Summary: When it was alleged by the plaintiffs that Mst. Bibi Roshan was alive at the time of death of Torah Baz and that he happened to have died somewhere in early 40 s or late then admittedly, at the time of attestation of mutation, the petitioners were major and being not in possession they could challenge and took a positive step for their redressal. The petitioners have also alleged their right on the strength of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. Apparently, this plea was taken with the intention to get a relief under the provision of Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, even then there was no such evidence which could be considered for the reason that date of death of both Turabaz and Mst Bibi Shahan was much earlier to the promulgation of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance,1961 to which no retrospective effect was given.

Summary: Being a beneficiary, the petitioner was required to prove the payment of entire sale consideration but he failed to produce any witness in this regard; and even, his statement with record to the venue of payment is self- contradictory. In his written statement, the petitioner did not mention the name of any witness of the alleged payment of sale consideration; however, in his cross examination he stated that he had made the payment before one Kamran. Then he stated that he had made the payment before Sub-Registrar and again stated that the payment was made underneath a tree and vendoradmitted the said payment before the sub-Registrar. He then took another bstance that Kamran and Hasrat were present at the time of payment. Petitioner is not fair and impartial in his claim and has not come to the court with clean hands. The petitioner is taking multiple version together and according to the maxim, allegans suam turpitudinemn non est audiendus i.e. a person alleges/boasts of his own depraved conduct should not be heard.The possession was not delivered to the petitioner and he failed to prove the payment of sale consideration therefore, missing of these two essential ingredients, there is no sale in the eye of law.

Summary: It is very important to note that in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for the payment of price of land to affected landowners, the word COMPENSATION is used and not the word MARKET VALUE however, compensation should not be less than the market value. There is much difference between the terms compensation and /market value . The market value is a highest price for which a properly is exchanged on the date of valuation between a willing buyer and a willing seller in an arm s-lengthtransaction wherein the parties acted knowledgeably, prudently, and without compulsion. Whereas, the term compensation though used in various sections of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 but has not been defined therein. But, as per dictionary meaning the compensation means something,typically money, awarded to someone in recognition of loss, suffering, or injury or money that is paid to someone in exchange for something that has been lost or damaged or for some problem . As the property was acquired against the will of owner, therefore, in order to eliminate the sense of deprivation and discrimination, the affected landlord is compensated with the amount not less than market value prevailing at the time of acquisition.

Summary: The Conduct of the petitioners before the trial court, wherein they despite repeated orders were unable to record the testimony of their witnesses, delayed the proceedings in the appellant as well as revisional Court, which is not positive attribute of the petitioners manifested by their conduct in approaching the equitable jurisdiction of this court. Thus their conduct surely denied them the right to claim equity, when they have not come to the equitable court with clean hands. In this case a sister is seeking right of partition of her right finalized form her brother but she conduct of the petitioner towards the proceedings and they have made every effort to prolong and delay the partition of the landed property for the last about nineteen years without any just and reasonable cause so that the matter could not reach the final decision.

Summary: The judgment discusses a case involving two separate petitions challenging a tender process and subsequent award, where a joint bid by the petitioners was unsuccessful. The judgment outlines the arguments presented by both the petitioners and the respondents and addresses issues related to the maintainability of the petitions, the existence of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and the vires (validity) of certain rules under consideration. Ultimately, the court concludes that the petitions are not maintainable as the petitioners failed to demonstrate sufficient justification for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the court when alternative fora (forums) for dispute resolution were available. The court also dismisses the challenge to the vires of a specific rule. The judgment emphasizes that the petitioners have the option to seek redressal through appropriate legal channels. The judgment addresses the legality of the petitions challenging a tender process and its outcome, focusing on jurisdictional issues and the vires of certain rules, and ultimately dismisses the petitions while directing the parties to pursue their grievances through proper legal avenues.

Summary: The petitioner argued that the Impugned Order did not comply with the Supreme Court's directives, as PTCL was not given a fair hearing, and there was no independent application of mind. The petitioner also contended that PTCL was not subject to AGP's jurisdiction based on legal grounds including the De-Regulation Policy for the Telecommunication Sector 2003 and specific sections of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996. The court analyzed the issue and noted that the Impugned Order lacked proper corroboration of a fair hearing being granted to PTCL and failed to demonstrate independent reasoning or application of mind. The court observed that the AGP had not complied with the Supreme Court's directions and had rendered the Impugned Order hastily and without due consideration. As a result, the court allowed the petition, set aside the Impugned Order, and remanded the matter back to the AGP for a fresh determination in accordance with the law. The AGP was instructed to conduct the proceedings expeditiously, uninfluenced by the court's observations, and preferably within three months from the date of the court's judgment. The court granted PTCL the liberty to present all grounds raised in the case and to rely on the reply filed by the Federal Government through the Ministry of Information Technology & Telecommunications.

