Summary: The nub of the matter is to determine whether a service provider is liable to pay compensation on account of faulty service when the consumer is also responsible to a certain extent inasmuch as the consumer shipped the goods to a consignee who was not a real person and committed fraud with the complainant- respondent. Held: The very concept of "self-collection" implies that the parcel should only be handed over upon strict verification of the identity of the recipient, especially when the item is valuable and insured. The failure to verify identity and the handing over of the parcel to an unauthorized person constitutes a breach of contractual duty as well as negligence. In fact, the fraud, which the intended consignee committed with the respondent, was materialized because of the inefficiency and breach of duty on the part of the appellant-company by handing over the mobile phone to the irrelevant person. 412Civil Revision 1718681.3483-

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Procedure for declaring an accused absconder elaborated. Distinction between absconder and proclaimed offender drawn. 410STR (Sales Tax Reference)- STR (Sales Tax Reference) 5-25 M/S ALI SHER TRADERS VS C.I.R ETC Mr. Justice Jawad Hassan 03- 06- 2025 2025 LHC 4279 2025 PTD 1429 [Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench)]

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: In today's interconnected world, no nation can thrive in isolation. The Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 reflects Pakistan's commitment to global arbitration standards. By aligning with the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, it ensures legal certainty for international investors. This progressive step will build foreign trust and support steady economic growth. 408C.O. (Commercial) 1-24 MUHAMMAD ARSAL VS SADIQ FFEEDS ETC Mr. Justice Jawad Hassan 03- 06- 2025 2025 LHC 4509 2025 CLD 1200 [Lahore (Rawalpindi Bench)] (https://sys.lhc.gov.pk/appjudgments/2025LHC4509.p

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 22-A & 22-B---Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S. 5---Illegal gratification---Ex-officio Justice of Peace, powers of---Scope---Petitioner assailed the order passed by Justice of Peace whereby the petitioner had been declined the request for issuance of direction for registration of FIR---Validity---Perusal of the record revealed that petitioner although filed a complaint for registration of FIR against the proposed accused as well as petition under S.22-A/B,Cr.P.C., but he had miserably failed to mention the date, time, place and name of witnesses in whose presence Rs.5,63,000/- were given as bribe to Police Official/ proposed accused---Not only on the asking of the petitioner the proposed accused took oath in front of the Court but inspite of departmental action he was only declared guilty of misconduct and the allegation of bribe, given to him was not proved---In the given circumstances, the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace had rightly thrashed out the material available on record and dismissed the application of petitioner, which did not require any interference from the igh Court, hence, resultantly instant petition being devoid of force was dismissed. Mian Abdul Qaddous for Petitioner. Muhammad Nasir Chohan, Additional Advocate General with Tahir ASI for the State. Rana Ghulam Sarwar for Respondent No. 5. Order Abher Gul Khan, J .--- The petitioner called in question the legality of order dated 23.07.2024 passed by Ex-Officio Justice of Peace Sheikhupura, who dismissed the application of petitioner under section 22-A/B Cr.P.C. for registration of criminal case against the proposed accused. 2. Arguments heard. Record perused. 3. Perusal of the record reveals that petitioner although filed a complaint for registration of FIR against the proposed accused as well as petition under section 22-A/B Cr.P.C. but he has miserably failed to mention the date, time, place and name of witnesses in whose presence Rs. 5,63,000/- were given as bribe to Tahir Majeed ASI. Not only on the asking of the petitioner the proposed accused Tahir Majeed ASI took oath in front of the court but inspite of departmental action he was only declared guilty of misconduct and the allegation of bribe, given to him was not proved. In the given circumstances, the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace has rightly thrashed out the material available on record and dismissed the application of petitioner, which does not require any interference from this Court, hence, resultantly instant petition being devoid of force is dismissed. JK/J-7/L Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 