Summary: Conviction under Section 21-L of the Anti Terrorism Act, 1997. Set-aside. Cannot be maintained on the basis of a mere statement recorded before framing of the Charge.

Summary: [Sind Rented Premises Act - Eviction---15] (a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-------S.15---Eviction petition---Default in payment of rent---Personal bona fide need of landlady---Scope---Trial Court dismissed the petition holding that landlady had failed to prove her personal need of the rented premises---Trial Court did not decide the issue of default on the ground that it was not agitated by her counsel at the time of final arguments---Appellate Court allowed the appeal and directed the tenant to vacate the rented premises---Validity---Held; it could not be believed that the counsel who filed case for default then filed an application for tentative rent order and after obtaining certified copies of ledger of Nazir filed an application for striking off defense, had failed to agitate ground of default in final arguments---Trial Court was entrusted with the duty of doing justice between the parties, to decide each issue between them in accordance with law on merit on the basis of record and evidence irrespective of arguments by the counsel---In presence of record/evidence, unless the question of default was dropped in writing, Trial Court was not supposed to leave a crucial issue between the parties undecided merely for want of arguments---Findings of Trial Court on the issue of personal bona fide need of landlady were equally perverse and contrary to the record and evidence---Tenant neither in her written statement nor in her affidavit-in-evidence had alleged that two flats of the landlady were lying vacant in the same building, but the Trial Court had relied on such purported statement of tenant---High Court, while maintaining the order of Appellate Court, dismissed the constitutional petition with costs.(b) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-------S.15---Eviction petition---Personal bona fide need of landlady---Choice of landlord---Even if more than one premises were available with the landlord and he/she chose to occupy for personal need a particular one, the tenant had no right to challenge such choice of the landlord.(c) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)-------S.16---Defense, striking off---Scope---Striking off defense in the case was not a mere technicality---Refusal to strike off defense amounted to denying statutory right accrued to the landlord---Use of word "shall" in S. 16(2) of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 left no room for the Rent Controller to form even 'a humble opinion' to deny a statutory right accrued to landlord.

Summary: The case revolved around a show cause notice issued by the Federal Board of Revenue in Pakistan to Van Oord Dredging and Marine Contractors B.V., a company based in the Netherlands, regarding its tax exemption claim under the Double Taxation Treaty between Pakistan and the Netherlands. The notice was issued based on the results of audit proceedings.The petitioner challenged the notice, claiming that it should not be considered a permanent establishment in Pakistan under the treaty, and that the revenue authority did not properly understand the facts of its presence in Pakistan.The respondents argued that the audit proceedings had revealed information that justified the issuance of the notice, and they did not dispute the applicability of the treaty. They also cited legal precedent stating that show cause notices are not typically justiciable in writ jurisdiction.The court considered the arguments and legal precedents and emphasized that a show cause notice is a preliminary step in a legal process meant to provide an alleged defaulter with a chance to respond before any adverse action is taken. It stated that a show cause notice could only be challenged in exceptional circumstances such as lack of jurisdiction, abuse of process, or coram non judice (lack of authority to try a case). The court also stressed that the right to a fair trial is a fundamental constitutional right.In this case, the court found that there was no evident lack of jurisdiction, abuse of process, or mala fide intent in the issuance of the notice. It noted that the determination of factual controversies is generally not suitable for resolution in writ jurisdiction. Therefore, the court concluded that the show cause notice should proceed through the designated forum as per the notice's provisions. The petitioner was directed to present its case there, and the respondents were instructed to conduct the proceedings and issue a reasoned decision. If the petitioner remained dissatisfied, they could challenge the findings in the appropriate jurisdiction as per the Income Tax Ordinance 2001.In summary, the High Court ruled that the show cause notice in question should not be interfered with in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction, and the petitioner should pursue its case through the designated forum provided by the notice.

