Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Art. 115---Estoppel of tenant---Tenant denying title of landlord---Scope---Respondents instituted suit for recovery of produce and ejectment against petitioners, which was decreed by Trial Court and such decree was maintained by appellate, revisional and constitutional forums---Supreme Court held that where a person enters into possession as tenant, he is estopped from disputing title of landlord so long as he continues to retain possession under tenancy---Doctrine embodied in Art.115 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 is founded on public policy and prevents tenant from approbating and reprobating simultaneously---Tenant who subsequently asserts ownership rights cannot retain possession as tenant and, at same time, deny landlord’s title. Cited Case: • Mst. Seema Begum v. Muhammad Ishaq and others PLD 2009 SC 45 (b) Landlord and tenant---- ----Tenant asserting ownership/proprietary rights---Duty to first surrender possession---Tenant disputing proprietary title of landlord must first vacate and surrender possession and thereafter may contest his alleged title before competent forum---Law does not permit tenant to continue possession under tenancy while simultaneously setting up hostile title against landlord---If tenant ultimately succeeds in establishing his proprietary rights, he may enforce decree according to law with all its consequences. Cited Case: • Barkat Masih v. Manzoor Ahmad deceased through L.Rs. 2006 SCMR 1068 (c) Landlord and tenant---- ----Agreement to sell or alleged purchase by tenant---Effect on tenancy---Mere assertion of ownership on basis of agreement to sell or alleged acquisition of proprietary rights does not defeat maintainability of ejectment proceedings---Until tenant establishes his claim before competent Court, landlord continues to enjoy status of owner/landlord and relationship between parties remains regulated by tenancy---Tenant cannot legitimately resist ejectment proceedings merely on ground of alleged sale agreement or ownership claim. Cited Cases: • Mst. Seema Begum v. Muhammad Ishaq and others PLD 2009 SC 45 • Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani 2002 SCMR 1540 • Waheed Ullah v. Mst. Rehana Nasim and others 2004 SCMR 1568 (d) Ejectment proceedings---- ----Maintainability---Tenant claiming purchase of share/co-ownership---Effect---Ejectment proceedings remain maintainable even where tenant asserts that he has acquired ownership rights by purchase of a share in the property---Such assertion does not automatically terminate tenancy nor oust jurisdiction of forum deciding ejectment---Tenant’s plea of ownership cannot be made basis to resist ejectment where his possession qua demised premises remains that of tenant. Cited Cases: • Nazir Ahmad v. Mst. Sardar Bibi and others 1989 SCMR 913 • Ghulam Mustafa and others v. Mst. Muhammadi Begum and others 1991 SCMR 432 (e) Rent Controller / ejectment forum---- ----Limited jurisdiction---Complicated question of title---Proper remedy---Forum exercising limited jurisdiction in ejectment proceedings cannot adjudicate upon complicated questions of ownership title between parties---Where tenant claims to have purchased a share or acquired co-ownership, proper remedy is to seek partition through competent civil forum and not to resist ejectment proceedings by raising disputed title questions before ejectment forum. (f) Landlord and tenant---- ----Tenant claiming co-ownership by purchase of share---Proper recourse---Tenant claiming co-ownership cannot use such plea as shield against ejectment while retaining possession under tenancy---His remedy is to file suit for partition or appropriate proceedings before competent civil forum---Ejectment cannot be refused merely because tenant claims purchase of a share, where his position in respect of disputed premises remains that of tenant. Cited Case: • Ghulam Mustafa and others v. Mst. Muhammadi Begum and others 1991 SCMR 432 (g) Constitutional jurisdiction---- ----Concurrent findings---Interference by Supreme Court---Suit