Summary: (Against the order dated 07.03.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in C.R. No. 274 of 2017). Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S.12---Specific performance of agreement to sell---Agreement---Proof---All pages not signed/thumb impressed---Suit filed by appellant/plaintiff was dismissed by High Court as first page of the agreement did not contain signatures and thumb impression---Validity---If first page of agreement was taken out of consideration, as it did not contain signatures/thumb impressions of any of the parties as well as of the witnesses, the suit for specific performance could not be decreed---Supreme Court declined to interfere in findings of High Court which were the result of thorough examination of documentary as well as oral evidence---Appeal was dismissed. Qadir Bukhsh, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (via video link from Lahore). Muhammad Yasin Hatif, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link from Lahore). Date of hearing: 2nd January, 2025.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code ( V of 1898 )--- ----S. 498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.302, 324, 147, 148, 149 & 337-H(2)--- Qatl-i-amd, attempt to qatl-i-amd, unlawful assembly, hurt---Pre-arrest bail, refusal of---Sufficient incriminating material, availability of--- Mala fide, absence of---Allegation against the applicant was that he along with co-accused, armed with hatchet, came at the scene of offence and caused a sharp side hatchet blow to deceased on his neck---Contention of the applicant wasthat mother of deceased recorded her statement under S.161, Cr.P.C, wherein she exonerated the applicant from the commission of the alleged offence---Validity---Though there was delay of five (05) hours in lodging of FIR, but the complainant had well explained the delay in his FIR on the ground that she shifted the deceased and injured to hospital for treatment and after getting postmortem, she lodged the FIR of the alleged incident--- Applicant was nominated in the FIR with specific role of causing sharp side hatchet injury on the neck of deceased--- Per postmortem report, injury No.2, which was attributed to the applicant, was sufficient for cause of death---During investigation, prosecution witnesses had supported the case of complainant in their statements under S.161, Cr.P.C.---Record did not show that name of applicant was placed in column No. II in the interim challan nor in the final challan---Even otherwise, opinion of the police officer was not binding on the Courts---Sufficient material was available on the record, which connected the applicant to the alleged offence, which carried capital punishment---Mother of deceased was not eye-witness of the case, and she had even exonerated the applicant---Concession of pre-arrest bail cannot be allowed to an accused person unless the Court feels satisfied about seriousness of the accused person's assertion regarding his intended arrest being actuated by mala fide on the part of the complainant party or the local police---No case of extra ordinary relief was made out--- Ad-interim pre-arrest bail earlier granted to the applicant was recalled---Pre-arrest bail was declined to accused, in circumstances. Mukhtar Ahmad v. The State and others 2016 SCMR 2064; Gulshan Ali Solangi and others v. The State through P.G Sindh 2020 SCMR 249; Abdul Aziz Memon v. The State 2020 SCMR 313 and Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited through President and others v. Sarfraz Khan Jadoon and others 2021 SCMR 1305 ref. Manzoor Hussain N. Larik for Applicant along with applicant. Fida Hussain Sahito for the Complainant along with Complainant. Khalil Ahmed Maitlo, Deputy Prosecutor General along with SIP/IO Rab Nawaz Manganhar of Police Station Setharja for the State. Order Shamsuddin Abbasi, J .--- Applicant Roshan son of Khuda Bux Gadehi seeks pre-arrest bail in FIR No. 162/2023 of Police Station Sobhodero for an offence under Sections 302, 324, 147, 148, 149, 337-H(2), P.P.C after rejection of his bail plea by learned trial Court vide order dated 11.06.2024. It is alleged in the FIR that applicant along with co-accused, armed with hatchet, came at the scene of offence and caused a sharp side hatchet blow to deceased Ashique Ali on his neck. 2. Learned Counsel for the applicant submits that applicant is innocent and he has been falsely implicated in this case due to mala fide intention and ulterior motives; that there is a civil dispute between the parties and he has purchased an agricultural land, whereby complainant party was annoyed with the applicant and, due to that civil dispute, he has been implicated; that during investigation, applicant was found innocent and his case was recommended to place him in column No. II of the challan sheet. At this juncture, learned Counsel for the applicant requests for adjournment on the ground that he wants to file some documents before this Court. Record shows that applicant was admitted on interim pre-arrest bail vide order dated 30.09.2024 and matter was adjourned for one or the other reason on 28.10.2024, 18.11.2024, 02.12.2024 and 30.12.2024. Counsel for the applicant still needs time to file some documents. Request of Counsel for the applicant is unjustified; therefore, his request for adjournment is turned down. 3. Learned Deputy Prosecutor General assisted by learned Counsel for the complainant submits that applicant is nominated in the promptly lodged FIR with specific role of causing sharp side hatchet blow to deceased Ashique Ali on his neck, and ocular version is corroborated by medical evidence. He further submits that PWs have supported the case of prosecution in their statements and applicant has not joined the investigation and question of recovery of crime weapon is involved; and applicant remained absconder for six months after rejection of his pre-arrest bail, therefore, his custody may be handed over to Investigating Officer to recover the alleged crime weapon. He has relied upon the case reported as 2022 SCMR 267, 2022 SCMR 363 and 2023 SCMR 1724. 4. Heard learned Counsel for the applicant, learned Counsel for the complainant, learned Deputy Prosecutor General, and perused the material available on record. 