Summary: (a) Limitation--- ----Fiscal laws---Principle of limitation is a crucial component of tax law, designed to ensure certainty, finality, and procedural discipline in legal proceedings---Limitation prescribes statutory time frame within which legal actions, including tax assessments and recovery proceedings must be initiated---Primary objective of limitation laws is to prevent undue delay, eliminate uncertainty and protect taxpayers from indefinite exposure to liability---Principle of limitation in tax law serves as a critical safeguard against arbitrary and indefinite proceedings, ensuring procedural fairness and adherence to statutory mandates---Interpretation of limitation provisions depends on legislative intent and statutory language---Where tax statutes prescribe a definitive time frame using prohibitive or restrictive language, such provisions are deemed mandatory, rendering any action beyond the prescribed period invalid---Such approach prevents tax authorities from exercising unfettered discretion in initiating or concluding proceedings outside the statutory framework. (b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act (XIX of 2022)--- ----S. 71---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act (XXI of 2013), Ss. 40 & 68---Reference---Tax and assessment---Limitation---Adjournment period---Time frame---Dispute was with regard to exclusion of period attributed to taxpayer by seeking adjournments---Validity---Statutory provisions governing exclusion of time due to adjournments sought by taxpayer, are enshrined in Ss. 40(4) & 68(5) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013---Both provisions share similar language in principle but a fundamental distinction exists: provision of S. 68(5) of Finance Act, 2013 explicitly imposes a maximum cap of thirty days on exclusion of time due to such adjournments, whereas provision of S.40(4) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013 does not prescribe any such limitation---Such distinction is pivotal in determining correct computation of limitation period in each case---Appellate Tribunal Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue Authority, while interpreting provisions of Ss. 40 & 68 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, failed to consider that Show Cause Notices issued to taxpayer stemmed from audit, which fell within the ambit of S.40 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, rather than S.68 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013---By applying thirty-day cap on the exclusion of time due to adjournments obtained by taxpayers, the Tribunal had misinterpreted the law---Correct legal approach required the Tribunal to assess the matter under S.40 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013 wherein no such cap was prescribed, and the period consumed due to adjournments sought by taxpayers was to be excluded in its entirety---Reasoning of Appellate Tribunal Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue Authority was flawed as it improperly applied statutory cap to S.40 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013 to adjudication that was only applicable under S.68 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, thereby rendering its decision legally unsustainable---High Court remanded the matter to Appellate Tribunal Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue Authority for reconsideration, as the assessment was made within the prescribed limitation period---High Court directed Appellate Tribunal Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue Authority to re-evaluate the case while duly accounting for all relevant documentation in computing the limitation period in accordance with the applicable provisions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, and where found to be in time, proceed to decide the cases on merit---Reference was allowed in circumstances. Messrs Tri-Star Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Trisa Burstenfabrik AG Triengen and another 2023 SCMR 1502 and Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Office (RTO), Mayo Road, Rawalpindi and another v. Messrs Sarwaq Traders, Adamjee Road, Rawalpindi 2022 SCMR 1333 rel. Barrister Atif Rahim Burki for Petitioner. Imran Javed, Shahid Jan and Nadia Gul for Respondent. Date of hearing: 6th February, 2025. JUDGMENT SYED MUDASSER AMEER, J.- Introduction: 1. This and the connected eight reference applications have been filed by the Director General Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue Authority (DG, KPRA) under Section 71 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022 against similar orders of the same date, i.e., 16.06.2022 raising the same question of law pertaining to limitation for adjudication and interpretation of Sections 40 and 68 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013. Since the same questions of law and interpretation are involved, we intend to decide all the 09 reference applications through this consolidated judgment. 2. The details of the connected reference applications are given below; S. No. Case No. Title 1. Sales Tax Ref. No.95/2022 DG KP Revenue Authority v. M/s Bee Line 2. Sales Tax Ref. No.96/2022 DG KP Revenue Authority v. M/s Haleem Telecom 3. Sales Tax Ref. No.97/2022 DG KP Revenue Authority v. M/s Reyan Telecom 4. Sales Tax Ref. No.98/2022 DG KP Revenue Authority v. M/s Ideal Trader and Developers 5. Sales Tax Ref. No.99/2022 DG KP Revenue Authority v. M/s Jadoon Communications 6. Sales Tax Ref. No.100/2022 DG KP Revenue Authority v. M/s Blue Dot 7. Sales Tax Ref. No. 101 / 2022 DG KP Revenue Authority v. M/s Ashrafia Communication 8. Sales Tax Ref. No.102/2022 DG KP Revenue Authority v. M/s Haroon Traders Facts of the Case: 3. In all these cases, the adjudication was concluded apparently beyond the statutory limitation period prescribed by law. However, if the days attributable to adjournments sought by the taxpayer are excluded from the computation of the prescribed period, the adjudication would then fall within the legally provided timeframe. The determination of whether the adjudication is time-barred thus hinges upon the exclusion of the period of delay caused by the taxpayer's own requests for adjournments, as permissible under the applicable legal provisions. 4. It is also pertinent to highlight that adjudication under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, may be conducted either under Section 40 or Section 68, with each section providing distinct parameters for the exclusion of time attributable to adjournments sought by the taxpayer. The applicability of these provisions directly impacts the computation of the statutory limitation period, thereby determining whether the adjudication falls within the legally prescribed timeframe. Legal Framework: 5. Since the matter involves the interpretation of Sections 40 and 68 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, it is appropriate to reproduce the text of these provisions for ready reference; "40. Assessment of tax.---(1) Where on the basis of any information acquired during an audit, inquiry, inspection or otherwise, an officer of the Authority is of the opinion that a registered person has not paid the tax due on taxable services provided by him or has made short payment, the officer shall make an assessment of the tax actually payable by that person and shall impose a penalty and charge default surcharge in accordance with sections 64 and 65. (2) No order under subsection (1) shall be made unless a notice to show-cause is given to the person in default within five years from the end of the tax period to which the assessment relates specifying the grounds on which it is intended to proceed against him and the said officer shall take into consideration the representation made by such person and provide him an opportunity of being heard if the person so desires. (3) An order under subsection (1), shall be made within one hundred and twenty days of issuance of the show-cause notice or within such extended period as the officer may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, fix: Provided that such extended period shall ordinarily not exceed sixty days. (4) In computing the period specified in subsection (3), any period during which the proceedings are adjourned on account of a stay order or proceedings under section 89 or the time taken through adjournments by the person shall be excluded. (5) An order passed under subsection (1), may be further amended as may be necessary when on the basis of any information acquired during an audit, inquiry, inspection or otherwise, the officer is satisfied that- (a) any tax has been under-assessed or assessed at a low rate; or (b) any taxable service provided by the person has escaped assessment. (6) The Collector may amend, or further amend any order passed under subsection (1) or (5), if he considers that the order is erroneous or prejudicial to interest of Justice. (7) The provisions of subsections (2), (3) and (4) shall be applicable to an order passed under subsections (5) and (6). (8) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Authority may prescribe thresholds, parameters, standards and basis for assessment of supply value and the assessment of tax. ... 