Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----Ss.13 & 15---Eviction proceedings--- Tenant subletting demised premises without landlord’s written consent---Impermissibility---Sub-lessee failing to establish lawful possession---Sub-lessee claiming ownership of demised premises on the basis of a mere sale agreement---Legality---Sale agreement--- Nature and legal effect---Sale agreement not being a document of title and having limited evidentiary value---Claim of ownership by tenant or sub-lessee in rent proceedings---Scope and limitations---Situation where tenant or sub-lessee asserts ownership of demised premises---Mandatory legal course highlighted---Obligation to vacate the premises and pursue civil remedy before competent forum---Principle---The petitioner, owner/landlord, rented out the demised premises to respondent No.1/tenant under a rent agreement in 1988 containing a prohibition against subletting; however, in 1990, respondent No.1 sublet the premises to respondent No.2 without the petitioner’s (landlord) written consent and in some instances possession was further handed over to respondent No.3, while rent fell into arrears---The petitioner filed rent applications seeking eviction and recovery of arrears, which were allowed by the rent controller; first rent appeals filed by the respondents were allowed by the appellate court, reversing the rent controller’s findings---The petitioner thereafter filed constitutional petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution challenging the appellate judgments---Held: Record showed that respondent No.2 (sub-lessee) although denied relationship of landlord and tenant with the petitioner (landlord), however, he had failed to produce any ownership documents and/or to prove his legal possession over the demised property---In the evidence respondent No.1 (tenant) candidly admitted that he entered into rent agreement with the petitioner (landlord) and that he sublet the demised premises to respondent No.2 and that since he did not receive payment from respondent No.2 as such he could not pay the same to the petitioner---Appellate Court completely lost sight of the fact that respondent No.2 failed to justify his possession over the demised premises---Under S.15(2)(ii) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, subletting without the landlord’s written consent constituted a valid ground for eviction---In so far as findings of appellate court with respect to criminal case was concerned it was well settled that standards of appraisement of evidence in criminal and civil case were altogether different therefore, findings of a criminal court were not binding on Civil Court---Respondent No.2 (sub-lessee) relying on a sale agreement did not suffice for the purpose of establishing his proprietary right over the property since sale agreement was not a title document---Petitioner (landlord) successfully proved that he was owner/landlord of the demised premises and respondent No.1 (tenant) committed default in payment of rentals and that he had further sub-let the demised premises without petitioner’s (landlord) written consent---Moreover, where tenant claimed ownership rights over the property then he was legally mandated to vacate the premises, pursue civil remedy and upon a favorable judgment, regain possession of the property---High Court under its constitutional jurisdiction intervened in the matter since Appellate Court exceeded jurisdiction vested in it which resulted in miscarriage of justice---Impugned judgment of appellate court was set aside and orders passed by rent controller were restored---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Karachi Transport Corporation v. Muhammad Hanif 2009 SCMR 1005; Shajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique and 2 others PLD 2007 SC 45; Rehmatullah v. Ali Muhammad and another 1983 SCMR 1064; Muhammad Nisar v. Izhar Ahmed Shaikh and others PLD 2014 SC 347 and Nasir Khan v. Nadia Ali Butt and others 2024 SCMR 452 rel. Aqeel Ahmed Siddiqui for Petitioners. Syed Abbas Ali Jaffery and Muhammad Ismail Bhutto, Addl. A.G for Respondents. Date of hearing: 14th April, 2025.