47---Sales Tax Reference, filing of---Limitation---Scope---Condonation of delay---Sufficient cause / reason, absence of---Effect---Application seeking condonation of delay in filing reference application was filed by Registered Person/Company (Applicant) while assailing order passed by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue ('Tribunal')---Ground taken by the Applicant was that though the impugned order was served on its (Applicant's)authorized representative after ten days of passing by the Tribunal but the same was handed over to the Applicant after a month or so, thus, period of limitation starts from said communication instead of date of serving to representative---Validity---Period of limitation for filing the reference application under S. 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, ('the Act 1990 ') is thirty (30) days from the communication of the order of the Appellate Tribunal or the Commissioner (Appeals), as the case may be---In the present case, the (instant) reference application was filed with a delay of as many as 16 days, whereas the same was to be filed within thirty days---Ground urged by the Applicant through (present) application is vague and unpersuasive as the applicant has merely annexed an affidavit executed by his authorized representative, who personally received the impugned order; it is further noted that the said (impugned) order was subsequently provided to the applicant (after about month of passing of the same), pursuant to his contact and request---Said sequence of events clearly establishes that the passing of the impugned order was within the knowledge of the Applicant---Pertinently, the authorized representative of the Applicant, being a registered tax practitioner, was well aware of the statutory period of limitation for filing a tax reference under S. 47 of the Act, 1990 which prescribes a specific time frame for instituting reference application but despite receiving the impugned order, he could provide the same to the applicant himself on or before the expiry of limitation, but instead of handing over the same, he kept it with him for almost sixteen days, without any solid explanation or reason---In case of time barred proceedings, defaulting party must explain the delay of each day caused in preferring valid proceedings in accordance with law---In the present case, no sufficient cause is pleaded even in the instant application, so the Applicant deserves no leniency---Law helps the vigilant and not the indolent---Application for condonation of delay, filed by Registered Person, was dismissed---Reference application, being barred by time, was dismissed, in circumstances. State Bank of Pakistan through Governor and another v. Imtiaz Ali Khan and others 2012 SCMR 280; Lahore Development Authority v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi and another PLD 2010 SC 705; Rehmat Din and others v. Mirza Nasir Abbas and others 2007 SCMR 1560; Muhammad Nawaz and others v. The State 2004 SCMR 945; Nazakat Ali v. WAPDA through Manager and others 2004 SCMR 145 and Aftab Iqbal Khan Khichi and another v. Messrs United Distributors Pakistan Ltd. Karachi 1999 SCMR 1326 ref. (b) Limitation--- ----Principles---Law of limitation provides an element of certainty in the conduct of human affair---Thus, statutes of limitation and prescriptions are statutes of peace and repose---In order to avoid the difficulty and errors that necessarily result from lapse of time, the presumption of coincidence of fact and right is rightly accepted as final after a certain number of years---Whoever wishes to dispute said presumption must do so, within that period; otherwise his rights, if any, will be forfeited as a penalty for his neglect---In other words, the law of limitation is a law which is designed to impose quietus on legal dissensions and conflicts---Limitation requires that persons must come to Court and take recourse to legal remedies with due diligence---Question of limitation cannot be termed as mere technicality---Importantly, with the afflux of time certain rights do accrue in favour of the adversary which cannot be taken away in a slipshod manner---Object for framing the law for the purpose of regulating the limitation was to push the parties to file their respective claims within the stipulated period---Time period provided for filing the proceedings in terms of suit, appeal, review, revision petition or any application cannot be lightly ignored or brushed aside---Question of limitation is as important as jurisdiction of the Court. Zahid Shafiq for Applicant. Malik Itaat Hussain Awan for Respondents. Yousaf Khan, S.O. IR (Hqrs), RTO, Rawalpindi for Respondents.

