Summary: --Quote: "(i) For computing ten days limitation period under section 22(2) of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 (Act) for filing leave to contest application, the first day of appearance is to be excluded in view of section 8 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1956 (Act of 1956). (ii) Under section 5(4) of the Act, landlord or tenant will not absolve from the liability to register the tenancy agreement under the law relating to registration of document, therefore, the lease deed beyond 12 months if not registered under the Registration Act, 1908 shall deem to be a lease from month to month basis terminable on part of lessor or lessee by notice. (iii) The term landlord is defined under section 2(d) of the Act, which means owner of premises and include a person entitled or authorized to receive rent, hence ejectment petition by Mutwalli who is receiving rent is maintainable." ---Issues 1)Whether the leave to contest application filed by the petitioner was within the statutory period of ten days. ---2) Whether the Mutwalli (Zahid Moyeen) had the authority to file the ejectment petition on behalf of the Trust. ---3) Whether the lease agreement was extended for 99 years or if it remained a 10-year lease that expired. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Leave to Contest Application: The court ruled that the leave to contest application filed by the petitioner was indeed within the statutory period of ten days as the first day of appearance is to be excluded from the computation, in line with section 8 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1956. -----Authority of the Mutwalli: The court upheld that the Mutwalli had the authority to file the ejectment petition. This authority was supported by the arbitration award dated 18.6.1989, which empowered the Mutwalli to manage, lease, and handle legal matters concerning the waqf property. Additionally, the Mutwalli was authorized to receive rent and manage bank accounts on behalf of the Trust, thereby falling under the definition of a landlord as per section 2(d) of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009. -----Lease Agreement: The court found that even if the lease was purportedly extended for 99 years, the agreement was not registered as required under the Registration Act, 1908, and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. As a result, it would be considered a month-to-month lease terminable with 15 days' notice. This finding was consistent with established legal precedents. Ultimately, the court dismissed the petition, affirming the decisions of the lower courts on the merits. ------Citations/Precedents: -----Abdul Karim vs. Shakeel Ahmad etc (2012 CLC 261) Exclusion of the first day of appearance in computing the period of ten days. -----Mst. Saima Zameer vs. Muhammad Javed Iqbal (2017 CLC 1695) Application for leave to appear and defend filed within the period of ten days, excluding the day of service. -----Babar Jahangir and another vs. Nadir Ali (2022 YLR 570) Similar ruling on exclusion of the day of service for computing the period of ten days. -----Raja vs. Tanveer Riaz and others (PLD Supreme Court 466) Exclusion of the day on which the order was passed for computing the period of deposit. -----Habib Bank Limited vs. Dr. Munawar Ali Siddiqui (1991 SCMR 1185) Unregistered lease agreements are considered month-to-month leases. -----Govt. of Sindh etc vs. Muhammad Shafi etc (PLD 2015 SC 380) Non-registration of a lease agreement results in a month-to-month tenancy. -----Mirza Book Agency etc vs. Additional District Judge etc (2013 SCMR 1520) Legal consequences of non-registration of lease agreements. -----Star Holdings vs. Dr. Nishat Afza Qureshi (2019 CLC 909) Lease agreements and their enforceability. -----Messrs IRIS Communications (Pvt.) Ltd vs. Ahmad Khalid (2019 MLD 772) Impact of non-registration of tenancy agreements. -----Israr Hussaain vs. Imtiaz Ahmad Sheikh etc (2024 CLC 486) Validity and enforceability of lease agreements without registration.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997) [as amended by the Control of Narcotic Substances (Amendment) Act (XX of 2022)]--- ----S.9(d)---Possession and transportation of narcotic substance---Appreciation of evidence---Safe custody and safe transmission of recovered substance to laboratory doubtful---Scope---Prosecution case was that 21000-grams Bhang was recovered from the possession of the accused---Chain of custody remained shrouded in mystery as nothing was brought on record to show why the parcel was kept in malkhana for 04 (four) days prior to being sent to the Chemical Examiner, and even the official who claimed to have taken the parcel to the office of the Chemical Examiner was not examined as witness---For the Chemical Examiner's Report to have real probative value, the sanctity of the chain of custody is absolutely imperative---It is prosecution's responsibility that such chain of custody must be safe and secure because the report of the Chemical Examiner