Summary: ----Applicability of enactment---Principle---When an Act of Parliament or a Provincial Assembly provides that it comes into force at once, then every provision of it becomes enforceable from the day the Act receives assent of the President or, as the case may be, the Governor, unless any provision of the Act suggests otherwise. Messrs Khurshid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Sheikh Muhammad Ilyas and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and others PLD 2020 SC 641 rel. (b) Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act (IV of 2010)--- ----S. 7 (6) [as amended under Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace (Amendment) Act, 2021]---Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017), S. 230---Election Rules, 2017, R. 170 (1)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Tenure post---Removal---Election Commission---Jurisdiction---Caretaker Government---Limitations---Petitioner was appointed as Ombudsperson for four years but she was removed from service by Election Commission, before completion of her tenure---Validity---In absence of statutorily prescribed procedure for removal of Ombudsperson, particularly when the appointment was for a fixed term, the incumbent could not be removed from office prior to the expiration of that term, save for the universally recognized grounds of proven misconduct or incapacity, which would necessitate a due process even if not explicitly detailed within Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010---Removal of Ombudsperson was not provided under Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010, except in the case of resignation---Even if removal became necessary on grounds of proven misconduct or incapacitation, the power to take such action was logically lie with the appointing authority, i.e., the Government, following due process---Election Commission was nowhere authorized in such regard under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010---Primary purposes of Election Commission, as delineated in the Constitution and the Elections Act, 2017, revolves around the conduct of free and fair elections---Achieving such purposes inherently, Election Commission was not empowered to direct permanent removal of any office bearer---Nature of removal contemplated in the notification of Election Commission, the "immediate termination of services" - implied a permanent cessation of employment, which did not directly relate to the Election Commission's core function of ensuring fair elections---At the most, Election Commission's powers in relation to public officials during election period, as indicated by R. 170(1) of Election Rules, 2017, and S. 230(2)(f) of Elections Act, 2017, (regarding the Caretaker Government's limitations), extended to transfer or shuffling of public officials with the Commission's approval---Such had suggested a focus on preventing misuse of official positions to influence elections, rather than permanent removal of appointees, particularly those with a statutorily defined tenure---De-notification of petitioner by Caretaker Government of Punjab by way of notification in question was not within its lawful authority---High Court set aside notification in question issued by Government of the Punjab de-notifying services of petitioner as Ombudsperson Protection against Harassment of Women at Workplace- --High Court declared notification in question to be null and void and petitioner was deemed to be in office as if the notification had not been issued---High Court directed that to ensure that future appointments to the position of Ombudsperson were beyond reproach, it would be apt to direct that the relevant authorities should, with due expediency, formulate and implement a comprehensive, transparent and merit-based appointment procedure---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Khawaja Muhammad Asif v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2013 SCMR 1205; Badshah Gul Wazir v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary and others 2015 SCMR 43 and Mushtaq Ahmad Moral and others v. The Honourable Lahore High Court, Lahore and others 1997 SCMR 1043 rel. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 10A---Fair trial and due process---Scope---Fair trial and due process rights guaranteed by article 10A of the Constitution are to be read as an integral part of every sub-constitutional legislative instrument that deals with determination of civil rights and obligations of any person. Naveed Asghar and 2 others v. The State PLD 2021 SC 600 rel. (d) Employment--- ----Tenure post---Object, purpose and scope---If incumbent knows he/she can be removed at any time without stated cause or due process, his/her ability to act fearlessly and independently, especially when dealing with potentially sensitive matters involving Government or influential individuals, can be curtailed---Security of tenure, within reasonable limits, is often considered essential for the effective functioning of such roles. Badsha Gul Wazir v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary and others 2015 SCMR 43 rel. Ch. Ishtiaq Ahmad Khan, Adnan Ahmad Chaudhry, Jahangir Ahmad Bhatti, Shahrukh Shahbaz, Ms. Zarish Fatima, Amjad Ali Shah, Ch. Umar Latif and Ms. Uzma Razzaq Khan for Petitioner. Barrister Hassan Khalid Ranjha, Additional Advocate General, Punjab, Muhammad Osman Khan, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab with Ibrar Ahmad, Law Officer, I&C Wing, S&GAD for Government of Punjab. Imran Arif Ranjha, Advocate/Legal Advisor with Bashir Arshad, Deputy Director (Law), Ms. Bushra Rasheed, Senior Law Officer ECP and Hafiz Adeel Ashraf, Assistant Law Officer ECP for Election Commission of Pakistan. Aaminah Qadir and Zeeshan Zafar Hashmi, Amici Curiae. Dates of hearing: 5th, 6th, December, 2023 and 9th April, 2025.

