Summary: (a) Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act (XLIII of 1976)---- ----Ss.2 & 5---Dowry articles---Meaning---Property of wife---Held, that dowry includes property given before or after marriage, directly or indirectly, to the bride by her parents in connection with marriage, excluding property inherited by her---Wife has an absolute right in her dowry and bridal gifts, and such property rights cannot be restricted, controlled or limited by the husband or his family. Cited Cases: • Ghulam Rasool v. Family Court 1991 CLC 1696 • Syeda Mehwish v. Additional District Judge, Islamabad (West) 2018 CLC 1337 (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---- ----Suit for recovery of dowry articles---Entrustment, existence and retention---Proof---Held, that dowry articles and personal belongings of wife are her exclusive property and, where not returned in specie, she may seek their alternate value---Such entitlement, however, is subject to proof of existence, entrustment and retention by husband or his family. (c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---- ----Recovery of dowry articles---Solitary statement of wife---Evidentiary value---Held, that wife’s solitary statement may be sufficient to prove existence of dowry articles in family proceedings, especially as Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 is not applied in its strict sense before the Family Court---Oral testimony can substantiate a claim for recovery of dowry articles. Cited Cases: • Aziz-ur-Rehman v. Mst. Bibi Jameela 2020 CLC 380 • Shafique Sultan v. Mst. Asma Firdous 2017 SCMR 393 (d) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---- ----Recovery of dowry articles---Valuation of used household items---No fixed formula---Held, that there is no rigid formula for determining price, condition or precise valuation of dowry articles; valuation must be made on case-to-case basis keeping in view market value, condition of articles, period of use, quality, nature of items and surrounding circumstances. Cited Cases: • Mst. Ayesha Shaheen v. Khalid Mehmood 2013 SCMR 1049 • Mst. Samreen Bibi v. Judge Family Court PLD 2015 Lahore 504 (e) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---- ----Dowry articles---Gold ornaments---Market value---Held, that where husband is unable to return ornaments or articles in specie, wife may be compensated by payment equivalent to the amount required to purchase such items according to prevailing market value. Cited Case: • Muhammad Zahid v. Mst. Ghazala Mazhar 2014 CLC 895 (f) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---- ----Execution of decree for dowry articles---Market value---Executing Court---Held, that executing Court may depart from the original decree for determining market value of unpaid dowry items where justice so requires. Cited Case: • Haji Muhammad Nawaz v. Samina Kanwal 2017 SCMR 321 (g) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---- ----Valuation of used dowry/household articles---Guiding factors---Held, that Family Court may consider recent and old market value, date of marriage or purchase, number of years of use, average life of household article, sentimental value, inflation, depreciation, current replacement cost, online market data, auction/used-item platforms, and scientific tools such as CPI/inflation calculators while assessing alternate value of dowry or household articles. (h) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---- ----Dowry articles purchased after marriage by wife---Entitlement---Held, that there is no legal bar on a woman purchasing dowry/household articles herself after marriage; such articles may still fall within the protective scope of dowry/personal property where purchased from her funds or with monetary assistance provided by her parents. (i) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---- ----Working wife---Contribution to household---Bank statement and salary withdrawals---Presumption---Held, that where a working wife’s salary was regularly withdrawn and consumed in joint family expenses, and household articles were acquired during marriage, Court could draw a presumption in favour of her financial contribution, especially where husband failed to produce affirmative evidence showing exclusive purchase by him. (j) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---- ----Written statement---Evasive denial regarding household articles---Effect---Held, that where wife specifically pleaded household articles such as air conditioners, LEDs, washing machine, refrigerator and curtains, and husband gave an evasive reply while claiming generally that he purchased household items himself, such plea required affirmative proof by husband---Failure to provide details or documentary evidence could support wife’s claim of contribution. (k) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)---- ----Nikah Nama---Column No.18---Matrimonial property condition---Recommendation---Held, that Nikah Nama may be amended to include a column/condition that property acquired by husband after marriage shall be equally divided with wife during marriage, upon divorce or on death of husband---Until legislative reform, women may protect such rights through enforceable terms in existing Column No.18. (l) Family Law---- ----Matrimonial property---Property acquired during marriage---Working wife’s contribution---Held, that household articles and vehicle acquired during subsistence of marriage, even if standing in husband’s name, may be treated as matrimonial property where wife contributed financially or through domestic labour, childcare, household management and family support---Courts must avoid bias in favour of the money-earner and against the homemaker or child carer. (m) Family Law---- ----Matrimonial property---Vehicle in husband’s name---Contribution by wife---Equitable division---Held, that vehicle bearing registration No.AAK-478, Suzuki Cultus Model 2015, purchased/leased during marriage in husband’s name, but allegedly acquired through wife’s hard-earned money/seed contribution, required consideration as matrimonial property and equitable division according to evidence. (n) Islamic Law---- ----Marriage---Separate property rights of spouses---Dower and maintenance---Matrimonial property---Held, that under classical Islamic law, husband and wife remain separate legal persons with independent property rights; wife does not automatically acquire ownership in husband’s property merely by marriage, nor does husband acquire rights in wife’s property---However, Islamic law does not prohibit legislation protecting women’s rights in matrimonial property, and doctrines such as partnership, maslahah, ijtihad, mut’at al-talaq and compensation may be used to prevent hardship and exploitation. (o) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Women’s rights---CEDAW---Matrimonial property---Legislative obligation---Held, that Pakistan, having ratified CEDAW, is under an international obligation to reconsider its legal framework on matrimonial property and eliminate discrimination against women in ownership, acquisition, management, enjoyment and disposition of property during and upon dissolution of marriage. (p) Family Law---- ----Comparative jurisprudence---Matrimonial property---Non-financial contribution---Held, that comparative Islamic and international jurisdictions increasingly recognize marriage as an economic partnership and account for domestic labour, childcare, homemaking and indirect contributions while dividing marital assets---Such comparative guidance may assist Pakistani courts and legislature in protecting proprietary rights of women after marital breakdown. (q) Family Law---- ----Homemaker wife---Domestic labour and childcare---Economic value---Held, that every wife who cohabits with husband during marriage may be deemed to have contributed through domestic labour, childcare and household management to establishment and maintenance of matrimonial home and welfare of family---Assets acquired during marriage, whether movable or immovable and irrespective of title, should be liable to equitable distribution subject to law. (r) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.199---Family Court matter---Dowry/matrimonial property---Reappraisal and enhancement of relief---Scope---Held, that High Court in constitutional jurisdiction does not ordinarily reappraise evidence or enhance relief granted by Family Court---Where appellate Court failed to properly appreciate material evidence and denied wife’s rights, proper course was to set aside judgments and remand matter to Family Court for fresh decision after hearing parties. (s) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---- ----Recovery of dowry/personal belongings/matrimonial property---Remand---Held, that where appellate Court set aside 30% alternate value of dowry articles without adequately appreciating wife’s working status, financial contribution, respondent’s admissions and household circumstances, the judgments were set aside and matter remanded to Family Court for fresh decision within two months. Disposition: Writ petition was allowed; appellate judgment and decree dated 29.10.2022 and trial Court judgment and decree dated 29.06.2022 were set aside; matter was remanded to Family Court for fresh decision after hearing the parties within two months; Court also recommended comprehensive legislation to recognize homemaker/working wife’s equitable share in assets acquired during marriage and suggested amendment in Nikah Nama to protect matrimonial property rights of wife.