Summary: (For review of the order dated 16.03.2020 passed by this Court). Supreme Court Rules, 1980--- ----O. XXVI, R. 1---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188---Peshawar High Court Ministerial Establishment (Appointment, Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2020, Rr. 16 & 20---Peshawar High Court Ministerial Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1989, R. 12---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1986, R. 3---West Pakistan (Civil Services) Delegation of Powers Rules, 1962, Appendix---Review petition---Reviewable ground(s)---Scope---Petitioner, who was an employee of Peshawar High Court, approached Supreme Court assailing dismissal of his constitution petition against his dismissal; which was also dismissed by the Supreme Court---Review was sought against said dismissal---Held: [Per Shakeel Ahmad, J.] The provisions of Rule 12 of the Peshawar High Court Ministerial Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1989 (‘the 1989 Rules’), Rule 3 of the [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa] Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1986 (‘the Rules 1986’),the Appendix of the High Court of West Pakistan (Civil Services) Delegation of Powers Rules, 1960 (‘the Rules 1960”),cumulatively stipulate that the right of appeal had been provided to the petitioner and such rules would mutatis mutandis apply to the petitioner’s case, which was to be heard by a Bench of two judges to be nominated by the Chief Justice, as per the statement showing delegation of powers of the Gazetted and non-Gazetted establishment under the Rules 1960---However, in exercise of powers conferred under Article 208 of the Constitution, the Peshawar High Court with the approval of the Governor Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has made the Peshawar High Court Ministerial Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2020 (‘the Rules 2020’), and in terms of Rule 16 of the Rules 2020, if any order affecting the terms and conditions of service of a member of the establishment is passed or any penalty is imposed by legislation, an appeal shall lie to the Chief Justice; where any such order is passed or penalty imposed by the Chief Justice, other than an appeal from an order of the Registrar, an appeal shall lie to a Bench of three senior most judges of the Court---Furthermore, while the Rules 1989 stand repealed under Rule 22 of the Rules 2020, the Rules so repealed shall not affect anything duly done or suffered before these Rules---A reviewable ground would essentially be one where the decision is per incuriam or where error is so evident that it is floating on the surface of the record, having substantial impact on the final outcome of the case as happened in the instant case, thereby constituting a valid ground for review---[Per Shahid Bilal Hassan, J.] It is the responsibility of the Judges of this/Supreme Court to correct their errors, because the principles of law enunciated in their judgments are binding on all other courts in the country under Article 189 of the Constitution of Pakistan---Orders and judgments based on an erroneous assumption of material facts, or those made without adverting to a provision of law, or reflecting a departure from the undisputed construction of law and the Constitution, may amount to an error apparent on the face of the record and can be rectified---Article 188 of the Constitution of Pakistan creates the constitutional right to seek review of any judgment or order of the Supreme Court---The matter of review is attended to in the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 in Order XXVI and its rule (1) enunciates that the review may be filed on grounds similar to those mentioned in Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure, Code, 1908---Order XLVII, Rule 1,C.P.C., stipulates that a review may be filed if there is “some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason”---In the present case, this (Supreme) Court while handing down the judgment under review did not ponder upon the peculiar facts of the case of the petitioner and prevalent law at the relevant time, which is an error apparent on record and a solid ground to review the judgment to the extent of the petitioner’s case, as it goes to the root of the case---Additionally, when the judgment sought to be reviewed has been passed by departing the relevant law on the subject the question of limitation could be ignored and the wrong done and committed has to be corrected and reviewed by condoning delay, because the rules and procedure are framed and enacted for advancement of justice--- Supreme Court set-aside judgment-under-review to the extent of the petitioner as well as order passed by the High Court in constitution petition through which constitutional petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed and remanded the matter to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, to place the petitioner’s appeal before the judges to be nominated by him for decision in accordance with law---Review petition was allowed accordingly. Government of Punjab v. Aamir Zahoor ul Haq PLD 2016 SC 421; Nadia Naz v. The President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 2023 SC 588 and Faryal Arif Latif v. Arif Latif 2025 SCMR 395 ref. Saleem Ullah Khan Ranazai, Advocate Supreme Court for the Petitioner along with Petitioner. Shah Faisal Ilyas, Additional Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Khalid Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court and Wajid Ali Khan, Director (Regulations) for Respondents (via video link from Peshawar). Date of hearing: 9th May, 2025. (a) All the appeals and civil petitions are dismissed, except for Civil Petition No.1439/2018 which is converted into an appeal and allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside (and the short order of even date is amended accordingly);

