SARDAR HUSSAIN /Applicant Versus The STATE and another
Summary: (Against
the judgment dated 04.06.2018 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in
Ehtesab Criminal Appeal No. 11-P of 2015).
National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---
----Ss. 9(a)(iii)(vi) & 9(a)(xii)---Mis-appropriation, misuse of
authority and abetment---Re-appraisal of evidence---Confession of
co-accused---Effect---Appellant / accused along with co-accused was alleged to
have misappropriated funds of Pakistan Tabacco Board by misusing his
authority---Conviction and sentenced awarded to appellant / accused by Trial
Court was maintained by High Court but amount of fine was
reduced---Validity---Complaint made by Pakistan Tobacco Board was primarily against
co-accused and not against appellant / accused---Confidential report was
prepared by officials of complainant Board on the statement of accountant,
which depicted that embezzlement was made by co-accused who had confessed
almost all allegations of forging / tampering cheques and preparing fake
documents depicting deposits in bank account of complainant Board---Fact
finding committee did not name appellant / accused as embezzlement had taken
place because of co-accused and defects in accounting system adopted by
complainant Board---Prosecution failed to make out a case of misuse of
authority under section 9 (a)(vi) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999
against appellant / accused---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence
awarded to accused by two Courts below and he was acquitted of the
charge---Appeal was allowed.
Wahid
Bakhsh Baloch v. The State 2014 SCMR 985; The State and others v. M. Idrees
Ghauri and others 2008 SCMR 1118; Mansur-ul-Haque's case PLD 2008 SC 166 and
The State v. Anwar Saifullah Khan PLD 2016 SC 276 rel.
Kamran
Murtaza, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner/Applicant along with
Petitioner/Applicant.
Raja
Muhammad Rizwan Ibrahim Satti, Special Prosecutor General NAB for NAB.
Date
of hearing: 16th June, 2025.
Munawar Ali and another Versus The State through AAG Sukkur and 2 others
Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 561-A, 22-A & 154---Inherent powers of High Court under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C.---Scope---Powers of Ex-officio Justice of Peace---Order passed by Ex-officio Justice of Peace for the registration of FIR---Petitioner sought quashing of the same---Allegations levelled by the respondent No.3/complainant and defense raised by applicants involved disputed questions of fact which required a thorough probe---Such matters could not be adjudicated upon in proceedings under S.561-A,Cr.P.C.---Inherent jurisdiction of the High Court was to be exercised sparingly only in cases where interference was necessary to prevent abuse of process of law and to secure the ends of justice---Whether the applicants were vicariously liable or not and whether the version of complainant was credible or otherwise, were matters that fell within exclusive domain of the Investigating Officer---Such questions could only be determined after proper investigation and collection of evidence--- At this stage, no conclusive opinion could be formed or expressed by the High Court as it might prejudice the case of either party---Impugned order passed by Justice of Peace was maintained---SHO Police Station concerned, who had been directed to record statement of complainant and, if a cognizable offence was made out, to incorporate in S. 154 Cr.P.C. Register may proceed in accordance with law---However, it was observed that unless some tangible incriminating evidence surfaced during the investigation, no arrest shall be effected against the applicants/accused--- Criminal Miscellaneous Application was disposed of accordingly. Syed Qambar Ali Shah v. Province of Sindh and others 2024 SCMR 1123 rel. Pervaiz Ahmed Kuber for Applicants. Ashfaque Hussain Leghari for the Complainant. Khalil Ahmed Maitlo, DPG for the State. Date of hearing: 26th May, 2025. Order Abdul Hamid Bhurgri, J .--- This Criminal Miscellaneous Application has been preferred under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. by the applicants, thereby assailing the order dated 16.05.2025 rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, Mirwah in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 1752/2025, preferred under Sections 22-A and 22-B, Cr.P.C., titled "Mst. Ameerzadi v. The State through DPP Khairpur and others". Through the impugned order, the learned Justice of Peace directed the Station House Officer, Police Station Mirwah, to record the statement of respondent No.3 and if a cognizable offence is made out same shall be incorporated in 154 Cr.P.C book. 2. The case, as projected by respondent No.3, Mst. Ameerzadi, is that her deceased son, Ali Raza, had been informally engaged by the proposed accused for electrical maintenance works in the locality. It is alleged that the proposed accused had extended express assurance to the deceased that the power supply from the grid station would be disconnected prior to the commencement of any such work. On such assurance the deceased ascended an electric pole on 12.03.2025 at approximately 8:00 p.m to repair the electricity of one Laluddin in presence of eye-witnesses namely Ali Dino son of Ali Muhammad and Wadero Allah Warrayo son of Beral. It is averred that due to the alleged gross negligence of deliberate act of proposed accused No.2, the electricity was suddenly restored, resulting in the instantaneous electrocution and death of the deceased. According to the complainant, upon hearing cries from villagers, she arrived at the location, retrieved the deceased's body with the assistance of others, and transported it to the Police Station for medico-legal formalities. However, it is further alleged that the police authorities declined to entertain the matter or to register an FIR, purportedly due to influence exerted by the proposed accused. Despite repeated efforts by respondent No.3, the police failed to discharge their statutory obligation. The complainant asserts that the Duty Officer, despite being legally enjoined under Section 154, Cr.P.C., to register an FIR upon the disclosure of a cognizable offence, declined to act accordingly, without lawful justification. 