Summary: ----O. XLI, R. 27---Appellate stage---Application for additional evidence, filing of---Whether such application should be decided first through a separate order or conjointly with the main appeal?---Held: Under the law, particularly concerning application for additional evidence, there is no specific rule that mandates such an application must be decided prior to the final judgment in the main appeal through a separate order---Appropriate course of action, whether to decide the application first or conjointly with the appeal, is entirely dependent on the specific facts and circumstances of each case and the court's assessment of what is necessary to achieve a just and holistic adjudication---Paramount consideration remains the ability of the court to pronounce a satisfactory and complete judgment, which may, in certain circumstances, be best achieved by integrating the consideration of additional evidence with the overall merits of the appeal---Additionally, an important consideration in such matters is the content and potential impact of the intended additional evidence---If the appellate court determines that the evidence sought to be produced is of such a nature that its inclusion on the record could fundamentally alter the decision of the main case, then it might indeed be prudent to decide the application separately through a distinct order---This would allow for proper consideration of its admissibility and relevance before proceeding to the merits of the appeal---However, if the appellate court, after initial assessment, forms the view that the proposed evidence, even if admitted, would likely have no material impact on the outcome of the main case, then there is no compelling need to decide the application for additional evidence separately---In such a scenario, a conjoint decision of the application and the main appeal becomes a matter of judicial economy and efficiency---Such approach significantly contributes to the sound administration of justice by streamlining proceedings, preventing unnecessary delays, and ensuring the expeditious dispensation of justice. Sultan Ali alias Sultan through L.Rs. and others v. Rasheed Ahmad and 45 others 2005 SCMR 1444 rel. Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Abdullah through legal heirs 2009 SCMR 326 distinguished. Tahir Mahmood for Petitioners. Syed Naeem-ul-Hassan Bukhari for Respondents Nos. 1 to 5. Date of hearing: 12th June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. VI, R. 17---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.12---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell---Amendment in pleadings, seeking of---Inordinate delay in seeking amendment of pleadings---Scope---Belated amendments introducing new factual assertions, without credible justification and likely to prejudice the opposing party, cannot be permitted under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C.---Facts in brevity were that the petitioners (vendees) filed a suit for specific performance against the respondent (vendor), concerning an alleged oral agreement to sell an immoveable property---The respondent (vendor) denied the agreement, and during the pendency of the trial, after seeking multiple adjournments for evidence, the petitioner (vendee) filed an application under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C. seeking to amend the plaint by inserting the specific location where oral agreement was made, i.e. "in the drawing room of the same house"---The Trial Court dismissed the amendment application, but the revision was allowed by the revisional court---The respondent (vendor) successfully challenged this before the High Court, whereby, order passed in revision was set aside---The petitioners (vendees) then filed a present CPLA before the Supreme Court---Core question requiring determination was as to "whether a party can be permitted to amend its pleadings under Order VI, Rule 17 C.P.C. to introduce a new factual assertion, central to the controversy, after an inordinate delay of ten years, without adequate justification, and in a manner that potentially prejudices the opposing party"---Held: Petitioner sought to amend a factual assertion specifically relating to the 'alleged place' where the oral agreement was made, after a delay of ten years---Such a request raised serious questions about the bona fides of the petitioners/vendees---Amendment in this case was a direct attempt to support and fortify a disputed fact, central to the dispute over the existence of the alleged agreement i.e. its location---The petitioners' amendment was sought after a decade of pendency, and multiple adjournments, all the while failing to lead evidence---The attempt to insert a significant factual detail relating to the alleged oral agreement, namely the location of its execution, after such an extended lapse of time could not be viewed as a benign clarification---Instead, it appeared to be an effort to recalibrate the factual matrix of the petitioners' case in light of the trial's trajectory---The proposed amendment had the effect of adding a key factual detail long after the other side had committed to a line of defence based on the original version of events---The petitioners' conduct did not merit the equitable indulgence contemplated under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C.---High Court's decision to disallow the amendment was legally sound and did not warrant interference---Petition being meritless was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Ghulam Nabi v. Sardar Nazir Ahmed 1985 SCMR 824; Dausa and others v. Province of the Punjab and others 2016 SCMR 1621; Secretary to Government of West Pakistan v. Kazi Abdul Kafil PLD 1978 SC 242; Muhammad Akram v. Altaf Ahmad PLD 2003 SC 688 and Mst. Ghulam Bibi and others v. Sarsa Khan and others PLD 1985 SC 345 rel. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. VI, R. 17---Amendment in pleadings---Inordinate delay in seeking amendment---Scope---Court is empowered to allow a party to amend their pleadings, particularly where such an amendment is necessary to determine the real issue in controversy between the parties and the power can be exercised by the court, at any time, during the pendency of such proceedings and even after the passage of the decree at the appellate stage or at the stage of revision in the highest Court---While it is true that the courts are empowered under Order VI, Rule 17 of C.P.C. to permit amendment "at any stage of the proceeding" this discretion is to be exercised with caution and only in furtherance of justice---Although the rule ibid is to be construed liberally, certain guardrails must be strictly observed---An amendment cannot be allowed if it alters the nature of the suit, seeks to withdraw admissions previously made, is tainted with mala fide intent, causes prejudice to the opposite party, or is designed to overcome evidentiary contradictions or prior judicial determinations---Courts must be vigilant in evaluating the motive behind the request, the stage at which it is brought and its impact on the rights of the opposite party---Where an amendment is sought after an inordinate delay, without adequate explanation, the delay itself, though not conclusive, becomes a weighty factor---An amendment of such a nature, introduced after the close of pleadings and during the trial phase, is likely to prejudice the opposing party by shifting the nature or focus of the controversy---An amendment should not be allowed where it alters the litigation landscape in a way that disadvantages the opposing party who relied upon the original pleading in the conduct of their case. Ghulam Nabi v. Sardar Nazir Ahmed 1985 SCMR 824; Abaid Ullah Malik v. Additional District Judge, Mianwali and others PLD 2013 SC 239; Muhammad Akram and another v. Altaf Ahmad PLD 2003 SC 688; Secretary to Government of West Pakistan v. Kazi Abdul Kafil PLD 1978 SC 242 and Mst. Ghulam Bibi and others v. Sarsa Khan and others PLD 1985 SC 345 rel. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.VI, R.17---Amendment in pleadings---Scope---Pleadings frame the boundaries of a party's case and the parties are bound to lead evidence in line with them---A party is not permitted to go beyond its pleadings and cannot lead or rely upon evidence that is inconsistent with what has been pleaded; even if such evidence is brought on record, it must be ignored---In this context, any belated amendment that introduces a new factual assertion must be examined with heightened scrutiny---The timing of the amendment request must, therefore, be viewed not in isolation, but in the context of its potential to disturb the procedural fairness and substantive rights of the opposing party. Sardar Muhammad Naseem Khan v. Returning Officer, PP-12 and others 2015 SCMR 1698; Muhammad Akram v. Altaf Ahmad PLD 2003 SC 688 and Mst. Ghulam Bibi and others v. Sarsa Khan and others PLD 1985 SC 345 rel. Muhammad Saleem, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing 5th June, 2025.

Summary: Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act (XIII of 1975) --- ---- Ss. 8, 10 & 17--- Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 10-A , 23 & 24---Property as evacuee trust property, declaration of---Property relating to a religious or charitable trust,transferring of---Validation of certain transfer---Scope ---Revision, powers of---Petitioners assailed the order of the cancellation of RL-II No.47 and the declaration of the land-in-question as evacuee trust propertypassed by the Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Inter-faith Harmony---Claim of the petitioners is that they are owners /vendee of the property-in-questionon separate Khasra Numbers having been purchased by a lady vendor, while a "Mandir" was constructed on Khasra Numbers different from theirs but they are wrongly considered as tenants by the Secretary /Respondent---Validity---Record reveals that the RL-II No.47 of land-in-question was cancelled by invoking the provisions (relatingdeclaration of property as evacuee trustproperty and validation of transfer) under Ss. 8 & 10 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal ) Act, 1975---But the Respondent (the Secretary), while passing the impugned order did not even touch/discuss the said provisions of Ss. 8 & 10 of the Act 1975, which effected the petitioners' valuable rights---Article 4 of the Constitution provides that it is an inalienable right of every citizen to be treated in accordance with law and no action detrimental to his/her life, liberty, reputation or property shall be taken except as per law---Article 10-A of the Constitution provides right of fair trial and due process for determination of rights and obligations but the impugned order has been passed without adopting due process and proper procedure of law as provided under the Act 1975---Moreover, the petitioners have fundamental right under Art.23 of the Constitution to acquire, hold and dispose of property and Art.24 of the Constitution clearly states that no person shall be deprived of his property except in accordance with law, therefore, the respondents are bound to act strictly in accordance with the Law specifically the Ss. 8, 10 & 17 of the Act 1975, which have not been even discussed properly---Respondent (the Secretary) while passing the impugned order did not properly examine or even discuss the said important provisions of Ss. 8 & 10 of the Act 1975---Said Ss. 8 and 9 are directly relevant to the present case because the petitioners are challenging the cancellation of RL-II No.47 and the declaration of the land as evacuee trust property---As per S.8 of the Act 1975 whenever there is a question about certain property relating to a religious or charitable trust, the matter must be decided by the Chairman Evacuee Trust Properties Board (ETPB), and before declaring any property as evacuee trust property, a notice must be given to the affected parties, which is a legal requirement that anyone having an interest in the property must be given a fair opportunity of hearing--- After said process, the declaration must be published in the official Gazette--- However, in the present case, there is nothing on record to show that such legal steps were followed, nor the petitioners were given any proper opportunity to present their version, which amounts to violation of legal procedure---Similarly, S.10 of the Act 1975,dealing with situations where evacuee trust property is already transferred to someone, stipulates that if the transfer happened in good faith before a certain date and under the relevant law, it will be considered valid If there is a doubt whether a transaction was made honestly, the Chairman has the authority to decide but even,in