Summary: This legal document pertains to a writ petition challenging the validity of two statutory regulatory orders (SROs) issued by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) in 2018 and 2019, along with the vires of a section in the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The petitioners, primarily retailers, contest the requirements imposed by the SROs for POS installation and object to specific sub-rules in Rule 150 ZEB of Chapter XIV-AA. Their arguments included challenges to the authority of the Board, allegations of conflict with the Act's provisions, and claims of unreasonableness and discrimination. The court rejected the jurisdictional challenge against the Board, emphasizing its authority to issue the SROs. It dismissed arguments related to the Act's sections, stating that the SROs are consistent with the legislative intent. The court addressed concerns about the definition of Tier-I retailers, pointing out that such classifications are justifiable. It also rejected claims of unreasonableness and discrimination, stating that the SROs meet the objectives of the Act. Ultimately, the court declared the challenged provisions in the Sales Tax Rules as intra vires the Sales Tax Act, 1990, dismissing the writ petition and affirming the validity of the SROs.

Summary: Acquittal granted--- The case involved allegations of strangulation as the cause of death, and the prosecution's case relied on medical evidence and a statement made by the appellant under Section 342, Cr.P.C. (Criminal Procedure Code). Upon review, the court found several shortcomings in the prosecution's case. The postmortem examination did not reveal any marks of violence on the deceased's body. The medical evidence did not conclusively establish death by strangulation, as symptoms such as a swollen and bruised tongue, bleeding from the ears, and other signs associated with strangulation were absent. Additionally, the court noted issues with the forensic analysis of organ samples, indicating that the samples were unsuitable for toxicological analysis. The court emphasized the difference between a confession and an admission, stating that the appellant's statement should be considered an admission rather than a true and voluntary confession. It highlighted that an admission alone cannot be the sole basis for awarding capital punishment. Ultimately, the court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a shadow of a doubt. Due to the lack of corroborative evidence and the presence of doubts, the appellant was acquitted of the charges, and the conviction and sentence were set aside.

Summary: Background:The case involved a challenge to the Circular issued by FBR regarding the computation of surcharge under Section 4A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The respondent firm, engaged in importing goods, contended that the surcharge should be computed only on the income derived during a specific 3? month period rather than for the entire tax year 2011.---Issues:Whether the Circular issued by FBR regarding the computation of surcharge under Section 4A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was lawful.Interpretation of Section 4A regarding the computation of surcharge for the tax year 2011.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court held that the Circular issued by FBR was lawful and in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.The Court interpreted Section 4A to mean that surcharge is to be computed on the income tax liability for the entire tax year 2011, proportionately allocated to the 3? month period. The Court rejected the respondent's contention that surcharge should only be computed on income derived during the specific 3? month period.The Court emphasized that splitting the tax year for the purpose of determining separate taxable incomes would be contrary to the provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.The Court highlighted the importance of adhering to the statutory provisions and the principle that taxation laws should be interpreted in a manner that promotes consistency and uniformity.---Citations/Precedents:Mehreen Zaibun Nisa v. Land Commissioner, Multan (PLD 1975 SC 397)Province of Punjab v. Muhammad Tayyab (1989 SCMR 1621)Income Tax Ordinance, 2001

Summary: As per record, the minor is aged about 3 or 3 ? years and it is settled by now that lap of mother is heavenly place and she is inherent to keep her children close to her bosom. Keeping in view age of minor which is 3? years, the mother is entitled to the interim custody and she cannot be deprived from the same until and unless decided otherwise by the Guardian Judge. Mother is symbol of sacrifice for her children and there is no substitute for her love and affection, who showers her love and affection upon children from cradle to grave. Even otherwise, she has the right of hizanat under the Muslim law and legally entitled to claim the custody of minor.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending