Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 11---Res judicata---Applicability---Petitioner seeking to reopen issue of respondent's paternity and entitlement to inherit legacy of her father despite earlier adjudication regarding paternity up to the Supreme Court---Legality---Constructive res judicata---Scope---Grounds available but not taken in former suit deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue---Judgment in rem and in personam---A judgment on paternity, being both in personam and in rem, operates as res judicata on status and title, binding even those claiming under a party to the earlier suit---In the present case the petitioner sought to challenge inheritance mutation and deprive the respondent of her share---Primary issue in the present case was as to "whether the petitioner could re-litigate/agitate the question of the respondent's parentage and her entitlement to inherit from her father, despite that matter already having been conclusively decided in earlier proceedings up to the Supreme Court"?---Held: The submission of the cognovit by the respondent No. 2 raised serious question of maintainability vis-a-vis the application of res judicata---Undeniably, he was the main defendant in the former suit---It was he who disputed the parentage of the respondent No. 1, and to reiterate, he unsuccessfully contested the same issue till the Supreme Court---The materiality of this admission lay in the fact that he was the real maternal uncle of the petitioner---In this perspective, perhaps there was no need to say who was standing behind the petitioner in the background---Indeed, the cognovit stood as more than a mere admission---It constituted a tacit alignment with the petitioner's position, thereby effectively placing the respondent No. 2 in the shoes of the petitioner---By supporting the petitioner's plea, he then, by implication, challenged, in fact, re-agitated the parentage of the respondent No. 1, which, as an issue directly and substantially involved in the former suit, had been determined by all the Courts concurrently---Principles of applicability of constructive res judicata were squarely attracted to the present case---It was fully established on all canons of evidence in the former suit that the respondent No. 1 was the daughter of late "AH"---Even Mst. "HJ", mother of petitioner, who, too, was alive at that time, did not raise any such objection---It was to be noted that the paternity was never challenged in the lifetime of "AH"---Another key aspect of the case was the legal character of the earlier judgment concerning the paternity of the respondent No. 1, which partook both of a judgment in personam and in rem---While a judgment in personam bound the parties to the suit, a judgment in rem conclusively determined the legal status of a person or thing and was binding erga omnes, provided it was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction---The adjudication in the former suit, upheld by the highest judicial fora, directly and conclusively determined the respondent No. 1's parentage as the biological daughter of "AH" and Mst. "MJ", an issue that was central to the dispute and decided after full contest---Although the petitioner was not a party to that litigation, he claimed under "AH" the same title as the respondent No. 2 did in the earlier suit-and was therefore bound by the earlier determination---Consequently, the former judgment operated as res judicata, both as to status and title, precluding the present challenge---High Court emphasized that the present case had serious implications for women's right to inheritance---It had been fully established from the record that in the former suit, the respondent No. 2 tried to deprive the respondent No. 1 in the inheritance of her father by fraudulently obtaining from her a sale deed which she challenged before the court and obtained a decree in her favour---The respondent No. 2 contested the suit till the Supreme Court, dragging her in litigation till the final Court---Now, in the present suit, he again approached the High Court being hands in glove with the petitioner, to re-agitate the issue which was deemed to have been taken on the doctrine of constructive res judicata---Present case was a typical example of creating a pretext to deprive a woman of her property rights in the inheritance of her parents---Higher Courts, particularly, the Supreme Court consistently condemned the practice of depriving female legal heirs of their rightful shares in inheritance, as ordained by Shari'ah---Petitioner's suit was barred by the principle of constructive res judicata---The concurrent findings of the Courts below dismissing the petitioner's claim were affirmed---Present suit constituted an impermissible attempt to reopen issues conclusively determined till the Supreme Court---The judgments and orders of the Courts below, being well-reasoned, did not warrant interference in revisional jurisdiction---Consequently, present petition, being devoid of merit, was dismissed in limini. Mst. Parveen (deceased) through L.Rs. v. M. Pervaiz and others 2022 SCMR 64 rel. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 11, 'Explanation IV'---Constructive res judicata---Principles stated---Explanation IV to S. 11 of C.P.C. postulates that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in a subsequent suit---Five principles of constructive res judicata as laid down by the Supreme Court are that: (i) The matter is directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit or issue must be the same matter which was directly or substantially in issue either in actually or constructively in the former suit; (ii) The former suit must have been a suit between the same parties or between the parties under whom they or anyone of them claim; (iii) The parties as aforesaid must have litigated under the same title in the former suit; (iv) The Court which decided the former suit must have been a Court competent to try the subsequent suit in which such issue is subsequently raised; (v) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided by the Court in the first suit. Province of Punjab v. Ibrahim and Sons 2000 SCMR 1172 rel. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 11---Constructive res judicata---Principle---Scope---A party cannot circumvent a final judgment by introducing new grounds or claims in a subsequent suit which were available but not asserted earlier---Even if certain questions were not raised in the earlier proceedings, the omission to do so attracted the principle of constructive res judicata---Where the parties had the opportunity to assert all available grounds in a prior suit but failed to do so, such unraised grounds shall be deemed to have been heard and decided, and the parties would be precluded from agitating the same in subsequent litigation. Ch. Maqbool Raza v. Ashfaq Ahmad 2013 YLR 407; Khushi Muhammad v. Province of Punjab 1999 SCMR 1633; Amanul Mulk v. Ghafoor-ur-Rehman 1997 SCMR 1796 and Ghulam Akbar Lang v. Deewan Ashiq Hussain Bukhari and others 2012 SCMR 366 rel. (d) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S. 42---Paternity, challenge to---Legality---Throwing a legal challenge to the paternity of someone is not an assertion of one's own legal character in terms of S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1887---A person whose legal character, including paternity, is denied, can file a suit to assert entitlement. Munir Hussain and others v. Riffat Shamim and others 2023 SCMR 6; Mst. Laila Qayyum v. Fawad Qayyum and others PLD 2019 SC 449; Rehmatullah Khan v. Government of Pakistan 2003 SCMR 50; Ghazala Tehsin Zohra v. Ghulam Dastagir Khan PLD 2015 SC 327 and Salman Akram Raja v. Government of Punjab 2013 SCMR 203 rel. Deokali v. Kedar Nath ILR 39 Cal. 704, 709; Khanchand v. Jacobabad Municipality AIR 1946 Sindh 98; Abdur Rahman Bhuyia v. Commission of Narayanganj Municipality PLD 1959 Dacca 5; Abdul Rahman Mobashir v. Amir Ali Shah PLD 1978 Lah. 113; Daw Pone v. Ma Hnin May AIR 1941 Rangood 220, 221 and Abdul Karim v. Sarray Begum AIR 1945 Lah. 266 ref. (e) Judgment--- ----Judgment in rem and judgment in personam---Scope---Distinction---Judgment in rem-determines the status of a thing or a person and is conclusive against the world at large---Judgment in personam binds specific parties to the litigation. Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Karachi International Container Terminal Limited, (K.I.C.T.) 2010 CLC 1666 ref. Majid Karim for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 12th May, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 02.02.2016 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 2308 of 2015). (a) Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974)--- ----S. 5---Punjab Service Tribunal---Powers---Principle of proportionality---Scope---Petitioner (Sub-Inspector) was proceeded against on allegations pertaining to faulty investigation by him, and was awarded major penalty of dismissal from service; on departmental appeal, the penalty was reduced to a two-stage reduction in pay while he was reinstated into service---Petitioner approached the Punjab Service Tribunal ('Tribunal'), seeking reinstatement with effect from the date of his original dismissal, along with all consequential benefits, however, the Tribunal modified the penalty from a two-stage to a one-stage reduction in pay('impugned order')---Validity---Record revealed that, through impugned order, the Tribunal found that although an investigation had been conducted, yet the prosecution failed to produce even a shred of evidence to substantiate the allegations---Despite said categorical findings, the Tribunal opted merely to reduce the penalty, rather than exonerate the petitioner---It appeared that the Tribunal relied, albeit implicitly, on the principle of proportionality, finding the original penalty disproportionate to the alleged misconduct---However, this application was both legally flawed and logically inconsistent with its own conclusion when no misconduct was established---Tribunal failed to properly exercise its discretion under Section 5 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, which empowered it to confirm, set aside, vary, or modify impugned orders---While the Tribunal has authority to vary the punishment in appropriate cases, such discretion must be exercised judiciously grounded in the record, legal standards, and principles of fairness---Judicial interference with disciplinary penalties is only justified where the penalty is arbitrary, perverse, or based on irrelevant considerations---Once the Tribunal found that the allegations were wholly unsubstantiated, the only lawful outcome was to exonerate the petitioner---Proportionality promotes a stable and systematic method of constitutional adjudication---Courts employing said approach are expected to articulate clearly the reasoning behind their decisions at each stage of the analysis thereby enhancing transparency, accountability, and legitimacy in judicial reasoning---Proportionality must, therefore, be applied with discipline, care, and sensitivity to context, particularly where fundamental rights and human dignity are at stake---Thus, the impugned order was untenable in both law and fact---Once the Tribunal determined that the charges were unsubstantiated, the only legally viable course was to exonerate the petitioner---The imposition of any penalty, absent proven misconduct, constitutes a violation of natural justice and results in a manifest miscarriage of justice---The Tribunal's decision, being internally inconsistent and contrary to constitutional norms, was accordingly set aside---The petitioner stood exonerated and was directed to be reinstated in service from the date of his original dismissal, with all consequential benefits---Accordingly, petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed. Deputy Postmaster General v. Habib Ahmed 2021 PLC (C.S.) 531; Secretary, Government of Punjab v. Khalid Hussain Hamdani 2013 SCMR 817; Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services, D.G. Khan v. Nadeem Raza 2023 SCMR 803; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Nargis Jamal 2022 SCMR 2114; Postmaster General Sindh, Karachi v. Syed Farhan 2022 SCMR 1154 and T Alexander Aleinikoff, 'Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing' (1987) 96 Yale LJ 943 ref. (b) Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974)--- ----S. 5---Punjab Service Tribunal---Powers---Disciplinary actions---Principle of proportionality, applicability of---Four-step test---Scope---Petitioner (Sub-Inspector) was proceeded against on allegations pertaining to faulty investigation by him, and was awarded major penalty of dismissal from service; on departmental appeal, the penalty was reduced to a two-stage reduction in pay while he was reinstated into service---Petitioner approached the Punjab Service Tribunal ('Tribunal'), seeking reinstatement with effect from the date of his original dismissal, along with all consequential benefits, however , the Tribunal modified the penalty from a two-stage to a one-stage reduction in pay ('impugned order')---Validity---Record revealed that, through impugned order , the Tribunal found that although an investigation had been conducted, yet the prosecution failed to produce even a shred of evidence to substantiate the allegations---The principle of proportionality provides a structured framework for judicial review of administrative actions ; it involves a four-step test: (i) the measure must pursue a legitimate aim; (ii) be suitable to achieve that aim; (iii) be necessary, in that no less restrictive alternative exists; and (iv) strike a fair balance between the measure's impact on individual rights and the public interest---Adopting said four-stage test to assess the legality and fairness of administrative and disciplinary decisions, ensures that any interference with rights is justified, necessary, and lawful---In the present case, the Tribunal's own findings confirmed that there was no credible evidence, documentary or oral, linking the petitioner to the alleged misconduct---No regular inquiry was held, and the principles of natural justice were violated---In such circumstances, the very first limb of the proportionality test i.e., legitimacy failed---Without proven misconduct, there can be no legitimate objective warranting disciplinary action---Any penalty, however minor, is thus disproportionate by default---The absence of evidence removes the legal basis for any sanction---Thus, the impugned order was untenable in both law and fact---Once the Tribunal determined that the charges were unsubstantiated, the only legally viable course was to exonerate the petitioner---The imposition of any penalty, absent proven misconduct, constitutes a violation of natural justice and results in a manifest miscarriage of justice---The Tribunal's decision, being internally inconsistent and contrary to constitutional norms, was accordingly set aside---The petitioner stood exonerated and was directed to be reinstated in service from the date of his original dismissal, with all consequential benefits---Accordingly, petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed. HP Wade, CR Forsyth and the Rt Hon Lord Woolf, De Smith's Judicial Review 8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018; Muhammad Nasir Ismail v. Government of Punjab 2025 SCMR 708; Shahida Siddiqa v. Allied Bank Limited 2024 SCMR 92; Pervaiz Hussain Shah v. Government of Punjab 2024 SCMR 309; Ijaz Badshah v. Government of Pakistan 2023 SCMR 407; Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services v. Nadeem Raza 2023 SCMR 803; Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police, Lahore 2021 PLC (C.S.) 762; Muhammad Iqbal Khan Noori v. NAB PLD 2021 SC 916; Sabir Iqbal v. Cantonment Board PLD 2019 SC 189; De Freitas v. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture [1999] 1 AC 69; R(Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 532; R v. Shayler [2003] 1 AC 247; Huang v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] 2 AC 167; Bank Mellat v. HM Treasury (No.2) [2013] UKSC 39; District and Sessions Judge (Authority), Jhang v. Ghulam Shabbir C.P.L.A. No. 2987-L of 2019; Aamir Akbar v. Additional Superintendent of Police, Bahawalpur 2025 SCMR 632; Sakhib Zar v. K-Electric Limited 2024 SCMR 1722 and Raja Muhammad Shahid v. Inspector General of Police 2023 SCMR 1135 ref. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 4, 14 & 25---Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974), S. 5---Punjab Service Tribunal---Powers---Treatment in accordance with law--- Human dignity---Equality before the law---Scope---Petitioner (Sub-Inspector) was proceeded against on allegations pertaining to faulty investigation by him, and was awarded major penalty of dismissal from service; on departmental appeal, the penalty was reduced to a two-stage reduction in pay while he was reinstated into service---Petitioner approached the Punjab Service Tribunal ('Tribunal'), seeking reinstatement with effect from the date of his original dismissal, along with all consequential benefits, however, the Tribunal modified the penalty from a two-stage to a one-stage reduction in pay ('impugned order')---Validity---Articles 4, 14 and 25 of the Constitution, which guarantee the right to be treated in accordance with law, human dignity, and equality before the law, require all forums, including Tribunals, to ensure that disciplinary measures are not only lawful but also fair and just---In the present case, once the Tribunal concluded that the disciplinary process was procedurally flawed and unsupported by evidence, it was legally and constitutionally bound to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits---Failure of the Tribunal to do so reflected a fundamental error of law, a misapplication of the principle of proportionality, and a disregard for the constitutional principles of fairness and due process---Endeavouring to "balance" unproven misconduct with the imposition of a continuing penalty is both illogical and legally untenable---Given the manifestly unjust disciplinary proceedings, the petitioner was entitled to complete exoneration and full restitution---It is not the role of the Tribunal to engage in an exercise of mercy or compromise where the foundational basis of penal action is wholly unsubstantiated---Fairness demands rectification, not calibration, in the face of injustice---Thus, the impugned order was untenable in both law and fact---Once the Tribunal determined that the charges were unsubstantiated, the only legally viable course was to exonerate the petitioner---The imposition of any penalty, absent proven misconduct, constitutes a violation of natural justice and results in a manifest miscarriage of justice---The Tribunal's decision, being internally inconsistent and contrary to constitutional norms, was accordingly set aside---The petitioner stood exonerated and was directed to be reinstated in service from the date of his original dismissal, with all consequential benefits---Accordingly, petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed. Javed Imran Ranjha, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (Through Video Link, Lahore). Khalid Masood Ghani, Additional Advocate General, Punjab along with Nasir Abbas, DSP Legal and Shoaib Inspector, Legal for Respondents. Assisted by Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan. Date of hearing: 12th May, 2025.

