Summary: Service against removal his post.

Summary: Service against removal from his post.

Summary: Pending

Summary: Pending

Summary: Pending

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199----Writ jurisdiction----Concurrent findings----Limited scope of High Court's interference. The petitioner challenged the attachment of his salary through a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution. Held, concurrent findings of fact by lower courts are binding and cannot be overturned by the High Court unless there is a jurisdictional error, illegality, or violation of natural justice. Certiorari is limited to quashing decisions based on errors of law or jurisdiction, and writ jurisdiction does not extend to reevaluating factual findings of lower courts. Cited Cases: • Ahmed v. Ghama (2005 SCMR 119) • Shafqatullah v. District and Sessions Judge, Nowshera (2001 SCMR 274) Disposition: Writ petition dismissed. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964) ----Ss. 13(3) & 17----Execution of decree----Attachment of salary----Scope of execution powers of Family Court. Section 13(3) of the Family Courts Act allows recovery of decrees as arrears of land revenue where explicitly directed in the decree. However, Family Courts are not restricted to this mode of execution and may adopt other lawful procedures, including attachment of salary or arrest of the judgment debtor. Family Courts are quasi-judicial forums and may devise procedures to enforce decrees, provided such procedures align with principles of fair trial and natural justice. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ramzan v. Ali Hamza (PLD 2016 Lahore 622) • Muhammad Amin v. Judge, Family Court, Sahiwal (2015 YLR 316) Disposition: Salary attachment upheld. (c) Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908) ----S. 60----Attachment of salary----Limitations. Petitioner argued against salary attachment under Section 60, C.P.C., claiming financial hardship. Held, Family Court decrees for maintenance are governed by the Family Courts Act, 1964, which provides specific enforcement mechanisms, and procedural limitations under Section 60, C.P.C., are not strictly applicable in such cases. Disposition: Objection dismissed. (d) Maintenance law----Family Courts' jurisdiction----Execution of maintenance decrees. The judgment debtor failed to comply with maintenance orders for his ex-wife and minor daughter, despite directions from the Supreme Court to clear arrears. Execution proceedings, including perpetual non-bailable warrants and freezing of assets, were initiated due to non-compliance. Family Courts hold broad discretion to enforce maintenance decrees, and non-compliance with higher courts' orders precludes equitable relief. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Tabish Naeem Khan v. Additional District Judge, Lahore (2014 SCMR 1365) • Syed Muhammad v. Mst. Zeenat Bibi (PLD 2001 SC 128) Disposition: Execution measures upheld. (e) Principle of laches----Writ petition dismissed for delay. The petitioner filed the writ petition over one year after the impugned decisions without adequate justification. Held, unreasonable delay renders the petition barred by the principle of laches, and no discretionary relief can be granted in such circumstances. Cited Cases: • Ahmed v. Ghama (2005 SCMR 119) • Shafqatullah v. District and Sessions Judge, Nowshera (2001 SCMR 274) Disposition: Petition dismissed on account of laches. (f) Obligation to approach court with clean hands. Petitioner failed to disclose prior decisions of the High Court and Supreme Court, including non-compliance with the Supreme Court's directives for maintenance payments. Held, equity requires petitioners to approach courts with clean hands; concealment of material facts disentitles petitioners from equitable relief. Disposition: Writ petition dismissed for lack of merit and concealment of facts.

Summary: Where an express provision of law provides a right or remedy to enforce said right and the court passes an order relating to the same, which order even if an interlocutory order and has finality attached to it for a particular purpose provided by the said provision of law, the same becomes a challengeable decision under Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964. The dismissal of application under Section 21-A of the Family Courts Act, 1964, which is a remedy provided under express provision of the said Act through which interim relief of protection of property during the pendency of pending family suit has been refused is a decision given which is appealable in terms of Section 14 of the Act; hence, without availing the said remedy, direct constitutional petition is not maintainable due to availability of alternate remedy, hence, the constitutional petition being premature is disposed of with observation that, if advised, the petitioner may seek the available remedy before approaching this Court.