carries critical importance under the Act, 1997, and the proof of chain of custody can only ensure the reaching of recovered material to the office of the Chemical Examiner---Investigating Officer dispatched the parcel to the laboratory through Police Constable, who in his examination-in-chief had not uttered a single word that Investigating Officer delivered the parcel to him on 24.10.2022 and he delivered the same to the Chemical Examiner---Thus, the prosecution admittedly failed to adduce evidence of dispatcher in order to corroborate the chain of custody of case property as unbroken, for which prosecution was liable to prove the safe custody and transmission of sealed sample parcel to the Chemical Examiner---Investigating Officer also failed to explain the delay of four (04) days for keeping the parcel with malkhana, therefore, the elements of tampering with the parcels could not be ruled out and due to such defect on the part of prosecution, it could not be held with any degree of certainty that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing its case against the accused beyond any reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. The State through Regional Director ANF v. Imam Bakhsh and others 2018 SCMR 2039 and Mst. Sakina Ramzan v. The State Criminal Appeal No. 184 of 2020 rel. (b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997) [as amended by the Control of Narcotic Substances (Amendment) Act (XX of 2022)]--- ----S.9(d)---Possession and transportation of narcotic substance---Appreciation of evidence---Contradictions in the evidence of witnesses---Prosecution case was that 21000-grams Bhang was recovered from the possession of the accused---Perusal of the record reflected that there were material contradictions in the evidence of complainant and mashir---According to complainant, the distance between Police Station and place of incident was about three (03) kilometers, whereas mashir deposed that said distance was only one (01) kilometer---Complainant deposed that he prepared memo. of arrest and recovery with the help of clipboard in standing position, whereas the mashir deposed that memo. was prepared by the complainant over bonnet of mobile vehicle---Though the evidence of complainant and mashir was recorded within four months of the alleged incident, yet their contradictory evidence made their presence at the time of alleged incident as doubtful---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (c) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Single doubt in the prosecution story is disastrous for the prosecution case and its benefit must go to the accused. Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 rel. Rukhsar Ahmed Junejo for Appellant. Aftab Ahmed Shar Additional Prosecutor General for the State. Date of hearing: 10th July, 2024. Judgment Amjad Ali Bohio, J .--- Appellant Nadir Hussain through instant appeal has assailed the judgment dated 15.05.2023 passed by Special Judge for (Control of Narcotic Substances), Khairpur in Special Case No.233 of 2022, arising out of FIR No. 22 of 2022, registered at Police Station F.M.Narejo, Khairpur, whereby the appellant was convicted for an offence under Section 9(d) of CNS (Amendment 2022) Act, 1997 and awarded Rigorous Imprisonment for fourteen (14) years. He was also directed to pay fine of Rs.2,00,000/- and in default of payment he is required to undergo simple imprisonment for one year more. Benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended to accused. 2. The brief facts of the prosecution case as emerged from the contents of the FIR are that on 20.10.2022 at 1100 hours, complainant / ASI Gulsher Maitlo along with his team proceeded from police station in official vehicle for patrolling duty vide entry No.05 and via link road leading from Kot Mir Muhammad to Piryaloi arrived at 'Jaamra Mor' where they received spy information that a person having two bags (gunny plastic bags) containing Bhang (Hemp) was waiting for conveyance near 'Odha Mor' to sell the same. On such information they arrived on pointed place at 1200 hours and found a person standing there beside whom, two filled gunny plastic bags were lying. On seeing the police party he by leaving the bags, tried to escape towards banana garden but was chased and apprehended. On enquiry, he disclosed his name as Nadir Hussain son of Abdul Latif Bhangar, resident of village Rahim Bux Bhangar, Taluka Kingri, and admitted that he used to sell Bhang (Hemp). They weighed the recovered Bhang (Hemp) which measured to be 21000 grams. From personal search, cash of Rs.150/- was secured. Recovered Bhang (Hemp) was sealed and such mashirnama of recovery and arrest was prepared. The appellant along with recovered property was brought at Police Station. Case was registered against appellant Nadir Hussain Bhangar under section 9(d) of CNS (Amendment) Act, 2022 as mentioned above. The recovered Bhang (Hemp) was sent to the Chemical Analyzer whose report was positive. 