Summary: ----Ss. 39 & 42---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Arts. 91 & 120---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss.19 & 19-A---Declaration against void mutations, sought---Question as to whether cancellation or declaration was to be sought against a void mutation---Limitation for seeking cancellation and declaration stated---Mutation is not an instrument, therefore, Art. 91 of Limitation Act, 1908 would not be applicable and instead a declaratory suit should be filed, limitation for which is six years as per Art. 120 thereof---Predecessor of the respondents filed a suit on 07.05.2010 for declaration and permanent injunction, seeking invalidation of different mutations entered in 1998 without his knowledge or consent by claiming the knowledge of the same from 07.03.2007---He claimed he never sold the property nor facilitated the Roznamcha-Waqiati entries---Trial Court decreed the suit, and the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of Trial Court---Petitioner/defendant then filed present civil revision, arguing primarily on the ground of limitation under Art. 91 & Art. 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Core question requiring determination before the High Court was as to "whether the suit for declaration, challenging void mutations recorded without the plaintiff's consent or knowledge, was barred by limitation under Article 91 of the Limitation Act, 1908, or whether Article 120 applied in light of the alleged date of knowledge, rendering the suit within time"---Held: Notably no evidence was brought on record to substantiate knowledge qua impugned mutations, before 07.03.2007, when knowledge qua impugned mutations was alleged---It was important aspect of the matter that the suit was for declaration substantially and not specifically for seeking cancellation of mutations---Multiple causes of action were available and even if cause of action was taken from 07.03.2007, pleaded as the date of having knowledge of impugned mutations, still suit was within six years, and Art. 120 of Limitation Act, 1908 was attracted---With regards to the issue of applicability of Art. 91 of Limitation Act, 1908, same was not attracted to the present case as mutation was not an instrument as per settled law---In another aspect of the matter, facts alleged depicted that declaration was sought against void and unenforceable transaction(s) of sale, which transactions, in wake of denial, were not classifiable as voidable transactions under the scope of Ss. 19 & 19-A of the Contract Act, 1872; factum of extending consent to alleged transactions and execution of mutations in the first place was not alleged---Since declaration, being the primary and fundamental relief, was sought therefore S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and not the S. 39 thereof was attracted---Declaration of rights, allegedly prejudiced upon execution of mutations, was sought and that was within six years of the accrual of case of action, bringing Art. 120 in focus---In the present case, respondent No.1 had rightly sought declaration against void transactions---Even otherwise evidence of official witnesses is not convincing enough to dislodge allegations of fraud and deception exercised for procuring execution of impugned mutations regarding underlying transactions of sale---Petitioner failed to prove underlying transactions, payment of consideration, recording of Roznamcha-Waqiati and execution of mutations; aforesaid requirements become more pressing in the context that respondent No.1 was an illiterate person, who, admittedly, was not accompanied by any of his relatives at the time of noting on Roznamcha-Waqiati and execution of mutations-- -Petitioner produced uncertified copies of Khasra Girdawari's through statement of counsel after completion of evidence and cross examination of the witnesses produced, which were inadmissible in evidence---Once underlying transaction was not proved, simplicitor, impugned mutations were ineffective and insufficient to refute the title of the respondent No.1/plaintiff---Civil revision being devoid of merits was dismissed, in circumstances. Fida Hussain v. Abdul Aziz PLD 2005 SC 343; Thakur Nirman Singh and others v. Thakur Lal Rudra Partab Narain Singh and others AIR 1926 PC 100 and Khalid Hussain and others V. Nazir Ahmad and others 2021 SCMR 1986 rel. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----First Sched., Art.91---Mutation, challenge to---Limitation---Scope---Mutation is not an instrument in the context of Art. 91 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Mutation records the effect of change in the ownership in fact caused by virtue of a legal transaction, effected through written document for the purposes of Art. 91 of the Act, 1908-- -Mutation is not the document of title but evidence thereof---Mutation in-fact embodies a transaction and an effect extended thereto for the purposes of revenue record---In essence mutation is the progeny, cause and effect of the transaction(s) and not predecessor thereto. Fida Hussain v. Abdul Aziz PLD 2005 SC 343 rel. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ---Arts.72, 117 & 120---Document---Proof---Documents tendered through statement of counsel after completion of evidence and cross-examination of the witnesses produced, are inadmissible in evidence. Qamar-uz-Zaman and Muhammad Tayyab Gul for Petitioner. Shaigan Ijaz Chadhar for Respondent No.1. Waheed Alam, A.A.G. for Respondents Nos.2 and 3. Shakeel Ahmad, Ch. Ahsan Gujjar and Malik Rizwan Khalid for legal heirs of Respondent No.5. Hafiz Muhammad Muzammil for Respondents Nos. 6 to 10, 12 to 14. Date of hearing: 21st May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S.42---Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (V of 1962), Ss.3 & 5---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.115---Inheritance dispute---Succession to estate of deceased by legal heirs of his brother, claim of---Core issue---Property devolved upon widow of deceased under prevailing custom---Reversion of estate to full owner upon death of widow---Effect---Brother of deceased claiming his share in inheritance of deceased---Entitlement and legality---Upon termination of limited estate of widow, property would revertto last full owner (deceased) and brother of deceased being alive at time ofdeath of deceasedwould entitle the legal heirs of deceased's brother to inherit his share---Whether brother of deceased survived/outlived the deceased---Factual controversy---Determination---Effect on succession rights, significance of---Challenge in the present case was regarding the determination of succession rights over agricultural land originally belonging to one "UB"---The case arose out of a dispute concerning inheritance of agricultural land originally owned by "UB", leaving behind his widow as a limited owner under prevailing custom---Upon widow's death, a mutation was sanctioned which excluded the legal heirs of "GM" who was "UB's" brother---The plaintiffs, being heirs of "GM", instituted a suit claiming entitlement to 95/576 share (5/24 of 19/24) in the suit property, asserting that "GM" survived "UB" and was therefore entitled to inherit his share---The Trial Court dismissed the suit on the basis of mutation entries suggesting "GM" predeceased "UB", but the appellate court reversed this decision, relying on prior admissions in earlier litigation---Therefore, the core issue before the High Court in the present civil revision was "whether the plaintiffs, being legal heirs of "GM", were legally entitled to a share in "UB's" estate upon the termination of the limited estate of widow of "UB"?"---Held: Main issue for determination was as to whether "UB" died in lifetime of "GM" and the trial court decided this issue against the respondent/plaintiffs by holding that in the inheritance mutation of "GM" (Exh.P-2)---In inheritance mutation (Exh.P-2) date of death of said "GM" was recorded as 02.01.1940---Mutation (Exh.P-3) was with regard to inheritance of "UB" which was sanctioned in favour of his widow, in column No.13 of said mutation, date of death of "UB" was written as 12.02.1941---Exh.P-2 was incorporated on 21.02.1941, whereas Exh.P-3 was incorporated on 22.02.1941---It meant that both the mutations were entered with a difference of one day---Both mutations were attested on the same day i.e. 19.03.1941---From perusal of both the mutations it appeared that the concerned Patwari entered the said mutations on the information provided by one of the relatives namely "H" andhe was not produced in the witness box---No other evidence was brought on record with regard to the date of death of "GM" and "UB"---Moreover, date of death mentioned in the mutations did not find corroboration through any other evidence---The entries in the mutation register by themselves were not conclusive evidence of the facts which they purported to record---Therefore, date of death mentioned in the said mutations entries had no evidentiary value---It was noted that with regards to inheritance of "GM" a suit for declaration was instituted on 22.03.1976---Witnesses in the said suit corroborated that "UB" had died prior to the death of "GM" and said suit was partially decreed and plaintiffs (defendants in the present suit) succeeded to get their share from legacy of "GM" on the ground that "GM" died after the death of "UB"---Plaintiffs of the said suit being defendants in the present suit were bound their plaint and were bound by the statement of PW-2 who represented all the plaintiffs of the said suit---After the death of widow of "UB" the property inherited to her was reverted to original full owner namely "UB"---It was evident that at the time of death of "UB" his brother "GM" was alive---So he was entitled to get his legal share from the legacy of his brother "UB"---But as at the time of opening of said succession he had died, hence his legal heirs were entitled to get same share as their predecessor "GM" was entitled---The lower appellate Court keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case reached to a just conclusion