such cases, it is compulsory to give a fair hearing to the person who may be affected---In the present case, the petitioners claimed ownership of the land through old transactions, starting from 1913 and that they purchased the property from a lawful lady owner---Impugned order does not show that the Chairman or the Secretary (Respondents) considered said facts or heard the petitioners properly---Thus, the matter was decided without following the procedure required by law---Hence, the impugned order had been passed without considering fundamental rights therefore, not sustainable in the eyes of law---High Court set aside the impugned order while remanding the case back to the Respondent(Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony), who would decide the issue afresh after giving proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and other concerned persons, strictly in accordance with law, especially Ss. 8, 10 & 17 of the Act through a speaking order---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Syed Qalb-i-Hassan, Advocate Supreme Court and Barrister Syed Saim Hussain for Petitioner. Barrister Zain Mansoor and Nabila Rubab, Assistant Attorney Generals. Barrister Raja Hashim Javed, Assistant Advocate-General. Syed Najam-ul-Hassan Hashmi for Respondent No. 2. Order Jawad Hassan, J .--- The Petitioners through this writ Petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the "Constitution") have impugned the order dated 14.02.2017, passed by the Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Inter-faith Harmony, Government of Pakistan; being illegal and unlawful. 2. When confronted to the maintainability of this Petition in the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as "Raja Ali Zaman (decd.) through L.Rs. and another v. Evacuee Trust Property Board and another (PLD 2022 SC 726), learned counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the Petitioners assailed the earlier orders dated 27.06.2002 and 14.07.2006, passed by the Respondent No.1/Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony, Government of Pakistan being revisional authority, through Writ Petition No.2464 of 2006, which was accepted by this Court on 15.05.2015; and the matter was remanded back to the Respondent No.1 by setting aside the said orders. Added that the Respondent No.1 again dismissed the Petitioner's claim vide order dated 14.02.2017, which is illegal and unlawful. 3. Learned counsel for the Respondents also objected to the maintainability of this Petition by stating that on 13.11.2024, the Petitioner No.4 namely Iqrar Hussain Bhatti, withdrew this Petition to his extent by accepting himself as tenant of the property. 4. In response thereof, learned counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the Petitioners are not tenants; they are owners of the property in question, which was originally owed by one Sher Muhammad, who sold the same to Kaku. Said Kaku then sold the same to one Mahindar Shiv Jee Maharaaj alias Barkat Roy vide mutation No.854, dated 21.07.1913. Adds that in the year 1940, consolidated proceedings were carried out and Khasra Nos.458 and 461 were changed into Khasra No.211 comprising of land measuring 1 kanal 5 marla upon which a "Mandir" was constructed; whereas Khasra Nos.456 and 457 were changed into Khasra No.209, which was purchased by the Petitioners from Mst. Bhulan; but the Petitioners' claim is not considered by the Respondents. 5. Heard. Record perused. 6. Perusal of record reveals that the issue started from the order passed by the Chairman, ETPB, on 25.02.2979, whereby the land in question was declared as an evacuee trust property and the RL-II No.47, dated 03.06.1970 issued by the Settlement Department in favour of Mst. Bhulan; was cancelled by invoking the provisions of Sections 8 and 10 of the Act. But the Respondent No.1, while passing the impugned order dated 14.02.2017 did not even touch/discuss the aforesaid Sections 8 and 10, which effect the Petitioners valuable rights. Article 4 of the Constitution of provides that it is an inalienable right of every citizen to be treated in accordance with law and no action detrimental to his/her life, liberty, reputation or property shall be taken except as per law. He maintained that Article 10-A of the Constitution provides right of fair trial and due process for determination of rights and obligations but the impugned order has been passed without adopting due process and proper procedure of law as provided under the Act. Moreover, the Petitioners have fundamental right under Article 23 of the Constitution to acquire, hold and dispose of property and Article 24 of the Constitution clearly states that no person shall be deprived of his property except in accordance with law, therefore, the Respondents/authorities are bound to act strictly in accordance with the Law specifically the Sections 8, 10 and 17 of the Act, which have not been even discussed properly. For ready reference the aforesaid Sections 8, 10 and 17 ibid are reproduced as under: 8. DECLARATION OF PROPERTY AS EVACUEE TRUST PROPERTY:- (1) If a question arises whether an evacuee trust property is attached to a charitable, religious or educational trust or institution or not, it shall be decided by the Chairman whose decision shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court; (2) If the decision of the Chairman under subsection (1) is that an evacuee trust property, he shall, by notification in the official Gazette, declare such property to be evacuee trust property. If a property is declared to be evacuee trust property under subsection (2), the Chairman may pass on order cancelling the allotment or alienation, as the case may be, take possession and assume administrative control, management and maintenance thereof; Provided that no declaration under sub-section (2) or order under subsection (3) shall be made or passed in respect of any property without giving the persons having interest in that property a reasonable opportunity of being heard. 