3. After completion of investigation, Investigating Officer submitted the report under Section 173, Cr.P.C against the appellant before the learned trial court at Khairpur. The charge was framed against the appellant on 11.01.2023, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial of the case. 4. To substantiate it's case, the prosecution examined complainant / ASI Gulsher Maitlo (PW-1), mashir / PC Saifullah Laghari (PW-2), IO / SIP Shah Nawaz (PW-3) and Incharge Malkhana / WHC Nazar Muhammad. They exhibited numerous documents and other items and thereafter closed its side of evidence on 31.03.2023. The statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 342, of Cr.P.C, in which he denied all the allegations levelled against him and claimed false implication. However, the appellant did not record his statement on oath in disproof of prosecution allegations and likewise did not lead evidence in his defence. 5. The trial court after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and examining the evidence brought on the record, through impugned judgment dated 15.05.2023 convicted the appellant and sentenced him as earlier set out in this judgment. Hence, this appeal against conviction has been filed by the appellant. 6. The facts of the case as well as evidence produced before the trial Court find an elaborate mention in the impugned judgment passed by the trial court and, therefore, the same is not be reproduced here so as to unnecessary repetition. 7. We have heard the learned Counsel representing the appellant, learned Additional Prosecutor General and with their assistance have carefully examined the entire available record. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the appellant is innocent and has not committed the alleged offence; that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt especially as the safe custody of property and its transmission to the office of the Chemical Examiner has not been proved; that the despatcher failed to depose as to whether property was entrusted to him for its delivery to the Chemical Examiner. Lastly he submitted that the case of the prosecution was thus marred by gaps and defects and under such circumstances there was no reason to convict the appellant. 9. Conversely, the learned APG defended the impugned judgment and relying on the report of the Chemical Examiner contended that the parcel received was found to containing Bhang (Hemp), which is sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant so as to prove the charge against him, hence his conviction ought to be sustained. 10. Having considered the matter in light of the record, we have observed that whilst the two prosecution witnesses furnished their testimony as to the recovery of Hemp(Bhang), and the investigation steps taken thereafter, the chain of custody remains shrouded in mystery as nothing was brought on record to show why the parcel was kept in malkhana for 04 (four) days prior to being sent to the Chemical Examiner, and even the official who is claimed to have taken the parcel to the office of the Chemical Examiner was not examined as witness. Needless to note that, for the Chemical Examiner's Report to have real probative value, the sanctity of the chain of custody is absolutely imperative. It is prosecution's responsibility that such chain of custody must be safe and secure because the report of the Chemical Examiner carries critical importance under the Act, 1997, and the proof of chain of custody can only ensure the reaching of recovered material to the office of the Chemical Examiner. We are fortified in this regard by the Judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the cases reported as The State through Regional Director ANF v. Imam Bakhsh and others (2018 SCMR 2039), as well as, a more recent Judgment in Criminal Appeal No.184 of 2020, titled Mst. Sakina Ramzan v. The State, wherein it was held as under: "The chain of custody or safe custody and safe transmission of narcotic drug begins with seizure of the narcotic drug by the law enforcement officer, followed by separation of the representative samples of the seized narcotic drug, storage of the representative samples and the narcotic drug with the law enforcement agency and then dispatch of the representative samples of the narcotic drugs to the office of the chemical examiner for examination and testing. This chain of custody must be safe and secure. This is because, the Report of the Chemical Examiner enjoys critical importance under CNSA and the chain of custody ensures that correct representative samples reach the office of the Chemical Examiner. Any break or gap in the chain of custody i.e., in the safe custody or safe transmission of the narcotic drug or its representative samples makes the Report of the Chemical Examiner unsafe and unreliable for justifying conviction of the accused. The prosecution, therefore, has to establish that the chain of custody has been unbroken and is safe, secure and indisputable in order to be able to place reliance on the Report of the Chemical Examiner." 