for recovery of produce and ejectment was decreed by Trial Court; appeal, revision, second revision and constitutional petition were dismissed---High Court correctly construed law relating to estoppel of tenant, surrender of possession, maintainability of ejectment proceedings and remedy of partition---No illegality or jurisdictional defect warranting interference by Supreme Court was shown---Petition was devoid of merit. Disposition: Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.806-P of 2018 was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused; Supreme Court held that tenant asserting ownership/co-ownership must first surrender possession before contesting title, ejectment proceedings remain maintainable, and remedy for alleged co-ownership lies through partition before competent civil forum. CMA No.1877-P of 2018 became infructuous and was disposed of accordingly.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: In a suit for dissolution of marriage, the court is required to make proper efforts to reconcile the matter in terms Section 10(3) of the Family Court Act, 1964 and on failure of reconciliation proceedings is empowered to pass a decree for dissolution of marriage but said Section does not provide that in every case, where reconciliation proceedings are declared as not successful, the decree for dissolution of marriage on basis of Khula is definitely to be passed, rather the Court has to assess whether wife through her voluntary decision really requires marriage to be dissolved or not. 24First Appeal Against Order(F.A.O.) 68910/22 Oil Marketing Association of Pakistan Vs Oil Companies Advisory Council etc Mr. Justice Raheel Kamran 29- 01- 2026 2025 LHC 8281

Summary: Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----Ss.42, 53 & 172---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 175F (1)(c) & 199---Entries in revenue record, assailing of--- Jurisdiction---Title, determination of---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Petitioners were aggrieved of order passed by High Court maintaining refusal of revenue authorities to implement an old mutation in their favour---Validity---Revenue entries do not by themselves confer title but carry a presumption of correctness until rebutted in accordance with law---Where correctness, validity or enforceability of old mutations is disputed, particularly when such mutations have remained unimplemented for decades, the matter inevitably involves disputed question of facts and title requiring proper adjudication and cannot be determined by revenue authorities---Extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is intended to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy in cases where illegality or impropriety of action in question is apparent on the face of record and can be determined without undertaking an elaborate inquiry or recording evidence---Where controversy involves intricate disputed or contentious questions of fact, the resolution of which necessitates recording an appraisal of evidence by parties, such matters fall within the domain of Court of plenary jurisdiction and High Court in exercise of its Constitution jurisdiction cannot assume the role of fact-finding forum or enter into such factual controversies---Revenue officer is not competent to decide questions of title and Civil Court alone is competent to decide it---Findings recorded by revenue authorities were based on plausible appreciation of record and did not suffer from any legal infirmity---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Muhammad Yousaf v. Khan Bahadur through Legal Heirs 1992 SCMR 2334; Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another 2013 SCMR 906; Nazir Ahmad and another v. Maula Bakhsh 1987 SCMR 61; Fida Hussain and another v. Mst. Saiqa 2011 SCMR 1990 and Waqar Ahmed and others v. The Federation of Pakistan 2024 SCMR 1877 rel. Ch. Muhammad Masood Jahangir, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Waseem Mumtaz Malik, Additional Advocate General for Respondents. Date of hearing: 28th January, 2026.

