Summary: Justices Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Agha Faisal, delivered a judgment on a series of petitions (CP D 7286-7389 of 2019) challenging an amendment to the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013. This amendment, introduced by the Sindh Local Government (Amendment) Act 2019, changed the requirement for removing a mayor, deputy mayor, chairman, or vice chairman through a vote of no confidence from a two-thirds majority to a simple majority.The petitioners, including Abdul Rauf Nizamani, Shakeel Ahmed, Farooque Jameel Durrani, and others, contended that this amendment violated their vested rights and was ultra vires (beyond the powers) of the Constitution, specifically Articles 4 (right to be dealt with in accordance with law) and 25 (equality of citizens). They sought to invalidate the amendment and the subsequent notifications issued for votes of no confidence against them, arguing that they should not be removed from office despite losing the confidence of the majority of their respective houses.The court examined the principles for evaluating the constitutionality of legislative enactments, emphasizing the presumption in favor of constitutionality and the principle that laws should not be declared unconstitutional unless their invalidity is beyond reasonable doubt. The judgment referenced various legal and constitutional precedents to underline the legislative competence of the Provincial Assembly of Sindh to enact amendments related to local government.The court rejected the petitioners' arguments, stating that there was no vested right for an officeholder to remain in position despite losing the confidence of the house. It was held that the amendment was neither retrospective in effect nor violative of any fundamental rights or principles of the Constitution. The court also dismissed the challenges to the notifications issued for conducting no-confidence motions, aligning with earlier Division Bench judgments that upheld the democratic process of no-confidence motions as part of the local government system.Ultimately, the High Court dismissed all the petitions and upheld the amendment and the impugned notifications, affirming the simple majority requirement for the removal of local government officials through a vote of no confidence. The decision emphasized the supremacy of democratic principles and the legislative authority of the provincial assembly in matters of local government.

Summary: The petitioners argued that this imposition was contrary to Entry 81 of the Sixth Schedule to the Sales Tax Act 1990, which provides a statutory exemption for the supply of cotton seed.The court examined the issue in light of a previous judgment (referred to as "Insaf Cotton"), which had addressed a similar matter and found that a statutory exemption could not be overridden by a notification. The court also considered the retrospective application of the impugned SRO and the denial of input tax adjustment, concluding that these aspects were not legally sustainable.The court found the impugned SRO to be ultra vires of the Sales Tax Act 1990, declaring it without any legal effect and restraining the respondents from demanding or enforcing any sales tax on the supply of cotton seed as per the impugned SRO. The petitioners were entitled to refunds for any sales tax paid under the impugned provisions, subject to claims made within 90 days and processed according to relevant rules.The judgment reaffirmed the principles laid out in "Insaf Cotton" and emphasized that statutory exemptions granted by the legislature cannot be negated or altered through subordinate notifications or rule-making powers. The court's decision underscores the supremacy of statutory provisions over administrative actions and reinforces the legal protections afforded to taxpayers against retrospective taxation and arbitrary rule-making.

Summary: Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)-------S. 17---Ejectment of tenant---Denial of relationship of landlord and tenant by the tenant---Default in payment of rent---Effect---Rent Controller accepted ejectment petition and directed the tenant to vacate the demised premises---Validity---Tenant had admitted that he had paid rent to the husband of landlady---Relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties---Tenant had not denied the ownership of landlady and he had entered in the demised premises as tenant---Tenant had committed default in payment of rent in the present case---Tenant had neither sent rent to the landlady or her husband through money order nor deposited the same in the Court---Tenant was directed to pay the defaulted rent and vacate the demised premises within fifteen days---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. Messrs MFMY Industries v. Federation of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 1550 rel.

Summary: Cantonments Act 1924, Civil Procedure Code CPC (Declaration and Permanent Injunction)