Summary: (On appeal against the judgment dated 19.10.2020 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Sibi Bench, in Criminal Jail Appeals No(s).14, 15 of 2019, Criminal Acquittal Appeal No(s).160 of 2019 and Murder Reference No.(s) 03 of 2019). (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Delay of three hours and ten minutes in lodging the FIR---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Occurrence in the case took place on 02.01.2019 at about 06:20 pm but the FIR was lodged on the same day at 09:30 pm, with the delay of about three hours and ten minutes from the occurrence---Distance between the police station and the place of occurrence was only two (02) furlongs---Postmortem examination on the dead-body of the deceased was conducted on 02.01.2019 at about 7:20 pm i.e., earlier to the registration of FIR, which was lodged at 9:30 p.m.---Medical Officer stated in his examination-in-chief that the dead-body of deceased was brought to the Hospital for postmortem examination by the police authorities---Even eyewitness stated in his examination-in-chief that after the occurrence, as soon as, the accused persons decamped from the spot, the patrolling police employees came to the shop of the complainant/place of occurrence---All the said facts showed that the police got information regarding the incident soon after the occurrence but even then the FIR was not lodged till 9:30 pm and the same was lodged after conducting postmortem examination on the dead-body of the deceased---Under the circumstances, it was evident that the FIR was lodged after due deliberations and consultations---Actually the prosecution eye-witnesses were not present at the spot at the relevant time and they had not witnessed the occurrence, therefore, the said delay in lodging the FIR was consumed in procuring the attendance of fake eye-witnesses and concocting a fabricated story of the prosecution---Said gross delay in lodging the FIR had created doubt regarding the truthfulness of the prosecution story---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. Mehmood Ahmed and others v. The State and another 1995 SCMR 127; Shaukat Hussain v. The State through PG Punjab and another 2024 SCMR 929 and Khial Muhammad v. The State 2024 SCMR 1490 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Contradictions in the statements of witnesses---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Complainant attributed to appellant and co-convict a joint role of firing at deceased, whereas eye-witness had not attributed any role to co-convict of firing at deceased or causing injuries to him---Said glaring contractions in the statements of eye-witnesses showed that in fact they were not present at the spot, at the time of occurrence---Said material contradictions about the salient features of the case had made their evidence highly doubtful and un-reliable---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly . (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Motive not proved---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant by firing---No motive whatsoever was alleged in the contents of the FIR or in the statements of the eye-witnesses recorded before the Trial Court and it was only mentioned therein that earlier appellant extended threats of life to the complainant party and also earlier committed an occurrence in the shop of the complainant party---Not explained by the prosecution that as to why the appellant earlier extended threats of life to the complainant party---No specific date, time or place of earlier threats allegedly given by the appellant to the complainant party was mentioned therein---Likewise, no date or time of the earlier incident, which was allegedly committed by the appellant in the shop of the complainant party was stated in the contents of the FIR or in the statements of witnesses---No FIR or Rapt or any application lodged by the complainant party against the appellant regarding the alleged earlier occurrence was produced in the prosecution evidence---Thus, a vague and ambiguous motive was alleged by the prosecution which could not be proved against the appellant or his co-accused---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Recovery of pistol and crime empties---Reliance---Scope---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Record showed that the empties and pistol were deposited together to the office of Forensic Science Laboratory on 01.02.2019---Under the circumstances, it was not safe to rely upon the prosecution evidence qua the recovery of pistol and positive report of Forensic Science Laboratory---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly. Sarfraz v. The State 2023 SCMR 670 and Abdul Wahid v. The State 2023 SCMR 1278 rel. (e) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---If there is a single circumstance, which creates doubt in the prosecution case then the same will be sufficient to acquit the accused. Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 and Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 rel. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt extended to co-convict---Scope---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant by firing---As per record, it had already been concluded that the facts and circumstances of the case showed that the prosecution eye-witnesses were not present at the spot at the relevant time and there were glaring contradictions in the statements of the prosecution eye-witnesses, hence their evidence was highly doubtful and unreliable---Prosecution had failed to prove the alleged motive---After coming to that conclusion, the conviction and sentence awarded to co-convict could not be allowed to remain in the field, merely on the basis of a technical ground that he had not filed any appeal before the Supreme Court against the judgment of the High Court---Though, co-convict had not filed any appeal against the impugned judgment of the High Court but it would not be just and fair for the Supreme Court to deny the benefit of doubt to co-convict, which benefit had been extended to appellant, when the case of the appellant and the co-convict was not distinguishable rather the case of the co-convict was at better footings, as compared to the case of appellant---Co-convict was not attributed any motive---No weapon was recovered from historical possession and the prosecution eye-witnesses did not assign him any role of firing at deceased or causing injuries to him---Under the circumstances, the conviction and sentence of co-convict could not be allowed to remain in the field, merely on the basis of that technicality that he had not filed any appeal before the Supreme Court against his conviction and sentence---Co-convict was acquitted, in circumstances. Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana AIR 2003 SC 2987; Lal Khan v. The State 2006 SCMR 1846; Rahib Ali v. The State 2018 SCMR 418; Rafaqat Ali v. Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab 2024 SCMR 34; Muhammad Aslam and 5 others v. The State 1972 SCMR 194; Ghulam Nabi Shah v. Crwon 1969 SCMR 629; Amin Ali and another v. The State 2011 SCMR 323; Shabbir Ahmed v. The State 2011 SCMR 1142 Imtiaz alias Taj v. The State and others 2018 SCMR 344 rel. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt extended to the absconding accused---Scope---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant by firing---As per record, one co-accused was a proclaimed offender---According to the prosecution evidence brought on the record, on the day of occurrence, the said co-accused since P.O along with co-accused since acquitted came outside the shop of the complainant along with appellant and co-convict and they both remained present outside the said shop and raised a proverbial lalkara that the complainant party should not be spared alive---Co-accused since acquitted, who was attributed a similar role along with co-accused since P.O, had already been acquitted by the Trial Court, therefore, no useful purpose shall be served by the arrest of co-accused since P.O and putting him to trial by the Trial Court because ultimately he had to be acquitted by the Trial Court in the light of observations made by the trial Court in respect of the case of co-accused since acquitted, as well as in the light of findings recorded by the Supreme Court in the instant judgment---Further Court proceedings in the case of co-accused since P.O shall be a futile exercise and the same shall amount to sheer abuse of process of the Court and the law---Thus, co-accused since P.O was acquitted by extending benefit of doubt. [p. 1643] I Muhammad Aslam and 5 others v. The State 1972 SCMR 194 rel. Syeda B. H. Shah, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Syed Pervez Bukhari, State Counsel for the State. Hafiz Ahsan Ahmad Khokhar, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant. Muhammad Akram Sheikh, Senior Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Syed Faraz Raza, Advocate High Court and Ms. Sehar Mahsud, Advocate Amici Curaie. Date of hearing: 12th May, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 31.01.2018, in Criminal Appeal No. 534 of 2015 and Murder Reference No. 8 of 2016). (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 302(c)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Lodgment of F.I.R with promptitude---Petitioner allegedly committed murder of the deceased by firing---From the record and the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it was clear that the occurrence took place within the shop premises of the petitioner on 20.11.2012 at approximately 04:00 p.m.---Matter was reported to the police with commendable promptitude at 05:40 p.m. by the complainant to police, thereby substantially excluding the possibility of deliberation or consultation in falsely implicating the petitioner---Circumstances established that the prosecution proved its case against the accused-petitioner, however, in view of the totality of circumstances including the absence of premeditation, the sudden and spontaneous nature of the occurrence, the fact that only a single shot was fired by the petitioner/convict, the unarmed status of the deceased and the consistency between the ocular and medical evidence, court was persuaded to hold that the case of the petitioner squarely fell within the ambit of Section 302(c), P.P.C---Conviction of the petitioner/convict recorded under Section 302(b), P.P.C. through the impugned judgment was altered to one under Section 302(c), P.P.C.---Accordingly, the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to the petitioner/convict was reduced to rigorous imprisonment for fourteen years---Consequently, the jail petition was converted into an appeal and was partly allowed. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 302(c)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Ocular account supported by medical evidence---Petitioner allegedly committed murder of the deceased by firing---Ocular account of the incident was furnished by the complainant and a witness, both of whom were natural witnesses, being related to the deceased and present at the scene of occurrence---Said witnesses had categorically and consistently attributed a solitary firearm injury to the petitioner, which was inflicted upon the deceased during a physical altercation---Incident having occurred in broad daylight, left no room for mistaken identity---Testimony of the eyewitnesses was coherent and consistent not only with each other but also with the medical evidence on all material particulars, including the date, time, and location of the occurrence---Both the eye-witnesses had stated unequivocally that the deceased had purchased a SIM from the petitioner a day prior to the incident---Upon discovering that the SIM contained no balance and the petitioner's refusal to accept responsibility, an exchange of hot words ensued, followed by a physical grappling initiated by the deceased---Moreover, it was in the heat of that altercation that the petitioner drew a pistol from a drawer of his shop and fired a single shot at the deceased, which struck the deceased on the left flank---Medical evidence, as provided by Medical Officer, who conducted the post-mortem examination, fully supported/corroborated the ocular account---Circumstances established that the prosecution proved its case against the accused-petitioner, however, in view of the totality of circumstances including the absence of premeditation, the sudden and spontaneous nature of the occurrence, the fact that only a single shot was fired by the petitioner/convict, the unarmed status of the deceased, and the consistency between the ocular and medical evidence, Court was persuaded to hold that the case of the petitioner squarely fell within the ambit of Section 302(c), P.P.C.---Conviction of the petitioner/convict recorded under Section 302(b), P.P.C. through the impugned judgment was altered to one under Section 302(c), P.P.C.---Accordingly, the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to the petitioner/convict was reduced to rigorous imprisonment for fourteen years---Consequently, the jail petition was converted into an appeal and was partly allowed. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 302(c)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Sentence, reduction in---Petitioner allegedly committed murder of the deceased by firing---On a meticulous appraisal of the evidence on record, it was evident that the occurrence took place at the spur of the moment without any premeditation or prior enmity between the deceased and the petitioner/convict---Deceased, who, was accompanied by his brothers and cousin, approached the petitioner's shop and initiated a confrontation that escalated into physical grappling---In an instinctive reaction to the perceived threat to his person, the petitioner resorted to the use of a firearm---However, as the deceased was unarmed at the time of the occurrence, therefore, the act of firing a shot even if in self-defence exceeded the bounds of lawful self-defence as contemplated under the law---In cases where the accused, while acting in self-defence or under sudden provocation, caused the death of a person, such circumstances may justify a conviction under Section 302(c), P.P.C.---Yet there was another fact that if the deceased had not visited the shop of the petitioner/convict, the occurrence would not have taken place---Case in hand was surely a case of lack of premeditation, the incident was one of a sudden fight which was the result of heat of passion developed upon a sudden quarrel and no undue advantage had been taken by the petitioner/convict nor had he acted in brutal or unusual manner---In the circumstances, Exception 4 contained in the erstwhile Section 300, P.P.C., squarely stood attracted to this case---In view of the totality of circumstances including the absence of premeditation, the sudden and spontaneous nature of the occurrence, the fact that only a single shot was fired by the petitioner/convict, the unarmed status of the deceased and the consistency between the ocular and medical evidence, Court was persuaded to hold that the case of the petitioner squarely fell within the ambit of Section 302(c), P.P.C.---Conviction of the petitioner/convict recorded under Section 302(b), P.P.C through the impugned judgment was altered to one under Section 302(c), P.P.C.---Accordingly, the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to the petitioner/convict was reduced to rigorous imprisonment for fourteen years---Consequently, the jail petition was converted into an appeal and was partly allowed. The State v. Muhammad Hanif and 5 others 1992 SCMR 2047; Azmat Ullah v. The State 2014 SCMR 1178; Zeeshan alias Shani v. The State PLD 2017 SC 165; Raza and another v. The State and others 2020 SCMR 1185 and Muhammad Ajmal v. The State 2022 SCMR 88 rel. Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record and Basharatullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in J.P. No. 149 of 2018). Laiq Khan Swati, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Crl. PLA. No. 374 of 2018). Tariq Siddique, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State. Date of hearing: 8th May, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 23.06.2021 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No. D-134 of 2016 and Confirmation Case No. 26 of 2016). (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 377, 341, 147, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, unnatural offence, wrongful restraint, rioting, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Re-appraisal of evidence---Delay of thirty one hours and thirty minutes in lodging the FIR---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of the minor son of complainant after committing sodomy with him---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death, which conviction and sentence was upheld by the High Court---Validity---Record showed that there was a considerable delay of more than 31_ hours in lodging of the FIR---Moreover, it was also a matter of record, rather it was an admitted position on the part of the complainant, that the FIR was registered after due consultation with two persons and the local police---From the deposition of complainant, it was evident that the postmortem of the deceased was conducted before lodging of the FIR---Complainant had admitted that after leaving the dead