Summary: Trusts Act (II of 1882)--- ----S. 34---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.2(4)---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.3(15)---Right to apply to court for opinion in management of trust property---Principal Civil Court of original Jurisdiction---Status---Petition under S.34 of the Trust Act, 1882 for reconstruction of trust deed---Question before the High Court was whether the Sindh High Court was the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction for purposes of S.34 of the Trust Act, 1882---Held, that distinguishing feature to hold the Sindh High Court as Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in Karachi and not a District Court was that except various districts in Karachi, the pecuniary jurisdiction of all district courts in Sindh or for that matter all over Pakistan was unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction and since the pecuniary jurisdiction of various district courts in Karachi was limited, therefore statuts of Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction could not be conferred on the District Court---High Court's jurisdiction in civil cases was therefore simply a District Court jurisdiction exercised by the High Court---Petition in terms of S.34 of the Trust Act, 1882 was, therefore, maintainable and was allowed, in circumstances.

Summary: Appreciation of Evidence. Cross examination is to be looked into and not merely the Examination in Chief. Evidence to be read as a whole.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. VII, R. 11(d), O. I, R. 10(3), (4) & O. VI, R. 17---Plaint, rejection of---Pleadings, amendment of---Amendment of plaint under O. I, R. 10(4), C.P.C. would not attract provision of O. VII, R. 11(d), C.P.C.---Defendant filed application under O. I, R. 10, C.P.C. to be joined as defendant in the suit, which was accepted by Trial Court, and plaintiff was, therefore, required to amend the plaint under O. I, R. 10(4), C.P.C.---Defendant, subsequently, filed another application under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C., seeking rejection of amended plaint on ground that plaintiff had made certain averments in the plaint without first seeking permission under O. VI, R. 17, C.P.C., which was allowed by Trial Court and amended plaint was rejected---Appellate court, setting aside order of rejection, remanded the case holding that provision of O. VII, R.11, C.P.C. did not apply to the plaint amended under O. I, R. 10(4), C.P.C.---Validity---Amended plaint in question was not barred by any law, nor had defendant referred to any law to declare that the same was hit by such law---Provisions of O. I, R. 10, C.P.C. and O.VI, R. 17, C.P.C. operated in quite different circumstances---Provision of O. VI, R. 17, C.P.C. were not applicable to facts of present case---Revision petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XXI, R. 10, O. III, R. 4(3) & O. XX, R. 13---Administration suit--- Compromise decree--- Execution of decree by Nazir of the Court---Recognized agent--- Requirements--- Decree-holder did not file execution petition but decree was satisfied by Nazir of the Court and report was submitted before the Court---Validity---Application for satisfaction of decree was filed before Nazir of the Court by the counsel who was not authorized by the decree-holder---Power of attorney should have been obtained from the decree-holder and application should have been filed for satisfaction of decree through Nazir after satisfying the Executing Court as to why judgment-debtor had failed to satisfy the compromise decree--- Executing Court was to apprise of the circumstances in which judgment-debtor i.e. plaintiff's real brothers and sisters had failed to fulfil their promise when they were living with the plaintiff---Nazir had acted without jurisdiction and on the willful and mala fide persuasion of counsel; had unlawfully executed sale-deed of suit property which was liable to be cancelled and declared as unlawful and was not supposed to act as judicial officer/presiding Judge of Executing Court to entertain application for satisfaction of decree and satisfy the same and at his own send a report to the Court for order of satisfaction of decree in the disposed of suit---If anything was lawful but it had been done unlawfully then it would become unlawful---Illegality committed by Nazir could not be allowed to perpetuate rather it was the duty of the Court to direct him to reverse the consequence of illegalities committed by him as an officer of the court---Decree-holder was issued show-cause notice as to why sale-deed executed by Nazir of the Court without lawful authority should not be cancelled---Nazir was directed to collect original registered sale-deed executed by him from the plaintiff and no further transaction was to be allowed to the plaintiff---Additional Registrar (O.S) was directed to hold inquiry with regard to execution of sale deeds by the Nazir on the basis of compromise decrees from January 2014 till date in the cases in which present counsel had obtained compromise decrees and without filing an execution petition same were satisfied by the Nazir.