68. Recovery of tax not levied or short-levied.---(1) Where by reason of inadvertence, error, misconstruction or for any other reason, any tax or charge has not been levied or has been short levied, the person liable to pay such amount of the tax or charge shall be served with a notice, within three years of the relevant tax period requiring him to show cause for non-payment of the amount specified in the notice. (2) Where by reason of some collusion, abetment, deliberate attempt, mis-statement, fraud, forgery, false or fake documents- (a) any tax or charge has not been paid or is, short paid, the person liable to pay such tax shall be served with a notice within five years of relevant tax period, requiring him to show cause for non-payment of such tax; and (b) Any amount of the tax is refunded which is not due, the person obtaining such refund shall be served with a notice within five years of the receipt of such refund to show cause against the recovery of such refund. (3) The officer shall, after considering the objections of the person served with a notice under subsection (1) or (2) or if the objections are not received within the stipulated period, determine the amount of the tax or charge payable by him and such person shall pay the amount so determined. (4) Any order under subsection (3) shall be made within one hundred and twenty days of issuance of the notice to show-cause or within such extended period as the officer may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, fix provided that such extended period shall not ordinarily exceed sixty days. (5) In computing the period specified in subsection (4), any period during which the proceedings are adjourned on account of a stay order or proceedings under section 89 or the time taken through adjournments by the petitioner not exceeding thirty days, shall be excluded." (Underlining supplied) 6. In the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, Section 40 and Section 68 outline distinct procedures for tax assessment and recovery, each applicable under specific circumstances. Section 40 of the KP Finance Act, 2013 empowers the tax authorities to conduct audits of registered persons to ensure compliance with the Act. If discrepancies or non-compliance are identified during the audit, the authorities can issue an assessment order to recover any unpaid taxes. The process is initiated by a show-cause notice to the taxpayer, and providing an opportunity for the taxpayer to respond before any assessment is finalized. Section 68 on the other hand addresses situations where a taxpayer fails to submit the required tax return. In such instances, the tax authorities are authorized to make an assessment based on the available information and proceed to recover the assessed tax. This provision ensures that tax obligations are enforced even when taxpayers do not fulfill their duty to file returns. 7. The key distinction between Sections 40 and 68 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, lies in their scope, applicability, and procedural framework. Section 40 governs tax assessments that arise from audit proceedings, whereas in contrast, Section 68 pertains to cases where a taxpayer fails to file a tax return within the prescribed timeframe. This fundamental difference dictates how and when each section is invoked. Section 40 applies post-audit, following an investigative process, whereas Section 68 is triggered by non-filing, allowing for an ex parte determination of liability in case no reply/objection is received. 8. A particularly significant procedural distinction arises between subsection (4) of Section 40 and subsection (5) of Section 68, both of which regulate the exclusion of time consumed due to adjournments obtained by the taxpayer in the computation of the statutory limitation period. Section 40(4) provides for an unrestricted exclusion of time for adjournments sought by the taxpayer. This provision reflects the legislative intent to prevent taxpayers from exploiting procedural delays to evade assessment. On the other hand, Section 68(5) imposes a restrictive ceiling, explicitly capping the maximum permissible exclusion of time due to taxpayer-sought adjournments at thirty days. This limitation recognizes the distinct nature of best judgment assessments, balancing administrative efficiency with taxpayer rights. The erroneous application of the thirty-day restriction provided under Section 68(5) to an audit-based assessment under Section 40 not only misconstrues the statutory framework but also frustrates the legislative intent, resulting in a miscalculation of the limitation period and an incorrect legal determination. Therefore, any assessment arising from audit proceedings must strictly adhere to the procedural mechanism outlined under Section 40, and any deviation that introduces an extraneous limitation period warrants judicial correction. Principle of Limitation in Tax Law: 9. The principle of limitation is a crucial component of tax law, designed to ensure certainty, finality, and procedural discipline in legal proceedings. It prescribes the statutory time frame within which legal actions, including tax assessments and recovery proceedings, must be initiated. The primary objective of limitation laws is to prevent undue delay, eliminate uncertainty, and protect taxpayers from indefinite exposure to liability. However, courts have clarified that limitation does not operate in an absolute manner in all circumstances and must be interpreted in light of the governing statute. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case titled Messrs Tri-Star Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Trisa Burstenfabrik AG Triengen and another reported as 2023 SCMR 1502 held that; "7. In order to comprehend the true spirit of any provision, whether it is mandatory or directory, the conception, acumen and stratagem of the Act and the enabling Rules should be considered for proper resolution. If we virtually converse in the differentiation and eccentricity flanked by 'mandatory' and 'directory' provisions, then we have to scrutinize the pith and substance and not exclusively the form. Sometimes a provision in the legislation seems to be mandatory, but substantially it is directory and, inversely, sometimes a provision seems to be directory but in quintessence it is found to be mandatory for compliance therefore, for all practical purposes, it is the fundamental nature which counts and should take preference and affinity more than the form. If a provision gives a power as well as a duty, it is mandatory and the enabling text of law and rules should be interpreted as obligatory so that the underlying principle and raison d'etre is not contravened or flouted. ... 10.5. Province of Punjab through Secretary, Excise and Taxation Department, Lahore and others v. Murree Brewery Company Limited and another (2021 SCMR 305). This Court referred to some foreign precedents that the test to determine whether a provision is directory or mandatory is by ascertaining the legislative intent behind the same. The general rule expounded by this Court is that the usage of the word 'shall generally carries the connotation that a provision in mandatory in nature. However, other factors such as the object and purpose of the statute and inclusion of penal consequences in cases of non-compliance also serve as an instructive guide in deducing the nature of the provision. If the provision is couched in prohibitive or negative language, it can rarely be directory, the use of peremptory language in a negative form is per se indicative of the interest that the provision is to be mandatory." 