11. In narcotic cases it is the duty of prosecution to establish the seizure of contraband, taking of samples from the recovered stuff, their safe transmission from the spot to the police station and from police station to the Chemical Examiner, however, as stated above in the present case, I.O dispatched the parcel to the laboratory through PC Saifullah, who in his examination-in-chief has not uttered a single word that I.O delivered the parcel to him on 24.10.2022 and he delivered the same to the Chemical Examiner. Thus, the prosecution admittedly failed to adduce evidence of dispatcher in order to corroborate the chain of custody of property as unbroken, for which prosecution was liable to prove the safe custody and transmission of sealed sample parcel to the Chemical Examiner. I.O also failed to explain the delay of four (04) days for keeping the parcel with malkhana, therefore, the elements of tampering with the parcels cannot be ruled out and thereby such defect on the part of prosecution, cannot be held with any degree of certainty that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing its case against the accused beyond any reasonable doubt as held in the case of Muhammad Hazir v. The State (2023 SCMR 986) as under: "3. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned state counsel and perusing the available record along with the impugned judgment with their assistance, it has been observed by us that neither the safe custody nor the safe transmission of the sealed sample parcels to the concerned Forensic Science Laboratory was established by the prosecution because neither the Moharrar nor the Constable Shah Said (FC-2391) who deposited the sample parcels in the concerned laboratory was produced. It is also a circumstance that recovery was affected on 10.02.2015 whereas the sample parcels were received in the said laboratory on 13.02.2015 and prosecution is silent as to where remained these sample parcels during this period, meaning thereby that the element of tampering with is quite apparent in this case. This Court in the cases of Qaiser Khan v. The State through Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar (2021 SCMR 363), Mst. Razia Sultana v. The State and another (2019 SCMR 1300), The State through Regional Director ANF v. Imam Bakhsh and others (2018 SCMR 2039), Ekramullah and others v. The State (2015 SCMR 1002) and Amjad Ali v. The State (2012 SCMR 577) has held that in a case containing the above mentioned defect on the part of the prosecution it cannot be held with any degree of certainty that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing its case against an accused person beyond any reasonable doubt." 12. Perusal of the record further reflects that there are material contradictions in the evidence of complainant / ASI Gulsher and mashir / PC Saifullah. According to complainant, the distance between Police Station and place of incident is about three (03) kilometers, whereas mashir / PC Saifullah deposed that said distance is only one (01) kilometer. The complainant deposed that he prepared memo. of arrest and recovery with the help of clipboard in standing position, whereas the mashir deposed that memo. was prepared by the complainant over bonnet of mobile vehicle. Though the evidence of complainant and mashir was recorded within four months of the alleged incident, yet their contradictory evidence make their presence at the time of alleged incident as doubtful. 13. From the above discussion, it is evident, that there are serious doubts in the case of prosecution. It is settled law that even a single doubt in the prosecution story is disastrous for the prosecution case and its benefit must go to the accused. In this respect, we would like to take reliance from a case of Apex Court reported as Tariq Pervez v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345), wherein it is held as: "The concept of benefit of doubt to an accused person is deep rooted in our country. For giving him benefit of doubt, it is not necessary that there should be many circumstances creating doubts. If there is a circumstance which creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind about the guilt of the accused, then the accused will be entitled to the benefit not as a matter of grace and concession but as a matter of right." 14. In the present case, there are series of circumstances creating doubts, and under the settled principle of criminal justice, the benefit of the doubt favours the appellant. 15. The final and eventual outcome of the entire discussion is that we are unable to agree with the findings and conclusions reached at by the learned trial Court and the same are unsustainable which vitiate the impugned judgment. We, therefore, allow the instant appeal. Resultantly, the judgment of the learned trial Court convicting and sentencing the appellant is set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of the offences for which he has been charged vide our short order dated 10.07.2024 and these are the reasons for the same. JK/N-17/Sindh. Appeal allowed.

