Summary: Misc Matter: Challanging the impunged order dated 13-09-2018 of Assistant Commissioner under the authority of payment of wages Act.

Summary: FAO: Appeal u/s 30(A) of PEMRA and against order dated 20-01-2020

Summary: Held:(1) Men may tell lies but circumstances do not.(2) Non-production of witnesses who tell as to whether it was the accused who reported the matter or otherwise, the report loses its worth. Had they been produced, they would not have supported the prosecution case, therefore, an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-shahadat order, 1984 would come into play.(3) The report loses its significance when its maker resiles.(Appeal was dismissed in the circumstances).

Summary: 1. The story narrated by the complainant depicts that the purpose was only and only to see the grandson of PW Gul Shaheed as the deceased had some personal work, the complainant and deceased reached to the spot baithak, where they met PW-07 and took their seats on the ground, the anxiety of this Court increased that if the purpose was to see the grandson of the eye-witness then why it was not demanded and that why PW Gul Shaheed did not call for his grandson.2. The accused/ appellant was shown at point No.4 who fired from a distance of 12-feet on the deceased and the deceased received five inlet wounds where injuries No.2 and 5 were caused from the back, whereas one of the injury was having blackening around, if the statement of the witnesses is taken to be correct then, we are confronted with a situation that how the two entry wounds were received from the back, when the assailant and deceased were facing each other and that how blackening could be caused from a distance of 12-feet, but the prosecution failed to answer.3. It is an element of surprise that when the deceased and complainant were empty handed, why the complainant was left unhurt, as he too was within the firing range.4. The time of occurrence has been given as 10.49 hours whereas the matter was reported at 13.00 hours, despite the fact that the spot and the Police Station are lying at a distance of 7/8 kilometers, after realizing the fact that if the delay is not explained, it would cost a lot, so an attempt was made to explain the same.5. Dilfaraz happens to be the brother of the deceased, who was examined as PW-01, who stated that on the day of occurrence he left for Sabir Abad to purchase vegetable where he felt unwell so he went to the hospital to consult a doctor and that it was after some time that the dead-body was brought to the hospital.6. The Court while dealing with the case of a single accused has to take great care and caution and to judge the available evidence coupled with circumstances of the case and if it comes to the conclusion that the witnesses were interested or chance witnesses then the concept of single accused and his substitution should not be a clog in the way to acquittal.7. The recovered empties were sent to FSL on 09.02.2017, whereas these were received on 15.02.2017, but nothing was brought on record that where these empties were lying in the intervening period neither the Moharrir of the Police Station was examined nor abstract from register number 19 was collected.

Summary: Admittedly, respondent No.1 was lawful owner of the disputed property, who entered into anagreement to sell with respondent No.2 and settled the matter with him, as a result thereof, theconsent decree was passed in favour of respondent No.2. Respondent No.1 never entered intoany transaction or agreement to sell with the petitioner. The alleged agreement to sell on the basisof which petition under section 12 (2) CPC was instituted by the petitioner, was executed betweenthe alleged general attorney of respondent No.1 and the petitioner during pendency of the suit on06.01.2016, when restraining order of the Court regarding further alienation of the disputedproperty was in the field. Thus, no fraud or misrepresentation was committed by respondent No.1with the petitioner or with the Court.

Summary: Sections of law; Article 199 of the Constitution, sections 35 , 382-B and 397 Cr.P.C and Rule 140 of Prison Manual.(a) Ordering the sentence to run concurrently or consecutively is normally taken by the trial Court or appellate Court as provided in sections 35, 397 Cr.P.C but where such a direction is not given then a High Court is fully competent to exercise its powers in constitutional jurisdiction, in the interest of justice.(b) When law vests powers in some authority, it is always with a purpose and object. If such a discretion or power is not exercised in appropriate and deserving cases, the very purpose of law may be defeated.