11. Similarly, in the case titled Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Office (RTO), Mayo Road, Rawalpindi and another v. Messrs Sarwaq Traders, Adamjee Road, Rawalpindi reported as 2022 SCMR 1333, the apex Court while discussing the interpretation of fiscal statues, held; "5. The rationale, as we understand, for prescribing a time frame is to ensure that tax matters be resolved at the earliest, within the relevant tax year, so that the taxpayer satisfies its liability and the Department is able to collect revenue, within the relevant tax year. This is important because taxes pay for public goods and services and is one of the main sources of revenue for the State. Consequently, the intent of the legislature is to obligate the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide the appeal within 180 days. The question is whether this obligation is mandatory or is it directory. We find that its mandatory as the first time frame given under section 45-B(2) is 120 days, which is extendable, meaning that, the Commissioner can exercise discretion and extend the time where required. The only caveat is that reasons have to be given in writing, so that the discretion is not misused and is not exercised arbitrarily. The second time frame under section 45-B(2) is for extending 120 days by 60 days and nothing beyond 60 days. With the help of negative language, the legislature has created an obligation on the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide the appeal in a total of 180 days where the appeal is not decided within 120 days. This obligation renders the section mandatory as the Commissioner (Appeals) cannot go beyond 180 days, as the Commissioner's discretion is curtailed if the time needs to be extended beyond 120 days. Consequently, the obligation fixed on the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide the matter within 180 days is mandatory and not directory. 6. Now, the question is what happens if the Commissioner (Appeals) does not decide the matter within the 180 days. To our mind, since this is a mandatory provision, if a decision is made beyond the 180 days as prescribed under section 45- B(2) of the Act, then such a decision made beyond the prescribed period is an invalid decision. This is because the statute requires the appeal to be decided within 180 days, hence, it has to be decided in the prescribed period. A similar view has already been taken in the case of Messrs Mujahid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Limited v. Customs Appellate Tribunal, Bench-I, Islamabad and others (2019 SCMR 1735) where the provision under consideration was Section 179 of the Customs Act, 1969, which is pari materia to the provisions under consideration under the Act, which reads as follows: "S. 179(3) The cases shall be decided within one hundred and twenty days of the issuance of show-cause notice or within such period extended by the Collector for which reasons shall be recorded in writing, but such extended period shall in no case exceed sixty days." This Court concluded that the understanding of law is for the taxing authority to decide the matter within the prescribed 180 days. In another case, reported as The Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Messrs Super Asia Mohammad Din and Sons and others (2017 SCMR 1427), this Court has held that the ultimate test to determine whether a provision is mandatory or directory is that of ascertaining the legislative intent. The Court found that while the use of the word 'shall' is not the sole factor which determines mandatory or directory nature of a provision, it is certainly one of the indicators of legislative intent. Other factors include the presence of penal consequences in case of non-compliance, but perhaps the clearest indicator is the object and purpose of the statute and the provision in question. The Court concluded that it is the duty of the Court to garner the real intent of the legislature as expressed in the law itself. 7. In this case, the intent of the legislature is clear, to regulate and control the time frame within which an appeal must be decided. The second proviso to section 45-B(2) of the Act limits the discretion of the Court, by providing that the extension period cannot be extended beyond 60 days. The restrictive words used, restricts the powers of the Commissioner and also shows that the intent of the legislature was mandatory and not discretionary. We also note that where the law regulates the manner in which public officials have to exercise power vested in them, then such provisions have to be interpreted in its legislative context. In this case, where the public authority is empowered to create a liability against a taxpayer, then such exercise of power must be performed within the prescribed time. This Court has already dealt with a similar issue on whether a provision is directory or mandatory in the case reported as Province of Punjab through Conservator of Forest, Faisalabad and others v. Javed Iqbal (2021 SCMR 328) where the Supreme Court concluded that the intent of the legislature was relevant and to ascertain if its non-compliance causes injustice or inconvenience. The Court also finds that negative language used in a statute where it imposes a statutory duty on a public official means that the provision is mandatory even if no penalty is prescribed for it." 12. The principle of limitation in tax law serves as a critical safeguard against arbitrary and indefinite proceedings, ensuring procedural fairness and adherence to statutory mandates. The interpretation of limitation provisions depends on legislative intent and statutory language. Where tax statutes prescribe a definitive time frame using prohibitive or restrictive language, such provisions are deemed mandatory, rendering any action beyond the prescribed period invalid. This approach prevents tax authorities from exercising unfettered discretion in initiating or concluding proceedings outside the statutory framework. Analysis of Limitation in Sections 40 and 68: 13. Sections 40(4) and 68(5) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, govern the exclusion of time due to adjournments sought by the taxpayer, yet they contain distinct provisions with significant legal implications. Section 40(4) explicitly stipulates that the entire period consumed due to adjournments sought by the taxpayer shall be excluded from the computation of the prescribed limitation period, without any restriction on the number of days that may be excluded. In contrast, Section 68(5) introduces a specific limitation by capping the maximum period that may be excluded due to adjournments obtained by the taxpayer at thirty days. This distinction is of critical legal significance, as it delineates separate frameworks for the computation of limitation under different proceedings. However, in the present case, the Appellate Tribunal KPRA erroneously applied the thirty-day cap prescribed under Section 68(5) to a matter governed by Section 40, which does not impose any such restriction. This misapplication of law resulted in an incorrect computation of the limitation period, ultimately leading to an erroneous decision. Such an incorrect interpretation not only contravenes the express legislative intent behind these provisions but also vitiates the adjudicatory process, warranting rectification of the legal error. Doctrine of Substantive Justice v. Procedural Compliance: 14. The legal system operates on two fundamental doctrines, Substantive Justice and Procedural Compliance. While both are essential for maintaining the rule of law, they serve distinct purposes and often come into conflict when courts are called upon to decide cases involving procedural irregularities. The Doctrine of Substantive Justice prioritizes fairness, equity, and the real intent behind the law over rigid procedural requirements. It ensures that justice is not denied due to mere technical lapses and emphasizes the actual rights and entitlements of parties rather than their ability to comply with legal formalities. On the other hand, the Doctrine of Procedural Compliance underscores the importance of following established legal procedures to maintain uniformity, predictability, and order in the legal system. It ensures that legal processes remain structured, preventing arbitrary decision-making and upholding the principle that laws must be applied consistently. Procedural rules serve as safeguards against bias, errors, and abuse of power, guaranteeing that all parties are treated equally under the law. However, a rigid application of procedural compliance can sometimes result in injustice, particularly when minor procedural lapses lead to the dismissal of meritorious claims. 