Summary: ----Ss. 4(q), 22, 28 & 31---Punjab Healthcare Commission Regulations for banning quackery in all its forms and manifestations and for dealing with quacks, 2016---Quackery---Hearing Committee, jurisdiction of---Authority of Enforcement Manager---Petitioner / accused was aggrieved of penalty imposed upon him for practicing as a quack---Validity---Petitioner nowhere alleged that his affidavit was procured through coercion, misrepresentation or undue influence---Submission of affidavit and acceptance of allegations constituted an admission, which could be used against petitioner in absence of any exception pleaded---Conceptually and legally there was a difference between admission and confession; former was attracted against petitioner---Regulatory wrongdoing(s) is a specie of strict liability wrong(s), where guilty act alone has to be established---Petitioner failed to point out any abuse of procedural and substantial due process---Opportunity of hearing was granted and fine imposed commensurate with the gravity of allegations and acts detrimental to public interest(s)---Imposition of fine by Hearing Committee was an exercise of powers extended to the Commission and such act / decision was within the scope of S.28 of the Act, 2010---Commission is a juridical person and same operates through Committee(s) or assigns/delegatees, provided authority is extended by the Commission to exercise powers and discharge the functions of the Commission---This case was no exception---There was no illegality in the decisions assailed and no alleged breach of any provision of Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010 or incidence of excessive exercise of authority by the Committees which were embodiment(s) of the Commission in the context of Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010 and Punjab Healthcare Commission Regulations For Banning Quackery In All Its Forms And Manifestations And For Dealing With Quacks Regulation, 2016---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances. Manzoor Elahi v. District and Sessions Judge, Sargodha and 2 others PLD 2021 Lahore 843; Chairperson Punjab Healthcare Commission through Chief Executive Officer, Lahore and another v. The District and Session Judge Sargodha and another Civil Petition No. 5444 of 2021 and Punjab Healthcare Commission through Chief Executive Officer, Office No. 185 Ahmad Block, New Garden Town, Lahore and another v. Muhammad Tariq Javaid and others Civil Petition No. 5355 of 2024 rel. Ch. Muhammad Abbas Majeed for Petitioner. Waheed Alam, Additional Advocate General. Barrister Hammad Babar and Mehran Shah, Legal Advisor on behalf of Punjab Healthcare Commission.

Summary: (For review of the order dated 16.03.2020 passed by this Court). Supreme Court Rules, 1980--- ----O. XXVI, R. 1---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188---Peshawar High Court Ministerial Establishment (Appointment, Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2020, Rr. 16 & 20---Peshawar High Court Ministerial Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1989, R. 12---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1986, R. 3---West Pakistan (Civil Services) Delegation of Powers Rules, 1962, Appendix---Review petition---Reviewable ground(s)---Scope---Petitioner, who was an employee of Peshawar High Court, approached Supreme Court assailing dismissal of his constitution petition against his dismissal; which was also dismissed by the Supreme Court---Review was sought against said dismissal---Held: [Per Shakeel Ahmad, J.] The provisions of Rule 12 of the Peshawar High Court Ministerial Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1989 (‘the 1989 Rules’), Rule 3 of the [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa] Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1986 (‘the Rules 1986’), the Appendix of the High Court of West Pakistan (Civil Services) Delegation of Powers Rules, 1960 (‘the Rules 1960”),cumulatively stipulate that the right of appeal had been provided to the petitioner and such rules would mutatis mutandis apply to the petitioner’s case, which was to be heard by a Bench of two judges to be nominated by the Chief Justice, as per the statement showing delegation of powers of the Gazetted and non-Gazetted establishment under the Rules 1960---However, in exercise of powers conferred under Article 208 of the Constitution, the Peshawar High Court with the approval of the Governor Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has made the Peshawar High Court Ministerial Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2020 (‘the Rules 2020’), and in terms of Rule 16 of the Rules 2020, if any order affecting the terms and conditions of service of a member of the establishment is passed or any penalty is imposed by legislation, an appeal shall lie to the Chief Justice; where any such order is passed or penalty imposed by the Chief Justice, other than an appeal from an order of the Registrar, an appeal shall lie to a Bench of three senior most judges of the Court---Furthermore, while the Rules 1989 stand repealed under Rule 22 of the Rules 2020, the Rules so repealed shall not affect anything duly done or suffered before these Rules---A reviewable ground would essentially be one where the decision is per incuriam or where error is so evident that it is floating on the surface of the record, having substantial impact on the final outcome of the case as happened in the instant case, thereby constituting a