3. Thereafter, respondent No.3 submitted a formal written application for registration of FIR; however, the Duty Officer, in alleged dereliction of his statutory duty failed to comply. Consequently she moved an application under sections 22-A and 22-B Cr.P.C before the Court of Justice of Peace, Khairpur, seeking registration of the FIR. 4. Upon issuance of notice, both the official respondents and the present applicants entered appearance and filed respective comments. Respondent No.2, SHO Police Station Mirwah, submitted that the complainant's version was falsely contrived in order to secure an undue advantages. 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants submitted that the impugned order was passed in a perfunctory and mechanical manner, devoid of any judicial application of mind. It was contended that both applicants are employees of SEPCO, and that applicant No.2, Ali Muhammad, had been transferred from the 132 KV Grid Station dated 29.01.2025. Said applicant was relieved from his former post on 31.01.2025 and assumed charge at Kandiaro on 01.02.2025, as evidenced by the annexed documents (Annexures 'C' and 'D'). It was further submitted that the deceased was in the habitual practice of illegally restoring electrical connections that had been disconnected due to non-payment, and had been repeatedly warned to desist from such unlawful activity. Despite prior warnings, he continued in said unlawful conduct, and consequently, FIR No. 152/2024 under Section 39-A of the Electricity Act was registered against him on the complaint of the Line Superintendent, SEPCO (Annexure 'E'). Additionally, a formal letter dated 27.02.2025 was addressed by the S.D.O (Operations), Sub-Division Setharja, to the SHO of Police Station Thari Mirwah, requesting legal action against the deceased in view of his continued illegal interference with the electrical infrastructure (page 39). Counsel vehemently denied that any directive or permission was issued by the applicants instructing the deceased to ascend the pole, asserting that the deceased was neither in the employ of SEPCO nor acting under their authority. It was contended that the unfortunate incident resulted solely from the deceased's own illegal actions, and not due to any act or omission of the applicants. Learned counsel concluded by submitting that all this material was unjustly ignored by the learned Justice of Peace while rendering the impugned order, and prayed that the same be set aside. 6. Conversely, Mr. Ishfaque Hussain Leghari, Advocate for respondent No.3, filed vakalatnama and defended the impugned order as a well-reasoned and lawful exercise of jurisdiction. He submitted that the deceased used to undertake private work for the applicants and was repeatedly called upon to repair electrical connections. On the fateful evening, the deceased was directed to carry out repairs to an electricity of one Laluddin Khaskheli. Based upon the assurance extended by proposed accused No.2 that power supply from the grid would be suspended, the deceased ascended the pole in presence of witnesses. However, the electricity was abruptly restored, and the deceased suffered fatal electrocution. Respondent No.3 approached the police to lodge an FIR and requested post-mortem examination, but the SHO flatly refused to entertain her complaint. Having been left with no alternative, she invoked the jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace under Sections 22-A and 22-B Cr.P.C., whereupon, the learned Judge passed the impugned order dated 16.05.2025, which, it was urged, required no interference as admittedly a death had occurred that warranted investigation. Learned counsel prayed for dismissal of the present application. 7. Mr. Khalil Ahmed Maitlo, learned Deputy Prosecutor General did not support the order on the ground that SHO in his report had exonerated the applicants. He also prayed that instant Criminal Misc. Application be allowed. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the applicants, the learned Deputy Prosecutor General Sindh and perused the material available on record. 9. It is well settled that the jurisdiction under Section 22-A Cr.P.C can be invoked when police failed to register FIR in respect of cognizable offence. However, it is equally settled that such jurisdiction must be exercised with care, caution and only in the absence of mala fide. This Court is a conscious of facts that the allegations levelled by the respondent No.3/complainant and defense raised by applicants involve disputed questions of fact which require a thorough probe. Such matters cannot be adjudicated upon in proceedings under section 561-A Cr.P.C. The inherent jurisdiction of this Court is to be exercised sparingly only in cases where interference is necessary to prevent abuse of process of law and to secure the ends of justice. Whether the applicants are vicariously liable or not, and whether the version of complainant is credible or otherwise, are matters that fall within exclusive domain of the Investigating Officer. These questions can only be determined after proper investigation and collection of evidence. At this stage, no conclusive opinion can be formed or expressed by this Court as it may prejudice the case of either party. Reliance is placed on the case of Syed Qambar Ali Shah v. Province of Sindh and others (2024 SCMR 1123). 10. In view of above, the impugned order dated 16.05.2025 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge/Justice of Peace, Mirwah is hereby maintained. The SHO Police Station Mirwah, who has been directed to record statement of respondent No.3 and, if a cognizable offence is made out, to incorporate in 154 Cr.P.C register may proceed in accordance with law. However, it is observed that unless some tangible incriminating evidence surfaces during the investigation, no arrest shall be effected against the applicants. The applicants are directed to fully co-operate with Investigating officer and place all relevant material before him, who shall conduct the investigation strictly in accordance with law. 11. The Criminal Misc. Application is disposed of in the above terms. JK/M-90/Sindh Order accordingly.