that the respondents/ plaintiffs were entitled to get their legal share as per their entitlement---No illegality, material irregularity, misreading or non-reading of evidence and jurisdictional defect were found in the findings of the lower appellate court, hence, same did not call for interreference by the High Court under S.115 of C.P.C while exercising revisional jurisdiction---Present civil revision having no substance, was dismissed, in circumstances. Khizrat Muhammad and others v. Ghulam Muhammad and others PLD 1962 (W.P.) Lah. 492 ref. (b) Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--- ----S.42---Mutation---Entering a mutation or reporting factum of acquisition of any right in an estate to patwari is a mere ministerial act which would not confer or extinguish any right in the property---Principle stated---Under S.42 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 no witnesses or respectable are required either to accompany the person reporting acquisition of such an interest to patwari not to witness the entering of a mutation in said connection---Entering a mutation or reporting the factum of acquisition of any right in an estate to the Patwari is a mere ministerial act, which does not confer or extinguish any right in any property and thus nothing really hinges on the same. Khalil Ahmad v. Abdul Jabbar Khan and others 2005 SCMR 911 rel. (c) Estoppel--- ----Admission of facts---Evidentiary value and binding effect---Admission becomes conclusive and binding when acted upon by other party and operates as estoppel, precluding retraction by maker---Scope and limitations---Although admission of facts are only relevant and are not conclusive proof of the matters made through said admission, however, such admissions become conclusive and are binding on a party making them only if it amounts to a representation on a matter of fact made to the other party, who in consequence of such representation has altered its position---When admission is thus acted upon by the party to whom it is made, it operates as estoppel and becomes in a way conclusive, inasmuch as the party making it is not then permitted to show that the admission. Ahmad Khan v. Rasul Shah and others PLD 1975 SC 311 rel. (d) Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (V of 1962)--- ----Ss.3 & 5---Female/widow as limited owner under prevailing custom---Limited ownership of female holder, termination of---Effect and consequence---Property to revert to last full owner---Scope---As per S.3 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, limited interest of female holders terminates and in terms of S.5 of the Act (ibid) on the termination of the limited estates, the property is to be considered as the ownership of the last full owner and should be devolved upon his legal sharai heirs alive at the time of his death and if anyone of such heir had died prior to the termination of the limited estate his heirs would get the share to which their predecessor would have been entitled if alive---Accordingly, the limited owners are also entitled to their sharai share whether alive or dead. Muhammad Shahzad Farid Langrial for Petitioners. Muhammad Khalid Khan Sikhani for Respondents. Date of hearing: 15th May, 2025. Judgment Ahmad Nadeem Arshad, J .--- This Civil Revision is directed against the judgment and decree dated 25.01.2006 whereby the learned lower appellate Court while accepting the appeal of the respondents/ plaintiffs set aside the judgment and decree dated 07.02.2005 of learned trial Court and consequently decreed their suit. 2. Relevant facts forming background of this revision petition are that the respondents/plaintiffs instituted a suit for declaration on 01.12.1993 to the effect that they are owners in possession of the property described in schedule Alif annexed to the extent of 95/576 share (5/24 of 19/24) and the petitioners/defendants have no concern whatsoever with the suit property and the entries in the revenue record to that extent are void having no effect upon their rights. The main assertion of the respondents/plaintiffs in their suit was that the suit property originally belonged to one Usman alias Bagga son of Mahmood who died (before pre-partition) prior to the death of his brother namely Ghulam Muhammad; that after the death of Usman the suit property was inherited to his widow namely Mst. Subhai as limited owner according to the custom prevailing at that time; that after the death of said Mst. Subhai, the property under her control being limited owner was reverted to original full owner namely Usman and being his brother Ghulam Muhammad was entitled to get 5/24 share from his inheritance; that through inheritance mutation No.6358 sanctioned after the demise of Mst. Subhai they being legal heirs of Ghulam Muhammad were illegally deprived from the legal share entitled by their predecessor. The suit was hotly contested by the petitioners/defendants with the assertion that Ghulam Muhammad had been died prior to the death of Usman, therefore, impugned mutation was rightly sanctioned and the respondents are not entitled for any share. Learned trial Court after full-fledged trial dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 07.02.2005. Feeling aggrieved, the respondents/plaintiffs preferred an appeal which was allowed vide impugned judgment and decree dated 25.01.2006 and consequently the respondents' suit was decreed. Being dis-satisfied, the petitioners/ defendants assailed the said judgment and decree through the instant civil revision. 