5. There is delay of five (05) hours in lodging of FIR as the alleged incident took place on 05.11.2023 at 06:00 pm, whereas, the FIR has been lodged on same day at 11:15 pm, but complainant has well explained the delay in his FIR on the ground that she shifted the deceased and injured Ghulam Rasool to hospital for treatment and, after getting postmortem, she lodged the FIR of the alleged incident. Applicant is nominated in the FIR with specific role of causing sharp side hatchet injury on the neck of deceased Ashique Ali. Per postmortem report, injury No.2, which is attributed to the applicant, is sufficient for cause of death. During investigation, prosecution witnesses have supported the case of complainant in their statements under Section 161, Cr.P.C. Record does not show that name of applicant was placed in column No. II in the interim challan nor in the final challan. Even otherwise, opinion of the police officer is not binding on the Courts. Sufficient material is available on the record, which connects the applicant in the alleged offence, which carries capital punishment. 6. Counsel for the applicant has mainly contended that mother of deceased Ashique Ali recorded her statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C, wherein she exonerated the applicant from the commission of the alleged offence, however, he admits that mother of deceased is not eye-witness of the case. Contention raised by Counsel for applicant on this aspect of the case amounts to be the deeper appreciation, which cannot be considered at this stage. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mukhtar Ahmad v. The State and others (2016 SCMR 2064) has observed that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that the concession of pre-arrest bail cannot be allowed to an accused person unless the Court feels satisfied about seriousness of the accused person's assertion regarding his intended arrest being actuated by mala fide on the part of the complainant party or the local police. Similar view was taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Gulshan Ali Solangi and others v. The State through P.G. Sindh (2020 SCMR 249), Abdul Aziz Memon v. The State (2020 SCMR 313) and Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited through president and others v. Sarfraz Khan Jadoon and others (202: SCMR 1305). 7. No case of extra ordinary relief is made out. At the request of learned Deputy Prosecutor General, the applicant is taken into custody. His custody is handed over to the Investigating Officer for further investigation in accordance with law. Consequently, bail application is dismissed and ad-interim pre-arrest bail earlier granted to the applicant vide order dated 30.09.2024 is hereby recalled. 8. The bail application stands disposed of in the above terms. The observation made hereinabove is tentative in nature and case of applicant would not prejudice at the trial. He may file a post-arrest bail application and the trial Court will decide the same in accordance with law. MQ/R-4/Sindh Bail recalled.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) --- S. 12 --- Specific performance of agreement to sell --- Agreement consisting of multiple pages --- Requirement of valid execution --- Page without signatures or thumb impressions --- Effect. The suit for specific performance was based on an agreement to sell spanning two pages. The first page of the agreement lacked signatures or thumb impressions of both parties and witnesses, while only the second page bore such marks. The Supreme Court held that where the primary (first) page of the agreement does not contain any authenticating signatures or thumb impressions, the document as a whole fails the test of valid execution. The absence of signatures on the first page rendered the agreement legally incomplete, and the suit for specific performance could not be decreed. (b) Civil Procedure --- Evidence --- Documentary evidence --- Execution of agreement --- Burden of proof --- Admissibility and reliability. The Court emphasized that for a party to succeed in a suit for specific performance, it must prove the valid execution of the agreement through credible and consistent evidence. Merely exhibiting signatures on the second page was insufficient where the first page—containing the terms—remained unauthenticated. The burden rested on the plaintiff/appellant to establish that the entire document formed a valid contract binding on both parties, which was not done in this case. (c) Constitutional jurisdiction --- Revision under S. 115, C.P.C. --- Reversal of concurrent findings --- Appraisal of evidence --- Scope of interference. The High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, reversed the concurrent findings of the courts below. The Supreme Court found no legal infirmity in this interference, holding that the High Court had conducted a thorough reappraisal of the documentary and oral evidence and reached a conclusion aligned with settled principles of law. Such revision was within the permissible scope of judicial review. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. High Court judgment upheld. Suit for specific performance dismissed. Suit for cancellation of agreement decreed.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) ---- S. 12—Specific performance of agreement to sell—Proof of agreement—Requirement of signatures/thumb impressions—Effect of unsigned first page Appellant filed suit for specific performance based on a two-page agreement to sell—Trial court decreed partial relief; appellate court granted full decree—However, High Court, in revision, dismissed the suit for specific performance and decreed the counter-suit for cancellation—Supreme Court affirmed High Court’s view—Held, where the first page of the agreement does not bear signatures or thumb impressions of either party or witnesses, and only the second page is signed, the document cannot be treated as a valid contract in law—Partial execution or selective authentication of agreement renders it legally unenforceable—Suit for specific performance rightly dismissed. Principle reaffirmed: Entire document must be signed or acknowledged for specific performance to be decreed. (b) Civil procedure—Appellate and revisional jurisdiction—Scope of interference by Supreme Court Supreme Court declined to interfere with High Court’s findings which were based on proper evaluation of both documentary and oral evidence—Held, where impugned findings are well-reasoned, supported by evidence, and aligned with legal precedent, Supreme Court will not reappraise facts or substitute its own view—Appeal dismissed accordingly. Principle: Concurrent findings based on sound legal reasoning and proper evidence do not warrant interference under Article 185(3) Constitution of Pakistan. Disposition: Appeal dismissed—Findings of High Court upheld—Suit for specific performance found unsustainable due to incomplete execution of agreement—Suit for cancellation decreed on legal grounds.