15. The tension between these doctrines arises when courts must decide whether to prioritize procedural regularity or substantive justice. In many cases, courts attempt to strike a balance, recognizing that while procedures are necessary for an orderly legal system, they should not become barriers to delivering justice. In the case at hand, the Appellate Tribunal KPRA accepted the taxpayer's appeal by treating the assessment under section 68 instead of section 40, despite the Show-Cause Notice indicating that it was issued as a result of audit proceedings. Strict procedural adherence would necessitate that the assessment be conducted under Section 40 of the KP Finance Act, 2013, as the Show Cause Notice was issued following an audit. However, the Appellate Tribunal's decision to treat the assessment under section 68, which is typically invoked when a taxpayer fails to file a return, suggests a departure from strict procedural norms. Nonetheless, it is crucial to recognize that while Substantive Justice seeks fair outcomes, it should not undermine the importance of Procedural Compliance. Procedures are established to ensure fairness, transparency, and consistency in the application of the law. Deviating from these procedures without compelling justification can lead to unpredictability and may set a precedent that could be misused in future cases. 16. The Appellate Tribunal's misapplication of Section 68(5) to a case governed by Section 40 of the KP Finance Act, 2013 demonstrates a fundamental error in legal interpretation, where procedural compliance was compromised in an attempt to achieve a purportedly fair outcome. However, the doctrine of Substantive Justice cannot be invoked to override clear legislative provisions, particularly where statutory language unambiguously prescribes distinct procedural frameworks. Procedural Compliance serves as the backbone of a just and predictable legal system, ensuring that adjudication is conducted within the bounds of statutory mandates. By imposing a limitation period that does not exist under Section 40, the Tribunal departed from the express intent of the law, thereby undermining the legitimacy of the adjudicatory process. Correcting this error is essential not only to uphold legal certainty but also to reinforce the principle that justice must be administered within the confines of the law, rather than through an erroneous application of equitable considerations. Consequently, the Tribunal's decision warrants reversal to restore procedural and legal correctness. Conclusion and Decision: 17. The upshot of the above discussion is that the statutory provisions governing the exclusion of time due to adjournments sought by the taxpayer are enshrined in Sections 40(4) and 68(5) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013. Although both provisions share similar language in principle, a fundamental distinction exists: Section 68(5) explicitly imposes a maximum cap of thirty days on the exclusion of time due to such adjournments, whereas Section 40(4) does not prescribe any such limitation. This distinction is pivotal in determining the correct computation of the limitation period in each case. 18. The Appellate Tribunal KPRA, while interpreting Sections 40 and 68 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, failed to consider that the Show-Cause Notice issued to the taxpayer stemmed from an audit, which falls within the ambit of Section 40 rather than Section 68 of the said Act. Consequently, by applying the thirty-day cap on the exclusion of time due to adjournments obtained by the taxpayer, the Tribunal has misinterpreted the law. The correct legal approach required the Tribunal to assess the matter under Section 40, wherein no such cap is prescribed, and the period consumed due to adjournments sought by the taxpayer is to be excluded in its entirety. Thus, the Tribunal's reasoning is flawed as it improperly applied a statutory cap to section 40 adjudication that is only applicable under Section 68, thereby rendering its decision legally unsustainable. 19. When the findings of the Appellate Tribunal are examined in light of the correct interpretation of the relevant legal provisions, it becomes evident, albeit based on the limited documentation available, that the assessment was made within the prescribed limitation period. Thus, for the reasons stated above, the instant reference applications are allowed, and the matter is remanded to the Appellate Tribunal KPRA for reconsideration. The Tribunal is directed to re-evaluate the case while duly accounting for all relevant documentation in computing the limitation period in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, and where found to be in time, proceed to decide the cases on merit. MH/66/P Case remanded.

Summary: Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 21(2) & 21(5) [as inserted by the Finance Act, 2024]---Sales Tax Rules, 2006, R. 12---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Issuance of notice by tax Authority---Assailing of notice by filing suit---Temporary injunction, seeking of---Factual controversies---Right of appeal, availability of---Effect---Registered person / Company (plaintiff) filed suit, invoking original jurisdiction of High Court, to challenge a 'pre-suspension notice' issued to plaintiff by the Commissioner-Inland Revenue ('Commissioner') for initiating suspension/blacklisting proceedings ('impugned notice')---Plaintiff prayed for a temporary injunction to restrain the Commissioner from taking coercive action against the plaintiff---For seeking temporary injunction, grounds taken by the petitioner / plaintiff (registered person) included that the impugned notice was without the signature of the Commissioner, which was received when date of hearing had passed, and that the allegation in the impugned notice that the petitioner / plaintiff made purchases from suspended or blacklisted vendors was belied by the tax profile of those vendors which showed that at the relevant time those vendors were not suspended nor blacklisted---Validity---The impugned (pre-suspension ) notice was essentially a notice to show-cause against suspension of sales tax registration---It was a precursor to blacklisting proceedings---By virtue of subsection (5) of S. 21 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which had been inserted by the Finance Act, 2024, a remedy was now available to the Plaintiff before the Chief Commissioner in the event an order of suspension was passed against the plaintiff/ petitioner---Excepting a jurisdictional defect, a Court of law did not ordinarily interfere with a show-cause notice issued by a statutory authority lest such interference stifled the exercise of fact-finding and provided an escape from special statutory proceedings and remedies---The grounds urged by petitioner / plaintiff for interference were based on the facts of the case and did not relate to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner in issuing the impugned notice---Said facts had been laid by the petitioner / plaintiff before the Commissioner who had yet to pass any order thereon---The temporary injunction sought in effect required (this/High) Court to determine facts instead of the Commissioner---Petitioner /plaintiff did not bring forth any exception for interfering with the impugned notice---Application for grant of temporary injunction, was dismissed, in circumstances. Taimur Ali Mirza for Plaintiff. Nemo. for Defendants. Date of hearing: 21st January, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 12.04.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in S.T.R. No. 5 of 2014). Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss.7, 8 (1)(d), 21, 47 & 73---Input tax adjustment---Invoices---Proof---Subsequent blacklisting of suppliers---Authorities denied adjustment of input tax on the ground that invoices relied upon by respondent/taxpayer were issued by the suppliers who had later been blacklisted---Validity---Authorities failed to provide any concrete evidence indicating that invoices were issued to respondent / taxpayer during any period of suspension or blacklisting---At the time purchases were made, the suppliers involved were neither blacklisted nor inactive---Payments for such purchases were processed through legitimate banking channels, adhering to procedures delineated in section 73 of Sales Tax Act, 1990---If a transaction was conducted while the suppliers were active and duly registered, invoices issued were not automatically invalidated by a subsequent black listing or suspension of the suppliers---Denial of refunds could not be justified solely based on lateral black listing of a supplier---All purchases according to Section 21(3) of Sales Tax Act, 1990 including the respondent/taxpayer, who procured goods before suppliers' registration were suspended or they were blacklisted, and who complied with the conditions outlined in section 73 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 were entitled to claim an adjustment of input tax---Demand raised by the Deputy Commissioner of Inland Revenue was unjustified, and as such it was rightly set aside by subsequent higher forums that reviewed the matter, affirming position of respondent/taxpayer---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused. Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondent. Date of hearing: 16th January, 2025.