body at the spot he did not go to the Police Station for lodging of the FIR rather he went to the Nekmard and his uncle to inform them about the incident---Even after picking the dead body from the spot complainant made no effort to lodge the FIR as again he went to the hospital and had the postmortem conducted, and finally after completing the burial of the deceased, he went to the Police Station for lodging the FIR, causing a delay of 31_ hours---First Information Report, was to be lodged at the very initial stage of the incidents, that the legal process might be put into motion---In the instant case however, the FIR was registered after some events, i.e. informing co-villagers, taking them to the spot, taking the deceased's body to the hospital, getting postmortem and medical checkup done and finally the burial of the deceased---Thus, it was only after all these episodes the FIR was lodged after due consultation and preliminary investigation/enquiry of the Police on the spot, which, had put a major dent on the case of the complainant as well as that of the prosecution---In this case, it stood admitted that the FIR was registered after due consultation with private persons and the police and after conducting an enquiry, due to which it lost its evidentiary value---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64; Altaf Hussain v. The State 2019 SCMR 274; Amir Muhammad Khan v. The State 2023 SCMR 566; Khial Muhammad v. The State 2024 SCMR 1490; Abid Hussain and another v. The State and another 2024 SCMR 1608; Shaukat Hussain v. The State through PG Punjab and another 2024 SCMR 929 and Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 377, 341, 147, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, unnatural offence, wrongful restraint, rioting, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Re-appraisal of evidence---Contradictions in the statements of witnesses---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of the minor son of complainant after committing sodomy with him---Deposition of complainant regarding the piece of cloth, with which his and his brother's hands and mouth as well as the mouth of deceased were tied also contradicted the deposition of the other witnesses---Complainant had stated that the cloth was red and white in colour whereas according to his brother, it was red in colour---Even in the postmortem report the said cloth had been mentioned as red and white---Other witness had deposed that he did not remember the colour of the said cloth---From the deposition of complainant, it was also evident that he had stated that the deceased was not tied with the kerchief whereas in the FIR he had mentioned that deceased's mouth was tied with it---Moreover, there was also a contradiction regarding the sodomy done by accused persons, as according to the deposition of complainant it was "A" who committed the said act first and then "I", whereas according to his brother, "I" committed the said offence first and then "A"---It was not mentioned in the FIR as to who committed the sodomy first either "A" or "I"---Brother of the complainant/witness had also given some contradictory statements as he stated that complainant informed the police over the telephone whereafter the police arrived at the place of incident/wardaat and inspected the dead body, whereas according to Head Constable, complainant come to the Police Station and informed him that "A" & "I" had committed murder of deceased---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 377, 341, 147, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, unnatural offence, wrongful restraint, rioting, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Re-appraisal of evidence---Medical evidence---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of the minor son of complainant after committing sodomy with him---Medical officer had categorically mentioned that crime number was not mentioned in the police letter nor CNIC number of the identifiers of the deceased's body were mentioned in the postmortem report---In the postmortem proforma, there was no mention with regard to sodomy---No chemical report with regard to the sodomy was produced---Admittedly, in the postmortem report there was no mention of the specific weapon, with which the head of deceased was allegedly cut off---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (d) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Benefit of doubt always accrues in the accused's favour. Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on-Record for Appellants. Salim Akhtar Buriro, Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh for the State. Ali Hyder, In person for the Complainant (via video-link, Karachi). Date of hearing: 12th May, 2025.

Summary: Special Customs Reference Applications Nos. 1129 to 1135 of 2023, decided on 12th May, 2025. (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss. 19 & 80---Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), S. 13 & Sixth Sched. Serial No. 19---Special Economic Zones Act (XX of 2012), S. 37---Exemption from payment of customs duties and sales tax on import of capital goods---Entitlement---'Capital goods', definition of---Prefabricated building structures fall within definition of 'capital goods' and same qualify for exemption---Facts in brevity were that the petitioner while establishing a new food manufacturing plant in the special economic zone (SEZ), imported prefabricated building structures and overhead cranes, claiming exemption from customs duties and sales tax under S. 37 of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2012, read with SRO 41(I)/2009 and Chapter 9917(2) of the Customs Tariff as "Capital Goods"---Customs authorities denied the exemption through an assessment order, which decision was upheld by both the collector (appeals) and the customs appellate tribunal---Petitioner argued that prefabricated buildings qualified as capital goods under the Customs Act, 1969 and existing SROs, relying on the case reported as (2011 PTD 569), where similar exemptions were upheld---Pivotal point for consideration by the High Court was as to "Whether the prefabricated building structures imported by the petitioner for setting up a manufacturing facility in a notified Special Economic Zone (SEZ) qualified as "capital goods" and were therefore entitled to exemption from customs duties and sales tax under S. 37 of the SEZ Act, 2012, read with SRO 41(I)/2009 and Chapter 9917(2) of the Customs Tariff, notwithstanding a contrary interpretation by the Federal Board of Revenue?" ---Held: Insofar as the definition of "Capital Goods" was concerned, it had been interpreted expansively to hold that prefabricated buildings and sheds, so imported, fell within the definition of either machinery, plant, equipment, apparatus or capital goods; and therefore, qualified for exemption under SRO 575(I)/2006---Once it had been held categorically by a Division Bench of the High Court that prefabricated buildings and sheds fell within the definition of plant, equipment, machinery and capital goods, then how could the department or for that matter the Tribunal disagree with such view merely for change in the SRO or classification of goods under some special Chapter (9917) of the Customs Tariff or under the 5th Schedule to the Customs Act---Till such time the definition remained the same, the dicta laid down in the case reported as (2011 PTD 569) was to remain applicable and any deviation thereof, in fact, was contemptuous on the part of the department---Accordingly, this aspect of the matter stood answered and the finding of the Tribunal in this context was not in accordance with the law---Similarly, Tribunal's observations while dealing with Serial No. 19 of the 6th Schedule of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 in respect of exemption of sales tax that the applicant was not a zone developer, but had set-up its industrial unit in special economic zone, hence not entitled for any exemption, was incorrect and without proper appreciation of law and facts---The said provision was pari materia to what had been provided under Special Classification Chapter 9917(2) and therefore, the applicant was not only entitled for exemption of duties on the goods in question being Capital Goods under Chapter 9917(2) read with the Preamble of Part-I of the Fifth Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969; but so also from Sales Tax against Serial No.19 of the Sixth Schedule to the Sales Tax Act, 1990---It was of paramount importance to note that an exemption was also provided under S. 37 of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2012 read with SRO 41(I)/2009 dated 19.01.2009 which was available for establishing projects in SEZ's---Such exemption was provided in terms of S. 19 of the Customs Act, 1969 read with S. 13 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 on the import of capital equipment (i.e. plant, machinery, equipment and accessories), whereas, in the said notification, it was only machinery, which had been defined and it was silent about as to what was plant, equipment and accessories---In the considered view of the High Court the claim of the applicant for exemption under SRO 41(I)/2009 was also valid by treating the goods in question as capital equipment as provided in the said SRO---The Tribunal's rejection in providing exemption to the petitioner was based on FBR's opinion that prefabricated buildings were not "plant, machinery or equipment---The Tribunal had erred in this regard by placing reliance on the directions of FBR and its interpretation in respect of capital goods viz a viz exemption claimed by the applicant---Reference application was allowed, in circumstances. Aisha Steel's case 2011 PTD 569 and Messrs Hayat Kimya Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others C.P. No. D-8480 of 2019 ref. (b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----S. 223, 'proviso'---Customs authority exercising quasi-judicial function---Jurisdiction---Interference of Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) in customs authority's judicial discretion---Legality---Any such directions / opinion of FBR are not binding on the officers of the customs performing quasi-judicial functions, at least not on the Tribunal as an Appellate forum---Thus, in all those cases in which customs authority exercises a quasi-judicial function, it is not bound by the instructions and directions or orders of the board which interfere with its judicial discretion. Assistant Director Intelligence v. B.R. Herman PLD 1992 SC 485 rel. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Interpretation made by Central Board of Revenue regarding any statutory provision---Binding nature---Limits and scope---Any interpretation placed by the Central Board of Revenue on a statutory provision cannot be treated as a pronouncement by a forum competent to adjudicate upon such a question judicially or quasi-judicially---Central Board of Revenue cannot control or curtail judicial adjudication power in the forums provided under the relevant law by giving a particular interpretation to a particular provision of the relevant law. Central Insurance Company v. The Central Board of Revenue 1993 SCMR 1232 and The Central Board of Revenue v. Sheikh Spinning Mills Ltd. 1999 SCMR 1442 rel. Hyder Ali Khan along with Hamza Waheed and Sami-ur-Rehman for Applicant (in all SCRAs). Faheem Raza Khuhro for Respondents (in all SCRAs). Date of hearing: 28th January, 2025.

Summary: (a) Medical jurisprudence--- ----Firearm wound---Blackening and burning---Distance of fire shot---Blackening and burning on wound caused by firearm only appears if shot has been fired from few inches---Fire shot from a distance of 5 feet cannot cause burning on wound. (b) Criminal trial--- ----Medical evidence---Scope---Medical evidence is merely supportive / confirmatory type of evidence, it can tell about locale, nature, magnitude of injury, duration of injury and kind of weapon used for causing injury but it cannot tell about identity of assailant who caused the injury. Muhammad Ramzan v. The State 2025 SCMR 762 rel. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302 (b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Weapon of offence---Proof---Opening of sealed parcel---Accused was convicted by Trial Court for qatl-i-Amd and was sentenced to death---Validity--- Pistol upon which number was rubbed, and which was statedly recovered from accused and secured through parcel and taken into possession vide recovery memo. was not sent to Punjab Forensic Science Agency for comparison---Safe custody of recovered pistol from accused had been compromised and not established / proved---Such fact had made report of Punjab Forensic Science Agency inconclusive as well as inconsequential and of no help to the case of prosecution---High Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused as prosecution had failed to establish its case against accused beyond shadow of doubt---Appeal was allowed, in circumstances. Haroon Shafique v. The State and others 2018 SCMR 2118; Muhammad Rafique alias Feeqa v. The State 2019 SCMR 1068; Sufyan Nawaz and another v. The State and others 2020 SCMR 192; Muhammad Adnan and another v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 16; Muhammad Rafique v. The State 2014 SCMR 1698; Arshad Khan v. The State 2017 SCMR 564; Mst. Sughra Begum and another v. Qaiser Pervez and others 2015 SCMR 1142; Muhammad Ashraf alias Acchu v. The State 2019 SCMR 652; Mst. Mir and another v. The State 2020 SCMR 1850; Sarfraz and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 670 and Lal Khan v. The State 2006 SCMR 1846 ref. Muhammad Saleem v. Shabbir Ahmed and others 2016 SCMR 1605; Kamal Din alias Kamala v. The State 2018 SCMR 577 and Abdul Ghafoor v. The State 2022 SCMR 1527 rel. Ms. Sahar Zareen Bandial, Defence Counsel at State expense along with Ms. Fareeha Arif, Defence Counsel at State expense for Appellant. Nuzhat Bashir, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State. Ch. Ahmad Khan Gondal for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 12th May, 2025. Judgment Farooq Haider, J .--- This single judgment will dispose of Crl. Appeal No.81582/2021 filed by Muhammad Nasir (appellant) against his "conviction and sentence" and Murder Reference No.01/2022 sent by trial court, as both the matters have arisen out of one and the same judgment dated: 17.12.2021 passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Jhang/trial court. 2. Muhammad Nasir (appellant) along with Muhammad Shahbaz (co-accused) was tried in case arising out of FIR No.88/2021 dated: 12.02.2021 registered under Sections 302, 34, P.P.C. at Police Station: Mochiwala, District Jhang and after conclusion of the trial, while acquitting aforementioned co-accused namely Muhammad Shahbaz vide impugned judgment dated: 17.12.2021, trial court has convicted and sentenced the appellant as under: - Conviction Sentence Under Section: 302(b), P.P.C. "Death" (for committing Qatl-e-Amd of Allah Rakhi) with payment of compensation Rs.5,00,000/-to the legal heirs of the deceased under Section 544-A, Cr.P.C. recoverable as arrears of land revenue. 3. Brief facts, as per application (Ex.PJ) moved by Haleema Bibi (complainant/PW-8) to Faqeer Muhammad, S.I. of Police Station: Mochiwala, District Jhang (PW-10) on 12.02.2021 for registration of the case are that she is poor and helpless woman; her marriage was solemnized with Muhammad Siddique son of Mehr about 30/32 years ago; two sons and two daughters were born out of the wedlock: Muhammad Siddique divorced the complainant about 9/10 years ago, whereupon she contracted marriage with Lashkar son of Pahlwan, who also divorced the complainant, upon which she (complainant) contracted marriage with Waseem son of Sharif, caste Lohar; Allah Rakhi daughter of Muhammad Siddique had grownup while residing with the complainant, who was married with Shaukat Rajoka resident of Rehmoana about 6/7 years ago; one daughter was born out of their wedlock, thereafter Shaukat divorced daughter of the complainant namely Allah Rakhi, upon which, complainant got contracted marriage of her daughter Allah Rakhi with Nasir (accused) of her biradari about 4/5 years ago, who were blessed with one son and one daughter; Allah Rakhi (deceased) being deserted for about six months was residing with the complainant along with her children in Chak No.346/GB, Thesil Gojra, District Toba Tek Singh; in the meanwhile, husband of the complainant namely Waseem son of Sharif died; complainant along with her daughter Allah Rakhi and Manzoor had come to Gojra More Adda for purchasing commodities on the eve of Khatam of 7th of her late husband on loader Rickshaw of their relative namely Muhammad Rashid; at about 11:40 a.m. after taking grocery when they crossed Total Petrol Pump on loader Rickshaw for going back, aforesaid accused persons came from behind on motorcycle and asked to stop the Rickshaw on a side; when Muhammad Rashid stopped the Rickshaw, Nasir (accused) armed with pistol, after raising lalkara that he would teach a lesson to Allah Rakhi for her living in "Maika" being annoyed, asked them for alighting from the Rickshaw, upon which complainant and Manzoor de-boarded from the Rickshaw whereas Allah Rakhi got frightened there; Irfan (accused) whose name was later on rectified as Muhammad Shahbaz through case diary, kept the motorcycle on start whereas Nasir (accused) resorted to straight firing with pistol at Allah Rakhi and fire shots hit below left ear, on backside of neck, shin of left leg and below left armpit of Allah Rakhi who succumbed to the injures at the spot while the accused persons along with firearm fled away towards Chamranwali on red coloured motorcycle 70/CC. Motive behind the occurrence was that accused was trying to convince/agree Allah Rakhi but she refused to reconcile, due to which grudge, Nasir (accused) committed murder of Allah Rakhi by resorting to firing. On the basis of application (Ex.PJ), FIR (Ex.PG) was chalked out by Safdar Khan, 1710/MHC (PW-4). 4. After completion of investigation, challan report under Section: 173 Cr.P.C. was submitted in the Court against the appellant by placing his name in column No.3 of the same; appellant was formally charge sheeted, however, he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial whereupon prosecution evidence was summoned; after recording of prosecution evidence, appellant was examined under Section: 342 Cr.P.C. but he refuted the allegations levelled against him; he opted not to appear as his own witness under Section: 340(2) Cr.P.C., however, produced some documents in his defence; then trial court after hearing learned counsel for the parties, passed the impugned judgment, whereby appellant was convicted and sentenced as mentioned above. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that conviction recorded against and sentence awarded to the appellant through impugned judgment are against the 'law and facts' and result of non-reading/misreading of evidence, therefore, same are not sustainable in the eyes of law. Learned counsel for the appellant finally prayed for acquittal of the appellant. 6. Conversely, learned Deputy Prosecutor General and learned counsel for the complainant have supported the impugned judgment and prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 7. Arguments heard. Record perused. 8. It has been noticed that as per case of prosecution, occurrence took place at 11:40 a.m. on 12.02.2021 whereas machinery of law was brought into motion by Haleema Bibi (complainant/PW-8) by way of moving application for registration of the case (Ex.PJ) to Faqeer Muhammad, S.I. (PW-10) and FIR (Ex.PG) was recorded at Police Station: Mochiwala, District Jhang at 01:00 p.m., however, time of receipt of aforementioned application by Faqeer Muhammad, S.I. has not been mentioned anywhere in the record rather relevant place is blank and relevant portion from the same is hereby scanned below:- Place of occurrence is within the area of Gojra More Adda, Chak No.214/JB at a distance of three miles from the Police Station as per column No.4 of the FIR. It is relevant to mention here that dead body of the deceased was received at 07:20 p.m. on 12.02.2021 in the hospital whereas documents for postmortem examination from the police were received at 07:20 p.m. and postmortem examination over dead body of Allah Rakhi (deceased of the case) was conducted at 07:30 p.m. and relevant portion of the statement of Dr. Sonia Iqbal (PW-2) is hereby reproduced as under:- "Time of death stated by police was on 12.2.2021 at 11:40 A.M and receiving dead body in death house on 12.2.2021 at 07:20 P.M. I received complete documents from police at 07:20 PM and started autopsy at 07:30 PM on the same day." hence as per case of prosecution, postmortem examination has been conducted after about eight hours i.e. seven hours and fifty minutes of the occurrence and after about six and half hours of the registration of the case. Perusal of the record reveals to the naked eye that reason of delay in postmortem examination was that documents for conducting autopsy were received at 07:20 p.m. which clearly depicts that time has been consumed for procuring, inducing and engaging the witnesses, tailoring story for the case of prosecution and then registering the case in its present form after much delay, however, ante-time has been mentioned in the record, which further reflects that none of the cited witnesses including the complainant was present at the place of occurrence and in above scenario, First Information Report (crime report), which is cornerstone of the case of the prosecution, cannot be termed as promptly recorded and such sort of FIR cannot provide any support to the case of prosecution and superstructure i.e. case of prosecution raised on the basis of such sort of FIR is bound to fall and in this regard, cases of "Haroon Shafique v. The State and others" (2018 SCMR 2118), "Muhammad Rafique alias Feeqa v. The State" (2019 SCMR 1068), "Sufyan Nawaz and another v. The State and others" (2020 SCMR 192) and "Muhammad Adnan and another v. The State and others" (2021 SCMR 16) can be safely referred. It is noteworthy here that in this case, ocular account produced by the prosecution comprises of statements of Haleema Bibi (complainant/PW-8) and Manzoor (PW-9); admittedly, they both are not residents of the place of occurrence i.e. Gojra More Adda rather Haleema Bibi (complainant/PW-8) is resident of Chak No.346/GB, which is situated at a considerable distance from the place of occurrence; in this regard, relevant portion of her statement is hereby reproduced as follows:- "Distance between Chak No. 356 to Gojra is about 10 to 15 miles. Similarly Gojra More from Chak No.356 is at the distance of 10-KM. Manzoor is resident of Chak No. 169/JB of District Jhang. Chak No. 169/JB is known as Chak of Garwah. Gojra More is at the distance of 4 to 5-KM from Garwah Chak." Similarly, Manzoor (PW-9) stated that he is resident of Chak No.169 commonly known as Chak of Girwah, which is situated at a distance of 4/5 Kilometers from Gojra More and relevant portion of the statement of PW-9 in this regard is hereby reproduced as follows:- "I am resident of Chak No. 169, Chak commonly known as Chak of Girwah. Halima Bibi is my Chachazad sister. Gojra More is at the distance of 4/5 KM from Chak of Girwah. The distance of Chak No.356 from my residence is at about 14/15-KM." therefore, they both were "chance witnesses" and were thus required to establish valid and acceptable reason to prove their presence at the "time and place" of occurrence. It was case of the prosecution as mentioned in the application for registration of the case (Ex.PJ) that on the day of occurrence, complainant lady along with her daughter namely Allah Rakhi (now deceased of the case) and Manzoor (cited eye-witness/PW-9) on the loader Rickshaw of their relative namely Muhammad Rashid came at Gojra More Adda for brining grocery articles on the eve of Khatam of 7th of late husband of the complainant and after taking grocery when they crossed Total Petrol Pump on loader Rickshaw for going back, Muhammad Nasir (appellant) and Muhammad Shahbaz (co-accused, since acquitted) came on motorcycle, stopped the motorcycle and committed the occurrence, hence purpose of going of the complainant along with other witnesses and deceased lady was bringing the grocery articles as per application (Ex.PJ), said grocery articles were also purchased but any grocery article/item was neither taken into possession by the Investigating Officer during investigation of the case nor produced during trial of the case and relevant portion of the statement of Manzoor (PW-9) in this regard reads as follows:- "Grocery was not taken into possession by the IO." Presence of any grocery article at the spot has even not been mentioned in the site plan of occurrence i.e. Ex.PP and Ex.PA. Therefore, aforementioned reason claimed by the complainant and other cited eye-witnesses regarding their presence/availability at the relevant "time and place" of occurrence could not be established; in this regard, guidance has been sought from the cases of "Muhammad Rafique v. The State" (2014 SCMR 1698) and "Arshad Khan v. The State" (2017 SCMR 564); relevant portion from latter case law is as under: - "Both the eye-witnesses produced in this case, i.e. Zahid Khan complainant (PW8) and Muhammad Sadiq (PW9) were very closely related to Mst. Naheed Akhtar deceased and they were admittedly chance witnesses. The said witnesses had maintained before the trial court that at the relevant time they were proceeding towards a mosque in order to offer Fajar prayers but a bare look at the site-plan of the place of occurrence shows that the houses of the said eye-witnesses were not situated close to the house of occurrence and they were situated so far away that they could not find any mention in the site-plan of the place of occurrence at all. No mosque near the house of occurrence had been shown in the said site-plan and, thus, the stated reason for presence of the said eye-witnesses near the place of occurrence never stood established on the record through any evidence whatsoever." In above scenario, evidence of both aforementioned cited witnesses, who could not establish any valid reason/cause regarding their stated presence at the stated time, at the place of occurrence, is "suspect" evidence and cannot be accepted without pinch of salt; guidance in this regard has been sought from the case of "Mst. Sughra Begum and another v. Oaiser Pervez and others" (2015 SCMR 1142) and relevant portion from paragraph No.14 of said case law is hereby reproduced: - "14. A chance witness, in legal parlance is the one who claims that he was present on the crime spot at the fateful time, albeit, his presence there was a sheer chance as in the ordinary course of business, place of residence and normal course of events, he was not supposed to be present on the spot but at a place where he resides, carries on business or runs day to day life affairs. It is in this context that the testimony of chance witness, ordinarily, is not accepted unless justifiable reasons are shown to establish his presence at the crime scene at the relevant time. In normal course, the presumption under the law would operate about his absence from the crime spot. True that in rare cases, the testimony of chance witness may be relied upon, provided some convincing explanations appealing to prudent mind for his presence on the crime spot are put forth, when the occurrence took place otherwise, his testimony would fall within the category of suspect evidence and cannot be accepted without a pinch