Summary: In case of ambiguity, executing Courts can look into contents of the order or judgment to ascertain the real nature of the relief or its extent.

Summary: Writ Petition Held: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973---Article 199---Code of Civil Law Procedure, 1908---Section 12(2)--- Limitation Act, 1908---Article 181---Section 18---Fraud and misrepresentation---Mixed question of law and fact---Recording of evidence---Scope of Constitutional Law jurisdiction---Respondents filed petition under Section 12(2) CPC seeking cancellation of decree whereby arbitral award had been made rule of Court in 1984---Trial Court dismissed petition without framing issues and without recording evidence---Revisional Court set aside said order and remanded matter for decision afresh after recording evidence---Petitioners challenged remand order through Constitutional Law petition contending that petition under Section 12(2) CPC filed after about thirty (30) years was hopelessly barred by limitation---Respondents pleaded that they had knowledge of impugned decree only shortly before filing petition and alleged that decree had been obtained through fraud, misrepresentation and by showing incorrect addresses while denying execution of power of attorney or participation in proceedings---Held, where fraud is specifically alleged and knowledge of decree is disputed, provisions of Section 18 Limitation Act become attracted and limitation is to be computed from date of knowledge of fraud---Question of limitation in such circumstances becomes mixed question of law and fact which cannot be determined without recording evidence---Trial Court erred in dismissing petition without framing issues and without providing opportunity to parties to lead evidence---Revisional Court rightly remanded matter for fresh decision in accordance with law---No jurisdictional defect, illegality or material irregularity found warranting interference in Constitutional Law jurisdiction---Writ petition dismissed---Trial Court directed to decide petition expeditiously. (Case remanded)