10 VALIDATION OF CERTAIN TRANSFERS:- (1) An immovable evacuee trust property; (a) If situated in a rural area and utilized bona fide under any Act prior to June, 1964, for allotment against the satisfaction of verified claims; and (b) If situated in an urban area and utilized bona fide under any Act for transfer against the satisfaction of verified claims in respect of which Permanent Transfer Deeds were issued prior to June, 1968; Shall be deemed to have been validly transferred by sale to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, and the sale proceeds shall be reimbursed to the Board and shall form part of the Trust Pool. (2) If a question arises whether a transaction referred to in subsection (1) is bona fide or not, it shall be decided by the Chairman whose decision shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court. (3) If it is decided that a transaction referred to in a sub-section (1) is not bona fide, the Chairman may pass an order cancelling the allotment or transfer of such property; provided that no decision under subsection (2) or order under sub-section (3) shall be taken or passed in respect of any property without giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard. 17. REVISION:- The Federal Government may at any time, of its own motion or otherwise, call for the record of any case or proceedings under this Act, which is pending or in which the Chairman or an Administrator, or a Deputy Administrator or an Assistant Administrator has passed an order, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such an order, and may pass such order in relation thereto as the Federal Government, thinks fit. Provided that the record of any case or proceedings in which the Chairman, or an Administrator, or a Deputy Administrator or an Assistant Administrator has passed an order shall not be called for under this section on the application of any aggrieved person made after the expiration of fifteen days from the date of such order. 7. In view of above, it appears that the Respondent No.1, while passing the impugned order dated 14.02.2017, did not properly examine or even discuss the aforesaid important provisions of Sections 8 and 10 of the Act. These sections are directly relevant to the present case because the Petitioners are challenging the cancellation of RL-II No.47 and the declaration of the land as evacuee trust property. As per Section 8, whenever there is a question about certain property relating to a religious or charitable trust, the matter must be decided by the Chairman ETPB, and before declaring any property as evacuee trust property, a notice must be given to the affected parties. It is a legal requirement that anyone having an interest in the property must be given a fair opportunity of hearing. After this, the declaration must be published in the official Gazette. However, in this case, there is nothing on record to show that such legal steps were followed, nor the Petitioners were given any proper opportunity to present their version, which amounts to violation of legal procedure. 8. Similarly, Section 10 deals with situations where evacuee trust property was already transferred to someone. It says that if the transfer happened in good faith before a certain date and under the relevant law, it will be considered valid. If there is a doubt whether a transaction was made honestly, the Chairman has the authority to decide. But even in such cases, it is compulsory to give a fair hearing to the person who might be affected. In this case, the Petitioners claimed ownership of the land through old transactions, starting from 1913 and that they purchased the property from a lawful owner Mst. Bhulan. But the impugned order does not show that the Chairman or Respondent No.1 considered these facts or heard the Petitioners properly. This again shows that the matter was decided without following the procedure required by law. Hence, the impugned order has been passed without considering fundamental rights therefore, not sustainable in the eyes of law. 9. For what has been discussed above, this writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 14.02.2017 is set aside. The case is remanded back to the Respondent No.1/Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony, who shall decide the issue afresh after giving proper opportunity of hearing to the Petitioners and other concerned persons, strictly in accordance with law, especially Sections 8, 10 and 17 of the Act through a speaking order within a period of three (03) months from the receipt of certified copy of this order. MQ/M-94/L Petition allowed.

Summary: Criminal appeal under section 8 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The appellant had filed a complaint alleging dispossession by respondent’s No. 2 to 6 from a property. The trial court acquitted the respondents using Section 265-K Cr.P.C. There was a previous civil suit regarding the property between the appellant and the respondent`s predecessor, which was decided against the appellant. PW-1 (Said Badshah) and PW-2 (Badshah Mian, the appellant`s brother) testified about the civil litigation concerning the property. The court found zero possibility of conviction based on the evidence and upheld the acquittal.

Summary: Criminal Appeal Held: Principal- A man may lie, but circumstances rarely do- the universal standard is that circumstantial evidence must lead to a singular, inescapable conclusion of guilt, excluding all other possibilities. The convergence of telecommunication records, geo-location, and recovery from possession eliminates the likelihood of mere coincidence. In the circumstances of the case, the Call Data Record (CDR) data speaks volumes, forming a strong and unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence that establishes the accused`s connection with the planning and execution of the offence. For every offence, the mens rea and actus rea needs to be independently proved against each accused, if there are more than one. Of the element of motive and intention is lacking against either of the accused, that accused must be given the benefit of such. Cr.A No. 456-P/2024 is dismissed, Cr.A No. 536-P/2024 is allowed while Cr.R No. 161-P/2024 stands infructuous)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Arts. 4, 9, 18, 25 & 199 --- Civil Aviation Authority Ordinance, 1982 ---- S. 21(1) --- CAA Service Regulations, 2000 --- Contract Employment --- Regularization --- Ultra Vires --- Maintainability --- Aforesaid Civil Petitions for leave to appeal are directed against judgment dated 12.01.2021, passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi, in Constitutional Petitions No. D-2576 and D-3167 of 2020 --- Short-lived facts of