Summary: [Civil Procedure Code CPC (Order II Rule 2 CPC), Civil Procedure Code CPC (Order VII R.11), Civil Procedure Code CPC (O.XXXVII, Rule 1)] Out of a common cause, parties may have different reliefs andremedies available to them within same jurisdiction of the Court butwith different procedural way outs for reliefs and remedies claimed suchas original civil jurisdiction and jurisdiction under Summary Chapter,though later is also categorized as original jurisdiction.

Summary: The petitions challenge the grant of greenfield status to another company, FJW, under the Automotive Development Policy 2016-21, arguing that it was not in accordance with the policy's provisions. The petitioner, a vehicle assembler, contended that greenfield status should only be awarded to new entrants introducing brands not previously available in the market, and that its previous assembly and promotion of Forland vehicles should preclude FJW from receiving such status.The court examined the arguments from both sides, including the petitioner's claim of substantial investment in promoting Forland vehicles and the continuity of its business with similar vehicle brands. The respondents defended the greenfield status grant, emphasizing that it was in line with the Auto Policy, designed after extensive stakeholder consultations, and that similar status had been granted to other companies to reintroduce or introduce vehicle brands in Pakistan.After considering the submissions and the Auto Policy provisions, the court found that the grant of greenfield status to FJW was neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. It noted that the policy allows for such status in cases of new and independent assembly and manufacturing facilities for brands not currently assembled in Pakistan. Since Forland vehicles had not been assembled in Pakistan since 2015, FJW's greenfield status for reintroducing the brand was justified. Furthermore, the court observed that similar status had been consistently granted to other companies, including the petitioner for a different brand, indicating a uniform application of the policy.Concluding that the petitions were misconceived, the court dismissed them without orders as to costs, reaffirming the lawful conferment of greenfield status to FJW in accordance with the Automotive Development Policy 2016-21.

Summary: Sindh Public Property (Removal of Encroachment) Act (V of 1975)-------Ss.3 & 4---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42, 54 & 55---Suit for declaration, perpetual and mandatory injunction---Contention of plaintiff was that he was in occupation of suit plot for the last 20 years and had raised Pacca construction of a residential house on one portion and on the other he was doing business---Notice under S. 3 Sindh Public Property (Removal of Encroachment) Act, 1975 to the plaintiff who apprehended that either, he would be forcibly evicted or the plot would be auctioned and filed suit for declaration, permanent and mandatory injunction against the authorities---Authorities had denied all the averments in the plaint and stated that the plaintiff had illegally encroached upon the suit plot and raised construction thereon unauthorizedly---Trial Court decreed suit filed by the plaintiff, and appellate court in appeal set aside judgment passed by the Trial Court---Validity---Plaintiff had failed to prove any assertion from the plaint about his lawful right under any statute for regularization of the suit plot by Karachi Development Authority---Plaintiff had sought regularization of the suit plot in his illegal possession---Plaintiff could not prove that he was in possession of suit plot for 20 years---Even if proved, it was not sufficient to claim legal cover for such occupation; nor it created legal obligation on Karachi Development Authority for conferring title of the suit plot on him---Plaintiff had not produced any of the Rules or Regulations of the Authority to show that the possession on land for 20 years was enough to confer on him legal status for occupation of suit plot---Show-cause notice, impugned through suit by the plaintiff, was supposed to be replied by the plaintiff within three days by way of review application in terms of S.4 of the Sindh Public Property (Removal of Encroachment) Act, 1975 which he neither complied nor removed encroachment and straightway filed suit in response to show-cause notice within 10 days---Plaintiff filed suit without showing his own entitlement to any legal character to the plot---Suit filed by the plaintiff was not maintainable and the plaintiff was guilty of abusing the process of court---Courts of law, were not supposed to help the illegal occupants to perpetuate their possession on the Government land, which possession was even protected by the inaction of the officials of the Authority---Rules, Regulations and the law relevant for the disposal of the State property should have been followed in letter and spirit by the Authority---Appellate court below had rightly reversed the findings of the Trial Court declaring that notice issued under S.3 of the Sindh Public Property (Removal of Encroachment) Act, 1975 by Karachi Development Authority (KDA) against encroachment by the plaintiff, was not illegal and unlawful and held to have been issued lawfully---Revision application was dismissed and cost of Rs.200,000 was imposed on the plaintiff for illegal occupying Government land for 35-40 years including 26 years in courts---Authority was also directed to deposit cost of Rs.100,000 on account of their willful inaction for 16 years, which had resulted in damaging the image of judiciary---Order accordingly. [Paras. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 & 12 of the judgment]

Summary: The product was approved for registration after comparing it with similar products registered in India and various other countries. The experts conducted a retrospective study comparing Reditux with another drug called Mabhtera in patients with diffuse large B-cell lymphoma and found no significant differences in terms of response rates, progression-free survival, overall survival, or toxicity.The experts' report emphasized the safety and effectiveness of Reditux, and the Registration Board approved its registration. The court noted that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for an injunction, and the balance of convenience favored the defendant. As a result, the injunction application was dismissed.