Summary: Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967—Ss. 42, 44, 52, 53, 166 & 172(2)(vi)—Specific Relief Act, 1877—S. 42—Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 175F(1)(c) & 199—Revenue record—Old sanctioned mutations—Non-implementation for over a century—Correction of entries—Clerical or arithmetical mistake—Contentious dispute—Jurisdiction of revenue authorities—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the alleged non-implementation of Mutation No. 117 dated 29.12.1907 and Mutations Nos. 401 and 402 dated 30.01.1913 could not be treated as a mere clerical or arithmetical mistake capable of correction by revenue authorities under S. 166 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967. The Court observed that where implementation of century-old mutations would potentially disturb long-standing revenue entries, affect possible intervening alienations, and prejudice third parties not before the forum, the matter plainly assumes a contentious character. In such circumstances, the limited power of correction available to revenue authorities cannot be invoked for deciding substantive controversies affecting proprietary rights. The Court further held that the discretion under S. 166 is not unbridled and is confined to cases free from factual controversy and incapable of adversely affecting vested rights without proper adjudication. Revenue law—Record-of-rights—Presumption of correctness—Remedy against adverse entry—The Court held that Ss. 42, 44, and 52 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 collectively regulate the preparation, evidentiary value, and correction of the record-of-rights, and once entries are incorporated therein, a presumption of truth attaches to them until the contrary is proved or lawful substitution is made. To dislodge such presumption, the law itself provides a remedy through S. 53 of the Act, enabling an aggrieved person to institute a suit for declaration under S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, where he is prejudiced by an entry in the record-of-rights or periodical record relating to a right of which he is in possession. The Court reaffirmed that the statute does envisage an appropriate remedy even where summary correction before revenue authorities is unavailable. In this regard, reliance was placed on Muhammad Yousaf v. Khan Bahadur through Legal Heirs (1992 SCMR 2334). Jurisdiction—Civil court and revenue authorities—Section 172(2)(vi), Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967—Bar of jurisdiction not absolute in contentious matters—The Federal Constitutional Court examined the petitioners’ contention that, because S. 172(2)(vi) bars civil court jurisdiction regarding correction of entries in the record-of-rights, periodical record, or register of mutations, only revenue authorities could grant relief. Rejecting the broad proposition, the Court held that the exclusion recognized in S. 172(2)(vi) operates in matters of correction that are not controversial in nature. Where, however, the dispute involves contentious questions, competing rights, and possible effect on absent parties, the matter cannot be summarily resolved by revenue authorities. The Court relied upon Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another (2013 SCMR 906), wherein the Supreme Court clarified that only non-controversial corrections in revenue record fall within the exclusive domain of revenue authorities to the exclusion of civil courts. Delay and equity—Laches and acquiescence—Unexplained silence for more than a century—The Court held that the petitioners’ claim was hopelessly belated, having been raised for the first time in the year 2020 in relation to mutations sanctioned in 1907 and 1913. It was observed that the petitioners had failed to produce any material explaining why their predecessors-in-interest did not seek implementation during their lifetime, or why the petitioners themselves remained silent for decades. Such inordinate and unexplained delay attracted the principles of laches and acquiescence with full force. The mere existence of old sanctioned but unimplemented mutations did not automatically entitle the petitioners to their implementation after a lapse of over one hundred years, particularly in the face of possible competing claims and long-standing contrary entries in the revenue record. Constitutional jurisdiction—Article 199—Disputed questions of fact and title—Scope of writ jurisdiction—The Court reiterated that constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 is meant to provide prompt relief where illegality or impropriety is apparent on the face of the record and can be determined without elaborate inquiry or recording of evidence. Where, however, the controversy involves disputed or intricate questions of fact, title, or enforceability of old mutations, requiring proper evidence and adjudication, the High Court cannot assume the role of a fact-finding forum. Such matters fall within the domain of courts of plenary jurisdiction. In support of this proposition, the Court referred to Nazir Ahmad and another v. Maula Bakhsh (1987 SCMR 61), Fida Hussain and another v. Mst. Saiqa (2011 SCMR 1990), and Waqar Ahmed and others v. the Federation of Pakistan (2024 SCMR 1877). The Court accordingly held that the Lahore High Court rightly declined to interfere in constitutional jurisdiction. Natural justice—Affected third parties—No adverse order behind the back of interested persons—The Court observed that during the extraordinarily long interregnum between the sanction of the mutations and the filing of the petitioners’ application, it was highly probable that various transactions, alienations, or changes in possession had taken place, and that third parties may have acquired rights on the basis of the existing revenue entries. Any order directing implementation of the old mutations without impleading such persons or affording them opportunity of hearing would violate the principles of natural justice and risk grave miscarriage of justice. This consideration further demonstrated that the matter was not one of a simple ministerial correction but of substantive adjudication. Case references—Muhammad Yousaf v. Khan Bahadur through Legal Heirs (1992 SCMR 2334); Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another (2013 SCMR 906); Nazir Ahmad and another v. Maula Bakhsh (1987 SCMR 61); Fida Hussain and another v. Mst. Saiqa (2011 SCMR 1990); Waqar Ahmed and others v. the Federation of Pakistan (2024 SCMR 1877). Petition dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the controversy regarding implementation of century-old mutations was contentious in nature, could not be resolved by revenue authorities under S. 166 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967, and was not amenable to determination in constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution. Finding no legal infirmity in the orders of the Member Board of Revenue, the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), and the Lahore High Court, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 4B [as inserted by Finance Act 2015] & First Schedule, Part I, Division IIA---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 73(2)(a), 175F & Fourth Schedule, Part I, Entry 47---Federal Constitutional Court---Appellate jurisdiction---Super tax, vires of---Principle of intelligible differentia---Applicability---Fiscal matters, judicial interference in---Dispute pertained to insertion of Section 4B in Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 vide Finance Act, 2015 for raising revenue for internally displaced persons for tax year 2015---Validity---Provision of Section 4B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is intra vires the Constitution and has to be applied as enacted for tax year 2015 and onwards at the rates prescribed in Division IIA, Part I, of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---High Courts had expounded correct position in law by holding that Section 4B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was validly enacted as a “tax”---Provisions of Section 4B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 are neither discriminatory nor they create any unreasonable or hostile classification among persons forming the same class upon whom the charge is imposed---Such classification introduced under Section 4B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is income-based, rests on an intelligible differentia, and bears a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved---Provision of section 4B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 does not suffer from any inherent lack of legislative competence, nor does it, on its face, transgress any fundamental right in a manner sufficient to warrant its invalidation---Any perceived inequities or hardships arising from the operation of Section 4B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 fall primarily within the Legislative domain and do not, by themselves, justify judicial interference in fiscal matters---Provision of Section 4B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 squarely falls within Entry 47, Part-I of Fourth Schedule, to the Constitution, namely, ‘taxes on income’---Legislature was fully competent to impose, abolish, remit, alter, or regulate such tax through a Finance Act, as part of a Money Bill under Article 73(2)(a) of the Constitution---Federal Constitutional Court declared Section 4B of Income Tax Ordinance, 2011 (as inserted by Finance Act, 2015) to be intra vires the Constitution---Matter was disposed of accordingly. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 187 [as amended by Constitution (Twenty-seventh Amendment) Act (XXXII of 2025)]---Federal Constitutional Court---Inherent powers---Complete justice---Federal Constitutional Court has inherent power to transpose a party, should it be necessary for just and proper adjudication of a matter before it. (c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 4C [as inserted by Finance Act 2022] & First Schedule, Part I, Division IIB---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 25, 73(2)(a), 175F & Fourth Schedule, Part I, Entry 47---Federal Constitutional Court---Appellate jurisdiction---High Earning Persons---Super tax, imposing of---Legislative competence---Reading down, principle of---Principle of intelligible differentia---Applicability---Dispute pertained to insertion of Section 4C in Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 vide Finance Act, 2022 on High Earning Persons and income arising to oil exploration and petroleum companies---Validity---Provision of Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is intra vires the Constitution and applies as enacted for tax year 2022 and onwards at the rates prescribed in Part-I of Division IIB, First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Legislature has plenary power to enact laws with retrospective and prospective effect subject to such laws not effecting past and closed transactions---There was no provision in Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 whereby closing of accounts of a tax year qualified as an event which had precluded imposition of fresh charge where none existed before, particularly when returns of income for tax year 2022 were yet to be filed---Federal Constitutional Court set aside the judgments passed by Division Benches of three High Cou2rts to the extent they held Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 not to apply retroactively to tax year 2022---Rates in Part I of Division IIB, First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 amended through Finance Act, 2023 was to apply for tax year 2023---Federal Constitutional Court further set aside judgment of Islamabad High Court to the extent it held the rates in amended Part I of Division IIB, First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 not to apply retroactively to tax year 2023---Definition of “income” for purposes of Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 in so far as it includes income from all sources is validly enacted---Federal Constitutional Court also set aside judgments of Islamabad High Court to the extent they read down Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Federal Constitutional Court further set aside the direction issued by Islamabad High Court, to Federal Board of Revenue to issue circular to implement judgment in question across Pakistan, as such direction was beyond its jurisdiction---Federal Constitutional Court declared that Classification of sectors through inclusion in First Proviso to Division IIB of Part I of First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and taxable under Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 at the rate of 10% for the tax year 2022 was reasonable; the differentia was intelligible and was permissible under Article 25 of the Constitution---Federal Constitutional Court set aside the judgments of three High Courts to the extent they declared contents of the first proviso to be discriminatory---Matter was disposed of accordingly. The Attock Oil Company Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2019 PTD 934; Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2022 PTD 1730; D.G.Khan Cement Company Limited v. Federal Board of Revenue and others 2018 PTD 287; D.G.Khan Cement Company Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2020 PTD 1186 and HBL Stock Fund and others v. Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue and others 2020 PTD 1742 rel. (d) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 4, 4B, 4C, 37A & Eighth Schedule---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 175F & Fourth Schedule, Part I, Entry 47---Federal Constitutional Court---Appellate jurisdiction---Super tax---Legislature, competence of---Super tax is a tax on income independent of tax levied under Section 4 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Parliament is competent under Entry 47, of Part I of the Fourth Schedule tothe Constitution, to levy “taxes on income”---Insofar as levy of super tax is concerned, Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is a self-contained provision and is a standalone tax on income---Provision of Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 as it applied to capital gains under Section 37A and Rules of the Eighth Schedule, Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was held to be applicable thereto, as it was within the ambit of Section 4C(2)(i) and (iv) of Income Tax Ordinance 2001. (e) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 4B, 4C, 53, Second Schedule & Fifth Schedule, Rr. 4AA & 4AB---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 73(2)(a), 175F & Fourth Schedule, Part I, Entry 47---Federal Constitutional Court---Appellate jurisdiction---High Earning Persons---Super tax, imposing of---Legislative competence---Dispute pertained to insertion of Sections 4B, 4C and Rules 4AA and 4AB into Fifth Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 on income arising to oil exploration and petroleum companies---Validity---Provisions of Section 4B and Section 4C, by virtue of Rules 4AA and 4AB of Fifth Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 would only apply to the income arising to oil exploration and petroleum (E&P) companies if it did not result in exceeding the aggregate rate of taxes provided in Fifth Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and their respective Petroleum Concession