Summary: (a) Succession Act, 1925: ---- Sections 372 & 373—Issuance of multiple succession certificates—Bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC not applicable ----- The petitioner, the eldest unmarried daughter of a deceased government officer, filed a second application for a succession certificate claiming her share in the family monthly pension. The respondents contested the application, arguing it was barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC as the petitioner had previously obtained a certificate for an amount left in the deceased's bank account. The Supreme Court held that the Succession Act, 1925, being a special law, provides a specific procedure for granting certificates, which does not impose a bar on filing successive applications. The provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC are inapplicable in matters governed by the Act. The court further emphasized that a certificate issued under the Act is limited in scope and does not preclude subsequent claims or proceedings. ----Cited Cases: Lahore Development Authority v. Muhammad Nadeem Kachloo 2006 SCMR 434 (b) Balochistan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1989: ---- Rule 4.10(2) (as amended in 1999)—Entitlement of eldest unmarried daughter to family pension The petitioner claimed entitlement to a share in her late father’s family pension under the amended Rule 4.10(2) of the Balochistan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1989, which provides that the eldest surviving unmarried daughter of a deceased government officer is entitled to receive the family pension until her marriage. The High Court dismissed her claim based on unamended Rules, failing to consider the 1999 amendment. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s decision, relying on outdated rules, constituted an illegality. The case was remanded to the Trial Court to determine the petitioner’s status and entitlement in light of the amended Rules, ensuring the rights of other legal heirs were considered. (c) Succession Act, 1925—Procedural principles: ---- Section 373—Summary proceedings—Determination of prima facie entitlement The Supreme Court highlighted the simplified procedure under Section 373 of the Succession Act, 1925, for granting certificates. Courts must conduct summary proceedings to determine the prima facie entitlement of an applicant while maintaining principles of natural justice. A succession certificate is limited in scope and does not constitute a final adjudication of the parties' rights, allowing subsequent claims. The Trial Court was directed to expedite the matter and decide within 60 days. ----Disposition: The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and set aside the judgments of the High Court, Appellate Court, and Trial Court. The matter was remanded to the Trial Court to determine the petitioner’s entitlement and share in the family pension through summary proceedings.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 337-H(2), 506, 147, 148, 149 & 337-D---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, rash or negligent act to endanger human life or personal safety of others, criminal intimidation, rioting, rioting, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly and jaifah---Pre-arrest bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Delay---Absence of overt act---Existence of previous enmity---No injury ascribed to the applicant---There was unexplained delay of about 06 days in lodging of FIR---Delay in criminal cases has always been deprecated by the superior Courts and held fatal for the prosecution---Although applicant was nominated in the FIR duly armed with pistol, yet he did not cause any injury to the complainant party---Applicant had allegedly accosted the complainant party, which was yet to be established at trial after recording evidence---Injuries allegedly sustained by PWs were attributed to co-accused---Every accused had to face the charge as per evidence and the applicant was alleged to have raised only 'lalkara' to the complainant party, which was still to be proved by the prosecution at trial after recording evidence---Parties had already strained relations on account of dispute over a plot---No complaint was brought on record against the applicant qua misuse of concession of interim pre-arrest bail---Case against the applicant required further inquiry--- Application was accepted and pre-arrest bail granted to the applicant was confirmed, in circumstances. Khalil Ahmed Soomro and others v. The State PLD 2017 SC 730 rel. Akbar Ali Dahar along with Applicant (on bail). Ali Anwar Kandhro, Addl. P.G., for the State. Farooque Ahmed Gaad and Azadi Ali Sher Roongh for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 1st January, 2025. order Muhammad Saleem Jessar, J .--- Through this application, applicant Jinsar Ali son of Mahboob Ali, by caste Chandio, seeks his admission on pre-arrest bail in Crime No.11 of 2024, registered at P.S Seehar, District Larkana for offences under Sections 324, 337-H(2), 506/2, 147, 148, 149 and 337-D, P.P.C Applicant filed anticipatory bail application vide Cr. Bail Appln. No. 1989 of 2024 before the Court of Sessions, which was assigned to learned VI-Additiona Sessions Judge, Larkana, who after hearing the parties, turned down his request vide order dated 26.09.2024, hence this application has bee maintained. 2. The facts of the prosecution case are mentioned in the memo of ba application; therefore, the same need not to be reproduced herein again. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the FIR is delayed f about 06 days without plausible explanation. He next submits that though th applicant is shown armed with pistol; however, has not caused any injury to t complainant party and the allegation against him is of mere accosting which yet to be established by the prosecution after recording evidence; hence submits that case against the applicant requires further enquiry and prays that by granting application in hand, the applicant may be granted pre-arrest bail. 4. Learned Addl. P.G. submits that active role of causing firearm injuries to injured Hamid and Sarfraz is assigned to co-accused Mahboob and Shahbaz, whereas the role of applicant is nothing but of 'lalkara', therefore, case of applicant requires further enquiry and he has no objection if the bail application is allowed. 5. Learned Counsels appearing on behalf of complainant under the cover of statement of today's date have filed photographs of the injured PWs, taken on record; they oppose the bail application, on the ground that the applicant is nominated in the FIR; besides, he was accompanying co-accused Mahboob and Shahbaz, who caused grievous injuries to PWs Hamid and Sarfraz, therefore, the applicant having shared common intention is not entitled for bail. 6. Heard. Record perused. 