Summary: Sentence upheld --- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 364-A & 376---Kidnapping, sexual assault and murder of minor---FIR initially lodged against unknown accused---Subsequent nomination through supplementary statement---Effect---Minor girl was abducted from a public place by a person riding a motorcycle---Informant initially lodged FIR against unknown accused and gave description of the culprit and motorcycle used in commission of offence---Petitioner was subsequently nominated when witnesses informed the complainant that they had seen the minor in the company of petitioner shortly after the abduction---Held, that non-nomination of petitioner in the FIR, in the peculiar circumstances, reflected bona fides of the informant---Had there been any ulterior motive, ill-will or previous enmity, the informant could have nominated petitioner at the first instance---Subsequent nomination, on the basis of information received from witnesses, was natural and consistent with ordinary human conduct. (b) Criminal trial--- ----Delay in lodging FIR---Explanation furnished---Effect---FIR was lodged with delay of about six hours---Informant explained that after occurrence he remained engaged in searching for the missing child, informing police and making public announcements for tracing her---Held, that delay in lodging FIR was satisfactorily explained---Conduct of informant was natural in the circumstances and did not adversely affect prosecution case. (c) Criminal trial--- ----Last seen evidence---Independent witness---Minor seen with accused shortly after abduction---Evidentiary value---Witness deposed that shortly after abduction he saw petitioner taking the minor towards his house on motorcycle and later saw petitioner in a disturbed condition carrying a bag on motorcycle---Witness was independent and unrelated to complainant or deceased---No previous enmity, motive or ill-will was elicited during cross-examination---Held, that testimony of last seen witness was consistent, confidence-inspiring and worthy of reliance---Close proximity of time between abduction and deceased being seen with petitioner provided strong corroboration to prosecution case. (d) Criminal trial--- ----Recovery-related circumstance---Dead body recovered from bag---Independent witness---Corroborative value---Witness stated that he saw a bag fall from petitioner’s motorcycle and, when petitioner did not stop, the bag was opened and the dead body of the minor was found therein---Witness was independent and no motive for false implication was established---Held, that such testimony materially corresponded with last seen evidence and provided further assurance to prosecution case---Inter se consistency between independent witnesses strengthened the chain of circumstances against petitioner. (e) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984--- ----Art. 122---Facts especially within knowledge of accused---Last seen theory---Duty to explain---Scope---Where prosecution established that deceased was last seen alive in company of accused, accused was expected to explain how and when he parted company with deceased---Held, that Art.122 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 does not shift the general burden of proof in criminal trial, which remains upon prosecution---However, where facts are especially within knowledge of accused, failure to offer a plausible explanation may constitute an additional link in the chain of circumstantial evidence---Petitioner’s failure to furnish a satisfactory explanation further strengthened prosecution case. (f) Criminal trial--- ----Last seen theory---Conviction not to be based solely thereon---Requirement of supporting circumstances---Held, that last seen theory is an important link in the chain of circumstances, but conviction cannot rest solely upon such theory---Court must examine the prosecution case as a whole, including circumstances preceding and following the point when deceased was last seen with accused---In the present case, last seen evidence was supported by independent recovery-related evidence, medical evidence and DNA evidence, forming a complete chain against petitioner. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 364-A & 376---Medical evidence---Sexual assault and murder of minor---Post-mortem examination and forensic sampling---Effect---Medical officer conducted post-mortem examination and secured necessary samples for chemical and forensic analysis---Medical evidence established that the minor had been subjected to sexual assault and thereafter murdered by smothering---Held, that medical evidence materially supported the prosecution version and corroborated other circumstances relied upon against petitioner. (h) Criminal trial--- ----DNA evidence---Scientific evidence---Identity of accused---Sexual offence---PFSA report---DNA profile obtained from samples secured from deceased was found consistent with DNA profile of petitioner---Held, that DNA evidence, due to its scientific accuracy and conclusiveness, is regarded as a strong corroborative piece of evidence, particularly in cases involving sexual offences---DNA report connected petitioner with commission of offence and strongly corroborated prosecution case. Cited Cases: • Ali Haider alias Papu v. Jameel Hussain • Salman Akram Raja case 2013 SCMR 203 • Atif Zareef and others v. The State PLD 2021 SC 550 (i) Criminal trial--- ----Circumstantial evidence---Complete chain---Capital sentence---Standard of proof---Held, that conviction, even in cases involving capital punishment, may be based on circumstantial evidence if circumstances form a complete and unbroken chain excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence---Each circumstance must be independently proved and must be interlinked with other proved circumstances---In the present case, cumulative effect of last seen evidence, recovery-related circumstance, medical evidence and DNA evidence formed a complete chain consistent only with guilt of petitioner and incompatible with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Cited Cases: • Khurshid v. The State PLD 1996 SC 305 • Munawar Hussain v. Imran Waseem 2013 SCMR 374 (j) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 340(2) & 342---Statement of accused---Bare denial---Failure to appear as witness or produce defence evidence---Effect---Petitioner neither appeared as witness under S.340(2), Cr.P.C. nor produced defence evidence---His statement under S.342, Cr.P.C. was a bare denial---Held, that such bare denial, being not on oath and not subject to cross-examination, did not rebut prosecution evidence after prosecution had established a prima facie case through reliable circumstantial and scientific evidence. (k) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 364-A & 376---Sentence---Death penalty---Kidnapping, sexual assault and murder of minor---No mitigating circumstance---Deterrence---Petitioner abducted a minor girl, subjected her to sexual assault and murdered her---Held, that offences were of extreme brutality and no leniency was warranted---Although accused is favourite child of law, Court also owes duty to society and legal heirs of victim---Sentence must be proportionate to gravity of offence and serve as deterrence---Death sentence awarded by Trial Court and confirmed by High Court was maintained. Disposition: Jail petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Convictions and sentences awarded by Trial Court under Ss.302(b), 364-A and 376, P.P.C., and confirmed by Lahore High Court, were maintained.