Summary: (a) Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)--- ----Ss. 3, 4 & 8---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 345---Illegal dispossession---Compromise---Scope---No doubt the legislature has not provided a specific section/provision under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, for compounding the offense---However, S.9 of the Act ibid provided that unless provided in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, the provisions contained under the scheme of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, shall apply to all the proceedings under the Act ibid---Therefore, the compromise effected between the parties under the Act ibid should be treated as the compromise within the meaning of S.345, Cr.P.C.---Non-compoundability of the particular Section of the law should not be read in isolation but it should be read in the background of each criminal case and beneficial interpretation should be given to it---When the parties had earnestly decided to live in peace and tranquility by forgetting and giving up all their past transactions then for the sake of their welfare in general and betterment of socio-economic conditions of the society as a whole in particular, it would be prime need of time to acquit the accused from the charge upon the basis of compromise despite the non-compoundability of the S.3 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. (b) Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)--- ----Ss. 3, 4 & 8---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.345---Illegal dispossession---Appreciation of evidence---Compromise---Accused was charged for illegally occupying the residential plot of the complainant---Appellants were convicted under S.3 subsection (2) of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005---Joint application for compromise between parties had been filed duly supported with affidavits of accused persons as well as complainant---Counsel for the complainant had also made a statement duly signed by the complainant to the effect that possession of the disputed property had been handed over to complainant, therefore he had no objection to acquittal of the accused persons---Legal question was that said offence was not compoundable nor the legislature had defined it in its Preamble whether it should be treated as compoundable or non-compoundable---However, if the parties, particularly the aggrieved person/victim and both the parties i.e. the complainant and appellant/convict, had compromised against themselves then it should be treated as compromised, though under the statute it had not been defined whether it was compoundable or non-compoundable---In the present case, keeping in view the compromise that had taken place between the parties outside the Court, it was not proper to hold the conviction, especially when the complainant did not want to pursue his case anymore and had raised his no objection for acquittal of the appellants---In the circumstances and in view of the compromise effected between the parties, the appeal was disposed of---Appellants were acquitted of all the charges. Ijaz and another v. Mst. Manadia PLD 2016 Pesh. 26 and The State v. Irfanullah Qazi 2007 MLD 1269 rel. Hakim Ali Mallah for Appellants along with Appellants. Respondent No. 1 in person. Zahoor Shah, Additional P.G. for the State. Date of hearing: 10th July, 2024. Order Adnan-ul-Karim Memon, J .--- The Appellants Papoo, Ghafoor and Karful through this Criminal Appeal under Section 410, Cr. P.C read with section 8 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 have assailed the judgment dated 18.1.2024 passed by II- Additional Sessions Judge Thatta in Criminal Illegal Dispossession Complaint No.51 of 2022, whereby the learned Judge convicted and sentenced the appellants for an offense under sections 3 and 4 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 for a period of seven years with a fine of Rs.50,000/- each and they were also directed to compensate the complainant with Rs.1,00,000/- each. 2. The case of the complainant is that on 10.02.2022, the appellants illegally occupied residential plot No.192 measuring 2000 Sq. Feet of complainant Adnan, situated in Deh Gharo, Taluka Mirpur Sakro District Thatta, such a complaint was filed before the trial court which was processed, and an investigation report was called from the SHO concerned, who after conducting the investigation submitted his report. After hearing the parties the trial court took cognizance of the offence and registered the criminal complaint vide order dated 21.07.2023. 3. The charge against them was framed at Ex. 02, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial vide pleas at Ex:02/A to Exh.02/C respectively. 4. To prove the case, the complainant Adnan examined himself at Ex:03 and produced a photocopy of Form-II at Exh.03/A and photocopy of the sketch at Exh.03/B. PW-02 Muhammad Ali at Exh.04 and PW-03 Ali at Exh.05. 5. The statement of accused under section 342, Cr.P.C were recorded at Exh.07 to Exh.09 respectively they denied the allegations of the complainant. The accused neither examined themselves on oath Under Section 340(2), Cr.P.C. nor produced any witness in their defence. 6. The trial court after hearing the parties convicted and sentenced the appellants as discussed in the preceding paragraph. 7. Today, a joint application for compromise between appellants and complainant/respondent has been filed by the respective counsel for the parties duly supported with affidavits of appellants as well as complainant/respondent, both parties are present in court. The counsel for the respondent/complainant has also made a statement duly signed by the respondent/complainant to the effect that possession of the disputed property has been handed over to him and, therefore, he has no objection to acquittal of the appellants; even if the appellants may be acquitted of all the charges including the fine amount. 8. Learned Additional PG has no objection to the compromise between the parties on the aforesaid analogy. 9. I have heard learned counsel for parties and have gone through the material available on record. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that though the specific provision for compounding offense is not embodied under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005; however, this being a Criminal Complaint is governed by the Scheme of Criminal Procedure Code of 1898, therefore, Section 345, Cr.P.C. is applicable and presumption would be that the offense related to the property which being of civil nature is compoundable; that the offenses in terms of Illegal Dispossession Act are compoundable. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the case reported as ljaz and another v. Mst. Manadia (PLD 2016 Peshawar 26) and Suo-Motu case (re-the State v. Irfanullah Qazi (2007 MLD 1269). He further submits that although the respondent complainant is an aggrieved person the property dispute has been resolved as the possession of the same has been handed over to him, therefore, he (respondent/complainant) does not wish to linger on the proceedings; hence, the appeal may be disposed of by acquitting the appellants based on compromise. 11. On the other hand, the advocate representing the respondent/complainant states that after the conviction of the appellants, the parties have entered into compromise as a result whereof, the joint statement was made on behalf of the appellants and complainant before this Court. Resultantly, their sentence was suspended and the appellants were enlarged on bail, and maintain law and order situation in the area and to live peacefully by maintaining peace and tranquility, they have filed a joint application duly supported by their respective affidavits, hence, no loss or injury would be caused to either side if they may be allowed to act upon the compromise effected between them (parties). 12. No doubt the legislature has not provided a specific section/provision under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 for compounding the offense even if it is lacking whether it will be treated as a compoundable or non-compoundable offense. However, Section 9 of the Act ibid provides that unless provided in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, the provisions contained under the scheme of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 shall apply to all the proceedings under the Act ibid. Therefore, I am of the clear view that the compromise effected between the parties under the Act ibid should be treated as the compromise within the meaning of Section 345, Cr.P.C. It is an admitted fact that both parties have amicably settled all their differences and have resolved to lead the rest of their lives in peace and tranquility. It is settled law that the non-compoundability of the particular Section of the law should not be read in isolation but it should be read in the background of each criminal case and beneficial interpretation should be given to it; more particularly, when the parties have earnestly decided to live in peace and tranquility by forgetting and giving up all their past transactions then for the sake of their welfare in general and betterment of socio-economic conditions of the society as a whole in particular, it will be prime need of time to acquit the appellant from the charge of instant case upon the basis of compromise despite the non compoundability of the Section 3 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, if it is so. 13. In the cases of Ijaz and another (Supra) and the State v. Irfanullah Qazi (Supra), the offenses related to Special Law/ATA, etc were not compoundable; however, due to the compromise effected between the parties, same was recognized by the Peshawar High Court as well as the Bench of this Court in the case of Abdul Wali and Abdul Wahab (Supra), the compromise was effected between the parties during the pendency of the cases before the trial Court in terms of Sections 3/4 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 and subsequently was accepted; however, after the acquittal of the accused therein, some of the parties had challenged the validity of compromise effected between them before trial Court and wanted to reopen the case on certain issues but the Benches of Lahore as well Peshawar High Court had not disturbed the findings of the Courts below on account of compromise and thus recognized the compromise took place between the parties before trial Court. 14. The appellants were convicted under Section 3 subsection (2) of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The legal question is that said offence is not compoundable nor the legislature has defined it in its preamble whether it should be treated as compoundable or non-compoundable. I am of the firm view that if the parties, particularly the aggrieved person/victim and both the parties i.e the complainant and appellant/convict have compromised against themselves then it should be treated as compromised; though under the statute it has not been defined whether it is compoundable or non-compoundable. In the present case, keeping in view the compromise that has taken place between the parties outside the Court, it is not proper to hold the conviction, especially when the complainant does not want to pursue his case anymore and has raised his no objection for acquittal of the appellants. 15. In the circumstances and in view of the compromise effected between the parties, the instant appeal is disposed of. The appellants present on bail are hereby acquitted of all the charges. Their bail bonds are canceled and the surety furnished by them is also hereby discharged and returned to the surety by proper verification. 16. The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms. JK/P-13/Sindh Order accordingly.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Background: The Respondent initiated a suit for recovery amounting to PKR 32,285,308/- before the Civil Judge 1st Class, Rawalpindi, on September 16, 1991. The claim was based on a contract (No. CEA-125/87) for the provision and installation of POL Cylindrical Steel Tanks at Quetta, agreed with the Appellants through the DW&CE (Army) Branch, Rawalpindi, in December 1986. The contract valued at PKR 14,296,501/- was to be completed within 12 months from the issuance of the first written work order dated January 17, 1987. The work commenced after delays in site handover and provision of layout plans, leading to substantial losses for the Respondent. Despite several changes and delays attributed to both parties, the project was completed on May 19, 1991, and the Respondent sought recovery due to delays and additional costs. ----Issues: 1- Whether the suit for recovery was barred by the limitation period. 