Summary: The petitioners pleaded that once applications of the respondent, under Section 5 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 for registration of the tenancies of the petitioners were rejected by the learned Special Judge (Rent) and the said order was upheld in appeal, the learned Rent Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain and proceed with eviction petitions filed by the respondent and hence, legal question that required opinion of this Court was to examine whether the Rent Tribunal is precluded from entertaining an application for ejectment of a tenant if an earlier application of the ejectment petitioner, for registration of tenancy agreement, under Section 5 of the Act has been dismissed by the Rent Registrar on the basis of denial of relationship of landlord and tenant. Held that the Rent Registrar does not have the authority and power to conclusively determine the issue of the status of the parties since the said power is judicial in nature and lies with the learned Rent Tribunal as the law creates a distinction between the functions and powers of the learned Special Judge (Rent) while functioning as Rent Registrar and in its capacity as the Rent Tribunal. The learned Rent Tribunal has the power to entertain and adjudicate applications in respect of the rented premises in terms of Section 19 of the Act and has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of cases arising under the Act as contemplated under Section 16(4) thereof that includes applications for deposit of rent, eviction of tenant etc., whereas, the Rent Registrar only receives applications for registration of the tenancy agreements in terms of Section 5 of the Act and his sole responsibility is to maintain a register to enter particulars of tenancy agreements, agreement to sell or any other agreement in respect of rented premises as per Section 17(2) of the Act. Moreover, under Section 25 of the Act, the learned Rent Tribunal has the power to record evidence, however, no such power vests with the Rent Registrar. Furthermore, the learned Rent Tribunal exercises powers of the Civil Court by virtue of Section 26 of the Act whereas no such powers are available to the Rent Registrar. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the decision by learned Special Judge (Rent) refusing a request to register a tenancy under Section 5 of the Act, cannot be termed as a ?decision? on merits since the same is not made after recording of any evidence or framing of issues but the rejection of the application is based on a prima facie view of the existence of a tenancy. Thus, this Court cannot countenance the argument that order under Section 5 made in exercise of administrative functions of the learned Special Judge (Rent) precludes the exercise of his judicial functions under the Act.

Summary: Background: The plaintiff, MCB Bank Limited, filed a suit under Section 9 of the Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, seeking the recovery of Rs. 103,007,781.63 from Adeel Shahbaz Steel Mills and its partners/guarantors. The bank extended various finance facilities to the defendant company, including a running finance facility, bank guarantee, and letters of credit, which were later restructured. The defendant company defaulted on its repayments, prompting the bank to file this suit. The defendants contested the suit, primarily on the grounds of territorial jurisdiction. ----Issues: 1- Whether the Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench) has territorial jurisdiction to hear the case. 2- Whether the defendants’ application for leave to defend raised substantial questions regarding the liabilities and the bank's claim. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court ruled that it lacked territorial jurisdiction to hear the case. The agreements were executed at Hattar Industrial Estate, Haripur, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the relevant properties and parties were located in Haripur and Islamabad. Despite the defendant company being registered in Rawalpindi, the court found that the cause of action arose outside its territorial jurisdiction. Consequently, the court returned the plaint to the plaintiff under Order VII Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) for filing in the appropriate jurisdiction. ----Citations/Precedents: Bahoo Dying Industries (Private) Limited vs. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (PLD 2021 Lahore 186) Messrs Muhammad Tufail and Company vs. Legal Heirs (PLD 2017 SC 51) Zahid Zaman Khan vs. Khan Afsar and others (PLD 2016 SC 409) National Bank of Pakistan vs. Messrs Kohinoor Spinning Mills (2021 CLD 1112) The court concluded that the plaintiff's suit should be filed in a court with proper territorial jurisdiction, specifically in Islamabad or Haripur, where the cause of action and relevant parties are located.

Summary: The petitioners were arrested following protests on May 9, 2023, which turned violent. The protests erupted in response to a high-profile political leader's arrest, leading to widespread clashes with law enforcement and significant damage to public and private property. Initially, the petitioners were detained under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 (MPO). After the MPO detention was revoked, they were re-arrested under Section 54 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) on suspicion of being involved in the violence. The police sought a Test Identification Parade (TIP) to identify the petitioners. However, the TIP was delayed, prompting the petitioners to file a writ petition, alleging deliberate delays aimed at keeping them in detention without due process. ----Issues: 1- Was the delay in conducting the Test Identification Parade (TIP) a violation of the petitioners' constitutional rights to liberty, dignity, and due process? 2- What measures should be implemented to prevent such delays and ensure adherence to legal procedures during pre-trial detention? ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court found that the delay in conducting the TIP violated the petitioners' fundamental rights as enshrined in Articles 4, 9, 10, 10A, and 14 of the Constitution of Pakistan. It emphasized that pre-trial detention must be a last resort and handled expeditiously. The court outlined clear directives for ensuring the timely conduct of TIPs and preventing unnecessary detention: Magistrates' Orders: Area Magistrates must immediately forward orders for TIP to the Sessions Judge. Judicial Oversight: Sessions Judges must ensure that a Judicial Magistrate or Special Judicial Magistrate conducts the TIP within 48 hours. Accountability for Delays: If the TIP is delayed, the JM/SJM must report the matter to the Sessions Judge and relevant police authorities to prevent further delays. TIP Process: After the TIP, the JM/SJM must promptly submit a report, ensuring that the process is completed without undue delay. The court ordered that the petitioners’ TIP be conducted within two days and extended these procedural reforms to all Sessions Judges and Special Courts across the province. ----Citations/Precedents: Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra & others (AIR 2011 SC 312) Salman Rafique & another v. National Accountability Bureau & others (PLD 2020 SC 456) Mohammed-Holgate v. Duke (1984 [1 All ER 1054]) Ch. Muhammad Anwar v. Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1963 Lahore 109) Hostages in Tehran case (ICJ Reports 1980, p. 42, para. 91) Syed Khursheed Ahmed Shah v. The State (PLD 2022 SC 261) Asghar Ali alias Sabah & others v. The State (1992 SCMR 2088) The State v. Farman Hussain & others (PLD 1995 SC 1) Khawand Bux & others v. The State (1997 PCr.LJ 280) Ghulam Nabi v. The State (2002 PCr.LJ 349) Saifullah v. The State (2018 MLD 751)