case are that respondent No. 2 is statutory body incorporated under Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority Ordinance, 1982 ("Ordinance") --- CAA Service Regulations, 2000 ("Regulations") was framed pursuant to provisions of Ordinance --- Regulations were revised first in year 2014 and then in year 2019 --- Respondent No.2 advertised certain vacancies in newspapers and petitioners applied against vacant posts on merit, and after qualifying written test and interview, they were appointed on contract basis for two years --- Contract period was subsequently extended, and after being granted extension of their last contract, Departmental Head recommended their case for further extension --- However, vide letter dated 20.05.2020, petitioners were informed that they will not be allowed further extension --- According to revised Regulations in 2019, maximum time limit for contract service was fixed as five years --- Petitioners, in serious apprehension that their period of contract service will not be extended, filed CP No. D-3167/2020 for relief that their appointment may be declared regular appointment and that Regulation 21(1) of Regulations is ultra vires Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 ("Constitution") and fundamental rights guaranteed under it --- High Court clubbed CP No. D-2576/2020 and CP No. D-3167/2020 together and dismissed both petitions vide consolidated judgment dated 12.01.2021 on ground that Civil Aviation Authority ("CAA") has no statutory rules --- However, High Court failed to consider that vires of Regulations were also under challenge, on which there was no discussion --- Learned counsel for petitioners argued that under rules and statutes of CAA, there is no mention of Contract or Project post, and no procedure laid down to fill such post --- It was further contended that contract appointments, without any backing of law, are not only unlawful but also amount to exploitation --- He further argued that neither plea of vires of regulations was considered nor any other crucial questions raised were taken into consideration, and though case law was noted in impugned judgment, but without appreciating same, High Court found it distinguishable --- It was further averred that if contract appointment is made against permanent post involving duties/work of permanent nature through transparent selection process, then it would be considered regular appointment --- According to learned counsel, revised Regulation 21(1) of Regulations are ultra vires fundamental rights guaranteed under Constitution, but High Court had dismissed petitions without considering or giving any findings on whether aforesaid Regulation is ultra vires or intra vires --- Learned counsel for CAA argued that petitions were not maintainable before High Court and fully supported impugned judgment --- He further argued that this Court, in various dicta, already held that contract employees cannot invoke constitutional jurisdiction for their regularization or otherwise, and proper remedy for contract employee, if there is any breach of contract, is to file civil suit --- However, when we confronted learned counsel on whether question of vires raised by petitioners was decided by High Court, learned counsel frankly conceded that no such issue was dealt with or decided in impugned judgment --- Heard arguments --- According to facts narrated in CPLA No.407-K of 2021 (CP.No.D-3167/2020 before High Court), petitioner No.1 (Syed Saad Ali) applied against one vacancy of Assistant Director (IT) (Data Base Administrator -EG-01), while petitioner No.2 (Syed Zia-ul-Haq) applied against vacancy of Assistant Director (IT) (Oracle Functional Consultant -EG-01) --- Both petitioners, in their writ petition, sought declaration that their appointment by way of direct recruitment in EG-01 is regular appointment and they further challenged vires of Regulation 21 (1) of Regulations, same being ultra vires their fundamental rights, and prayed to High Court to strike it down as unreasonable --- Moreover, Office Memorandum dated 20.05.2020, issued pursuant to Regulation 21(1) of Regulations, was also challenged, with prayer that since they were performing their duties against permanent post for last 5 years, hence directions be issued against respondents to regularize their services --- Whereas, in CP No. 449-K of 2021 (CP No.D-2576 of 2020 before High Court), claim of petitioner (Javed Iqbal) was that he was commissioned in Pakistan Air Force in year 1993 and having more than 17 years of service at his credit, he was sent on deputation to CAA on 29.08.2001 and was posted as ADC to Deputy DG (Ops. CAA) --- He remained on deputation till 16.12.2005 and also submitted application, as per Regulations, for his permanent absorption, which was processed and he was consequently asked to seek retirement from his parent organization --- It is further stated by said petitioner that he was appointed as Airworthiness Safety Inspector, Ex-Cadre "B" (PG-10), on 25.01.2008 after fulfilling all codal formalities for regular appointment in CAA, but he was appointed on contract basis --- He had also prayed to High Court for declaration that he is regular employee and is entitled to serve till age of superannuation, and that respondents may be directed to issue his notification as regular employee --- Bone of contention before High Court in CP No.D-3167/2020 was challenge to alleged vires of revised Regulation 21 (1) of Regulations, whereby it was articulated that "subject to upper age limit criteria, authority may fill regular post or temporary post, or project post on contract basis for specified period, initially for two years to be renewed, upon satisfactory performance --- Provided that fresh yearly contract to be executed up to maximum of five years" --- Learned counsel for petitioners collectively argued that plea of ultra vires was not taken into consideration by learned High Court and impugned judgment, in this regard, is silent --- It is translucent from impugned judgment that while jotting down other relevant facts in CP No.D-3167/2020, learned High Court also mentioned that petitioner has prayed for declaration to effect that revised Regulation 21(1) of Regulations is ultra vires fundamental rights of petitioners and same be struck down being unreasonable --- It is further reflected from arguments of Mr. M. M. Aqil