Summary: Summary pending

Summary: The request of the petitioner Company for acquisition of land is merely for commercial purpose as is manifest from the application of the Company dated 07.01.2017. The proposed expansion of the Company's factory aims to increase production of Soda Ash and Sodium Bicarbonate, which is essentially a commercial purpose. Article 24(2) of the Constitution erects a formidable barrier against the Government's use of authority for advancing private commercial interests. Article 23 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to property, emphasizes that any restriction on this right must be reasonable and in the public interest. Compelling landowners to relinquish their property for a private company's commercial gain, without a direct public utility, fails this test.

Summary: Does the non-deposit of the balance sale consideration, in compliance with a Court order prescribing penal consequences, invariably warrant the dismissal of the suit as a general rule? If so, what legal criteria and parameters must be kept in sight by the Court before passing such an order? 622Review Application (Civil) 12-21 MUHAMMAD FARAZ VS POP ETC Mr. Justice Malik Muhammad Awais Khalid 18- 03- 2025 2025 LHC 2236

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: The request of the petitioner Company for acquisition of land is merely for commercial purpose as is manifest from the application of the Company dated 07.01.2017. The proposed expansion of the Company's factory aims to increase production of Soda Ash and Sodium Bicarbonate, which is essentially a commercial purpose. Article 24(2) of the Constitution erects a formidable barrier against the Government's use of authority for advancing private commercial interests. Article 23 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to property, emphasizes that any restriction on this right must be reasonable and in the public interest. Compelling landowners to relinquish their property for a private company's commercial gain, without a direct public utility, fails this test. 620Crl. Appeal- Against Conviction- PPC 34-23 MUHAMMAD ABID VS STATE Mr. Justice Sadiq Mahmud Khurram 19- 03- 2025 2025 LHC 1923

Summary: (On appeal from: [2023] EWCA Civ 305). Per Lord Briggs, J.; Lord Reed (President), Lord Hodge (Deputy President) and Lord Richards, JJ. agreeing; Lord Leggatt, Lord Burrows and Lady Rose, JJ. concurring with the conclusion but for their own reasons. (a) Equity--- ----Fiduciary duty---Relationship between a company (principal/beneficiary) and its directors (trustees/fiduciaries)---Where defendants (fiduciaries) breaching fiduciary duties by appropriating business opportunity belonging to principal---Duty to account to principal for profits made from breach---Scope---Whether defendants liable to account for profits which would have been made regardless of breach---Whether "but for" test to be applied to account of profits---Whether common law rule on account of profits is now outdated. The respondents in this appeal consist of a British Virgin Islands-incorporated company (which has also been assigned the claims of another similar entity) and an English limited liability partnership. The individual appellants previously worked for the respondents in senior roles, including as directors, thereby owing them fiduciary duties. The appellants breached these duties by diverting a business opportunity away from the respondents and exploiting it for their own benefit. In proceedings before the High Court, under the established "profit rule", the appellants were ordered to pay the respondents the profits they had made from this diverted opportunity. An appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. The appellants brought the matter before the Supreme Court through the present appeal, challenging both their obligations to account for the profits and, alternatively, the method by which those profits were calculated. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the current legal standard for ordering an account of profits should be modified by introducing a requirement that the fiduciary could not have obtained the same profit without breaching their duty. In other words, applying a "but for" test, could the same profit have been earned lawfully, without the breach? The appellants acknowledged that adopting such a test would require departing from two House of Lords decisions: Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134 and Boardman v. Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46. Per Lord Briggs, J. The profit rule stems from the equitable principle that profits earned by a fiduciary are considered to belong to the principal. From the moment the profit is made, it is treated as held on trust for the principal, specifically, under a constructive trust. As a result, the fiduciary is obligated both to disclose these profits and to hand them over to the principal. If a fiduciary earns a profit after the fiduciary relationship has ended, they may still be required to account for it if the profit can be traced back to the previous fiduciary role. While there is often disagreement about whether a profit is sufficiently connected to that past relationship, it is clear that a former fiduciary cannot escape liability by claiming they would have made the profit even without breaching their duty. The appellants argued that the profit rule is outdated and counter-intuitive, leads to unpredictable and sometimes unduly harsh results, and is fundamentally unfair. They contended that adding a "but for" test i.e., requiring that the fiduciary could not have earned the profit lawfully, would resolve these problems. However, upon closer examination, these arguments do not amount to a compelling case for changing the legal rule. Target Holdings Ltd v. Redferns [1996] AC 421 ref. The central aim of the profit rule is to deter fiduciaries from succumbing to self-interest at the expense of their duty of undivided loyalty to the principal. The duty to account for profits is a core equitable obligation that arises simply by virtue of being a fiduciary. It does not necessarily depend on a separate breach of duty, nor is it a discretionary remedy granted by a court or triggered by a demand from the principal, although it may result in a remedial consequence. It is also distinct from an award of damages. Similarly, comparing this duty to equitable compensation, which does involve a "but for" test, is inappropriate, as an account of profits is not aimed at compensating loss. Keech v. Sandford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61; 25 ER 223; Gray v. Global Energy Horizons Corpn v. Gray [2020] EWCA Civ 1668; [2021] 1 WLR 2264, para 126; Murad v. Al-Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959, paras 74-75; Swain v. Law Society [1982] 1 WLR 17, 36 and Regal (Hastings) Ltd v. Gulliver (Note) [1967] 2 AC 134 ref. Inserting a "but for" test would mischaracterise the fiduciary's duty as merely a remedy for breach, thereby diluting its core deterrent function, namely, the automatic obligation to surrender unauthorised profits. The current law already provides a mechanism to address potential unfairness: courts can grant an equitable allowance to the fiduciary, reducing the amount payable to reflect their contribution and skill in generating the profits. Moreover, the appellants' claim that the profit rule is unclear, incompatible with contemporary commercial practice, and outdated in light of modern regulation was not substantiated and did not warrant departing from long-standing legal doctrine. There is no significant inconsistency between English law and the approaches taken in other common law jurisdictions. Nor was there any strong academic consensus in favour of reforming the law along the lines proposed by the appellants. Per Lord Leggatt, J. The term 'profit rule' is not accurate. The actual rule is that a fiduciary is prohibited from using any property, information, or opportunity that belongs to the principal for personal gain or for any unauthorised purpose If a fiduciary breaches this obligation, they are either required to compensate the principal for any resulting loss or to account for any profits obtained through the breach. This includes an implicit requirement to establish a causal connection between the breach and the loss or profit, commonly known as the 'but for' test. In the present case, that test is met: the appellants made use of a business opportunity and confidential information in breach of their fiduciary duties to the respondents. Without those breaches, they would not have obtained the profits they did. Lastly, it was incorrect to describe an account of profits as a duty rather than just a remedy. Bristol and West Building Society v. Mothew [1998] Ch 1, 18; FHR European Ventures LLP v. Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45; [2015] AC 250, para 5 and In Defence of AIB v. Redler" (2021) 27 Trusts & Trustees 725, 742 ref. Per Lord Burrows, J. In the present case, the account of profits operates as a remedy for the breach of fiduciary duty. The two leading authorities i.e. Regal (Hastings) Ltd v. Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134 and Boardman v. Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46.), which the appellants argue should be overturned, did not apply a 'but for' test to establish a connection between the wrongdoing and the profits earned. This is because the causation test in those cases did not involve assessing what profits the defendant might have lawfully made by alternative means. Any argument to overturn an established Supreme Court/ House of Lords authority should be approached with caution. The two key decisions in question cannot be regarded as clearly wrong for not applying the version of the 'but for' test that includes a 'lawful alternative counterfactual', i.e. the test advanced by the appellants. Rather, the reasoning in these two cases can be robustly supported on grounds of both legal principle and policy. As a result, those precedents should remain undisturbed. In re Dalton [2023] UKSC 36, [2023] 3 WLR 671, at paras 45-50 ref. Per Lady Rose, J. The appellants' core grievance is that the formal