Agreements (PCAs)---Departmental determination / assessment of each PCA was to be undertaken by placing respective terms and conditions in juxtaposition with Regulation of Mines and Minerals (Government Control) Act, 1948 and applicable taxing law governing their respective PCAs, whether it was Income Tax Act, 1922, Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 or Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Provision of Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001was not to apply to E&P companies to the extent that its application would result in taxation exceeding the threshold stipulated in Rule 4 of Fifth Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Legislative intent underlying Rule 4 of Fifth Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 was to provide a sector-specific framework recognizing the unique nature, risks, and investment requirements of petroleum and exploration industry---Imposing a super tax beyond prescribed threshold would effectively override such Legislative safeguard, impose excessive and disproportionate burden, and frustrate the purpose for which special provisions were enacted---In absence of clear and express intention of Legislature to abrogate or modify such sectoral thresholds, Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 could not be construed so as to operate in a manner inconsistent with Rule 4 of Fifth Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Matter was disposed of accordingly. (f) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S.4C [as inserted by Finance Act, 2022]---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 175F---Federal Constitutional Court---Appellate jurisdiction---Super tax, imposing of---Banking Companies---Scope---In case of banking companies, Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 would apply to them as enacted vide Finance Act, 2022 for tax year 2023 and onwards, at the rates applicable to tax year 2023 as amended by Finance Act, 2023---Matter was disposed of accordingly. (g) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 4C, 53, Second Schedule & Ninth Schedule---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 73(2)(a), 175F & Fourth Schedule, Part I, Entry 47---Federal Constitutional Court---Appellate jurisdiction---Super tax, imposing of---Legislative competence---Benevolent and Provident Funds---Dispute pertained to insertion of Section 4C to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 on income arising to Benevolent and Provident Funds---Validity---Provision of Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 would not apply to the income, particularly to the benevolent funds enjoying exemption from tax under Section 53, read with Second Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Such funds constituted a distinct class expressly exempted by the Legislature in furtherance of recognized charitable and welfare objectives---Subjecting such funds to a super tax would defeat the very purpose of statutory exemption and would be inconsistent with the legislative scheme of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---In the absence of a clear and specific legislative intent to withdraw or curtail such exemption, Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 could not be construed so as to override the exemption granted to benevolent funds---Provident and benevolent funds whichheld valid exemption certificates under the Ninth Schedule read with the relevant entries in the Second Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 were not liable to pay super tax under Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Federal Constitutional Court directed such funds to furnish their exemption certificates issued for the relevant tax years to the concerned authorities of Inland Revenue,who would pass written orders absolving such funds of their liability to pay super tax under Section 4C of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Matter was disposed of accordingly. For the Taxpayers: Makhdoom Ali Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Haider Ali Khan, Hussain Ali Almani, Ms. Naila Irshad and Yawar Mukhtar, Advocates]. Salman Akram Raja, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Malik Ghulam Sabir; Asad Ladha and Moazin and Rashid, Advocates]. Khalid Javed Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court. Dr. Farogh Naseem, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Sardar Haseeb Iftikhar Ahmed, Advocate]. Sardar Ahmad Jamal Sukhera, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Sikandar Jamal Sukhera and Ms. Khadija Jamal Sukhera, Advocates]. Shehzad Ata Elahi, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Salman Sohail Khan, Advocate]. Sikandar Bashir Mohmand, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Ms. Shahkar Shahab, Khizer Hayat Khan, Hamza Azmat Khan and Abdullah Noor Advocates]. Ali Sibtain Fazli, Advocate Supreme Court. Malik Ahsan Mehmood, Advocate Supreme Court. Khurram Mumtaz Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court. Umar Azad Malik, Advocate Supreme Court. Barrister Saad Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court. Ch. Mumtaz-ul-Hassan, Advocate