7. No doubt, the applicant is nominated in the FIR duly armed with pistal: however, it is also an undeniable fact that he did not cause any injury to the complainant party. Per FIR, the applicant had allegedly accosted the complainant party, which is yet to be established at trial after recording evidence of the prosecution witnesses. It is also evident from the FIR that alleged incident occurred on 23.05.2024, whereas the report thereof was lodged on 29.05.2024 i.e. with the delay of about 06 days and no plausible explanation has been furnished by the prosecution for such an inordinate delay. The delay in criminal cases has always been deprecated by the superior Courts and held fatal for the prosecution. The injuries allegedly sustained by PWs Hamid and Sarfraz are attributed to co-accused Mahboob and Shahbaz, of whom, Mahboob is said to be behind bars while Shahbaz is absconding It is settled law that every accused has to face the charge as per evidence and the applicant is alleged to have raised only 'lalkara' to the complainant party, which is still to be proved by the prosecution at trial after recording evidence and then the trial Court has to determine the accusation against him. As admitted by the complainant, the parties are already on strained relations on account of dispute over the plot; hence, malafide on the part of prosecution cannot be ruled out. The case has been challaned and no complaint is brought on record against the applicant regarding misuse of concession of interim pre-arrest bail extended to him. In the circumstances and in view of the dicta laid down by learned Apex Court in the case of Khalil Ahmed Soomro and others v. The State (PLD 2017 SC 730), the case against the applicant requires further enquiry as envisaged under sub-section (2) to Section 497, Cr.P.C. 8. Consequently, instant bail application is hereby allowed. Resultantly, the interim pre-arrest bail granted to the applicant on 03.10.2024 is hereby confirmed on same terms and conditions. 9. The observations recorded above are based on tentative assessment of the material placed on record, which shall not influence the trial Court, in any manner, during the trial. SA/J-2/Sindh Bail confirmed.

Summary: Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013)--- ----S.23(1)(a)---Possession of illegal weapon---Appreciation of evidence---Present case offshoot of another case---Acquittal recorded in other case---Effect---Prosecution case was that an unlicensed pistol with magazine containing 03 live bullets was recovered from the possession of accused---From the perusal of the record it appeared that the recovery shown from the appellant originated from the incident of case for the offence under S.365-B, P.P.C, alleging abduction of wife of complainant of that case by the appellant and his brother on gunpoint in a car---However, due to accident of the car, the appellant was apprehended along with pistol being allegedly carried by him and was produced before police---Record transpired that the Trial Court had acquitted the appellant, mainly for the reason that alleged abductee did not support the prosecution case, stating that no such incident had occurred---Surprisingly, the Trial Court, on one hand, believing the evidence of alleged abductee, acquitted the appellant of the charge of abduction, then the question was on what basis the evidence of mashir/eye-witness, who had produced the appellant before police claiming to have apprehended him along with the weapon after the incident of abduction, was believed---Trial Court had not properly appreciated the entire material and had not applied judicious mind to evaluate/appreciate the facts and circumstances of case in hand---In such circumstances, the other oral and documentary evidence brought on record, was of no effect, rather, the very recovery of offensive weapon became doubtful---Since the appellant had been acquitted from the charge of main case, the propriety of law demanded that the appellant should also be acquitted from the charge of present case, which was offshoot of main case---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Manjhi v. The State PLD 1996 Karachi 345 and Fida Hussain v. The State 2012 PCr.LJ 226 ref. Yasir Chaudhry v. The State 2012 MLD 1315 rel. Abdul Rehman Bhutto and Shakeel Ahmed Abro for Appellant. Ali Anwar Kandhro, Additional Prosecutor General Sindh for the State. Date of hearing: 1st January, 2025. Judgment Muhammad Saleem Jessar, J .--- Through instant criminal appeal, the appellant has called in question the Judgment dated 25.07.2024 (impugned judgment) penned down by learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Kandhkot, vide Sessions Case No.48 / 2024 (re: State v. Mir Nooroze Ali Domki). The case is outcome of Crime No.75/2024, registered at P.S A-Section, Kandhkot, for offence under Sections 23(1)(a) and 25 of Sindh Arms Act, 2013. After recording evidence and determination of points, the trial Court held the appellant guilty of charge under section 25, Sindh Arms Act, 2013, convicted and sentenced him to undergo R.I. for 10(ten) years, and to pay fine of Rs.200,000/-. In case of default, the appellant was directed to undergo S.I. for two years more. However, the benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C was extended to the appellant/ convict. 2. According to the case of prosecution, on 18.03.2024, at about 1200 hours, the appellant was allegedly apprehended by Sadar Ali and Noor Muhammad, both by caste Shaikh, at Daya Muhalla of Kandihkot town and an unlicensed Pistol with magazine containing 03 live bullets was recovered from him; whereafter, they took and handed over the custody of appellant along with recovered weapon and a GLI Car in accidented condition to HC Abdul Jabbar, being duty officer at PS A-Section, Kandhkot, who finding the aforementioned weapon unlicensed sealed it under memo and booked the appellant in this case. Besides, another FIR vide Crime No.74/2024, for offence under section 365-B, P.P.C. was also lodged by one Shaman Ali Shaikh against the appellant at the same police station at 1230 hours. 3. A formal charge was framed against the accused, to which he pleaded 'not guilty' and claimed to be tried. 4. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined and relied upon the evidence of in all five witnesses i.e. complainant/author HC Abdul Jabbar, mashir/eye-witness Noor Muhammad Shaikh, IO/ASI Muhammad Anwar, incharge Malkhana WPC Sadam Hussain and dispatch official PC Niaz Muhammad. They exhibited several documents in their evidence. 5. In his statement under section 342, Cr.P.C, the appellant/accused denied the prosecution case and claimed to be innocent and implicated at the behest of complainant of main case vide Crime No.74/2024. However, neither he examined himself on oath nor produced any witness in his defence. 