3. I have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties at full length and also perused the record with their able assistance. 4. From the perusal of record it appears that the only point for determination is whether Usman alias Bagga son of Mahmood died prior to the death of his brother namely Ghulam Muhammad or not. The learned trial Court in this regard framed issue No.4 in the following words:- "4. Whether Usman died in the life time of Ghulam Muhammad? OPP" 5. The learned trial Court decided this issue against the respondents/plaintiffs by holding that in the inheritance mutation of Ghulam Muhammad (Exh.P-2) the date of his death was written as 02.01.1941, whereas in the inheritance mutation of Usman (Exh.P-3) his date of death was shown as 12.02.1941, therefore, it is established that Ghulam Muhammad died prior to the death of Usman. The learned appellate Court reversed the said findings in the light of admission made by the petitioners/defendants in earlier round of litigation. 6. There is no dispute to the effect that one Mahmood died leaving behind his two sons namely Ghulam Muhammad and Usman with the landed properties. It is also admitted fact that Usman contracted two marriages, one with Hoor and second with Mst. Subhai. Whereas, Ghulam Muhammad contracted marriage with Mst. Bharo. Mutation No.2650 (Exh.P-2) is with regard to inheritance of Ghulam Muhammad son of Mahmood, which was sanctioned in favour of his widow namely Mst. Baharo. In column No.13 of said mutation, date of death of said Ghulam Muhammad was recorded as 02.01.1940. Mutation No.2651 (Exh.P-3) is with regard to inheritance of Usman son of Mahmood which was sanctioned in favour of Mst. Subhai. In column No.13 of said mutation, date of death of Usman is written as 12.02.1941. Exh.P-2 was incorporated on 21.02.1941, whereas Exh.P-3 was incorporated on 22.02.1941. It means that both the mutations were entered with a difference of one day. Both mutations were attested on the same day i.e. 19.03.1941. It is also evident that both the mutations were sanctioned in favour of the widows as limited owner. 7. Perusal of both the mutations it appears that the concerned Patwari entered the said mutations on the information provided by one of the relatives namely Haider. Said Haider was not produced in the witness box. No other evidence was brought on record with regard to the date of death of Ghulam Muhammad and Usman. Presumption of truth and correctness is not attached to the entries made in the mutation. In order to prove these entries strong and unimpeachable evidence is required. Entering a mutation or reporting factum of acquisition of any right in an estate to Patwari is mere ministerial act, which would not confer or extinguish any right in property. Under section 42 of Land Revenue Act, 1967, no witnesses or respectables are required either to accompany the person reporting acquisition of such an interest to Patwari nor to witness the entering of a mutation in said connection. For reference "Khalil Ahmad v. Abdul Jabbar Khan and others" (2005 SCMR 911), wherein it has been held as under:- "We say with respect that entering a mutation or reporting the factum of acquisition of any right in an estate to the Patwari was a mere ministerial act, which did not confer or extinguish any right in any property and thus nothing really hinged on the same. As would be evident from section 42 of Land Revenue Act no witnesses or respectables were required either to accompany the person reporting acquisition of such an interest to the Patwari nor to witness the entering of a mutation in the said connection." 8. The date of death mentioned in the mutations do not find corroboration through any other evidence. The entries in the mutation register by themselves are not conclusive evidence of the facts which they purport to record. Therefore, date of death mentioned in the said mutations entries have no any evidentiary value. Reliance is placed upon "Khizrat Muhammad and others v. Ghulam Muhammad and others" (PLD 1962 (W.P.) Lahore 492), whereby the learned Division Bench of this Court observed as under:- "A copy of the inheritance mutation Exh.P-6 of Muhammad Khan's estate was also produced on the record. This again has not been referred to by the Courts below and the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellants pressed it on our attention as it contains, in Column No.3, the date of the death of Muhammad Khan as the 3rd of June 1950, mutabiq-kitab-e-chowkidar. We do not think this has any evidentiary value by itself, being a piece of second-hand evidence based on the chowkidar's book which was not produced." 