Supreme Court. Rashid Anwar, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Yousaf Khalid Anwar, Advocate High Court]. Abdul Aziz Nishtar, Advocate Supreme Court. Qazi Ghulam Dastagir, Advocate Supreme Court. Sajeel Shehryar Sawati, Advocate Supreme Court. Barrister Jahanzeb Awan, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Barrister Saif Mehmood Abbasi]. Mrs. Shireen Imran, Advocate Supreme Court. Umer Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court. Umer Akram Sahi, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Khalil Khan Sahibzada, Advocate]. Shehryar Kasuri, Advocate Supreme Court. Waseem Ahmad Malik, Advocate Supreme Court. Rana Mohammad Afzal, Advocate Supreme Court. Barrister Haroon Dugal, Advocate Supreme Court. Ajmal Ghaffar Toor, Advocate Supreme Court. Ms. Samia Faiz Durrani, Advocate Supreme Court. Abid Hussain Shaban, Advocate Supreme Court. Rai Azhar Iqbal Kharral, Advocate Supreme Court. Ajmal Khan, Advocate Supreme Court. Barrister Yousuf Kausar, Advocate Supreme Court. Adnan Haider, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Muhammad Zulqarnain Hashmi, Advocate]. Taimoor Aslam Malik, Advocate Supreme Court. Ijaz Ahmed Zahid, Advocate Supreme Court. Omer Asad Malik, Advocate Supreme Court. Hafiz Munawar Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court. Dr. Ikram-ul-Haq, Advocate Supreme Court. Mohsin Mumtaz, Advocate Supreme Court. Hassan Kamran Bashir, Advocate Supreme Court. Mirza Mehmood Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Ms. Zaria Adnan, Saadullah Tahir and Javaid Chohan, Advocates]. Nouman A. Farooqui, Advocate Supreme Court. Mirza Mehmood Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court. Syed Ovais Ali Shah, Advocate Supreme Court. Qazi Umair Ali, Advocate Supreme Court. Naeem Suleman, Advocate Supreme Court. Syed Shahab Qutub, Advocate Supreme Court. Abdul Sattar Pirzada, Advocate Supreme Court. Qazi Umair Ali, Advocate Supreme Court. Muhammad Shoaib Rashid, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Zeeshan Shaukat, Advocate]. Isaac Ali Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court. Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record. Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record. Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record. Syeda B.H. Shah, Advocate-on-Record. Sheikh Mehmood Ahmed, Advocate-on-Record. Qazi Shehryar Iqbal, Advocate-on-Record. Naeem Ul Haq, Advocate High Court. Syed Jaffer Hussain, Advocate High Court. Shah Rukh Sheikh, Advocate High Court. Sardar Haseeb, Advocate High Court. Asad Zaman Tarar, Advocate High Court. Zeeshan Hashmi, Advocate High Court. Sheikh Aqeel Ahmad, Advocate High Court. Rana Usman Habib, Advocate High Court. Qaiser Amir [Legal Head, Frontier Foundry]. Ms. Rida Zahra [Legal Officer, Mari Petroleum]. Bilal Farrid Rana, [Head Legal, UBL]. Hafiz Bilal Bin Akbar [DD (L), DRAP]. For the Federation: Ch. Aamir Rehman, Addl. AGP [Assisted by: Miss Maryam Rashid, Advocate]. For the FBR: Mian Raza Rabbani, Advocate Supreme Court. Ms. Asma Hamid, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Mustafa Khalid, Faisal Khalid, Ms. Rabia Khan, Ms. Navail Haider and Ms. Zarwa Jamal, Advocates]. Dr. Shah Nawaz, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Ms. Sameena Mumtaz, Advocate]. Saalim Salaam Ansari, Advocate Supreme Court. Zeeshan Abdullah, Advocate Supreme Court. Muhammad Nasir Khan, Advocate Supreme Court. Malik Itaat Hussain Awan, Advocate Supreme Court. Muhammad Faisal Khalid, Advocate Supreme Court. Hafiz Ahsaan Ahmad Khokhar, Advocate Supreme Court. Ashtar Ausaf Ali, Senior Advocate Supreme Court. Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court. Ghulam Shoaib Jally, Advocate Supreme Court. Babar Bilal, Advocate Supreme Court. Riaz Azam Bhopera, Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on-Record. Ch. Zafar Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court. Ibrar Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court. Shehzad Ahmed Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court [Assisted by: Malik Abdullah Raza, Advocate]. Muhammad Yahya Johar, Advocate Supreme Court. Munawar Ali Memon, Advocate Supreme Court. Ch. Imtiaz Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court. Dr. Abrar Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court. Ms. Humaira Bashir, Advocate Supreme Court. Mrs. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, Advocate Supreme Court. Dr. Raana Khan, Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on-Record. Mrs. Kausar Iqbal Bhatti, Advocate-on-Record. Muhammad Amir Malik, Advocate-on-Record. Ms. Ruqiya Samee, Advocate-on-Record. Jawaid Masood Tahir Bhatti, Advocate-on-Record. Mir Badshah Khan Wazir, Member Legal. Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, D.G. Law. Yousaf Khan, S.O I.R (Legal). Dates of hearing: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 26th and 27th January, 2026. SHORT ORDER