of salt." Further guidance on the subject has been sought from the case of "Muhammad Ashraf alias Acchu v. The State" (2019 SCMR 652), "Mst. Mir and another v. The State" (2020 SCMR 1850) and "Sarfraz and another v. The State" (2023 SCMR 670). Furthermore, Muhammad Rashid, who according to own case of prosecution contained in the application for registration of the case (Ex.PJ), is relative of the complainant as well as deceased lady in this case, on whose loader Rickshaw, they went to Gojra More Adda for bringing grocery articles, was the most important star witness in this case to prove that complainant along with deceased lady and cited eye-witness namely Manzoor went on his Rickshaw for the purpose of bringing grocery when occurrence took place, but he (Muhammad Rashid) was not produced by the prosecution rather he was given up being unnecessary and adverse inference in this regard can safely be drawn against the prosecution to the effect that had he been produced, he might not have supported the prosecution version and prosecution case is squarely hit by the Article 129 (g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, as is held by Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of "Lal Khan v. The State" (2006 SCMR 1846) in the following terms:- ".......Art. 129(g)---Criminal trial--withholding natural witness---Presumption.....Act of withholding of most natural and a material witness of occurrence would create an impression that had such witness been brought into witness-box, he might not have supported the prosecution---Prosecution, in such eventuality must not be in a position to avoid the consequence". Furthermore, Haleema Bibi (complainant/PW-8) herself conceded during cross-examination before the Court that Rashid used to ply rickshaw towards Shorkot side and relevant portion of her statement in this regard is hereby reproduced as under:- "Rashid used to ply Rickshaw towards Shorkot side. " Complainant also claimed that her clothes were smeared with blood and relevant portion of the statement of Haleema Bibi (complainant/PW-8) in this regard is hereby reproduced as under:- "My clothes were also smeared with blood." but it is noteworthy here that neither said clothes were taken into possession by the Investigating Officer of the case nor produced during trial of the case. As per application for registration of the case (Ex.PJ), though firing was made at Allah Rakhi (deceased of the case) when she was sitting in the Rickshaw but neither as per site plan of the place of occurrence (Ex.PA) nor recovery memo. of Rickshaw (Ex.PM), any shot fired during the occurrence, hit seat, body or any other part of the Rickshaw; furthermore, as per Postmortem Examination Report of the deceased as well as statement of Dr. Sonia Iqbal (PW-2), there was blackening and burning on injuries Nos.1-A, 2-A, 3-A and 4-A. It goes without saying that as per medical jurisprudence, burning on the wound caused by firearm weapon only appears if shot has been fired from few inches but as per site plan of the place of occurrence (Ex.PA), distance between assailant and the deceased when she sustained firearm injuries was 5-feet, hence shot fired from such distance cannot cause burning on the wound. So when all the aforementioned factors are taken into consideration in totality, then ocular account comprising of chance witnesses, is neither convincing nor confidence inspiring, hence cannot be relied for convicting and sentencing the appellant and thus discarded. It is trite law that medical evidence is mere supportive/confirmatory type of evidence; it can tell about locale, nature, magnitude of injury, duration of the injury and kind of weapon used for causing injury but it cannot tell about identity of the assailant who caused the injury; therefore, same neither can provide any corroboration nor is of any help to the prosecution in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and in this regard guidance has been sought from the case of "Muhammad Ramzan v. The State" (2025 SCMR 762), relevant portion from the case law is as under:- "It is by now well settled that medical evidence is a type of supporting evidence, which may confirm the prosecution version of weapon used in the occurrence but it would not identify the assailant." So far as recovery of pistol .30-bore from the appellant through recovery memo. (Ex.PN) and report of Punjab Forensic Science Agency, Lahore (Ex.PS) wherein it has been mentioned that three cartridge cases have been identified as having been fired from said pistol are concerned, it is relevant to mention here that as per own case of the prosecution, pistol was statedly recovered on the pointing out of the appellant and was taken into possession through recovery memo/Ex.PN (copy of the same is available at page No.141 of the Paper-Book) and it has been mentioned therein categorically that number was rubbed on said pistol and relevant portion of the recovery memo (Ex.PN) is hereby reproduced as under:- It has been noticed that recovery memo was attested by Manzoor Hussain and Muhammad Rashid (witnesses), however, during recording of statement of Manzoor as PW-9, parcel of the pistol was de-sealed in the court, upon which it was categorically observed by the court that "no rubbing" was found on the pistol and relevant portion of the statement of PW-9 in this regard is hereby reproduced as follows:- (At this stage case property i.e sealed parcels of pistol, crime empties and live bullets were de-sealed on the request of learned defence counsel, case property Rickshaw, motorcycle is present for inspection of defence. There are five crime empties and one live bullet of .30-bore along with .30-bore pistol were found in sealed parcels. Photographs of the above said articles have been taken and be placed. Pistol .30-bore No.CAL-30 is made in china, no rubbing was found upon pistol. Case property again sealed.) (emphasis added) Hence it is crystal clear that the pistol upon which number was rubbed and which was statedly recovered from the appellant and secured through parcel and taken into possession vide recovery memo. (Ex.PN) was not sent to Punjab Forensic Science Agency for comparison, therefore, safe custody of statedly recovered pistol from the appellant has been compromised and not established/proved, which has ultimately made report of Punjab Forensic Science Agency, Lahore as inconclusive as well as inconsequential and of no help to the case of prosecution and in this regard, guidance has been sought from the dictum laid down in the cases of "Muhammad Saleem v. Shabbir Ahmed and others" (2016 SCMR 1605) and "Kamal Din alias Kamala v. The State" (2018 SCMR 577). So far as recovery of motorcycle from the appellant through recovery memo. (Ex.PO) is concerned, suffice it to say that since any registration number, model or company of motorcycle statedly used by the assailants in the occurrence has not been mentioned in the application for registration of the case (Ex.PJ) as well as FIR (Ex.PG), hence same is of no avail to the case of prosecution. As far as motive for the occurrence is concerned, Haleema Bibi (complainant/PW-8) in the application for registration of the case (Ex.PJ) has mentioned that Allah Rakhi (now deceased of the case) after being deserted had been living with her (complainant), accused had been trying to convince/agree Allah Rakhi but she refused to reconcile, due to which grudge, accused by way of firing committed her murder, however, any detail that why deceased lady was deserted from her house has not been brought on the record by the prosecution; furthermore, any date, time and place when appellant came for getting Allah Rakhi agreed has also not been mentioned by the prosecution; so much so, Faqeer Muhammad, S.I./Investigating Officer of the case (PW-10) during trial of the case categorically stated that he did not investigate regarding motive part of the FIR and relevant portion of his statement in this regard is hereby reproduced as under:- "I did not investigated qua the motive part of the FIR." So motive as alleged by the prosecution has not been proved. 9. It is well established principle of law that single dent/circumstance in case of prosecution is sufficient for acquittal; in this regard, case of "Abdul Ghafoor v. The State" (2022 SCMR 1527) can be safely referred. 10. In the instant case after examining the prosecution case from all corners and evaluating it on the touchstone of principle of "safe administration of criminal justice", this Court has arrived at the conclusion that prosecution has miserably failed to establish its case against the appellant beyond shadow of doubt. As prosecution has failed to prove its case against the appellant, therefore, there is no need to discuss defence version. 11. Resultantly, instant appeal bearing Crl. Appeal No.81582/2021, filed by Muhammad Nasir (appellant), is allowed; conviction recorded and sentence awarded to the appellant through impugned judgment dated: 17.12.2021 is hereby set aside. Appellant is acquitted of the charge, he be released from jail forthwith, if not required in any other case. Murder Reference No.01 of 2022 is answered in negative and death sentence awarded to Muhammad Nasir is not confirmed. MH/M-68/L Appeal allowed.