valid ground for review---[Per Shahid Bilal Hassan, J.] It is the responsibility of the Judges of this/Supreme Court to correct their errors, because the principles of law enunciated in their judgments are binding on all other courts in the country under Article 189 of the Constitution of Pakistan---Orders and judgments based on an erroneous assumption of material facts, or those made without adverting to a provision of law, or reflecting a departure from the undisputed construction of law and the Constitution, may amount to an error apparent on the face of the record and can be rectified---Article 188 of the Constitution of Pakistan creates the constitutional right to seek review of any judgment or order of the Supreme Court---The matter of review is attended to in the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 in Order XXVI and its rule (1) enunciates that the review may be filed on grounds similar to those mentioned in Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure, Code, 1908---Order XLVII, Rule 1,C.P.C., stipulates that a review may be filed if there is “some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason”---In the present case, this (Supreme) Court while handing down the judgment under review did not ponder upon the peculiar facts of the case of the petitioner and prevalent law at the relevant time, which is an error apparent on record and a solid ground to review the judgment to the extent of the petitioner’s case, as it goes to the root of the case---Additionally, when the judgment sought to be reviewed has been passed by departing the relevant law on the subject the question of limitation could be ignored and the wrong done and committed has to be corrected and reviewed by condoning delay, because the rules and procedure are framed and enacted for advancement of justice--- Supreme Court set-aside judgment-under-review to the extent of the petitioner as well as order passed by the High Court in constitution petition through which constitutional petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed and remanded the matter to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, to place the petitioner’s appeal before the judges to be nominated by him for decision in accordance with law---Review petition was allowed accordingly. Government of Punjab v. Aamir Zahoor ul Haq PLD 2016 SC 421; Nadia Naz v. The President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 2023 SC 588 and Faryal Arif Latif v. Arif Latif 2025 SCMR 395 ref. Saleem Ullah Khan Ranazai, Advocate Supreme Court for the Petitioner along with Petitioner. Shah Faisal Ilyas, Additional Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Khalid Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court and Wajid Ali Khan, Director (Regulations) for Respondents (via video link from Peshawar). Date of hearing: 9th May, 2025. (a) All the appeals and civil petitions are dismissed, except for Civil Petition No.1439/2018 which is converted into an appeal and allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside (and the short order of even date is amended accordingly);

Summary: Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)--- ----Ss. 143, 144 & 155---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VI, R. 15---Appeal---Election petition---Verification process---Absence of deponent---Phrase "declared on oath before me" on rubber stamp of Oath Commissioner---Effect---Appellant was aggrieved of dismissal of his election petition wherein election of respondent/returned candidate was assailed---Objection to election petition was appellant's failure to comply with verification procedures mandated by Order VI, Rule 15, C.P.C. which was a fundamental requirement as stipulated in section 144(4) of Elections Act, 2017---Validity---There were significant discrepancies in rubber stamp affixed by the Oath Commissioner regarding presence of appellant during the verification process---Appellant was not physically present at the time the verification occurred, primarily because he was not identified by any person nor by his Computerized National Identity Card---Stamp failed to provide clarity on the specific location and circumstances under which the oath was administered, thereby raising further questions about validity of proceedings---Phrase "declared on oath before me," inscribed in the stamp, lacked necessary specificity and was inherently ambiguous---Rubber stamp did not clarify what specific declaration was made under oath, nor did it confirm whether contents of verification were indeed presented as sworn testimony before Oath Commissioner---Such ambiguity fundamentally undermined assurance required for proper attestation of verification---Verification of election petition did not adhere to legal standards set forth by Supreme Court---Election Tribunal had thoroughly examined the election petition and reached a well-founded decision to reject the same---Supreme Court declined to interfere with the order passed by Election Tribunal---Appeal was dismissed. Zafar Abbas v. Hassan Murtaza PLD 2005 SC 600; Inayatullah v. Syed Khursheed Ahmed Shah 2014 SCMR 1477; Hina Manzoor v. Malik Ibrar Ahmed and others PLD 2015 SC 396; Lt.-Col. (Rtd.) Ghazanfar Abbas Shah v. Mehr Khalid Mehmood Sargana and others 2015 SCMR 1585; Feroze Ahmed Jamali v. Masroor Ahmad Khan Jatoi and others 2016 SCMR 750; Muhammad Ibrahim Jatoi v. Aftab Shaban Mirani 2016 SCMR 722; Malik Umar Aslam v. Sumera Malik PLD 2007 SC 362 and Zia Ur Rehman v. Syed Ahmed. Hussain 2014 SCMR 1015 rel. Barrister Tassaduq Hanif, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicant. Yasir Ali Raja, Director Law and Zaheer Abbas, AD Law for ECP. Date of hearing: 9th May, 2025.