6. After formulating the points for determination. recording evidence of the prosecution witnesses and hearing counsel for the parties, trial Court vide impugned judgment convicted and sentenced the appellant / accused, as stated above. Against said judgment, the appellant has preferred instant appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the offensive weapon was foisted upon the appellant at the behest of complainant of main case Crime No.74/2024. He further submits that the appellant has been acquitted of the charge of said main case and this being offshoot case, therefore, the appellant is entitled to be acquitted in this case as well. 8. Learned Addl. Prosecutor General does not support the impugned judgment and submits that since the appellant has been acquitted from charges of above-mentioned main case, therefore he has no objection for grant of instant appeal and acquittal of the appellant in this case in the light of dicta laid down in the cases reported as Manjhi v. The State (PLD 1996 Karachi 345) and Fida Hussain v. The State (2012 PCr.LJ 226). 9. I have heard learned Counsel for the appellant as well as learned Addl. P.G for the State and have perused the material available on the record. 10. From perusal of the record it appears that the recovery shown from the appellant originates from the incident of Crime No.74/2024 lodged by one Shaman Ali Shaikh at same police station for offence under section 365-B, P.P.C. alleging abduction of his wife Mst. Asia on 18.3.2024, at 12.00 o'clock, by the appellant and his brother Sheroz Khan on gunpoint in a car; however, due to accident of the car, the appellant was apprehended along with pistol being allegedly carried by him and was produced before police. From perusal of judgment dated 29.06.2024 rendered in the main case based on Crime No.74/2024, copy whereof is available on record, it appears that the trial Court has acquitted the appellant, mainly for the reason that alleged abductee Mst. Asia did not support the prosecution case, stating that no such incident had occurred. It is surprising to note that the trial Court, on one hand, believing the evidence of Mst. Asia, the alleged abductee of Crime No.74/2024, acquitted the appellant of the charge in said crime, then on what basis the evidence of mashir/eye-witness Noor Muhammad, who had produced the appellant before police claiming to have apprehended him along with the weapon after the incident of Crime No.74/2024, was believed. It appears that the trial Court has not properly appreciated the entire material and not applied judicious mind to evaluate/appreciate the facts and circumstances of case in hand. In such circumstances, the other oral and documentary evidence brought on record, is of no effect: rather, the very recovery of offensive weapon becomes doubtful. 11. Since the appellant has been acquitted from the charge of main case; the propriety of law demands the appellant should also be acquitted from the charge of instant case, which is offshoot of said main case. In this connection reliance may be placed on the case of Yasir Chaudhry v. The State reported in 2012 MLD 1315, wherein it was held by learned Bench of the Lahore High Court as under:- "In the case reported as Manjhi v. The State (PLD 1996 Karachi 345) it has been held that when the accused has been acquitted in the main case, he would become entitled to acquittal in a case which is offshoot of the said case. Same is the position here, as the present lis is an offshoot of the main murder case, so, respectfully following the dictum laid down in the judgment supra, this petition is allowed and the application of the petitioner under section 249-A Cr.P.C. is accepted and the petitioner is acquitted from the charge in case FIR No.17 of 2003 dated 12.1.2003 registered under section 7 of the Surrender of Illicit Arms Act No.XXI of 1991 with Police Station Civil Lines, Bahawalpur." 12. Keeping in view above factual as well as legal position, it can safely be held that the accused / appellant deserves his acquittal in this offshoot case as well. 13. For what has been discussed above, instant Criminal Appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment dated 25.07.2024, handed down by learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Kandhkot, vide Sessions Case No.48 of 2024 (re: State v. Mir Nooroze Ali Domki), being outcome of FIR No.75/2024 registered at Police Station A-Section, Kandhkot, is hereby set aside. Consequently, the appellant is acquitted of the charge. The appellant shall be released forthwith, if his custody is not required in any other case. JK/M-11/Sindh Appeal allowed.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)--- ----Ss. 3, 4, 5, 6 & 7---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 439---Illegal dispossession of property---Appreciation of evidence---Civil litigation---Scope---Allegation against accused/respondents was that they illegally dispossessed the applicant and his brother issuing threats of murder---Complaint filed by the applicant/complainant was dismissed---Validity---Record reflected that the applicant/complainant purchased the subject land from the respondent in November 2020 through a sale agreement dated 20-11-2020, and the possession thereof was handed over to the applicant/complainant at that time on part payment, while the remaining amount was to be paid by the applicant in installments---Execution of the agreement, part payment of consideration amount and the possession in pursuance of the sale agreement was admitted by respondent No 1---Possession of subject land was protected by law, even in cases where full ownership had not yet been transferred---Complainant had been in possession in pursuance of the sale agreement and no clause in the agreement explicitly allowed the respondent to reclaim possession forcibly in case the full payment had not been made---Respondent could not take possession by force---Instead, legal proceedings would have to be initiated---Forceful eviction of the complainant would generally be not permissible under law without a Court order---Record showed that respondent No. 1 filed a suit for declaration, cancellation of agreement, possession and permanent injunction and the applicant also had filed a suit for specific performance of a contract, which was pending adjudication in the Civil Court---As long as the suits were pending, the Trial Court was the proper forum for resolving disputes regarding the terms and conditions of the sale agreement---Taking possession without the Court's order would violate the principle of