Summary: General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf's petition against the inclusion of his name on the Exit Control List (ECL) meticulously examines a wide array of legal precedents and citations to underpin its decision. Here's a detailed overview of the key legal citations and precedents the court relied upon in its judgment:Interim Orders and Final Orders: The court deliberated on the nature of interim orders versus final orders, emphasizing that interim orders are meant to provide temporary relief until a final decision is made. It discussed how interim orders merge into final orders, losing their standalone significance upon the issuance of a final judgment. The court referenced several cases to illustrate this principle, including:PLD 1969 Karachi 546 (Roshan Din v. S.M.Badruddin), where it was held that interim orders merge into final orders.AIR 1987 Madras 173 (C.Kamatchi Ammal v. Kattabomman Transport Corpn. Ltd.), reaffirming that interim orders lapse with the decision of the main suit.AIR 1995 SC 441 (Mrs.Kavita Trehan and another v.Balsara Hygiene Products Ltd.), discussing how interim orders are set aside upon the dismissal of the main suit.Fundamental Right to Travel: The court explored the fundamental right to travel as enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan, particularly referencing Article 15. It reviewed cases where restrictions on travel were scrutinized, such as:PLD 1997 Lahore 617 (Wajid Shamas-ul-Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan), which discussed the fundamental right to travel and its constitutional protections.PLD 2005 Karachi 252 (Khan Muhammad Mahar v. Federation of Pakistan), where the court held that placing an individual's name on the ECL without valid reasons violates fundamental rights.Exit Control List (ECL) Regulations: The judgment examined the legal framework governing the ECL, particularly the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Rules, 2010. It highlighted Rule 2, which outlines the grounds for prohibiting a person from leaving Pakistan, and the requirement for the government to specify reasons for such prohibitions, emphasizing the importance of procedural fairness and transparency.Jurisdictional Issues: The court addressed jurisdictional challenges, particularly the argument that the Sindh High Court may not have territorial jurisdiction over matters decided by the Federal Government in Islamabad. It referred to cases that expanded on the concept of territorial jurisdiction in constitutional petitions, such as:PLD 2001 SC 340 (Anoud Power Generation Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others), discussing how jurisdiction depends on the nature of the relief sought and the effects of governmental actions across territorial boundaries.2009 CLD 1498 (LPG Association of Pakistan v. Federation of Pakistan), which held that federal decisions affecting individuals or entities in a province fall within the purview of the high courts in those provinces.Precedents on ECL and Personal Liberty: The court considered several cases where the inclusion of individuals' names on the ECL was challenged, underscoring the judiciary's role in protecting personal liberty and ensuring that any restrictions on the right to travel must be legally justified and proportionate. These included cases like PLD 2006 Karachi 530 (Farrukh Niaz v. Federal Government of Pakistan) and 2014 SCMR 856 (M/s.United Bank Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan & others), where the courts ordered the removal of names from the ECL due to procedural flaws or lack of justified reasons.

Summary: Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, overrides Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977.