Awan, Sr. ASC (mentioned in impugned judgment) that he strongly objected to decision of respondent (CAA) of introducing Regulation 21(1) of revised Regulations --- Learned Division Bench of High Court acknowledged and noted that petitioners also attacked revised Regulation 21 (1) of Regulations, under which time limit was provided for contractual appointment, but learned High Court, in paragraph 10 of impugned judgment, without adverting to plea of vires raised by petitioners and argued by their learned counsel, confined judgment to question of regularization in service of CAA alone, and in same scenario, held that contractual employees have no vested right to be regularized unless it has specifically been provided for under terms and conditions of appointment and law --- Ultimately, writ petitions were not found maintainable either on facts or in law --- Terms "intra vires" and "ultra vires" are both Latin phrases, and diametrical opposites --- Expression ultra vires means "beyond powers" --- If act entails legal authority and it is done with such authority, it is symbolized as intra vires, that is, within precincts of powers, but if it is carried out shorn of authority, it is ultra vires --- It is well-settled that constitutionality of any law, rules, or regulations, can be scrutinized and surveyed, and law can be struck down if it is found to be offending Constitution due to absence of law-making and jurisdictive competence, or found in violation of fundamental rights enshrined therein --- At same time, it is established precept of interpretation of laws, one backed by judicial sagacity and prudence in form of numerous precedents of superior courts, that law should be saved rather than be destroyed and court must lean in favour of upholding constitutionality of legislation unless it is ex facie violative of constitutional provision --- Function of judiciary is not to legislate or question wisdom of legislature in making particular law, nor can it refuse to enforce law --- Doctrine of severability permits court to sever unconstitutional portion of partially unconstitutional statute in order to preserve operation of any uncontested or valid remainder --- Words contained in statutes, rules, or regulations, are first to be understood in their natural, ordinary, or popular sense, and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in context, or in object of statute, to suggest contrary --- Vires of law, rules, or regulations can be challenged if its provisions are ex facie discriminatory, in which case actual proof of discriminatory treatment is not required to be shown, but there is also presumption in favour of constitutionality of enactments, unless it is ex facie violative of constitutional provision --- Reference can be made to judgment of this Court rendered in case of Lahore Development Authority v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana and others (2015 SCMR 1739), wherein this Court summarized applicable rules while determining constitutionality of statute and also referred to various other judicial precedents --- It is well settled exposition of law that each case has to be decided on its own facts --- Every litigant deserves fair chance of being heard and decision of court must be founded and structured on facts of case --- It is admitted position that learned High Court neither considered plea of vires of Regulation under challenge nor discussed anything in this regard in impugned judgment which completely ignored and overlooked same --- Doctrine of "sub-silentio" accentuates legal principle where judgment is rendered without specifically and precisely avowing or attending to exact question of law raised for determination --- In fact, sub silentio, Latin term, literally translates to "under silence" or "in silence" --- In legal milieus, it points towards incidence where Court decides lis without appreciating or deliberating particular point of law raised before it, which disturbs precedential value of judgment --- This doctrine often denotes that if court, in its judgment, overlooked or dispensed with crucial point of law raised before it, then precedential value of such decision is seriously disturbed --- Decision is not binding if it was reached at without argument, without reference to critical terms of law, and without citation of authority --- Such decision, taken as sub silentio, lacks authoritative weight --- This Court, in case of Uch Power (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (2010 PTD 1809), explained that decisions sub silentio have no precedential value --- Such decisions are defined as "those which are given on point of law not perceived by Court or present to its mind" --- Whereas, in case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur ((1989) 1 SCC 101), Supreme Court of India, while quoting Salmond on Jurisprudence, explained that decision passed sub silentio in technical sense is when particular point of law involved in decision is not perceived by court or present to its mind --- Aforesaid Civil Petitions were converted into appeal and allowed vide our Short Order dated 12.06.2025 --- As consequence thereof, impugned consolidated judgment dated 12.01.2021, passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi, in Constitutional Petitions No.D-2576 and D-3167/2020, was set aside and matter was remanded to High Court for fresh adjudication, expeditiously, preferably within period of three months, excluding period of summer vacations --- Above are reasons assigned in support of our Short Order --- Petitions were allowed accordingly.