due process, which ensured that legal disputes were settled through a fair trial, not force or unilateral action---Thus, no one was allowed to take possession by force while the suits were pending in the Court---Respondent must wait for the Court's decision on the matter and any dispossession without the Court's order was illegal and unlawful---Provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, were applicable universally and were not confined solely to cases involving land grabbers or individuals with mala fide intent---Determination of civil rights, ownership, contractual obligations or any other related matters under the pending civil suit remained within the exclusive domain of the civil Court---Findings or directions in the present judgment shall not prejudice or influence the outcome of those proceedings---Civil Court shall independently adjudicate upon the issues before it based on the evidence and arguments presented in accordance with the applicable law, free from any inference drawn from this judgment--- In view of the foregoing, the impugned order of the Trial Court was set aside---Cognizance of the matter was deemed to have been taken under the provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005---Criminal revision petition was disposed of. 2011 YLR 677 and 2020 PCr.LJ 2020 ref. Muhammad Ismail Nizami and another v. Javed Iqbal and another 2016 SCMR 2039; Shaikh Muhammad Naseem v. Mst. Farida Gull 2016 SCMR 1931; Mst. Gulshan Bibi and others v. Muhammad Sadiq and others PLD 2016 SC 769 and Seema Fareed and other's case 2008 SCMR 839 rel. Ghulam Dastghir A Shahani for Applicant. Habibullah G. Ghouri for Respondents. Anwer Ali Kandhro, Additional Prosecutor General Sindh for the State, along with Muhammad Aslam Magsi, Mukhtiarkar Mehar. Date of hearing: 9th October, 2024. Order Khadim Hussain Soomro, J .--- Through this Criminal Revision Application, the applicant has impugned the order dated 28.02.2023, passed by learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Dadu, in Criminal Complaint bearing No.06 of 2023, under Sections 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Illegal Dispossession, Act, 2005 whereby the complaint filed by the applicant/complainant was dismissed. Hence, the applicant prefers this Revision. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the applicant/ complainant has the business of real estate in the local limits of Taluka Mehar while the accused is the feudal lord of the locality. The applicant/complainant purchased landed property bearing survey No. 299 (5-2) and survey No. 308 (1-34), a total area of 6 Acres 36 Ghuntas in Deh Betto Taluka Mehar District Dadu (Subject Land) from the respondent No. 1/accused in November 2020, through sale agreement dated 20-11-2020. The possession of the subject land was handed over to the applicant/complainant at that time on part payment, while the remaining amount was to be paid by the applicant in instalments. In case of failure from either side, the fine amount was fixed. The applicant/complainant spent a huge sum of Rs 70,00 000/ (Rupees Seventy Lacks) on the subject land for levelling and drainage to make it suitable for sale and use for residential purposes. The respondent, Ihsan Ali Khan Jatoi, at first revoked the contract of sale agreement by sending an illegal, illogical and unjustified legal notice, which was adequately replied to by the applicant/complainant as there was no such condition to revoke the sale agreement or by making false pretext delay in the payment of remaining consideration amount and revocation of the contract. However, there was only one security clause for the interest of the seller to claim a fine amount of Rs 50,000,00/ (Rupees Fifty Lacs) in case of default from their side. The complainant paid most of the consideration amount as per terms and conditions settled in the agreement and was waiting for the seller / accused to receive the balance amount outstanding against them and execute the registered sale deed, but the delay was caused by the accused consequently the Flood came which endangered and damaged the whole infrastructure and lives of the people in the locality. On 26-11-2022, at 11 AM when, the complainant, along with his brother Ali Asghar, son of Khan Muhammad Mahessar and Zulfiqar Ali, son of Muhammad Hassan by caste Sodhar resident of village Banhon Sodhar Taluka Mehar, was present at the subject land, then accused Ihsan Ali Khan, son of Abdul Hameed Khan Jatoi, resident of Village Betto Taluka Mehar District Dadu, along with 8 unknown accused persons duly armed with deadly weapons came there, and illegally dispossessed the applicant, and his brother issuing threats of murder that if they ever come again to the subject land, they would face dire consequence. By doing such an act of illegal dispossession, the accused had committed an offence under Section 3(1) of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 (The Act). hence, they were liable to be convicted under Section 3(2) of the Act. The complainant/ applicant approached the trial court to take cognizance of the offence with the following prayers: (A) That this Honourable Court may be pleased to take cognizance of the offence under section 3 of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 and punish the accused for the offence committed by them. (B) That the accused may be directed to hand over vacant possession of the land to the complainant and in case of the failure from the part of accused the concerned SHO may be called and directed to take possession and hand over the same to the complainant. (C) Whatever relief this Honourable Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances. 3. After filing of the complaint, the report from concerned Mukhtiarkar and the SHO PS Mehar was called; meanwhile, the accused, No: 1, appeared through his counsel and submitted objections to the complaint. In the wake of considering the submissions and the reports from concerned Mukhtiarkar and SHO, the trial court passed the impugned order, dated 28-2-2023, wherein the complaint of the complainant was dismissed by the trial court relying on the case law reported in 2011 YLR 677 and 2020 PCr.LJ 2020 (Balochistan). Hence, the instant Revision. 