Summary: (a) Customs Law – Jurisdiction of Directorate General Intelligence & Investigation (DG I&I) – Authority to Seize Goods ----DG I&I is not empowered to seize goods on the basis of non-application of a valuation ruling or alleged short payment of customs duties, sales tax, or income tax----Jurisdiction of DG I&I is limited to preventing smuggling and detaining goods liable to confiscation under Sections 15 and 16 of the Customs Act, 1969----Misdeclaration related to valuation or intended use does not, by itself, render goods liable to seizure under Section 168 of the Customs Act. Cited Cases: M/s Meerab Enterprises vs. Federation of Pakistan (2021 PTD 1764) Saadat Khan vs. Federation of Pakistan (2014 PTD 1615) Shahzad Ahmed Corporation vs. Federation of Pakistan (2005 PTD 23) (b) Customs Valuation – Application of Valuation Ruling – Section 32 of the Customs Act ----Non-application of a valuation ruling issued under Sections 25 and 25A of the Customs Act does not amount to misdeclaration under Section 32----Valuation rulings are valid for a limited period (90 days), and reliance on outdated rulings for assessing duty and taxes is unlawful----No penal proceedings can be initiated under Section 32(1) solely based on non-application of a valuation ruling. Cited Cases: S.T. Enterprises vs. Federation of Pakistan (PTCL 2009 CL 330) Sadia Jabbar vs. Federation of Pakistan (2018 PTD 1746) Messrs Ayesha Impex vs. Federation of Pakistan (2012 PTD 1) (c) Customs Adjudication – Confiscation of Goods – Requirement of Conviction ----Customs officials, including the Additional Collector (Adjudication), cannot order confiscation of goods under Section 180 read with Section 32(1) of the Customs Act without a prior conviction by a Special Judge under Section 185----Confiscation is a penalty and cannot be imposed through executive action without due process and judicial determination. Cited Cases: Muhammad Yasin vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2012 SC 132) Muhammad Ashraf Tiwana vs. Pakistan (2013 SCMR 1159) (d) Assessment of Sales Tax and Income Tax by Customs Authorities – Lack of Jurisdiction ----Customs authorities are not empowered to assess or recover alleged short levies of sales tax or income tax under Section 179(1) read with Section 32(2) of the Customs Act once goods have been cleared and are out of charge----Such assessments fall exclusively within the domain of the Inland Revenue authorities under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Cited Cases: Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd. vs. Federation of Pakistan (2019 PTD 353) Nestle Pakistan Ltd. vs. Federal Board of Revenue (2023 PTD 527) (e) DG I&I’s Role as an Intelligence Agency – Limited Authority in Post-Clearance Cases ----DG I&I’s functions are limited to intelligence gathering and targeted anti-smuggling operations----It does not have the authority to conduct post-clearance audits or reassessments once customs duties and taxes have been assessed and goods have been released. Cited Cases: Shahzad Ahmed Corporation vs. Federation of Pakistan (2005 PTD 23) Saadat Khan vs. Federation of Pakistan (2014 PTD 1615) Disposition: Petition allowed. The impugned seizure report, recovery notice, and show cause notice were declared void ab initio. The security deposited for the release of goods was ordered to be refunded immediately.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 3(2)(b) & 10---SRO 180(I)/2011, dated 05.03.2011---Sales tax refund, denial of---Record, absence of---Effect---Case of the company (registered person), dealing in the sale of tea and spices, being that it had charged sales tax (output) at the reduced rate in view of SRO 180(I)/2011 dated 05.03.2011 ('SRO 180'), therefore, it was required to refund the sales tax paid by it as input---The findings of the Assessing Officer declining refund claim were upheld by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) as well as by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue on the ground that the registered person (petitioner) could not produce sufficient record for verification of the claim---Validity---Record showed that the recipient could not be traced nor the statement of account presented by the petitioner could verify the fact that the petitioner had charged a reduced rate of sales tax at the time of sale---Thus, said question of fact had been rightly determined by all fora against the petitioner, which did not call for interference in view of the limited jurisdiction of the High Court---Thus, the proposed question was answered in favour of Department and against the Applicant (Company /Registered Person)---Reference Application, filed by registered person, was disposed off accordingly. Messrs Zarghoon Zarai Corporation v. Collector of Customs and another 2006 PTD 534; Pak Suzuki Motors Co. Ltd., Karachi v. Collector of Customs. Karachi 2006 PTD 2237; Collector of Customs v. M/s. Noman Chugtai 2007 PTD 153; M/s. Ittehad Textile Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Collector of Sales Tax Collectorate of Sales Tax and Central Excise, Faisalabad 2007 PTD 663; Assistant Collector of Customs, Sambrial Dry Port Sialkot v. M/s. Al-Badar Poultry Farms, Wazirabad 2004 PTD 2683 and M/s B.P. Industries, Karachi and others v. The Additional Collector of Customs, Sales Tax and Central Excise (Adjudication) and another 2008 PTD (Trib.) 36 ref. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 2(37), 10 & 33 (11)---SRO 180(I)/2011 dated 05.03.2011---Malafide intention, absence of---Penalty, imposition of---Scope---The findings of the Assessing Officer, declining refund along with imposing penalty, were upheld by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) as well as by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue on the ground that the registered person (company/petitioner) could not produce sufficient record for verification of the claim---Validity---Imposition of penalty would only be attracted when the person with mala fide intention presents a forged document in support of his claim, however, in the present case, the claim of the petitioner cannot be considered as to be based on mala fide for the obvious reasons that at the relevant time, the SRO 180(I)/2011 dated 05.03.2011 was in vogue allowing the refund of sales tax, and mere fact that the petitioner could not establish its claim before the Assessing Officer by producing the relevant record which the Assessing Officer himself had confirmed that the same is/was a cumbersome job; therefore, mala fide cannot be attributed to the petitioner, hence, the imposition of penalty was not legal---Thus, the proposed question was answered in favour of Applicant (Company /Registered Person)---Reference Application, filed by registered person, was disposed of accordingly. Messrs D.G. Khan Cement Company Ltd. and others v. The Federation of Pakistan and others 2004 SCMR 456 = 2004 PTD 1179 ref. Isaac Ali Qazi for Petitioner. Qaiser Abbas Bangash for Respondents. Date of hearing: 20th November, 2024.