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 ---- Ss. 2(8)(f), 20 & 71; Provincial Employees’ Social Security (Contributions) Rules, 1966, R. 4(3) ---- Minimum wages notifications --- Social Security contribution --- Benchmark wage determination --- Invalidity of administrative substitution The Court held that social security contributions under the Ordinance must be calculated based solely on wages determined and notified under Section 71 of the Ordinance. The impugned Notifications dated 20.09.2024, 19.07.2022, and 17.10.2023—fixing contribution benchmarks based on minimum wages under the Punjab Minimum Wages Act, 2019—were declared nonconformist and without legal effect. Section 71 provides a self-contained mechanism, requiring recommendations from the Governing Body followed by government notification. The Notifications bypassed this process, thereby undermining the Ordinance and rendering its provisions, particularly Sections 2(8)(f) and 20, ineffective. The Court observed that importing wage benchmarks from another statutory framework without compliance with Section 71 constitutes legislative overreach. (b) Provincial Employees' Social Security (Contributions) Rules, 1966 ---- R. 4(3) --- Subordinate legislation --- Cannot override primary statute --- Interpretation The Court rejected the argument that Rule 4(3) of the 1966 Rules validated the impugned Notifications. It held that rules cannot override the parent statute, and Rule 4(3) merely ensures contributions are calculated at a minimum threshold where actual wages are below the Ordinance-prescribed level. It does not authorize substitution of the statutory benchmark with wage levels fixed under external statutes like the Punjab Minimum Wages Act, 2019. Post-amendment provisions introduced by the 2013 Amendment Act further narrowed the scope for deviation from Section 71. (c) Constitutional jurisdiction ---- Judicial review --- Beneficial legislation --- Scope of judicial deference to legislative scheme The Court emphasized that while the Ordinance is a beneficial piece of legislation, the Court cannot expand or supplement its provisions under the guise of beneficial interpretation. Judicial review cannot be invoked to fill legislative gaps where the scheme is unambiguous. The delay by the Government in acting on recommendations of the Governing Body cannot be judicially corrected through recognition of otherwise unlawful Notifications. Any hardship to employees resulting from such delay must be remedied through legislative action, not administrative substitution or judicial indulgence. (d) Administrative law ---- Ultra vires executive action ---- Invalidity of notifications contradicting statutory scheme The Notifications directing computation of social security contributions on the basis of revised minimum wages, without proper invocation of Section 71, were held to be ultra vires and a direct affront to the statutory mandate. Executive instructions or circulars cannot override, amend, or substitute statutory procedures. The impugned Notifications effectively rendered Section 71 redundant, which is impermissible in law. (e) Interpretation of statutes ---- Principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius ---- Procedure prescribed by law must be followed Where the law prescribes a specific method for determining wage benchmarks (i.e., through Section 71), the same must be strictly followed. The principle that what is not explicitly permitted is forbidden was reaffirmed. Resort to wage levels under the Minimum Wages Act 2019 cannot substitute the express mechanism under the Ordinance, and any attempt to do so constitutes a violation of the separation of powers and the integrity of the statutory framework. Disposition: Writ petition and connected petitions allowed; impugned Notifications declared invalid to the extent they directed computation of social security contributions on the basis of minimum wage rates fixed outside the scope of Section 71 of the Ordinance. Cited Provisions: • Provincial Employees’ Social Security Ordinance, 1965, Ss. 2(8)(f), 20, 71 • Provincial Employees’ Social Security (Contributions) Rules, 1966, R. 4(3) • Punjab Minimum Wages Act, 2019 Cited Cases (selected): • Pioneer Cement Ltd. v. Government of the Punjab (2017 PLC 199) • PLD 2020 SC 641, PLD 2016 SC 995, PLD 2005 SC 842 • Messrs Mehraj Flour Mills v. Provincial Government (2001 SCMR 1806) • Ahmed Ali Talpur v. Sub-Registrar Latifabad (PLD 2025 SC 302) • PLD 2012 SC 553 (Suo Motu Case No. 4 of 2010) "Determination of benchmark wage under the provisions of Provincial Employee's Social Security Ordinance, 1965, is essential for determining the quantum of contribution payable thereunder."

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre‑emption Act, 1987 --- S. 13 (Talbs) --- Talb‑i‑Muwathibat—Proof of informer—Failure fatal— Appellant claimed he proclaimed his intention to pre‑empt immediately upon learning of the sale from one Akbar Shah, yet never produced the informer in evidence. Supreme Court held the foundational requirement of naming and examining the informer is mandatory; non‑production leaves time, place, and mode of knowledge uncorroborated, attracting an adverse presumption. Concurrent findings upholding performance of Talb‑i‑Muwathibat were founded on mis‑reading of evidence and were rightly reversed in revision. Cited cases: Abdul Rehman v. Haji Ghazan Khan 2007 SCMR 1491; Subhanuddin v. Pir Ghulam PLD 2015 SC 69. (b) Pre‑emption—Shafī‑e‑Khalīt (contiguous owner) —Requirement of strict contiguity— Local commission and CWs confirmed Khasra No. 225, recorded as “Chair Mumkin Nijji Raasta” (private passage), lay between appellant’s Khasra No. 226 and the suit Khasra No. 223/1. Mere building a retaining wall or exercising possessory control over part of another Khasra does not create contiguity absent ownership. Trial and appellate courts ignored this critical fact; High Court correctly held appellant was not a Shafī‑e‑Khalīt. (c) Pre‑emption—Shafī‑e‑Jār (common irrigation) —Topographical bar— Appellant’s field lay at a markedly higher elevation than the communal water channel; irrigation from the claimed source was physically impossible. Absence of common source negated status as Shafī‑e‑Jār. Findings of courts below were perverse and liable to correction. (d) Talb‑i‑Ishhād—Statutory mode of notice— Appellant admitted he did not dispatch the notice himself; alleged intermediary (Akbar Shah) not produced; notice was not sent by registered post with acknowledgment‑due as expressly required by S. 13(3) of the 1987 Act. Procedural non‑compliance rendered Talb‑i‑Ishhād invalid. (e) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 --- S. 115—Revisional jurisdiction—Scope to upset concurrent findings— Where trial and first appellate courts commit non‑reading, mis‑reading, or misconstruction of material evidence, High Court may justifiably exercise revisional powers to rectify the error and prevent miscarriage of justice. Impugned revision fell squarely within this ambit. Disposition: Appeal dismissed; High Court judgment dated 15‑06‑2016 upheld; appellant’s suit for pre‑emption finally dismissed.