2- Whether the delays in completing the contract were attributable to the Appellants or the Respondent. 3- Whether the Respondent was entitled to recover the claimed amount due to the delays and changes in the contract terms. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the Respondent for PKR 99,35,373/- with costs and interest at 10% per annum until the realization of the decree, provided a three-month grace period for satisfaction of the decree. The Appellants challenged this decision before the Lahore High Court, which dismissed their appeal, affirming that the delays were primarily due to the Appellants' failure to provide necessary materials and drawings in time. The present appeal before the Supreme Court resulted in a reversal of the High Court's decision. The Supreme Court found concurrent delays attributable to both parties and emphasized the principle of "concurrent delays," where each party contributed to the delays. The Court also found the Respondent’s recovery proceedings to be a retaliatory measure to avoid refunding an overpayment identified in a post-payment audit. Thus, the appeal was allowed, and the decrees of the lower courts were set aside, with each party bearing its own costs. ----Citations/Precedents: Henry Boot Construction (UK) Limited v. Malmaison Hotel (Manchester) Limited (1999) 70 Con LR 32 Adyard Abu Dhabi v. SD Marine Services [2011] EWHC 848 (Comm) United Bank Limited v. Jamil Ahmed (2024 SCMR 164) Nazim-ud-Din v. Sheikh Zia-ul-Qamar (2016 SCMR 24) A. Rahim Foods v. K&N’s Foods (2023 CLD 1001) Society of Construction Law Delay and Disruption Protocol, 2nd Edition

Summary: FIR quashed ---- In Criminal Revision No. 39439 of 2024, Sanam Javed (the petitioner) sought the quashing of an order dated 14.06.2024, passed by the Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC), Gujranwala. The petitioner was accused in FIR No. 823/23 dated 10.05.2023, involving multiple charges under the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 1997. The petitioner contended that she was not initially named in the FIR and was implicated based on the disclosure of a co-accused, Karim Hasan, more than a year after the registration of the case. ----Issues: 1) Jurisdiction of the Court under Section 439 Cr.P.C.: Whether the court has the jurisdiction to entertain the petition when the period of physical remand granted by the ATC had already elapsed, and the petitioner had been sent on judicial remand. ---2) Validity of the Physical Remand Order: Whether the order granting physical remand of the petitioner was justified and in accordance with legal standards. ---3) Evidentiary Basis of Implication: Whether the statement of the co-accused/approver was sufficient to implicate the petitioner in the alleged offences. ---4) Malafide Intentions and Ulterior Motives: Whether the repeated implication of the petitioner in multiple cases was done with malafide intentions and ulterior motives to curtail her liberty. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Jurisdiction of the Court under Section 439 Cr.P.C.: The court emphasized its broad jurisdiction under Section 439 Cr.P.C. to correct manifest illegality and prevent miscarriage of justice. It held that the petition was not infructuous despite the elapse of the physical remand period because the petitioner sought discharge from the case. The court referenced: Mushtaq Ahmad vs. The State (PLD 1966 SC 126) Dr. Waqar Hussain vs. The State (2000 SCMR 735) ----Validity of the Physical Remand Order: The court scrutinized the process of granting physical remand and concluded that the remand was granted in a mechanical manner without considering whether the petitioner’s presence was genuinely required for the investigation. The court highlighted the need to balance personal liberty and investigational rights, referencing the principles laid out in the Rules and Orders of Lahore High Court, Lahore. It found that the physical remand was unjustified given the lack of incriminating evidence beyond the co-accused’s statement. ----Evidentiary Basis of Implication: The court found that the statement of the co-accused/approver, recorded after 22 days of physical remand, was not voluntary and lacked corroborating evidence. The statement was considered inadmissible as it violated the proviso to Section 337(1) Cr.P.C., which prohibits tendering pardon in cases of hurt or qatl without the victim’s or heirs' permission. The court referenced: Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif vs. The State (PLD 2009 SC 814) -----Malafide Intentions and Ulterior Motives: The court noted a pattern of malicious prosecution against the petitioner, involving her in multiple cases with similar allegations to prolong her detention. It held that such actions violated her fundamental rights under Articles 4, 9, 10, and 13 of the Constitution, and amounted to malicious persecution. The court criticized the executive and police for repeatedly implicating the petitioner in new cases on the same charges. It referenced: Muhammad Bashir vs. SHO, Okara Cantt. (PLD 2007 SC 539) Ammad Yousaf vs. The State (PLD 2024 SC 273) Muhammad Sultan vs. Muhammad Raza and others (2020 SCMR 1200) ----Citations/Precedents: Mushtaq Ahmad vs. The State (PLD 1966 SC 126) Dr. Waqar Hussain vs. The State (2000 SCMR 735) Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif vs. The State (PLD 2009 SC 814) Muhammad Bashir vs. SHO, Okara Cantt. (PLD 2007 SC 539) Ammad Yousaf vs. The State (PLD 2024 SC 273) Muhammad Sultan vs. Muhammad Raza and others (2020 SCMR 1200) ----Outcome: The court accepted the criminal revision petition and quashed the order dated 14.06.2024, discharging the petitioner from FIR No. 823/23. It ruled that the investigation against the petitioner was initiated with malafide intentions and lacked incriminating evidence. The court ordered the petitioner’s immediate release and criticized the executive and police for their highhandedness and disregard for judicial orders. The court also issued a directive to circulate the judgment among judicial officers, deputy commissioners, and the Inspector General of Police, Punjab, for guidance and compliance.