Summary: Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)--- ----Ss. 143, 144 & 155---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VI, R. 15---Appeal---Election petition---Verification process---Absence of deponent---Phrase "declared on oath before me" on rubber stamp of Oath Commissioner---Effect---Appellant was aggrieved of dismissal of his election petition wherein election of respondent/returned candidate was assailed---Objection to election petition was appellant's failure to comply with verification procedures mandated by Order VI, Rule 15, C.P.C. which was a fundamental requirement as stipulated in section 144(4) of Elections Act, 2017---Validity---There were significant discrepancies in rubber stamp affixed by the Oath Commissioner regarding presence of appellant during the verification process---Appellant was not physically present at the time the verification occurred, primarily because he was not identified by any person nor by his Computerized National Identity Card---Stamp failed to provide clarity on the specific location and circumstances under which the oath was administered, thereby raising further questions about validity of proceedings---Phrase "declared on oath before me," inscribed in the stamp, lacked necessary specificity and was inherently ambiguous---Rubber stamp did not clarify what specific declaration was made under oath, nor did it confirm whether contents of verification were indeed presented as sworn testimony before Oath Commissioner---Such ambiguity fundamentally undermined assurance required for proper attestation of verification---Verification of election petition did not adhere to legal standards set forth by Supreme Court---Election Tribunal had thoroughly examined the election petition and reached a well-founded decision to reject the same---Supreme Court declined to interfere with the order passed by Election Tribunal---Appeal was dismissed. Zafar Abbas v. Hassan Murtaza PLD 2005 SC 600; Inayatullah v. Syed Khursheed Ahmed Shah 2014 SCMR 1477; Hina Manzoor v. Malik Ibrar Ahmed and others PLD 2015 SC 396; Lt.-Col. (Rtd.) Ghazanfar Abbas Shah v. Mehr Khalid Mehmood Sargana and others 2015 SCMR 1585; Feroze Ahmed Jamali v. Masroor Ahmad Khan Jatoi and others 2016 SCMR 750; Muhammad Ibrahim Jatoi v. Aftab Shaban Mirani 2016 SCMR 722; Malik Umar Aslam v. Sumera Malik PLD 2007 SC 362 and Zia Ur Rehman v. Syed Ahmed. Hussain 2014 SCMR 1015 rel. Barrister Tassaduq Hanif, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicant. Yasir Ali Raja, Director Law and Zaheer Abbas, AD Law for ECP. Date of hearing: 9th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)--- ----Ss.2(l), 22(3) & 24---Proceedings before the Rent Controller---Application for production of an extra witness---Ceiling regarding number of witnesses to be produced in rent proceedings---Scope---Whether such provision was directory or mandatory---Principle---Depositing of rent in court pending proceedings---Exceptions---Facts in brevity were that the dispute arose during rent proceedings where respondents Nos. 1 to 3 (alleged tenant/who denied relationship of landlord and tenant) moved an application for the production of a witness---Petitioner (landlady) filed an application seeking directions for the respondents to deposit rent in the court---Former application was allowed and latter application was dismissed---In appeal the decision of the Trial Court was upheld against which present Constitutional petition was filed---The two pivotal questions for determination before the High Court were as to (i) Whether provision of S. 22(3) of the Act is directory or mandatory in nature? and (ii) Whether order for deposit of rent in Court can be passed by the Special Judge (Rent)/Rent Tribunal when relationship of landlord and tenant is yet to be determined?---Held: A bare perusal of the interpretation of a mandatory and directory provision would make it crystal clear that S. 22(3) of the Act, 2009 was "directory" in nature, however, courts were required to make all endeavors to follow the directory persuasions but not at the cost of justice---Although in S. 22(3) of the Act, 2009, the words "affidavits of not more than two witnesses" have been mentioned but these words were directory in nature and court could exercise its jurisdiction keeping in view the facts of the case and could allow more witnesses to appear in the witness box and depose---The purpose of the Act, 2009 was to regulate the relationship between landlords and tenants and to provide a mechanism for resolving disputes in a timely and cost-effective manner---The rationale behind mentioning of number of witnesses was actually to curtail the time spent in rent matters and expeditious disposal thereof---Trial Court being at the helm of affairs closely monitored and controlled the speed of trial and could exercise its discretion but in accordance with legal principles while applying judicious mind---If production of witness was permitted, even then it would not have prejudiced the case of either party as the petitioner would have the right to cross-examine the said witness and in this way, permission to produce the said witness would not have prejudiced the rights of the petitioner (landlady)---As regards deposit of rent in court, it was noted that when