Summary: Acquittal granted----Background: The case arose from an incident on August 30, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., within the area of "Tahli Adda," where two individuals allegedly attacked and killed the victim by firing successive shots. The accused had a prior altercation with the victim, which allegedly motivated the murder. A First Information Report (FIR) was filed the same day at 11:45 a.m. under sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). However, after the initial investigation, one of the co-accused was exonerated, prompting the complainant to file a private complaint. Following a trial, the Additional Sessions Judge sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment under section 302(b) of the PPC and ordered compensation of Rs. 200,000 to the victim’s family. The appellant challenged the conviction through a criminal appeal, while the complainant sought an enhancement of the sentence and compensation. ----Issues: 1- Whether the appellant's conviction under section 302(b) PPC was justified given the alleged discrepancies in the prosecution’s case. 2- Whether the presence of the eye-witnesses at the crime scene was credible and sufficiently corroborated. 3- Whether the trial court erred in acquitting the co-accused while convicting the appellant. 4- Whether the sentence of life imprisonment should be enhanced to the death penalty. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court found several contradictions in the prosecution's case. It was noted that there was a delayed postmortem examination, which cast doubt on the timeline presented by the prosecution. The eye-witnesses were deemed "chance witnesses" without adequate explanation for their presence at the crime scene. Additionally, discrepancies were found between the medical evidence and the eye-witness accounts, including the lack of explanation for blunt weapon injuries discovered during the postmortem. The court also found the recovery of the weapon from the appellant to be legally inconsequential and the evidence linking the appellant to the crime as unreliable. The appellant's conviction was overturned, and he was acquitted of all charges. Consequently, the complainant's request for sentence enhancement was dismissed. -----Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Ashraf alias Acchu v. The State, 2019 SCMR 652 Muhammad Rafique alias Feeqa v. The State, 2019 SCMR 1068 Safdar Mehmood v. Tanvir Hussain, 2019 SCMR 1978 Ulfat Hussain v. The State, 2018 SCMR 313 Nazir Ahmad v. The State, 2018 SCMR 787 Muhammad Yaseen v. Muhammad Afzal, 2018 SCMR 1549 Ibrar Hussain v. The State, 2020 SCMR 1850 Mst. Mir Zalai v. Ghazi Khan, 2020 SCMR 319 Naveed Asghar v. The State, PLD 2021 Supreme Court 600 Nadeem alias Kala v. The State, 2018 SCMR 153 Haroon Shafique v. The State, 2018 SCMR 2118 Mst. Sughra Begum v. Qaiser Pervez, 2015 SCMR 1142 Amir Muhammad Khan v. The State, 2023 SCMR 566 Liaqat Ali v. The State, 2021 SCMR 780 Najaf Ali Shah v. The State, 2021 SCMR 736 Khalid Mehmood v. The State, 2021 SCMR 810 Abdul Jabbar v. The State, 2019 SCMR 129 Tajmal Hussain Shah v. The State, 2022 SCMR 1567 Muhammad Sadiq v. The State, 2017 SCMR 144 Pervaiz Khan v. The State, 2022 SCMR 393 Abdul Ghafoor v. The State, 2022 SCMR 1527 Sajjad Hussain v. The State, 2022 SCMR 1540

Summary: Bail Matters (bail granted in NAB case)

Summary: [Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (Section 4B)]It is held that provisions of Treaty, which are statutorily recognized in terms of Section 107 of the Income Tax Law, has been given preference and would prevail over the provisions of the Income Tax Law. In Paragraph-9 of the above judgment, question of imposition of Super Tax has been specifically dealt with and the contention of the Department / Suit No.229 of 2017 present Defendants, has been discarded.