Summary: The petitioner through the present constitutional petition sought declaration that the petitioner is engaged in the manufacturing process through Toll Manufacturer and thus eligible to be registered as Manufacturer with the Tax Authorities.It was considered that the petitioner being manufacturer of its products owns the proprietary rights over its brand name and fixes the retail price and sell the finished product, hence the petitioner is engaged in the taxable supply being manufacturer. Provisions and definition clauses of the Sales Tax Act 1990, Federal Excise Act 2005 & Sales Tax Registration Rules 2006 were examined.Section 2 (17) was examined and it was considered that manufacturer is a person who engages, whether exclusively or not, in the production or manufacture of goods whether or not the raw material of which the goods are produced or manufactured are owned by him and shall include a person any person, firm or company which owns, holds, claims or uses any patent, proprietary, or other right to goods being manufactured, whether in his or its name, or on his or its behalf, as the case may be, whether or not such person, firm or company sells, distributes, consigns or otherwise disposes of the goods. It was also observed that there appears no provision in sales tax act, which could exclude a person who does not possess its own facility of manufacturing and get his products manufactured from toll manufacturing from claiming himself as manufacturer. The Federal Excise General Order No.2 of 2008 dated 06.10.2008, was taken into consideration and it was observed that both vendor and the principal fall in purview of the definition of manufacturer.Hence, it was decided that the petitioner is engaged in the manufacturing of its products through Toll manufacturing arrangement and thus eligible to be registered as Manufacturer with Tax authority. The Petition was allowed.

Summary: The central issue in the case appears to be related to the payment of rent and the terms of the tenancy agreement. The respondent No. 1 claimed that the appellant stopped paying rent and owed a significant amount. The appellant, on the other hand, argued that the rent was paid and disputed the validity of the order for eviction. The judgment mentions the terms of the tenancy agreement, specifically Clause 10, which the appellant believed allowed the respondent No. 1 to sell the premises only with the appellant's consent. However, the court held that this clause was not relevant to the eviction proceedings and that the appellant's possession as a tenant continued even after the initial term of the agreement expired. The court also referred to the importance of complying with the tentative rent deposit order, which the appellant had apparently failed to do. This non-compliance led to the court striking off the appellant's defense and ultimately ordering eviction. The judgment concludes that the appellant's arguments were not strong enough to overturn the Rent Controller's decision, and therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

Summary: Cancellation of Bail; held Yes, if a bail granting order is perverse, it can be recalled.Directions to complete trial or examination of witnessesin a certain period of time is always directory and not mandatory.

Summary: (a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-------S. 15---Ejectment of tenant---Personal bona fide need of landlord---Tenancy agreement being un-registered---Effect---Contention of tenant was that landlord had waived his personal need through registered tenancy agreement---Ejectment petition was accepted concurrently---Validity---Alleged tenancy agreement was compulsory registerable as tenant had claimed protection of his right to held tenancy for life for valuable consideration---Impugned tenancy agreement was not registered document and same was neither admissible in evidence nor it was enforceable in law---Relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties---Any dispute between the landlord and tenant could not adversely affect on the personal need of landlord---Finding recorded by the courts below did not suffer from arbitrariness nor same were perverse---Tenant was directed to vacate the demised premises within 30 days and in default Executing Court should issue writ of possession with permission to break open the locks and police aid and hand over the possession to the landlord---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances. [Paras. 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the judgment] Lal Khan through Legal Heirs v. Muhammad Yousuf PLD 2011 SC 657; Badruddin H. Mavani v. Government of Pakistan and others 1982 CLC 44; Muhammad Azizullah v. Abdul Ghaffar 1984 CLC 2837 and Commissioner of Income Tax, Peshawar Zone, Peshawar v. Messrs Sieman A.G. PLD 1991 SC 368 distinguished.(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------Ss. 100 & 115---Appellate and revisional jurisdiction---Scope---Findings recorded by the courts below on the basis of evidence could not be interfered with by the second appellate court or revisional court simply because on the same evidence different conclusion could be drawn.

Summary: Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) issued by the Company can be considered as directions /instructions with a binding effect provided it is not violative of fundamental principles of law --- Issue: The appellant challenged the judgment and decree which modified the arbitration award concerning the liability for the theft of oil during transportation from Karachi to Lahore.Holding: The High Court upheld the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge, which modified the arbitration award by holding the respondent liable only for the theft committed during the trip to KEL on 20.04.2011, and not for past trips.Reasoning: The court found that the imposition of penalties for 25 trips by the appellant and the reduction to 10 trips by the arbitrator were excessive, given that there were no prior complaints of embezzlement before the incident on 20.04.2011. The court concluded that penalties should only be imposed for the actual embezzled quantity discovered during the trip in question, in accordance with the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and the agreement between the parties.Legal Precedents Cited:Wadero Muhammad Tayyab v. Akbar Hussain and Another (1989 MLD 3952)Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and Others (2001 SCMR 1700)Saibesh Chandra Sarkar v. Bijoychand Mohatop Bahadur (AIR 1922 Calcutta 4)Khimji v. Nathibai (AIR 1925 Sindh 42)Devani v. Wells (2019 SCMR 711)Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation v. Hydro Quebec (2019 SCMR 454)Muhammad Sattar and Others v. Tariq Javaid and Others (2017 SCMR 98)M/s. Mechanised Contractors of Pakistan Limited v. Airport Development Authority, Karachi (2000 CLC 1239)A. Qutubuddin Khan S. Chec Millwala Dredging Co. Pvt. Limited (2014 SCMR 1268)Allah Din & Company v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan and Others (2006 SCMR 615)House Building Finance Corporation v. Shahinshah Humayun Cooperative House Building Society and Others (1992 SCMR 19)Order: The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the modified award made by the learned Single Judge, which limited the respondent's liability to the theft detected on 20.04.2011 only.

Summary: Entitlement of pension to a person contribution in respect of whom was not paid for at least fifteen years; Held YES