4. Learned counsel for the applicant/complainant submits that the subject land was purchased by the applicant through an agreement to sale dated 20-11-2020, for consideration and possession of the subject land was handed over to him; he further submits that the execution of the sale agreement has not been denied by the respondent/accused; even in the legal notice issued by the respondent which was filed along with the statement filed by learned counsel for the applicant admits the execution of the agreement; the counsel further argue that the applicant has set forth the incident of dispossession which is categorically mentioned in the paragraph No. 09 of his complaint; the counsel refers the legal notice wherein the respondent claim that he has taken the possession back from the applicant, which is not warranted by the law; he further argues that the Mukhtiarkar report demonstrates that the same was prepared by the Tapedar of the beat and not by the Mukhtiarkar; he further reffered to the police report which reveals that statement of the witnesses who supported the compliant. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that, admittedly, the respondent/ accused is an owner of the subject land; that the claim of the applicant on the basis of an unregistered sale agreement, which does not create any right or title in his favour; that the Mukhtiyarkar report also reflects that the respondent No 1 is an owner of the subject property, and he is in possession; as the agreement does not exist and ceased to have any legal effect; therefore the respondent had taken the possession back from the applicant. 6. I have heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant, the respondents, and the learned Additional Prosecutor General. Furthermore, I have meticulously examined the material available on the record. 7. The record reflects that the applicant/complainant purchased the subject land from the respondent in November 2020 through a sale agreement dated 20-11-2020, and the possession thereof was handed over to the applicant/complainant at that time on part payment, while the remaining amount was to be paid by the applicant in instalments. It is worth noting that the execution of the agreement, part consideration amount and the possession in pursuance of the sale agreement admitted by respondent No. 1. The possession of subject land is protected by law, even in cases where full ownership has not yet been transferred. The complainant has been in possession pursuance of the sale agreement, and no clause in the agreement explicitly allows the respondent to reclaim possession forcibly in case the full payment has not been made. The respondent cannot take possession by force. Instead, legal proceedings would have been initiated. Forceful eviction of the complainant would generally not be permissible under law without a court order. This would constitute an illegal act. 8. It is a matter of fact and the record that respondent No. 1 filed a suit for Declaration, Cancellation of agreement, Possession and Permanent Injunction being F.C Suit No. 22 of 2023, and the applicant also has a Suit for Specific Performance of a contract, which is pending adjudication in the court of senior Civil Judge 1 Mehar. As long as the suits are pending, the trial court is the proper forum for resolving disputes regarding the terms and conditions of the sale agreement. Taking possession without the court's order would violate the principle of due process, ensuring that legal disputes are settled through a fair trial, not force or unilateral action. In light of the above principles, no one is allowed to take possession by force while the suits are pending in the court. The respondent must wait for the court's decision on the matter, and any dispossession without the court's order is illegal and unlawful against the law. Reliance can be placed in the case of Muhammad Ismail Nizami and another v. Javed Iqbal and another 2016 SCMR 2039. 9. Another important aspect in the instant matter, which is worth consideration, is that if individuals were allowed to take possession of property by force, it would undermine the rule of law and create chaos in society. Property rights are fundamental to social order, and allowing forceful possession would lead to the erosion of legal protections for property owners and occupiers. People would resort to self-help measures instead of seeking legal resolution through courts, resulting in violence, vigilantism, and widespread disputes. This would erode trust in the legal system, as individuals would no longer feel secure in their rights to property or the protection of those rights guaranteed by the State in the supreme law of the land. Such a shift could destabilize the social and economic framework, as people might hesitate to invest in property or engage in contracts, knowing that their rights could be arbitrarily violated. Overall, it would create an atmosphere of fear, instability, and injustice, harming both individual security and broader societal harmony. 10. At this stage, it is pertinent to refer to the operative portions of the judgment in the case of Shaikh Muhammad Naseem v. Mst. Farida Gull, 2016 SCMR 1931, in which the esteemed Supreme Court has elucidated two key aspects concerning the scope and intent of the Act The operative parts of the judgment are reproduced hereunder:-" "3....As the term 'property grabbers' appearing in the preamble of the Act has been used in general sense, it cannot be identified with any particular category of offenders in order to restrict the scope and applicability of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 to a particular category of offenders. Additional the substantive provision of Illegal Dispossession Act i.e. section 3 expressly uses general term such as 'no one' and 'whoever' for the offender. This clearly indicates that the widest possible meaning is to he attributed to these terms. Thus the provisions of section 3 clearly demonstrate that whosoever commits the Act of illegal dispossession as described in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 against a lawful owner or a lawful occupier, he can be prosecuted under its provisions without any restriction." "5....No one can be allowed to take law in his own hands and unlawfully dispossess an owner or lawful occupier of an immovable property and then seek to thwart the criminal proceedings initiated against him under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 on the pretext that civil litigation on the issue is pending adjudication between the parties in a court of law. Therefore, irrespective of any civil litigation that may be pending in any Court, where an offence, as described in the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, has been committed, the proceedings under the said Act can be initiated as the same would be maintainable in law." 11. The term "lawful occupier", as used in the Act, can be defined in light of Halsbury's Laws of England Volume 27, Paragraph 1,. According to it, a "lawful occupier" implies that a lawful occupier is one who has legal rights or authority over the property. According to Black's Law Dictionary (11th Edition), a lawful occupier is someone with the legal right to occupy or possess a property. This individual or entity is in possession of the property with legal consent or authority, such as through ownership, lease, or valid contractual arrangement. It is not occupying the property in an unlawful or unauthorized manner. In the instant matter, the applicant has occupied the subject land in pursuance of the sale agreement, the execution of which has not been denied by the respondent. 