Summary: Justices Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Agha Faisal, delivered a judgment on a series of petitions (CP D 7286-7389 of 2019) challenging an amendment to the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013. This amendment, introduced by the Sindh Local Government (Amendment) Act 2019, changed the requirement for removing a mayor, deputy mayor, chairman, or vice chairman through a vote of no confidence from a two-thirds majority to a simple majority.The petitioners, including Abdul Rauf Nizamani, Shakeel Ahmed, Farooque Jameel Durrani, and others, contended that this amendment violated their vested rights and was ultra vires (beyond the powers) of the Constitution, specifically Articles 4 (right to be dealt with in accordance with law) and 25 (equality of citizens). They sought to invalidate the amendment and the subsequent notifications issued for votes of no confidence against them, arguing that they should not be removed from office despite losing the confidence of the majority of their respective houses.The court examined the principles for evaluating the constitutionality of legislative enactments, emphasizing the presumption in favor of constitutionality and the principle that laws should not be declared unconstitutional unless their invalidity is beyond reasonable doubt. The judgment referenced various legal and constitutional precedents to underline the legislative competence of the Provincial Assembly of Sindh to enact amendments related to local government.The court rejected the petitioners' arguments, stating that there was no vested right for an officeholder to remain in position despite losing the confidence of the house. It was held that the amendment was neither retrospective in effect nor violative of any fundamental rights or principles of the Constitution. The court also dismissed the challenges to the notifications issued for conducting no-confidence motions, aligning with earlier Division Bench judgments that upheld the democratic process of no-confidence motions as part of the local government system.Ultimately, the High Court dismissed all the petitions and upheld the amendment and the impugned notifications, affirming the simple majority requirement for the removal of local government officials through a vote of no confidence. The decision emphasized the supremacy of democratic principles and the legislative authority of the provincial assembly in matters of local government.

Summary: The petitioner, a company, challenged the decision of a Grievance Redressal Committee and raised various grounds, including issues related to technical evaluation, the status of being the lowest bidder, and the authority of the Committee to recommend re-tendering. The court referred to previous judgments emphasizing that the mere intent to award a contract does not create a vested right, and the lowest bidder's right is not absolute until the contract is accepted and signed. The court noted that the Committee's recommendation for re-tendering is not a final order, and no cause of action has arisen for the petitioner to challenge it. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Summary: The legal passage pertains to two appeals against a judgment on compensation enhancement in a case involving the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The appeals were filed by the appellants seeking further enhancement and by the Land Acquisition Collector and others (respondents) challenging the decision on compensation. During the proceedings, a crucial issue arose regarding the competency of the appeal filed by the Land Acquisition Collector. The appellants argued that the Collector was an incompetent person as the acquiring authority, the Ring Road Authority, was not impleaded. The respondents contended that the omission of the acquiring body as a party in the Reference rendered the entire proceedings illegal. The court held that the failure to include the necessary party in the Reference was a fundamental flaw, making the appeal incompetent. As a result, the court allowed the appeal filed by the Land Acquisition Collector, set aside the judgment, and remanded the case for fresh proceedings.

Summary: In this legal document, the petitioner challenged the rejection of their estimates for advance income tax payments for the 1st and 2nd quarters of the tax year 2020. A jurisdictional challenged was raised against the authority that rejected the estimates, contending that the officer lacked the authority to question them. The court rejected this jurisdictional objection, stating that the officer had the power to reject estimates under specific conditions. Additionally, the court clarified that the mechanism for the computation and recovery of advance tax is distinct from the final determination of income tax liability. The petitioner's argument that recovery cannot occur until conclusive determination of income tax liability is dismissed. The court emphasized the applicability of deeming provisions in recovering due advance tax under section 137 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The court addressed the availability of the remedy of appeal under section 127 of the Ordinance against the orders in question. Despite the petitioner's objections, the court asserted that the orders, particularly one involving default surcharge, are appealable. The document concluded by dismissing the petition.