company and partnership roles assigned to the parties did not align with their actual business relationships or with the behaviour they believed was reasonably expected of them. Instead, those formal structures were adopted primarily for tax efficiency or similar reasons. Nonetheless, the relevant legal rules have been recently codified in the Companies Act 2006, indicating that Parliament did not view evolving business practices in the UK, where the parties in the present case operated, as a reason to consider the existing rules outdated. The legal change being proposed would have wide-ranging implications. Any such reform, falls within the remit of the legislature rather than the courts. Per Lord Leggatt, J.; concurring with the conclusion but for his own reasons (b) Equity--- ----Fiduciary duty---Relationship between a company (principal/beneficiary) and its directors (trustees/fiduciaries)---Where defendants (fiduciaries) breaching fiduciary duties by appropriating business opportunity belonging to principal---Duty to account to principal for profits made from breach---Scope---Whether defendants liable to account for profits which would have been made regardless of breach---Whether "but for" test to be applied to account of profits---Principles stated. (i) A fiduciary owes a duty to the principal not to use any property (or any information or opportunity which, as between the parties to the fiduciary relationship, the principal has the exclusive right to exploit) for the fiduciary's own benefit, or for any purpose outside the scope of the fiduciary's authority. (ii) This duty is distinct from the duty to avoid a conflict of interest and, unlike the latter duty, continues after the termination of the relationship which gave rise to it. (iii) If the fiduciary breaches this duty, the fiduciary will be liable to compensate the principal for any loss suffered by the principal as a result of the breach or to account to the principal for any profit made by the fiduciary as a result of the breach (or to claim a proprietary remedy). The principal can choose between these remedies. (iv) In determining what loss or profit, if any, resulted from the breach, a "but for" test of causation is applied: the fiduciary is liable to compensate the principal for any loss which the principal would not have suffered or to account to the principal for any profit which the fiduciary would not have made but for the breach of duty. (v) It is not relevant to consider whether, if the fiduciary had sought to obtain the informed consent of the principal to the use made by the fiduciary of the principal's property (or information or opportunity), such consent would have been given. The breach of duty does not consist in failure to obtain the principal's consent but in the wrongful use of the property. Such use is made lawful only by actual and not by hypothetical consent of the principal. (vi) Applying the "but for" test of causation in this case, the defendants breached fiduciary duties (and duties not to make unauthorised use of confidential information) owed to the claimants by appropriating for themselves the business opportunity of providing the recovery services. But for these breaches of duty, the defendants would not have made any of the profits which they in fact made from providing those services. (vii) The judge was therefore right to order the defendants to account for those profits, subject to an equitable allowance for the work done to generate the profits. (viii) It is unnecessary and unsound to postulate a duty owed by a fiduciary who makes unauthorised use of any property, information or opportunity of the principal to disclose and pay to the principal any profits made from such misuse without the need for a demand by the principal or an order of the court. (ix) The proper analysis is simply that such misuse is a breach of fiduciary duty which renders the fiduciary liable to be ordered by a court to remedy the wrong done (by paying compensation for loss caused or paying over the profits gained to the principal or treating an asset as if it were held on trust for the principal). Lord Wolfson KC, Graham Virgo KC (Hon) and Watson Pringle for Appellants (Instructed by Signature Litigation LLP). Jonathan Crow KC, Tom Weisselberg KC and Tom Cleaver for Respondents (Instructed by Brown Rudnick LLP). Dates of hearing: 23rd and 24th July, 2024. (i) he would have made those profits anyway even if he had not done the things which have been held to amount to a breach by him of his fiduciary duty (see para. 38 of Lord Briggs' judgment); or that