12. The lawful possession is indeed protected under the Transfer of Property Act of 1882. This Act provides legal recognition and safeguards for individuals who possess property under valid ownership or agreements. Several sections of the Act above address the concept of lawful possession, particularly in relation to transfer, rights, and obligations. Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is reproduced as under:- 53-A. Part performance. Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty; and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof or the transferee, being already in possession continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, Then notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by me terms of the contract: Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof". 13. The section described above provides a shield to the transferee in possession under an unregistered agreement to transfer property, protecting them from dispossession by the transferor as long as they fulfil their contractual obligations. The principle underlying the protection of lawful possession is to ensure that individuals in rightful occupation of property are not unjustly evicted or deprived of their rights without following due legal process. 14. Turning to the impugned order, the learned trial court has observed that since the respondent/accused does not belong to the land grabber and land mafia, the provision of the Act is not applicable. In this regard, the authoritative judgment rendered by the Apex Court of Pakistan in the case of Mst. Gulshan Bibi and others v. Muhammad Sadiq and others (PLD 2016 SC 769), it has been unequivocally established that the provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, are applicable universally and are not confined solely to cases involving land grabbers or individuals with mala fide intent. The court clarified that the scope of the Act mentioned above extends to protecting the rights of lawful owners and occupiers against illegal dispossession by any individual, irrespective of their status or intent. Consequently, any undue emphasis placed by the learned trial court on the restraint of the Act to "land grabbers" or "land mafias" constitutes an erroneous interpretation of the law, as such a restrictive construction is neither warranted by the statutory language nor supported by the principles laid down by the apex court of Pakistan. Therefore, the broader protective scope of the Act must be upheld to ensure justice and safeguard the rights of lawful owners and occupiers. 15. Reverting to another observation of the learned trial court suggesting that the applicant should seek remedy exclusively before a civil court due to a civil dispute. This does not preclude the applicant from pursuing concurrent criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court, in multiple judgments, has deliberated on the coexistence of criminal and civil proceedings arising from the same set of transactions, particularly those involving provisions of the criminal law and contractual civil liabilities. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has consistently treated these proceedings as distinct and separate in nature, emphasizing that both can proceed concurrently. This distinction arises from the differing standards of proof and objectives governing criminal and civil matters, where criminal conviction pertains to criminal law consequences, while civil liability addresses compensatory or contractual obligations. In the case of Seema Fareed and others (2008 SCMR 839), the court observed as follows:-" 4. ... Interpretation placed by Honourable, Judge of the High Court on the provisions of the contract as well as the repealing statute does not suffer from any misconception of law or violation of the settled principles laid down by this court. It is well-settled that, a criminal case must be allowed to proceed on its own merits and merely because civil proceedings relating to same transaction have been instituted it has never been considered to be a legal bar to the maintainability of criminal proceedings which can proceed concurrently because conviction for a criminal offence is altogether a different matter from the civil liability. While the spirit and purpose of criminal proceedings is to punish the offender for the commission of a crime the purpose behind the civil proceedings is to enforce civil rights arising out of contracts and in law both the proceedings can co-exist and proceed with simultaneously without any legal restriction." Further reliance can be placed on case titled "Haji Sardar Khalid Saleem v. Muhammad Ashraf and others" (2006 SCMR 1192) and "Muhammad Aslam v. The State and others" (2017 SCMR 390). 16. Before parting with this judgment, it is clarified that the observations made herein are strictly confined to the adjudication of the present criminal proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, and shall have no bearing on the civil proceedings currently pending before the competent civil court. The determination of civil rights, ownership, contractual obligations, or any other related matters under the pending civil suit remains within the exclusive domain of the civil court, and the findings or directions in this judgment shall not prejudice or influence the outcome of those proceedings. The civil court shall independently adjudicate upon the issues before it based on the evidence and arguments presented in accordance with the applicable law, free from any inference drawn from this judgment. 17. In view of the foregoing, the impugned order of the learned trial court is hereby set aside. Cognizance of the matter is deemed to have been taken under the provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act of 2005. The learned trial court is directed to proceed further with the matter expeditiously and preferably decide the same within a period of six months from the date of this order; in accordance with the law, such compliance report shall be submitted through the Additional Registrar of this Court upon conclusion of the proceedings. 18. The instant Criminal Revision application is disposed of in the above terms. JK/N-5/Sindh Order accordingly.