9. With regard to inheritance of Ghulam Muhammad son of Mahmood a suit for declaration titled as "Muhammad Yar etc. v. Mahmood etc." was instituted on 22.03.1976 (Exh.P-9). Perusal of Para 11 of the said plaint it appears that the plaintiffs of said suit maintained that Umar, Ahmad sons of Bakhsh, Usman son of Mahmod, Ali Muhammad son of Mehmeed were died prior to the death of Ghulam Muhammad. The exact narration is as under:- In the said suit Haq Nawaz appeared as PW-1 (Exh.P-12) and deposed in his examination-in-chief as under:- Noor Muhammad, one of the plaintiffs of said suit, appeared as PW-2 (Exh.P-12). He also maintained that Usman had been died prior to the death of Ghulam Muhammad. His exact deposition is as under:- The said suit was partially decreed vide judgment (Exh.P-10) and decree (Exh.P-11) dated 18.01.1978. Through said judgment and decree the plaintiffs of said suit succeeded to get their share from the legacy of Ghulam Muhammad on the ground that Ghulam Muhammad died after the death of Usman. The plaintiffs of said suit are now defendants in the present suit. Noor Muhammad son of Mahmood is arrayed as defendant No.11 in the present suit who is plaintiff No.7 in the said suit. Therefore, they are bound by their plaint and the statement of Noor Muhammad who represented all the plaintiffs of said suit and entered in the witness box on their behalf as PW-2. 10. Although admission of facts are only relevant and are not conclusive proof of the matters made through said admission. However, such admissions become conclusive and are binding on a party making them only if it amounts to a representation on a matter of fact made to the other party, who in consequence of such representation has altered its position. When admission is thus acted upon by the party to whom it is made, it operates as estoppel and becomes in a way conclusive, inasmuch as the party making it is not then permitted to show that the admission was wrong. For reference "Ahmad Khan v. Rasul Shah and others" (PLD 1975 SC 311), wherein it is held as under:- "Therefore, an admission which is wrong in point of fact or is made in ignorance of legal right, has no binding effect on the person making it. This is however, subject to two well recognized exceptions. First: such admissions become conclusive and are binding on a party making them only if it amounts to a representation on a matter of fact made to the other party, who in consequence of such representation has altered its position. When admission is thus acted upon by the party to whom it is made, it operates as estoppel and becomes in a way conclusive, inasmuch as the party making it is not then permitted to show that the admission was wrong. Such admission is really hit by rule of estoppel in section 115 of the Evidence Act, 1872." 11. The controversy was arisen when Mst. Subhai passed away and her inheritance mutation No.6358 (Exh.P-6) was attested on 13.05.1987. In the said mutation legal heirs of Ghulam Muhammad were deprived. 12. Admittedly, Mst. Subhai was a limited owner. As per Section 3 of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, limited interest of female holders terminates and in terms of Section 5 of the Act (ibid) on the termination of the limited estates, the property was to be considered as the ownership of the last full owner and should have devolved upon his legal sharai heirs alive at the time of his death and if anyone of such heir had died prior to the termination of the limited estate his heirs would get the share to which their predecessor would have been entitled if alive. Accordingly, the limited owners were also entitled to their sharai share whether alive or dead. 13. Therefore, after the death of Mst. Subhai the property inherited to her was reverted to original full owner namely Usman. In the light of above discussion it is evident that at the time of death of Usman his brother Ghulam Muhammad was alive. So he was entitled to get his legal share from the legacy of his brother Usman. But as at the time of opening of said succession he had been died, hence his legal heirs are entitled to get same share as their predecessor Ghulam Muhammad was entitled. 14. The learned lower appellate Court keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case reached to a just conclusion that the respondents/plaintiffs are entitled to get their legal share as per their entitlement and the inheritance mutation No.6358 dated 13.05.1987 (Exh.P-6) is required to be corrected/rectified. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners/defendants has not been able to point out any illegality, material irregularity, misreading or non-reading of evidence and jurisdictional defect in the findings of learned lower appellate Court, which do not call for any interference by this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the C.P.C. 16. Epitome of above discussion is that the instant civil revision having no substance/merit is dismissed. No order as to costs. UN/M-117/L Revision dismissed.