Summary: (a) Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XVII of 2002)-------S.12(2)---Appeal---Regulating activity---Scope---When decision is 'concerning a regulating activity' which adversely affects licensee, the aggrieved licensee can approach High Court as no other adequate remedy is provided in Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 to deal with such decision of Authority.(b) Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XVII of 2002)-------Ss. 12(2) & 45---Pakistan Oil and Gas (Refining, Blending, Transporting, Storage and Marketing) Rules, 2016, R. 12(1)(c), Schedule-V, Part-A---Appeal---Existing blending plant---Phrase 'notwithstanding anything contained in the Ordinance'---Scope---Appellant was running lube and oil blending plant prior to promulgation of Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---Appellant assailed letter issued by Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority imposing additional conditions on its licence---Validity---Use of phrase 'notwithstanding anything contained in the Ordinance' and its repetition in relevant Rule of Pakistan Oil and Gas (Refining, Blending, Transporting, Storage and Marketing) Rules, 2016, indicated that decision and direction contained in letters in question were not applicable to appellant who fell within the category of existing operations/existing blending plants which were in field before commencement of Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---Non-obstante clause was repeated by Pakistan Oil and Gas (Refining, Blending, Transporting, Storage and Marketing) Rules, 2016,making the Authority while making Rules in exercise of powers conferred on the Authority wherever it referred to the existing lubricant blending plant, which amounted to acknowledgement of the Authority that Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 and Pakistan Oil and Gas (Refining, Blending, Transporting, Storage and Marketing) Rules, 2016, would not affect or apply on existing Lube Oil blending plant---High Court refrained the Authority from applying additional condition on the licensees to whom licences were granted under R.13 of Pakistan Oil and Gas (Refining, Blending, Transporting, Storage and Marketing) Rules, 2016, including appellant as they were already carrying out regulated activities of running lube oil blending plants immediately before commencement of Pakistan Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, and requirement of Part-A of Schedule-V of R. 12 (1)(c) of Oil and Gas (Refining, Blending, Transporting, Storage and Marketing) Rules, 2016,were not enforceable against them---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Summary: [Civil Procedure Code CPC, Civil Procedure Code CPC (Recovery of amount/damages)] Claim of Plaintiff has been disproved that he suffer any loss (financial or otherwise) or mental anguish on account of any decision or acts on the part of Defendant. Plaintiff was adequatelycompensated monetarily by his erstwhile employer - PIAC, International Association as well as Defendant, coupled with the fact that he was reemployed by PIAC. Consequently, not encashing the cheque given by Defendant will not improve the case of Plaintiff, who is not entitled for any further amount in view of Bye-Law 25(v). Both Issues are answered inaffirmative that Plaintiff received his insurance and other compensation.

Summary: Both these petitions are allowed, however, with no order as to costs. Resultantly, the impugned orders of removal of the petitioners from service are hereby set aside and their cases are remanded back to the competent authority of NAB for holding regular inquiry against them after providing opportunity of hearing / representation to them strictly in accordance with law, which exercise shall be completed within three (03) months from the date hereof. Needless to say the question of granting back benefits to the petitioners shall depend upon the outcome of the inquiry to be held in pursuance of this judgment.

Summary: The case revolves around the plaintiff's long-standing business relationship with Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) in supplying medicines and medical instruments. Despite the plaintiff's successful track record, they were disqualified from bidding on a contract due to alleged misrepresentation regarding their status with other entities, including Pakistan Navy?s Shifa Hospital. The plaintiff contended that the additional criteria imposed after bid opening were arbitrary and not part of the initial pre-qualification requirements. They argued that their disqualification violated the Public Procurement Rules, 2004, and the principles of transparency and fairness in public procurement. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, stating that the decision to disqualify them was illegal, capricious, and an abuse of power. The court set aside the plaintiff's blacklisting and the negotiated awarding of the contract to other bidders. This decision emphasizes the importance of adhering to transparent and fair procurement procedures, as outlined in both domestic laws and international conventions against corruption.

Summary: The interconnected petitions discussed in the judgment involve medical students enrolled in MBBS programs who were affected by their university's decision to switch from a semester to an annual examination system. The petitioners, who failed to clear subjects in previous semesters, faced ineligibility for promotion without awaiting annual examination results. Initially seeking to maintain the semester system, the petitioners later requested a special examination to clear their remaining subjects and advance without losing a year. Arguments presented focused on discrepancies between the semester and annual systems, including the lack of clarity from regulatory bodies like the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PMDC). The respondents, including PMDC and Jinnah Sindh Medical University (JSMU), defended the annual system's legality and argued that medical education traditionally followed an annual examination format. They emphasized the PMDC's regulatory authority and the need for uniformity in examination systems. The court noted past interim orders allowing retake examinations but highlighted their subsequent nullification by higher courts. The discussion also delved into the regulations governing medical education and the transition from semester to annual examination systems. Ultimately, the court dismissed the petitions, concluding that the petitioners failed to demonstrate an infringement of fundamental rights justifying judicial intervention. However, it urged PMDC to consider JSMU's request for a special examination within a specified timeframe.