Summary: [Civil Procedure Code CPC (Declaration and Permanent Injunction), Civil Procedure Code CPC] Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 42 & 8---Suit for declaration, possession, mesne profits and damages---Contention of plaintiff was that he was owner of suit land whose possession had been taken by the defendants forcibly---Validity---Plaintiff had established that he was owner of suit property---Possession of defendants upon the suit land could not be lawful---Unlawful occupant of suit property could only be termed as "trespasser"---No fraud had been committed in leasing the suit property in favour of plaintiff---Plaintiff had been denied to enjoy ownership right in the plot in question and he was entitled to mesne profit @ Rs. 500/ per day from the date of illegal possession of defendants---No documentary evidence had been produced to justify the claim of damages, therefore same could not be awarded on account of increase in cost of construction material---Plaintiff was declared lawful owner of suit land and he was entitled for vacant possession from defendants and mesne profits jointly and severally---Suit was decreed in circumstances. ---- The judgment from the High Court of Sindh at Karachi in Suit No. 365 of 1994, dated October 25, 2013, involves the plaintiff Saleem Ahmed Mirza, who sought a declaration of ownership, possession, mesne profits/damages, and permanent injunction regarding a plot of land in Karachi. The plaintiff had purchased the plot from Mst. Shahida Ghafoor, with the Karachi Development Authority transferring the plot and executing a lease in his favor. The defendant, Retd. Major Syed Iftikhar Hussain Zaidi, along with defendants Muhammad Saleem and Syed Hussain Ali Zaidi, unlawfully occupied the plot. The plaintiff's complaint was deemed a civil matter, leading to this suit.The court addressed several issues, including the plaintiff's ownership, the validity of the lease deed, and the defendants' unlawful occupation and trespassing. The court found in favor of the plaintiff, establishing his ownership and right to possession, dismissing the defendants' claims based on an alleged agreement of sale and an arbitration award, which were found to be set aside and not affecting the plaintiff's rights.The judgment declared the plaintiff as the lawful owner entitled to possession and mesne profits from the defendants, with the suit being decreed in terms of prayer clauses A, B, and C, along with the cost of the suit. The defendants' lack of appearance and representation, as well as their failure to substantiate their claims, contributed to the court's findings in favor of the plaintiff.

Summary: [Cantonments Act 1924 (Section 185)] In the circumstances, this being pure a question of law, where perusal of section 185 read with section 2(iv) of the Cantonment Act, 1924 leave no doubt in my mind that raising of boundary wall of less than eight 8 feet in height as long as it does not abutt a street, does not require approval by the defendant No.2. Resultantly Issue Nos.1 and 2 are answered in affirmative.

Summary: NAB (Post arrest bail granted , on the ground, hardship and 56 witnesses have examined , accused are in Custody since 2 years )

Summary: [Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance,1979 (Section 8 (Fair Rent))] - Similarly, a presumptive view in respect of overall inflation and rate of taxes cannot be applied. The maintenance claimed to have been made/done by the landlord/respondent and in support thereof they have filed some accounts and debit vouchers but it pertains to a period w.e.f. March 2007onward. How these debit vouchers and maintenance bills are being applied to entire building and on what calculation and basis its ratio in terms of facilities provided to the premises is being applied, is inconceivable on the strength of the evidence available on record. Floor-wise true calculation is not provided. The presumptive analysis thus is beyond the domain and jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. The statistics in terms of inflation and maintenance charges should have been provided in statement recorded on oath and only then it could have been taken into consideration by the appellate Court. Filing plethora of documents disclosing them as debit vouchers in respect of maintaining the entire building is inconceivable. Statistics showing percentage of taxation over the building in question as well as maintenance as to be applied to entire building and has to be established statistically and not generally. Such data was not provided to Rent Controller. Taxation and maintenance are differently applied on ground floor and upper floors.- Similarly in presence of lease deeds of the same building between same landlord and tenant or between same landlord and other tenants, the reliance/applicability of rent or fair rent of other buildings in the adjoining locality should not have been applied as a priority, wherein respect of which direct evidence is available. When a building is operated by lifts there is not a serious degree of difference between second and third floor of the same building where premises are situated.- Though the Rent Controller while determining fair rent of the premises in question has taken a very conservative view by fixing fair rent at Rs.10/-per sq. foot, yet I am of the view that fair rent fixed by the appellate Court is on higher side. The Rent Controller and appellate Court were required to provide a cumulative effect of all those factors available under section 8 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 subject to availability of evidence though the quantum of inflation and the enhancement of taxation has not been statistically provided in terms of applicability of such claim/charges per sq. foot yet the other factors may contribute for the determination of fair rent.- The rise in cost of construction has also not been demonstrated statistically. It is only presumptive analysis that cost of construction rises with the passage of time, however, the witness is required to provide data of such rise in cost of construction through his affidavit or any expert witness. It is a difficult assignment but the requirement of law. This burden could be relieved had appropriate lease deeds of same building or of adjoining building having similar facilities could be cited in evidence.- Section 8(2) of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 enables the Rent Controller to revise such fair rent on account of changes/ additions brought or improving the premises in question which is not the case here. Similarly, there cannot be an automatic enhancement at the rate of 10% per annum on the fair rent in terms of Section 9 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. It provides a maximum cap of 10% per annum on the existing fair rent and not an automatic enhancement to its maximum. Such enhancement at any particular rate, which in any case should not be 10% per annum, is dependent on certain factors which were not decided in the application under section 8 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. Besides, there was no prayer for such enhancement under section 9 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979.

Summary: Order VII rule 11 CPC - Rejection of Plaint sought - Suit barred in law under Order 2 Rule 2 - Application dismissed.

Summary: The short question is whether compulsory retirement of the petitioner on the aforesaid grounds would be a valid exercise of the powers; and, whether such a purpose could be termed to be in the public interest?