relationship of landlord and tenant had been denied by tenant, he could not be burdened with deposit of rent, especially in the present case when respondents Nos. 1 to 3 (alleged tenants) had already vacated the premises---Where relationship of landlord and tenant was denied by the tenants, they could not be compelled to deposit the rent till the relationship was established---No jurisdictional defect, illegality, legal infirmity or perversity in the impugned order and judgment could be pointed out---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)--- ----Ss. 2(l) & 24---Eviction application---Relationship of landlord and tenant, denial of---Order for payment of rent pending proceedings---Principle---Where the relationship of landlord and tenant is denied, the Rent Tribunal would lack jurisdiction, on account of the doctrine of jurisdictional fact, to pass an order for payment of rent due under S. 24 of the Act until and unless the Tribunal positively ascertains the relationship of tenancy and establishes that the respondent to the eviction application is in fact a 'tenant' in terms of S. 2(l) of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009. Mian Umar Ikram-ul-Haque v. Dr. Shahida Hasnain and another 2016 SCMR 2186 rel. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Words "may" and "shall" used in a section of an Act or an Ordinance---Whether directory or mandatory---Principle---'May' and 'shall' are interchangeable and their interpretation as to whether they are directory or mandatory in nature depends upon the context in which they are used and cannot be interpreted with the rigidity attributed to them in ordinary parlance---If no penal consequences are given in a provision, even if the word "shall" is used therein, the said provision becomes directory (and not mandatory) and the word "shall" will be read as "may". Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Officer (RTO), Mayo Road, Rawalpindi and another v. Messrs Sarwaq Traders, 216/1-A, Adamjee Road, Rawalpindi and another 2022 SCMR 1333 and Orient Power Company (Private) Limited through Authorized Officer v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited through Managing Director 2021 SCMR 1728 rel. (d) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Provision in a statute---Whether directory or mandatory---Principle---In order to determine whether a proviso is directory or mandatory, the duty of the court is to try to unravel the real intention of the legislature---The ultimate test is the intent of the legislature and not the language in which the intent is clothed---The object and purpose of enacting the provision provide a strong and clear indicator for ascertaining such intent of the legislature---The intention of the legislature must govern and this is to be ascertained not only from the phraseology of the provision but also by considering its nature, its object, and the consequences which would follow from construing it one way or the other---This exercise entails careful examination of the scheme of the Act in order to discover the real purpose and object of the Act---A provision in a statute is mandatory if the omission to follow it renders the proceedings to which it relates illegal and void, while a provision is directory if its observance is not necessary to the validity of the proceeding---One of the important tests that must always be employed in order to determine whether a provision is mandatory or directory in character is to consider whether the non-compliance of a particular provision causes inconvenience or injustice and, if it does, the court would say that that provision must be complied within and that it is obligatory in its character---There are three fundamental tests, which are often applied with remarkable success in the determination of this question---They are based on considerations of the scope and object, sometimes called the scheme and purpose, of the enactment in question, on considerations of justice and balance of convenience and on a consideration of the nature of the particular provision, namely, whether it affects the performance of a public duty or relates to a right, privilege or power - in the former case the enactment is generally directory, in the latter mandatory. Province of Punjab through Conservator of Forest, Faisalabad and others's case 2021 SCMR 328 rel. (e) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Provision in a statute---Whether directory or mandatory---Principle---The test to determine whether a provision is directory or mandatory is by ascertaining the legislative intent behind the same---The general rule expounded by the Supreme Court is that the usage of the word "shall" generally carries the connotation that a provision is mandatory in nature---However, other factors such as the object and purpose of the statute and inclusion of penal consequences in cases of non-compliance also serve as an instructive guide in deducing the nature of the provision. Province of Punjab through Secretary Excise and Taxation Department, Lahore and others v. Murree Brewery Company Limited (MBCL) and another 2021 SCMR 305 rel. Muhammad Akbar Awan for Petitioner. Muhammad Usman Rasheed, Ahtisham-ud-Din Khan and Nouman Sarwar for Respondents Nos. 1 to 3. Date of hearing: 