Summary: Although it is claimed that the non-disclosure was not intentional rather based on erroneous assumption that the provisions of Order VII Rule 13 CPC provided that on rejection of plaint in earlier suit plaintiff was not precluded for filing subsequent plaint on same cause of action, yet the said provision does not absolve the appellant from disclosing previous litigation between the parties and non-disclosure of the same in the given circumstances of the case is fatal to the stance taken by the appellant in the subsequent suit, therefore, in the given circumstances, the provisions of Order VII Rule 13 CPC would be of no help to the appellant despite the fact that appellant was not precluded to file subsequent plaint/suit on rejection of previous plaint.

Summary: The competency of the suit in presence of the previous litigation inter se parties and secondly, the effect of mutation No.1659 dated 03rd April, 2002, which is still unchallenged.

Summary: The absence of any description of the assailants in the crime report, coupled with their subsequent implication through a tainted identification process, gravely impairs the credibility of the alleged identification.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Held: Civil Law Procedure Code (V of 1908)— Section 9— Act of 2017—Section 102(6)— Jurisdiction of Civil Law Court—Ouster clause—Scope—Allegation of mala fide, ill-will and jurisdictional defect—Effect— Plaintiff instituted suit alleging that the act of a statutory authority was tainted with mala fide, ill-will and was in excess of lawful authority. The trial Court, invoking the ouster clause contained in Section 102(6) of the Act of 2017, returned the plaint for want of jurisdiction, which order was upheld by the Appellate Court. Held: Jurisdiction of Civil Law Courts under Section 9, C.P.C., is plenary in nature and extends to all disputes of Civil Law nature unless expressly or impliedly barred. An ouster clause, though indicative of legislative intent, is not to be construed as absolute. The exclusion of jurisdiction must be strictly interpreted and is subject to well-recognized exceptions. Where a plaintiff alleges that the impugned act of a statutory authority is (i) without jurisdiction, (ii) in excess of powers conferred by the parent statute, or (iii) tainted with mala fide or ill-will, the jurisdiction of Civil Law Court remains intact. Allegations of mala fide strike at the root of the proceedings and render even the most solemn acts void. Determination of mala fide involves adjudication upon disputed questions of fact, requiring recording of evidence, which falls within the exclusive domain of Civil Law Courts. An appellate authority constituted under the same statute cannot be deemed an adequate forum to examine independent allegations of bad faith against functionaries acting under that statute. Courts are obligated to examine the substance of the controversy rather than being swayed by the mere existence of an ouster clause. The Courts below failed to appreciate the true nature of the dispute and mechanically applied the statutory bar without addressing the pleaded allegations of mala fide and jurisdictional defect. Result: Petition allowed. Impugned orders set aside. Plaint restored for decision on merits.

Summary: (a)It is settled principle of law that in an appeal against acquittal, the appellate Court does not ordinarily interfere unless the conclusions drawn by the learned trial Court are shown to be arbitrary, capricious, perverse or based on misreading or non-reading of the evidence. At the same time, it is equally well settled that where material evidence has either been ignored, misread or not read at all, and the view formed by the learned trial Court is found to be wholly against the weight of evidence on record, interference by the appellate Court becomes not only permissible but necessary in order to prevent miscarriage of justice. (b) It is well settled that minor discrepancies or variations, which are but natural after passage of time, do not shatter the prosecution case when the core of the occurrence remains intact. Likewise, merely because no other person sitting nearby sustained injury, it cannot be inferred that the occurrence did not take place in the manner alleged, for in such incidents it is quite possible that the assailant successfully hits only the targeted victim.