Summary: (a) Criminal Law – Sales Tax Fraud – Bail Granted –– ---- Sales Tax Act, 1990 – Sections 2(37), 33, 37A(4) – FIR Alleging Tax Fraud – Petitioner, a bank manager, was arrested for allegedly aiding and abetting tax fraud by facilitating the opening of accounts for a taxpayer accused of tax fraud of Rs. 3.2 billion – Held, no material was placed on record to establish the petitioner’s role in tax fraud – Mere account opening does not constitute aiding and abetting tax fraud under Section 2(37) of the Sales Tax Act – Bail granted. (b) Tax Law – Criminal Proceedings – Prerequisite of Tax Assessment –– ---- Determination of tax liability under Section 11 of the Sales Tax Act – Held, before initiating criminal proceedings for tax fraud, it is a mandatory requirement that the taxpayer’s liability must be assessed under Section 11 of the Sales Tax Act – No criminal liability can arise until tax due has been determined – Arrest before such determination is unlawful – Reliance placed on Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. FBR (2014 PTD 1807), affirmed by the Supreme Court (Order dated 04.12.2024). (c) Criminal and Civil Proceedings – When They Can Proceed Simultaneously –– ---- Guiding principles on concurrent proceedings – Held, civil and criminal proceedings can run simultaneously only when criminal liability is independent of civil adjudication – In tax fraud cases, criminal liability arises only after tax liability has been established through civil adjudication under Section 11 of the Sales Tax Act – Principle reaffirmed in Muhammad Akbar vs. The State (PLD 1968 SC 281) and Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. FBR (2014 PTD 1807). (d) Fundamental Rights – Abuse of Authority by Tax Authorities –– ---- Articles 9, 10A, 14, 25 of the Constitution – Due Process and Liberty – The tax department initiated criminal proceedings against the petitioner despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. – Held, this amounted to an abuse of authority, undermining the petitioner’s fundamental rights to liberty, dignity, equality, and due process – Arrest and detention declared unlawful. (e) Judicial Criticism – Failure of Lower Courts to Apply Settled Law –– ---- Remand and Bail Decisions – Judicial Oversight Criticized – Held, both the Magistrate granting remand and the Court denying bail failed to apply the settled legal principles regarding tax fraud under Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. – Instead of protecting the petitioner’s rights, they acted as enablers of the tax department’s unlawful actions – Trial court directed to reconsider legality of the criminal proceedings. (f) Directive to FBR – Circulation of Judgment –– ---- FBR Ordered to Ensure Compliance with Law – Chairman FBR directed to circulate the judgment of the Lahore High Court in Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. and this Court’s order to all tax officials within its territorial jurisdiction – Warning issued that any further criminal proceedings in violation of Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. would expose the FBR and tax officers to penal consequences for abuse of power. Disposition: ---- Bail granted – Petitioner admitted to bail on furnishing surety of Rs. 100/- – FBR directed to ensure compliance with the law laid down in Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. – Warning issued against future abuse of power by tax officials.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 3---Suppression / concealment in sales tax record---Allegations raised in Show-Cause Notice---Order passed beyond the allegation in show-cause notice---Certain aspects controverted by the taxpayer---Effect---Further inquiry, requirement of---Scope---During interim scrutiny of monthly sales tax record, on account of certain discrepancies found in the results declared by the Taxpayer / Association of Persons (AOP), a Show-Cause Notice was issued, which culminated in passing of order-in-original against the taxpayer, which was maintained upto Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue ('the Tribunal')---Submission of the applicant / taxpayer was that the fora below had travelled beyond the allegations voiced and raised in the Show-Cause Notice whereas substantial grounds were raised by it in response to allegations mentioned in Show-Cause Notice---Validity---Where, in response to a Show-Cause Notice, the taxpayer raises substantial grounds or presents significant factual aspects not covered in the initial notice and which therefore require further inquiry or verification by the Department, a fresh or supplementary Show-Cause Notice should be issued to the taxpayer, if necessary, after conducting such further inquiry---No determination can be made regarding these new grounds or facts unless the taxpayer is given the opportunity to respond to any deficiencies or misrepresentations found in relation thereto, with such issues specifically alleged in a fresh or supplementary Show-Cause Notice---Therefore, it would be appropriate that, instead of proceeding under the original Show-Cause Notice, a fresh or supplementary notice be issued to the taxpayer in light of the defence presented---In light of the grounds or facts raised in the taxpayer's defence, which were unknown to the tax authorities and thus not part of the original Show-Cause Notice, no further action should be taken under the initial notice---Any adjudication on these grounds would be legally unsustainable, rendering the entire process redundant---Charges or allegations in a Show-Cause Notice must be specific, otherwise, the taxpayer would be prejudiced and denied the right to a fair trial---Adjudicating Authority must confine the proceedings to the specific charges and allegations clearly stated in the Show-Cause Notice---Adjudicating a charge or allegation not addressed in the notice would not be legally valid---In the present case, after the taxpayer's response to the Show-Cause Notice, the new situation that emerged should have been addressed through a fresh Show-Cause Notice, but this was not done---Rationale for not exceeding the scope of the Show-Cause Notice is that the aggrieved party must be given the chance to present their case; otherwise, this would violate the principles of natural justice, as the aggrieved party would not be aware of the new grounds or factual elements and would not be able to properly defend itself before the concerned authority---Reference Application, filed by taxpayer , was allowed. Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs RYK Mills 2023 SCMR 1856; Commissioner Inland Revenue, Chenab Zone, RTO, Faisalabad v. Messrs Rose Food Industries, Faisalabad and another 2023 SCMR 2070; Hyderabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry (HCCI) through duly authorized person v. Ministry of Commerce Government of Pakistan through Directorate General of Trade Organization and 4 others PLD 2024 Isl. 350; Ramlala v. State of U.P. and others 2023 SCC OnLine (All) 2479; Associated Switch Gears and Projects v. State of U.P. and others 2024:AHC:12780 and The Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P. v. Kunari Chitra Srivastava (1970) 1 SCC 121 ref. (b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)--- ----S. 24-A---Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), S. 3---Suppression / concealment in sales tax record---Allegations raised in Show-Cause Notice---Certain aspects of Show-Cause Notice controverted by the taxpayer---Effect---Speaking order, passing of---Order-in-Original against the taxpayer / Association of Persons (AOP) was maintained upto Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue ('Appellate Tribunal')---Validity---Record revealed that the Appellate Tribunal had not independently addressed the material aspect of the matter---As a result, the impugned order passed by the Appellate Tribunal failed to meet the requirements of a speaking order as contemplated under S. 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897---It was obligatory for the Appellate Tribunal to examine the case with proper application of mind and to provide reasons in support of the impugned order---However, such reasoning was conspicuously absent in the present case, rendering the impugned order unsustainable in the eyes of the law---Reference Application, filed by taxpayer, was allowed. Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), WAPDA House, Lahore v. The Commissioner Inland Revenue and others 2022 SCMR 824 ref. Shahbaz Butt for Applicant. Shahid Sarwar Chahil for Respondents. Date of hearing: 11th December, 2024.