6th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Service law — Recruitment to teaching posts (Lecturer/Assistant Professor Commerce) — “Relevant subject” — MBA v. M.Com — Azad Jammu & Kashmir Education Service Class-I (Collegiate Branch-Men) Rules, 2001 — For Lecturer (B-17) a Master’s degree in the “relevant subject”; for Assistant Professor (B-18) Ph.D/M.Phil/Master’s with specified experience in the “relevant subject” — Held: in the context of Commerce, “relevant subject” means M.Com and allied commerce-specific postgraduate study; MBA is a professional, management-oriented qualification and is not an interchangeable substitute for M.Com for faculty recruitment in Commerce. (b) Academic equivalence v. employment eligibility — Mandate of HEC & PSC — Higher Education Commission (HEC) may determine equivalence for academic purposes only; it has no authority to declare degrees interchangeable for employment or to bind employers on recruitment criteria — Public Service Commission (PSC) conducts/ recommends but cannot override employer’s prescribed qualifications — Employer/appointing authority retains prerogative to stipulate job-specific qualifications subject to law — Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Farasatullah (2020 PLC (C.S.) 1423) & Waqas Aslam v. LESCO (2023 SCMR 549) followed. (c) Judicial review — Limits in qualification/equivalence determinations — Courts in writ/appellate jurisdiction do not sit as HR or academic bodies to compare curricula or declare functional equivalence of degrees for service recruitment — Interference lies only on arbitrariness, mala fides, discrimination, or violation of statute/policy — High Court erred in suo motu equating MBA with M.Com on a 30-10-1983 letter while record reflected distinct fields and employer discretion. (d) MBA–M.Com distinction — Nature, orientation & trajectories — M.Com is academic/research-centric in commerce (advanced accounting, taxation, business law, corporate finance); MBA is professional/industry-focused (management, strategy, operations, HR) — International persuasive authority: Ity Patni v. University of Rajasthan, 2019 SCC OnLine Raj 2416; Dhanya Babu v. University of Calicut, W.P.(C) 25511/2015 — Distinction upheld. (e) “Higher” qualification argument rejected — A higher or broader degree cannot substitute a specifically prescribed qualification unless recruitment rules or a competent equivalence notification so provide — Doctrine of specificity over generality applied. (f) PSC process — Pre-examination scrutiny — PSC policy of deferring document verification until after written tests criticized as administratively unsound and unfair to candidates; Court recommends PSC adopt transparent, front-loaded scrutiny to avoid hardship and legitimate-expectation issues (observation/direction in policy domain). (g) Natural justice/audi alteram partem — Respondents’ plea of denial of hearing prior to disqualification untenable where ineligibility stems from clear, rule-based qualification mismatch; no vested right to interview contrary to prescribed criteria. Disposition: All four appeals allowed; High Court judgments dated 25-04-2024 (W.P. 2046/2019) and 24-06-2024 (W.P. 1702/2019) set aside; PSC disqualification letters restored; proceedings to be finalized within two months of communication; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan—Art. 225—Elections Act, 2017, Ss. 144(4), 145—Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), O.VI, R.15 & S.139—Election dispute—Maintainability—Verification of election petition—Mandatory requirement—Scope—Jurisdiction of Tribunal—Nature—Effect of non-compliance. Challenge was made to election results for PP-167 (Lahore-XXIII), alleging corrupt practices and manipulation of Forms-45—Election Tribunal rejected the petition due to procedural defects in its filing—Supreme Court held that election disputes must strictly comply with the Elections Act, 2017, which operates as a self-contained code under Art. 225 of the Constitution—Filing and verification requirements under Ss. 144(4) & 145 of the Elections Act, read with O.VI, R.15 CPC, were found to be mandatory and not procedural formalities—Failure to provide valid verification under oath rendered the petition defective—Verification lacked proper attestation by the Oath Commissioner; petitioner was not identified by CNIC or in person, and the rubber stamp lacked clarity about the oath’s administration—Such procedural non-compliance, having penal consequences, vitiated the petition—Jurisdiction of the Election Tribunal being statutory and exceptional, strict adherence to legal formalities was imperative—Held, the election petition was rightly rejected by the Tribunal for non-compliance with statutory requirements. Cited Cases: • Zafar Abbas v. Hassan Murtaza (PLD 2005 SC 600) • Inayatullah v. Syed Khursheed Ahmed Shah (2014 SCMR 1477) • Hina Manzoor v. Malik Ibrar Ahmed (PLD 2015 SC 396) • Lt.-Col. (Rtd.) Ghazanfar Abbas Shah v. Mehr Khalid Mehmood Sargana (2015 SCMR 1585) • Feroze Ahmed Jamali v. Masroor Ahmad Khan Jatoi (2016 SCMR 750) • Muhammad Ibrahim Jatoi v. Aftab Shaban Mirani (2016 SCMR 722) • Malik Umar Aslam v. Sumera Malik (PLD 2007 SC 362) • Zia Ur Rehman v. Syed Ahmed Hussain (2014 SCMR 1015) Disposition: Appeal dismissed.