appellant cited urban flooding and COVID-19-related challenges as extenuating circumstances---Bench held that force majeure events and pandemic-related disruptions do not absolve the insurer of its statutory obligations under the Ordinance---Penalty of Rs. 500,000/- upheld to reinforce compliance requirements. (b) Regulatory Compliance: ----Force majeure and unforeseen circumstances---Effect on compliance obligations---Bench acknowledged the challenges posed by urban flooding and the COVID-19 pandemic but emphasized that regulatory compliance is a fundamental obligation irrespective of unforeseen events---Appellant's proactive measures for future compliance (e.g., scanning and digital preservation) noted but deemed insufficient to mitigate past violations. (c) SECP Act, 1997: ----Section 33; Appellate powers---Scope of review---Bench affirmed the penalty imposed by the Director/HOD, Adjudication-I, noting that the violations were evident and justified action under the Ordinance---No interference warranted in the Impugned Order as the penalties aligned with legal provisions and regulatory objectives. -----Disposition: Appeal dismissed; penalty upheld to reinforce adherence to statutory requirements and ensure integrity of insurance operations.