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 8(1), 23, 24(1), 24(2) & 24(3)---Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), S. 4---Acquisition of land sought by a company for a factory---Public purpose---Scope---Compulsory acquisition, non-permitting of---Scope---Protection of property---Scope---Company, having already established factory by acquiring land, sought additional land from private land owners in order to enhance its production capacity by extending its area---Company invoked constitutional jurisdiction of High Court being aggrieved of rejection of acquisition by Respondents (Board of Revenue-Settlement and all relevant departments)---Contention of the petitioner/company was that acquisition of land for a company was not necessarily required to be for the public purpose as the same might be for construction of a work that was likely to prove useful to the public---Objection of respondents was that even for industrial purpose acquisition of land could be allowed only when it served public purpose while the request of the petitioner/company for acquisition of land was merely for commercial purpose as was manifest from their application---Validity---Article 8(1) of the Constitution postulates that any law or any custom or usage having the force of law, insofar as it is inconsistent with the rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void---Article 23 of the Constitution grants every citizen the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property within Pakistan, subject to the Constitution and any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public interest---Article 24 of the Constitution guarantees/embodies protection of property rights, which inter alia postulates that no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law---Sub-Article (2) of Art. 24 of the Constitution further restricts acquisition or taking possession of any property except for public purpose only and that too by the authority of law which provides for compensation therefor---Sub-Article (3) of Art. 24 of the Constitution contains specified exceptions to the general rules articulated in the first two provisions of Art. 24 of the Constitution, whereby validity of any law permitting compulsory acquisition or taking possession of any property has been made immune from challenge for certain purposes specified therein---Inasmuch as the exceptions specified in sub-Article (3) of Art. 24 of the Constitution limit the protection of fundamental right to property guaranteed under sub-Article (1), therefore, the same are to be construed narrowly and there is no room for reading into the said Article anything that abridges or undermines the protection of property rights---Thus, the principle of harmonious construction of the provisions of Art. 24 of the Constitution makes it abundantly clear that protection of property rights guaranteed under Art. 24 of the Constitution is only abridged or taken away for compulsory acquisition or taking possession of it under any law for any public purpose or such other purpose as have been clearly specified in Art. 24(3) of the Constitution---No provision of Art. 24 of the Constitution permits compulsory acquisition or taking possession of any property by or under any law merely because the same is required for a company for its commercial purposes---Petitioner/Company failed to point out any illegality, material irregularity, any violation of acquisition laws or jurisdictional defect in the impugned orders passed by the respondents regretting petitioner's request for acquisition of land owned by private owners---Constitutional petition, filed by company/factory, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances. Hamza Rasheed Khan and another v. Election Appellate Tribunal, Lahore High Court, Lahore PLD 2024 SC 256 ref. (b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)--- ----Ss. 3(e) & 4---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 23 & 24(2)---Acquisition of land by a company fora factory---Public purpose---Scope---Compulsory acquisition, non-permitting of---Scope---Protection of property---Scope---Company, having already established factory by acquiring land, sought additional land from private land owners in order to enhance its production capacity by extending its area---Company invoked constitutional jurisdiction of High Court being aggrieved of rejection of acquisition by respondents (Board of Revenue-Settlement and all relevant departments)---Contention of the petitioner/company was that acquisition of land for a company was not necessarily required to be for the public purpose as the same might be for construction of a work that was likely to prove useful to the public-- -Objection of respondents was that even for industrial purpose acquisition of land could be allowed only when it served public purpose while the request of the petitioner/company for acquisition of land was merely for commercial purpose as was manifest from their application-- -Validity---"Company" has been defined in S. 3(e) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which means a Company having been registered/ incorporated under prevalent law and includes a society registered under the prevalent law (i.e. Societies Registration Act, 1860 or Cooperative Societies Act, 1912)---In the present case, the request of the petitioner/Company for acquisition of land was merely for commercial purpose as was manifest from their own relevant application---The proposed expansion of the Company's factory aims to increase production of Soda Ash and Sodium Bicarbonate, which is essentially a commercial purpose---Article 