Summary: Judgment/order passed with consent of the parties could not be challenged by any of the parties. Presumption of regularity is attached to all judicial and official acts, which include orders of courts and the same also finds support from the illustration (e) attached to Article 129 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 which provides that Court may presume that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. It is settled by now that the minor could not be burdened with onus to prove the financial status and payment capacity of his father to be held entitled to maintenance allowance rather it was for the father to prove his financial sources which, if he fails to prove, inference is to be drawn against him. The maintenance for past six years could be allowed by the Family Court as a suit for maintenance allowance would be governed by the residuary Article 120 of the Schedule attached to the Limitation Act, 1908 providing limitation of six years. It is settled position of law that the interim maintenance allowance paid during the pendency of the suit in compliance of orders passed by the court is to be adjusted from the amount determined in the final decree.

Summary: The petition filed by the Federation of Pakistan through its Secretary, Finance, and the FBR sought leave to appeal against the High Court's judgment. The petitioners' representative, Mr. Muhammad Khalil Dogar, argued that the High Court erred in setting aside the contract awarded to NLC Construction Solutions (NCSPL). He contended that the Public Procurement Rules allowed for a viable third party, NCSPL, to participate in the project. Additionally, Mr. Dogar asserted that the FBR had the authority to award the contract to the most qualified contractor, as determined through a competitive bidding process. During the proceedings, questions were raised regarding the representation of the Federation of Pakistan by a private counsel instead of the Attorney-General or a law officer from the office of the Attorney General. The original case file revealed a power-of-attorney signed by Dr. Fareed Iqbal Qureshi, Collector of Customs, Model Collectorate of Custom Preventive, Custom House, Karachi, authorising an Advocate-on-Record (AOR). However, there was no authorisation by the Federation of Pakistan itself. Consequently, the petition filed on behalf of the Federation of Pakistan was deemed not maintainable by the Supreme Court. Upon careful consideration of the arguments presented by both parties, the Supreme Court rendered its judgment in the case. While noting the lack of authorization for the Federation of Pakistan's representation, the Court proceeded to hear the petition on behalf of the FBR. The Court acknowledged the issues raised in the report of the Federal Tax Ombudsman and the concerns regarding the awarding of the contract to NCSPL. Ultimately, the Court upheld the judgment of the High Court, affirming the cancellation of the contract.

Summary: The dispute arose due to the promotion of these individuals from the post of Personal Assistant (BPS-16) to Private Secretary (BPS-17), which the respondents contested.The respondents initially held positions as Regular Stenographers (BPS-15) in NAB. Over time, the post of Stenographer was upgraded to BPS-16, and the respondents were promoted to the post of Personal Assistant (BPS-16). The respondents filed a Constitution Petition seeking promotion to BPS-17 with retroactive effect and raised concerns about promotions within NAB not following the proper process.The High Court of Sindh issued an order in response to the petition, directing NAB to consider the case of the respondents in the next Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) meeting. Subsequently, the respondents were promoted to the post of Private Secretary (BPS-17). However, the respondents challenged this promotion through another Constitution Petition, arguing that the promotion was contrary to rules and fundamental rights.The High Court issued a judgment in favor of the respondents, striking down the promotion to Private Secretary (BPS-17) and instructing NAB to revisit the nomenclature of the respondents' positions. This decision was based on the High Court's interpretation of rules and regulations.The Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the High Court had overlooked certain critical aspects of the case, including the existence of established Private Secretary (BPS-17) positions within NAB since 2002 and the adoption of rules applicable to government servants for these promotions. The Court ruled that the posts of Private Secretary (BPS-17) within NAB were created following proper rules and procedures and that the respondents were appropriately promoted.As a result, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and allowed the appeal, concluding that the promotion of the respondents to the post of Private Secretary (BPS-17) was valid and in accordance with established rules and regulations.