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Arts. 2(c), 71 & 132---Evidence, producing of---Party’s failure to complete its cross-examination---Effect---Suit was dismissed as the plaintiff failed to complete cross-examination of his witnesses---Validity---The term "evidence" encompasses examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-examination as outlined in Art. 132, together with Arts. 2(c) & 71 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---A cross-examination is a continuing part of the whole statement and often more crucial than the examination-in-chief---The right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses is a fundamental and inalienable right of the accused; without this opportunity, the court cannot rely on the evidence of those witnesses---Cross-examination is crucial for uncovering the truth and any party must have the chance to cross-examine opposing witnesses---Evidence affecting a party is inadmissible unless the party has had the opportunity to test its truthfulness through cross-examination ---If no opportunity is provided to cross-examine a deponent, his testimony would be inadmissible---In the present case, however, appellant's witness was substantially cross-examined on two occasions, after which he voluntarily abstained despite being given further opportunities to appear while no reason was documented for his absence---If a party chooses to abstain from taking the witness stand, it can result in an adverse inference being drawn against it, suggesting that the party is withholding testimony because it would be damaging to its case---Moreover, at the very least, the incomplete cross-examination should not be used adversely against the accused or opposing party---However, if there is relevant material, the incomplete cross-examination of the party or witness may be used against them, provided that the existing material or evidence justifies such a conclusion, rather than discarding the incomplete cross-examination outright---Said baseline standards would ensure that parties cannot strategically avoid or abandon cross-examination midway without potential consequences---Division Bench of the High Court maintained the impugned judgment and decree passed by Single Bench dismissing suit filed by the appellant---Appeal was dismissed. Muhammad Shah v. The State 2010 SCMR 1009; Mukhtar Ahmad v. The State 2003 SCMR 1374; Yahya Bakhtiar, Advocate v. The State PLD 1983 SC 291; Muhammad Afzal v. Muhammad Altaf Hussain 1986 SCMR 1736; Pir Mazhar ul Haq v. The State PLD 2005 SC 63 and Abid Ali v. The State 2022 PCr.LJ 1088 ref. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S. 5 & First Sched., Art. 151---Delay in filing appeal against judgment passed by Single Bench of High Court---Condonation of delay---Sufficient cause, absence of---The time limit for filing an appeal prescribed under Art. 151 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is twenty (20) days, starting from the date of the decree or order of a High Court passed in exercise of its original jurisdiction---The instant High Court Appeal was overdue by five (5) days, while appellant in an application seeking condonation of the delay cited his wife's illness as the reason for the late filing, however, no documentary evidence such as medical records confirming her illness or supporting his claim was provided along with the application initially---Later on, the appellant presented a statement (annexing medical prescription / certificate etc.) yet the same (statement) was neither sworn nor accompanied by the said partner's affidavit---Therefore, said reason could not be considered a sufficient cause or a compelling ground for justifying the delay---Importantly, the delay in filing the High Court Appeal had vested rights in the respondent, which could not be disregarded unless the defaulting party (i.e. Appellant) demonstrated sufficient cause and explained each day's delay---Consequently, the delay in filing present HCA could not be condoned---Appellant's application for condonation of delay was dismissed---High Court Appeal was time barred---Division Bench of the High Court maintained the impugned judgment and decree passed by Single Bench dismissing suit filed by the appellant---Appeal was dismissed. KSKB-KNK Joint Venture v. Water and Power Development Authority 2022 SCMR 1615 ref. Kazim Hussain Mahesar for Appellant. Mehmood A. H. Baloch for Respondent. Date of hearing: 29th May, 2024.

Summary: Summary pending