24(2) of the Constitution erects a formidable barrier against the Government's use of authority for advancing private commercial interests---Article 23 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to property, emphasizes that any restriction on this right must be reasonable and in the public interest---Compelling landowners to relinquish their property for a private company's commercial gain, without a direct public utility, failed this test---Acquisition of private land for a purpose other than public purpose is not legal---Requisition and acquisition for purpose of private business concern and not for public purpose or in public interest is illegal---Petitioner/Company failed to point out any illegality, material irregularity, any violation of acquisition laws or jurisdictional defect in the impugned orders passed by the respondents regretting petitioner's request for acquisition of land owned by private owners---Constitutional petition, filed by company/factory, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances. Federal Government Employees' Housing Foundation through Director-General, Islamabad and another v. Muhammad Akram Alizai, Deputy Controller, PBC, Islamabad 2002 PLC (C.S.) 1655 and Radba Kanta Banik v. The Province of East Pakistan and 2 others PLD 1969 SC 545 ref. Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Government of Punjab and others 2002 SCMR 1652 and Suo Motu Case No.13 of 2007 PLD 2009 SC 217 distinguished. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 24 & 268---Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), Preamble---Land Acquisition Act, 1894, being a colonial law, continuity of---Scope---In terms of Art. 268 of Constitution, continuance in force of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, ('the Act 1894') is subject to the Constitution and with necessary adaptations until altered, amended or repealed by the appropriate legislature---The phrase "subject to the Constitution" indicates that the continuance in force of laws was made subordinate to the constitutional scheme---Thus, continuance in force of the Act 1894, by virtue of Art. 268 of the Constitution, does not render any of the provisions of the Act, 1894,immune from challenge for being ultra vires the Constitution including on the ground of repugnancy to the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.24 of Constitution---Petitioner / Company failed to point out any illegality, material irregularity, any violation of acquisition laws or jurisdictional defect in the impugned orders passed by the Respondents regretting petitioner's request for acquisition of land owned by private owners---Constitutional petition, filed by company/factory, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances. (d) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)--- ----S. 4---Acquisition of land sought by a company for a factory---Public purpose---Scope---Compulsory acquisition, non-permitting of---Protection of property---Scope---Interpretation of statutes---"Reading down" of a provision--- Company, having already established factory by acquiring land, sought additional land from private land owners in order to enhance its production capacity by extending of its area---Company invoked constitutional jurisdiction of High Court being aggrieved of rejection of acquisition by Respondents (Board of Revenue-Settlement and all relevant departments)---Contention of the petitioner/company was that acquisition of land for the company was not necessarily required to be for the public purpose as the same might be for construction of a work that is likely to prove useful to the public---Objection of Respondents is that even for industrial purpose acquisition of land could be allowed only when it served public purpose while the request of the petitioner/company for acquisition of land was merely for commercial purpose as was manifest from their application-- -Validity---In the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('the Act 1894'), land can be acquired either for public purpose or for a Company---A literal construction of the provisions of the Act 1894 appears to be in conflict with Art. 24 of the Constitution insofar as those apparently permit acquisition of property by a Company even in the absence of any public purpose or such other purposes as have been specified in the exceptions stipulated in Art. 24(3) of the Constitution---A statutory provision, when read literally, leads to any violation of a fundamental right, or renders it without legislative competence---Court read such a provision narrowly to save it from invalidity---This is a rule of interpretation of statutes termed as "reading down"---The rule of "reading down", when applied to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, would permit acquisition of property only for public purpose or any other purpose specified in sub-Article (3) of Art. 24 of the Constitution- --Petitioner/Company failed to point out any illegality, material irregularity, any violation of acquisition laws or jurisdictional defect in the impugned orders passed by the Respondents regretting petitioner's request for acquisition of land owned by private owners---Constitutional petition, filed by company/factory, being merit-less, was dismissed. Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 6 others PLD 1997 SC 582; Haroon-ur-Rasheed v. Lahore Development Authority and others 2016 SCMR 931; Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others v. M.Q.M. through Deputy Convener and others PLD 2014 SC 531 and Syed Mushahid Shah and others v. Federal Investment Agency and others 2017 SCMR 1218 ref. Shamim ur Rehman Malik for Petitioner. Muhammad Osman Khan, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab for Respondents. Date of hearing: 19th March, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Family Law – Dower (Haq Mehr) – Deferred Dower Payable on Demand ----Family Courts Act, 1964, S. 5 & Schedule; Evidence Act, 1872, Art. 85 Dower deed—Interpretation of expression "عند المطالب" (Ind-at-Talab) meaning "payable on demand"—Petitioner wife claimed dower comprising a portion of immovable property and five tolas of gold—Family Court and Appellate Court decreed dower in respect of property but dismissed claim for gold ornaments on grounds of insufficient proof that it remained unpaid—Held, both courts below erred in construing the legal import of the term "Ind-at-Talab"—Said term in the dower deed clearly indicated that gold was not paid and remained payable upon demand—Courts could not validly bifurcate the enforceability of different parts of the same dower deed—Reliance placed on dictionary definitions and judgment of Samina v. Additional District Judge, PLJ 2023 Lahore 844—Dower payable on demand remains enforceable until paid—Petition allowed; respondent-husband directed to pay five tolas gold to petitioner as deferred dower. ----Cited Case: • Samina v. Additional District Judge etc. PLJ 2023 Lahore 844 "The above expression ‘ﻋﻨﺪاﻟﻄﻠﺐ’ or payable on demand also presupposes that dower was not paid to the petitioner and was yet to be paid as and when a demand was made by the wife. View in this context, it may also be added that the document Ex PW 4/5 by the name of ‘ ﻣہﺮﻧﺎﻣہﺑﺤﻖامکﻠﺜﻮمﺑیﺑی ’ was subscribed to by the two courts below with respect to part of the dower in form of immovable property and so they could not have made any exception while deciding the case in respect of remaining part of five tolas gold ornaments as dower which was clearly stated to be payable on demand in the same very deed."

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ----O. XXI, Rr. 97, 99, 100, 101 & 103; S. 47—Maintainability of objection petition—Scope of executing court’s jurisdiction—Third party claim to property not derived from judgment-debtor—Execution petition marked as satisfied through compromise deed—Subsequent objection filed by third party claiming ownership—Effect— Execution petition was satisfied and consigned to record upon a compromise between decree holders and father of the judgment-debtor, wherein a house was transferred in lieu of decretal amount. Respondent No.1, a third party, filed an objection claiming that he was the true owner of the house and was not party to the suit or compromise. The executing court held the objection petition maintainable under Order XXI Rule 99 CPC. High Court held that such objection could be validly entertained under the procedural framework laid out in Order XXI Rules 97 to 101, which empowers executing courts to determine rights and interests of third-party claimants resisting or objecting to execution. Filing of regular suit barred under Rule 103 CPC once such an application is filed. Section 47 CPC, dealing with questions between parties to the decree, was inapplicable to third-party claims. Held, executing court rightly held the objection maintainable as it involved determination of right, title, or possession of a stranger to the decree who claimed bonafide ownership. The executing court was empowered to entertain such an objection prior to actual dispossession. Mere marking of execution petition as “satisfied” did not preclude a third-party claim rooted in alleged ownership. The executing court had not decided the merits of ownership, and the impugned order being interlocutory in nature warranted no interference by the High Court. ----Cited Cases: • Lashkhani Begum etc. v. Mr. Ghulam Rabbani etc., 1982 SCMR 90 • Habib Bank Ltd. v. Syed Zia ul Hassan, 1990 SCMR 60 "Order XXI rule 97, 98, 99, 199 & 101 CPC. There is no cavil with the proposition that where any person other than the judgment debtor is dispossessed from immoveable property by the decree holder, he may make an application to the Court complaining o[ such dispossession. The term 'any person' used in Order XXI Rule 99 CPC means a stranger to the suit who was not impleaded in the original suit. Once an application under Order XXI Rule 99 is filed, it is incumbent upon the executing court to consider all for and against claims including the right, title and interest of the parties under Order XXI Rule 101 which bars a separate suit by mandating the execution court to decide such a dispute.