Summary: (a) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal taxation laws---Authority seeking to impose a tax must first establish that the individual is liable to taxation through clear language of the statute. Muhammad Uneeb Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Science and Technology, Islamabad and others 2019 MLD 1347; Mir Shabbir Ali Khan Bijarini and 3 others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2018 Sindh 603; National Electric Power Regulatory Authority v. Faisalabad Electric Supply Company Limited 2016 SCMR 550; Sunbiz Private Limited (7 News TV Pakistan) through Abbas Ali Khan v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Information and 3 others 2018 YLR 1785; Ahmad Mehmood v. Government of Punjab through Chief Secretary and others PLD 2019 Lah. 206; Whitney v. IR Commissioners (1926) 10 TC 88 and H.M. Extraction Ghee and Oil Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and another v. Federal Board of Revenue and another 2019 SCMR 1081 rel. (b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Professions, Trades and Callings Tax Rules, 1991--- ----R.10---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions Reforms Act (IV of 2015), S. 3---Professional tax---Deduction at source---Quantum of tax---Petitioners were aggrieved of deduction / withholding of professional tax directly from their salaries and had also assailed quantum of the tax so deducted---Validity---Professional tax is not tax on income but a tax on profession---Wisdom of Legislation quantifying tax cannot be substituted by High Court, which is otherwise not confiscatory---Two different modes were provided under R. 10 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Professions, Trades and Callings Tax Rules, 1991, for deduction / withholding of advanced tax; one from civil servant and the other from the person who were in employment of companies or statutory bodies---One petitioner was an employee of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions, whereas the other two were civil servants---Petitioners were liable to impost of professional tax and the same had been rightly recovered from their salaries in the manner as provided under Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Professions, Trades and Callings Tax Rules, 1991---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Province of Punjab through Secretary, Excise and Taxation. Government of Punjab and others v. Sargodha Textile Mills Ltd., Sargodha and others PLD 2005 SC 988; Pearl Continental Hotel and another v. Government of N.W.F.P. and others PLD 2010 SC 1004; Collector of Customs, Sales Tax and Central Now Federal Excise Quetta v. Messrs Haji Mehmood Essa Co. and another 2017 SCMR 884; Shahtaj Sugar Mills Ltd. and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance and others 2024 SCMR 1656; Black's Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition), page 1329; Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Eleventh Revised Edition), page 1145; Black's Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition), page 1629; Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Eleventh Revised Edition), page 199 and Black's Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition), page 566 rel. (c) Words and Phrases--- ----Profession---Meaning. Employees State Insurance Corporation cum Medical Officers Association v. Employees State Insurance Corporation and another AIR 2014 SC 1259 rel. Qazi Jawad Ehsanullah for Petitioner. Adnan Ali, A.A.G. along with Yasir Ali for Respondents. Date of hearing: 20th November, 2024.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 48---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 10-A & 199---Reference application already filed by registered person---Notice of recovery, assailing of---Constitutional jurisdiction---Scope---Alternate remedy, availability /availing of---Effect---Case of the petitioner was that the Sales Tax Reference is still pending before High Court and due to grudge of filing of Sales Tax Reference, Impugned Notices have been sent for recovery---Impugned Notices have been challenged by the petitioner (Registered Person) through Constitutional petition seeking suspension of recovery notices/proceedings during pendency of the said STR---Whether the High Court while exercising its constitutional jurisdiction should stay the recovery notices issued to the petitioner during the pendency of Sales Tax Reference before High Court---Held: It is not disputed that access to justice is a fundamental right and an essential feature of the said right is that there should be adjudication of grievance by an independent tribunal before a person can be proceeded against under the law ensuring essential ingredients (there should be an independent, impartial court, a fair and public hearing, right of counsel, right to information of the offence charged for with an opportunity to cross examine witnesses and an opportunity to produce evidence) of right of fair trial in reference to Art. 10-A of the Constitution---It is also pertinent that assessment orders as such do not have touch of finality unless all the forums are exhausted in which such orders can be challenged, so that the orders take the shape of final decisions---The legislature when it provides a hierarchy of tribunals for the determination of a dispute is really providing one complete procedure for such determination, proceedings before different tribunals are only steps in such procedure---Order passed in original proceedings is not final unless it crosses all the forums set up under that law in which it can be challenged and the order of the last forum would become final---An assessee is entitled to adjudication in respect of his disputed tax liabilities by at least one independent forum outside hierarchy of the respondent department and the appellate tribunal in taxation matters is the first independent forum---Thus, stay order against recovery of demand of tax cannot be issued by High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction, when the Tax Reference has already been filed before High Court---Consequently, constitutional petition at this stage is not entertainable/maintainable due to equally efficacious alternate remedy available to petitioner under the law---Constitutional petition, filed by Registered Person, having been withdrawn, was disposed of. Mehram Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1998 SC 1445; Jawad S. Khawaja and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2024 SC 337; Central Board of Revenue and others v. Chanda Motors 1993 SCMR 39; Caltex Oil (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Collector, Central Excise and Sales Tax and others 2005 PTD 480 = 2006 SCMR 1519; Messrs Islamabad Electric Supply Company Limited v. Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue and others 2024 PTD 30; Pakistan Oil Fields Ltd. through Authorised Attorney and General Manager v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue and 2 others 2016 PTD 1590 = PLD 2016 Islamabad 76; Messrs Magna Processing Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., Faisalabad through Chief Executive v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and others 2014 PTD 841; Messrs Niagara Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue, and others 2014 CLD 1253 and Messrs Dawood Textile Printing Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., Faisalabad through Chief Executive v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue Division, F.B.R. and others 2009 PTD 1220 ref. Messrs Pak Saudi Fertilizers Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2002 PTD 679; Messrs Islamabad Electric Supply Company Limited v. Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue and others 2024 PTD 30; Messrs Pakistan Housing Foundation v. The Commissioner Inland Revenue Appeal and others 2022 PTD 1263; Messrs Kamal Ltd. through Director v. Federation of Pakistan through Chairman and 2 others 2017 PTD 243; Messrs Magna Processing Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., Faisalabad through Chief Executive v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and others 2014 PTD 841; Messrs Niagara Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue, and others 2014 CLD 1253; Messrs Dawood Textile Printing Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., Faisalabad through Chief Executive v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue Division, F.B.R. and others 2009 PTD 1220; Sun-Rise Bottling Company (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive v. Federation of Pakistan and 4 others 2006 PTD 535; Brothers Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Appellate Tribunal Sales Tax 2003 PTD 1836; Z.N. Exports (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Collector of Sales Tax 2003 PTD 1746; Agri Force Chemicals v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2016 PTD 1070; Messrs Aidy Vee & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. through Director v. Taxation Office of Income Tax, Lahore and 4 others 2009 PTD 1715 and Messrs Ibrahim Fibers Limited through Secretary v. Commissioner of Income Tax (Audit), Large Taxpayer Unit, Lahore and 3 others 2009 PTD 2006 distinguished. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----199---Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), S. 48---Reference application already filed by Registered Person---Notice of recovery, assailing of---Constitutional jurisdiction---Scope---Powers of the High Court to convert one type of proceeding into another type of proceeding and decide it itself---Case of the petitioner is that the Sales Tax Reference is still pending before High Court and due to grudge of filing of STR, Impugned Notices have been sent for recovery---Impugned Notices have been challenged by the petitioner (Registered Person) through filing constitutional petition seeking suspension of recovery notices / proceedings during pendency of the said STR---Plea of the petitioner was that the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction may convert present petition into Reference Application and decide it itself---Validity---Though High Court can always convert one type of proceeding into another type of proceeding and decide itself, yet subject to the rider that it has jurisdiction over the issue, subject matter of the dispute and if jurisdiction is not vested in High Court to decide then refer the same to the competent authority, forum, officer or court for its decision on merits---Thus, despite the power vested in High Court to convert present constitution petition into a reference application / petition, it is not a plausible/ feasible option in the present case for the reason that a reference application has already been filed by the petitioner prior to the filing of this constitution petition and the Division Bench of High Court, that has to hear the said reference application, enjoys full powers to grant relief prayed for by the petitioner---Although High Court may in appropriate cases exercise its constitutional jurisdiction despite availability of alternate remedy, yet that jurisdiction is to be exercised by keeping in view the question whether equally efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner or not---In the present c ase, it is apparent that equally efficacious alternate remedy is available to the petitioner which right has also been exercised by the petitioner by filing a reference application before High Court, which is still pending, and consequently it would not be appropriate for High Court to exercise constitutional jurisdiction at this stage for the reason that where a thing is required to be done in a particular manner then it should be done in that manner as required by the statute otherwise such act will be illegal and without jurisdiction---Petitioner has not made any attempt to get his reference application and the stay application fixed for hearing before approaching High Court for redress of grievance through the instant constitution petition---Moreover, High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction is not in a position to give direction to the learned Division Bench of High Court to entertain and decide the reference application already pending before it for the reason that the same would amount to High Court entertaining constitutional petition against itself which jurisdiction has specifically been excluded by Art. 199 of the Constitution and High Court cannot exercise its writ jurisdiction against itself---Consequently, present constitutional petition, at this stage is not entertainable / maintainable due to equally efficacious alternate remedy available to petitioner, under the law---Constitutional petition, filed by Registered Person, having been withdrawn, is disposed of. Hafsa Habib Qureshi and others v. Amir Hamza and others PLD 2024 SC 780; Muhammad Salman v. Naveed Anjum and others 2021 SCMR 1675; Government of Punjab v. Sanosh Sultan PLD 1995 SC 541; Raunaq Ali v. Chief Settlement Commissioner PLD 1973 SC 236; Commissioner Inland Revenue, Large Taxpayers Office, Islamabad v. Pakistan Oilfields Ltd., Rawalpindi and others 2024 PTD 1085 SC = 2024 SCMR 853; Muhammad Hanif Abbasi v. Imran Khan Niazi and others PLD 2018 SC 189; Federal Board of Revenue v. Dewan Salman Fiber Ltd. and others 2023 SCMR 1871; Gul Taiz Khan Marwat v. The Registrar, Peshawar High Court, Peshawar and others PLD 2021 SC 391; Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry v. President of Pakistan through Secretary and others PLD 2010 SC 61; Muhammad Iqbal and others v. Lahore High Court through Registrar and others 2010 SCMR 632 and Muhammad Shafi and another v. Attaullah and others 1984 SCMR 1124 ref. Tanveer Hussain Ansari and Abdul Sattar for Petitioner. Malik Muhammad Bakhsh Khaki, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab for Respondents. Kashif Nadeem Malik, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan for Respondents.