FAYYAZ AHMED Versus SPECIAL JUDGE (RENT) and 2 others
Summary: (a) Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (IX of 1963)--- ----S. 17---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, Rr.100, 101 & 103---Ejectment proceedings---Execution of eviction order---Objection application by the tenant, adjudication of---Scope---While adjudicating objection application of the tenant the court was obligated to frame issues and record evidence in order to resolve disputes raised by the tenant---Petitioner (landlord) filed an ejectment petition against respondent No.2 (tenant) regarding the shop in question resulting in passing of eviction order---Respondent No.2/tenant claimed to be a tenant of petitioner with respect to shop No.986-A and raised grievance that in execution of eviction order the possession of his rented premises was taken, whereas, eviction order was passed with respect to a different shop bearing No. 986 against another person 'MS'---Tenant's objection application filed under O. XXI, R. 100, C.P.C. was allowed by the Rent Controller directing restoration of possession---Held: It was an imperative aspect of the matter that such order was passed without proper investigation, framing of issues, or recording of evidence---Petitioner/landlord was admittedly the owner of two shops having No. 986 and 986-A---He had filed ejectment petition against another person 'MS'---As per stance of the petitioner/landlord, he rented out property measuring 32x13 sq. ft. to one 'MS', after removing partition wall between two adjacent shops---The number of shop given in eviction petition was No. 986, however, the rent agreement was with respect to shop No. 986-A, which was relied upon---The agreement clearly stipulated that the property subject of rent agreement was measuring 32x13 sq. ft---The number of property mentioned therein was No. 986-A---Somehow, respondent No.2/tenant who instituted the objection application under O. XXI R. 100 of C.P.C., previously approached the Rent Controller with an application claiming that petitioner/landlord had executed a rent agreement in his favour---He claimed that he was tenant in the shop which was subject of eviction-petition and sought to be impleaded in the array of parties---This application, under O. I, R. 10 of C.P.C. was rejected---Then respondent No.2/tenant never raised any challenge to the said order until the conclusion of trial---It was admitted position that 'MS' maintained in ejectment proceedings that he was tenant of shops subject to eviction proceeding until 13.08.2000 and then respondent No.2/tenant obtained the same shops on rent under separate arrangement---Thereafter, 'MS' stopped pursuing the proceeding and he was proceeded ex-parte---Statements of three witnesses were recorded in support of the stance of ejectment petitioner---These statements went un-rebutted as they were never cross-examined---Finally, the ejectment-petition was allowed---The disputes raised by respondent No.2/tenant in his objection filed under O. XXI, R. 100 of C.P.C. clearly involved such questions which should not have been resolved in his favour in a summary manner---The impugned order without due investigation and proper exercise of jurisdiction could cause miscarriage of justice---The case was remanded to the Rent Controller for decision afresh, after framing relevant issues and permitting the parties to lead their evidence---The impugned order and the subsequent orders passed by Rent Controller were set-aside, in circumstances. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.XXI, Rr.100, 101 & 103---Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (IX of 1963), S. 17---Ejectment proceedings---Execution of eviction order---Adjudication of questions as to title, right, interest or possession by the Executing Court---Powers and jurisdiction of Executing Court---Scope---Rule 103 of O. XXI of C.P.C. was substituted through Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972---Under the substituted provision, any party not being judgment-debtor against whom order is made for restoration of possession in terms of O. XXI, R. 101 was permitted to institute a suit to establish rights to claim possession of the property---This position stood changed after the above substitution---Now all the questions arising as to title, right, interest in or possession of immovable property are required to be adjudicated by the Executing Court---The orders passed, in this regard, become conclusive and no separate suit is permitted---The legislature has used the words "adjudicate upon" and "determined by the Court" besides restricting separate suit---Any person other than judgment-debtor dispossessed from immovable property by decree holder, can make an application under O. XXI R. 100 of C.P.C., which then requires investigation in terms of O. XXI R. 100(2) of C.P.C.---Order XXI R. 100 of C.P.C. is to be read with Rules 101 and 103 of Order XXI of C.P.C.---Order XXI R. 101 of C.P.C. provides that the Court can make the order when satisfied that the applicant was in possession on his own account or on account of some person other than judgment-debtor---The scheme of law is such that it confers full jurisdiction upon the Executing Court to decide the issues involved therein. Qasim Ali and 5 others v. Fazal and another 1986 MLD 2997; Ibrahim v. Mst. Saeeda Bano 1984 MLD 1124 and Hindu Panchayat of Sukkur v. Matloob Ahmed and others 1991 MLD 480 ref. Barrister Ch. Saeed Hussain Nagra and Mian Usman Ramzan for Petitioner. Shakeel Ahmad Malik for Respondent No. 2. Date of hearing: 16th June, 2025.