Summary: Though the Specific Relief Act, 1877 contains no express provision for return of sale consideration upon refusal of specific performance, its equitable scheme vests ample discretion in the Court to grant an alternate relief getting support from Order VII Rule 7 CPC so as to dispense substantial justice. In appropriate cases, return of the actual sale consideration stands on a higher footing than compensation and the Court, while eschewing technicalities, must act to meet the ends of justice. 32Crl. Appeal- Against Conviction- PPC 1566-19 ALLAH DITTA VS STATE ETC Mr. Justice Sardar Akbar Ali 26-01- 2026 2026 LHC 945

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002), S.3---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 14 & 19---Suit for recovery of damages under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002---Limited interim injunction, grant of---Principles---Preventing irreparable harm during pendency of suit---Allegations of sexual harassment were made by petitioner (lady) against the respondent---Suit for damages was filed by respondent against the petitioner claiming substantial reputational harm arising from sexual harassment allegations---Interim injunction was granted by Trial Court restraining the petitioner from making any statement regarding the subject matter of the alleged defamation until the disposal of the suit---Legality---At present preliminary stage, the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations could not be determined without recording of evidence---Repetition or continuous propagation of such allegations, while the matter was sub judice, would amount to conducting a parallel media trial, which was neither permissible nor desirable in the interest of justice and fair adjudication---Respondent had successfully established a prima facie case in his favour; the allegations levelled against him, if found to be untrue, were of such a nature that they directly struck at his dignity, honour and professional credibility---Material available on record prima facie showed that the suit raised serious triable issues requiring evidence, and therefore, the respondent could not be left remediless during pendency of the proceedings---Balance of convenience also tilted heavily in favour of respondent---If the injunction was not maintained, respondent would continue to suffer damage to his reputation on a daily basis---On the contrary, the petitioner would not suffer any irreparable prejudice by being restrained from making statements relevant to the controversy till the matter was decided on merits---Restraint imposed was temporary in nature and subject to the final outcome of the suit---Trial Court had rightly exercised its discretion by imposing a limited and reasonable restriction, instead of a blanket prohibition, thereby ensuring that the petitioner's right to speech was not completely curtailed---Impugned order, by restraining only such statements which were directly related to the matter in controversy, achieved a constitutional balance between two competing rights i.e. freedom of speech (Article 19) and inviolability of the dignity of man (Article 14) and did not amount to an unlawful curtailment of freedom of expression---Impugned order was a well-reasoned order based on sound legal principles and did not warrant interference by this Court---Constitutional petition was dismissed. Bonnard v. Perryman (1891) 2 Ch 269 and K.V. Ramaniah v. Special Public Prosecutor AIR 1961 Andh Pra 190 ref. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002), S.3---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 14 & 19---Public figure---Suit for recovery of damages under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002---Limited interim injunction, grant of---Principles---Prevent of irreparable harm during pendency of suit---Although, Courts exercise restraint while granting injunctions restraining speech, however, there is no absolute bar in law against grant of such relief where circumstances so warrant---Where a person of established reputation claims that false allegations are being repeatedly propagated, the court is empowered to protect such reputation from irreparable harm till final adjudication---Reputation, once damaged, cannot be restored merely through monetary compensation---For a public figure whose career and livelihood depend upon public perception and trust, continuous circulation of unproven allegations would cause harm which cannot be quantified in terms of money---If the reputation of a responsible citizen can be measured in terms of money, then, it will amount to issuing a license against a citizen and asking him to take money as compensation for the injury---In such circumstances, denial of interim protection would render the final relief, if granted, meaningless. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Interim injunction, grant/refusal of---Interference by High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction---Scope---Discretionary orders passed by a competent court, particularly those relating to grant or refusal of interim injunction, should not be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction unless the same are shown to be arbitrary, perverse or suffering from jurisdictional defect. Muhammad Saqib Jillani for Petitioner. Umar Tariq Gill for Respondent No. 2. Date of hearing: 23rd January, 2026.