Summary: The petitioner, a former contractual employee of the Sindh Revenue Board (SRB), challenged the engagement of private legal counsel by the SRB, arguing that as a government department, the SRB should be represented by the office of the advocate general, rather than hiring private lawyers. The petitioner claimed that the SRB had retained the services of private counsel, resulting in substantial legal fees. He cited the Rasheed Ahmed case as a precedent against the engagement of private counsel by government entities and requested the court to declare the vakalatnamas (authorizations to represent) issued by the SRB in specific cases as void and to direct the deposit of the fees paid to advocates into the national exchequer. The SRB's representative argued that the petitioner's claims were motivated by personal grudges and that the Rasheed Ahmed case applied to the Rules of Business of the Federal Government, not the Government of Sindh. It was contended that the SRB's role in the Government of Sindh was akin to the Federal Board of Revenue's role in the Federal Government, allowing them to engage legal counsel to protect revenue interests. The court considered the arguments presented and referenced the Rasheed Ahmed case, which deprecated the engagement of private counsel by the government without compelling reasons or public interest. It noted that the SRB was not a ministry or division of the Government of Sindh, as confirmed by official documentation. Therefore, the court concluded that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate any legal restraint on the SRB's ability to hire private legal counsel. Additionally, the court expressed doubt about the petitioner's claim being an act of public interest litigation, given the absence of a matter affecting the public at large. The court dismissed the petition, finding it misconceived and lacking in merit.

Summary: Judgments related to several petitions (CP D 4140 of 2018, CP D 4223 of 2018, CP D 4226 of 2018, CP D 4229 of 2018, and CP D 4284 of 2018) involving issues of disqualification of members of the Provincial Assembly of Sindh. The petitions are seeking the permanent disqualification of these members due to alleged non-disclosure of an "iqama" (a residency permit) in their nomination forms. The judgment addresses various legal aspects, including the maintainability of the petitions, the definition of an "iqama" as an asset, and whether the alleged non-disclosure of an iqama constitutes a disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. The court concludes that the petitions are maintainable for members currently holding public office, but not for those who are not currently in office. Additionally, the court determines that an iqama is not an asset as defined by the law, and the existence of an iqama alone is not sufficient evidence to establish undisclosed assets. Ultimately, the court dismisses the petitions for being either misconceived, not maintainable, or devoid of merit based on the arguments and evidence presented. The judgments are provided by different judges for each of the mentioned petitions.

Summary: The petitioners argued that the respondents failed to disclose their iqamas and related assets in their nomination forms, which, according to the petitioners, rendered them ineligible for holding public office. The respondents countered by claiming that an iqama is not an asset, that there's no requirement to disclose it in nomination forms, and that all assets were appropriately disclosed. The judgment discusses the maintainability of the petitions considering the timing of their filing, pointing out that under certain circumstances, the High Court's jurisdiction can be invoked to challenge the qualification of individuals even after an election. The court finds some petitions maintainable, given that the respondents were elected to the Provincial Assembly in the 2018 general elections. Regarding the argument whether an iqama qualifies as an asset, the court examines the definition of "asset" and concludes that the petitioners failed to demonstrate that an iqama is an asset. The court also notes that no provision required the disclosure of iqamas in nomination forms. Ultimately, the court dismisses some petitions as not maintainable and the others for lack of merit, as the petitioners were unable to provide clear evidence of undisclosed assets related to the iqamas, thereby rendering the allegations unproven.

Summary: Imposition of compensation/cost to delinquent police official while dealing with petition under Section 491 Cr.P.C---In this case, Tahir Mahmood Gujar, a police official, has filed a revision petition challenging an order from the Sessions Judge, Gujranwala, which directed him to pay compensation of Rs. 10,000 to each of the detenus for their illegal detention. The detenus were allegedly taken into custody by the police and kept in the premises of C.I.A. Staff, Gujranwala, without proper documentation of their arrest. The Sessions Judge, after examining the situation, concluded that the detenus were indeed held illegally and held Tahir Mahmood Gujar responsible for the unlawful detention. The petitioner challenged this decision, arguing that compensation cannot be awarded in habeas corpus cases. The court discussed the permissible orders in habeas corpus cases, including the award of compensation. While acknowledging the validity of awarding compensation, the court finds that a more detailed inquiry should be conducted to determine responsibility for illegal detention. The court sets aside the order directing Tahir Mahmood Gujar to pay compensation and remands the case to the Sessions Judge.