Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 103--- Recovery proceedings---Associating of witnesses---Scope---Provision of S.103,Cr.P.C. enjoins officer or other person, who wants to make search of a place, to call uponbefore making the search, two or more respectable inhabitants of the locality to attend andwitness the search---Purpose of the same is to prevent chicaneries of police.(b) Explosive Substances Act (XI of 1908)-------S.5---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Explosive substance, recovery of---Appreciation of evidence---Complainant as investigation officer---Benefit of doubt---Accused was arrested for recovery of explosive substance from him---Complainant himselfwas investigation officer and his investigation was biased and a mockery---Though policeofficer was not prohibited under law to be a complainant if he was a witness to commissionof an offence and also to be an investigation officer, so long as it did not in any wayprejudiced the accused person---Court was required to appraise evidence produced byprosecution as a whole and to form opinion after evaluating the same---Seizing officerexcluded independent persons to act as witnesses of arrest and recovery and to choose two ofhis subordinates to act as attesting witnesses---Contradictions existed among statements ofwitnesses and investigation was by an officer who was not competent to do so---Expertreport was issued by a person not notified by Provincial or Federal Government and seizingofficer himself acted as investigation officer---High Court set aside conviction and sentenceawarded to accused and acquitted him of the charge---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.The State v. Bashir and others PLD 1997 SC 408 rel.

Summary: (a) Criminal Trial-------Administration of justice---Courts of law were not to sit entirely unconcerned during theproceedings, nor was a court, holding a criminal trial expected to leave it to the contestants todo what they liked---Main purpose of the entire judicial proceedings was to find out truth,arrive at a correct decision; and to see that no innocent person was punished, merely becauseof certain technical omission (s) on his part; or on the part of his counsel---In case of capitalpunishment, accused must be given reasonable opportunity of rebutting the evidence sobrought on record---Intentional or unintentional lapse on the part of complainant, prosecutioncounsel or defence counsel was not to be allowed to stand in the way of justice, because ithad a bearing on the determination of guilt or innocence of accused---Such a power underArt.161, Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 and S.540, Cr.P.C. had been given to criminal court for thesafe administration of justice---Fair and free administration of justice was primary andessentially an obligation cast on the courts of law constituted for the purpose.(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.360---Qatl-e-amd---Appreciation ofevidence---Administration of justice---Trial of the case had been conducted in violation of thesettled principles of law, resulting in miscarriage of justice in a careless and ridiculousmanner---Accused persons had been deprived of their fundamental rights to be defended by aproper counsel---Such practice, would not only shake the confidence of general public, butwould also damage the noble profession of law in the eye of community---Statement of theprosecution witness had been recorded in violation of S.360, Cr.P.C., object of which was toobtain an accurate record from the witness of what he really meant to say; and to give him anopportunity of correcting the words which the court or his clerk had taken down---Before a deposition was closed, the evidence must be read over to the witness enabling him to protecthimself against any inaccuracy in the words taken down from his lips---Serious prejudice hadbeen caused to accused, resulting in grave miscarriage of justice---Presiding Officer wasrequired to record the evidence in his own hand; and if it was not possible for him, then itshould be taken down by the clerk/reader from direct dictation of the Presiding Judge---Not asingle bit of tangible evidence was available on record, in the present case, to connectaccused with the commission of alleged offence---Eye-witnesses had not uttered a singleword against one accused--Appeal up to the extent of said one accused was allowed and hewas acquitted of the charge and ordered to be released forthwith---Impugned judgment wasset aside and case was remanded to the Trial Court for retrial of other accused.

Summary: (a) Balochistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)-------S.13---Eviction petition---Bona fide personal need of landlord---Scope---Tenantchallenged order passed by Rent Controller whereby he was directed to hand over vacantpossession of the demised premises---Validity---Burden to prove that need of landlord wasbona fide rather than mala fide was on the landlord---Landlord had tried to eject 22 tenantssimultaneously on the ground of personal bona fide use---Landlord had not obtainedpermission from Municipal Committee for re-construction or for alteration in the building---Landlord's brothers could not start business in 22 shops which were admittedly separateunits---Landlord's brothers were admittedly independent, they had settled their businessabroad and rarely visit Pakistan---Names of the brothers, for whom the shops were required,were not mentioned in the eviction application---Property was mutated in the name oflandlord's father but he had not filed the eviction application---Appeal was accepted,impugned judgment was set aside and the eviction application was dismissed, incircumstances.Syed Abdul Rauf v. Abdul Sattar 1997 SCMR 1169 and Mahmood Khan v. NasimaKhatoon 1982 CLC 1807 ref.Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander and others AIR 1988 SC 1422 and Siddalingamma andanother v. Mamtha Shenoy AIR 2001 SC 2896 rel.(b) Balochistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)-------S.13---Eviction petition---Bona fide personal need of landlord---Scope---Landlord has asuperior right of possession and use of his property as against the tenant, but it has equallybeen settled that the tenant may not be deprived of his legal business and may not be shuntedout from the said premises on mere assertion of the landlord.(c) Balochistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)------S. 13---Eviction petition---Good faith---Scope---Term 'good faith' is prime and essential ingredient of ejectment of the tenant---Mala fide intention of landlord for ejectment on theground of personal need can only be ascertained if it is proved that landlord in fact is not'needy' rather is 'greedy' and he only desires to enhance the rent according to his own willand wants to rent it out to another person on much higher rent.(d) Balochistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)-------S.13---Eviction petition---Scope---Tenant cannot be evicted on mere wish, convenience,whim and fancy of the landlord.Abdullah and others v. Yahya Bakhtiar PLD 2001 SC 158 rel.

Summary: (a) Criminal trial- -Sentence-Sentencing range-Appellate Court, powers of-Sentence imposed by Trial Court-Interference by Appellate Court-Grounds-Appellate Court could only intervene in sentence imposed by Trial Court if such sentence was demonstrably unfit, or, the sentencing judge made an error in principle that had an impact on the sentence-Appellate courts should give sentencing judges the tools to depart from past precedents and provide appropriate sentences when a body of precedent no longer responded to society's current understanding and awareness of the gravity of a particular offence and blameworthiness of particular offenders or to the legislative initiatives of Parliament-However, appellate courts could not interpret or apply the standard of review to enforce ranges or starting points of sentences, as doing so would be to usurp the role of Parliament in creating categories of offences. Appellate courts must generally defer to sentencing judges' decisions and could only intervene to vary a sentence if the sentence was demonstrably unfit, or, the sentencing judge made an error in principle that had an impact on the sentence. Errors in principle included an error of law, a failure to consider a relevant factor, or erroneous consideration of an aggravating or mitigating factor. If appellate intervention was justified, the court would apply the principles of sentencing afresh to the facts, without deference to the existing sentence, even if that sentence fell within the applicable range. Where an appellate court had found that an error in principle had an impact on the sentence, it was not a further precondition to appellate intervention that the existing sentence was demonstrably unfit or fell outside the range of sentences imposed in the past. R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089 at para 48; R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, at para. 46 and R. v. McKnight (1999), 135 C.C.C. (3d) 41 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 35 ref. Appellate courts had a dual role in sentence appeals; they corrected errors in sentencing to ensure both that the principles of sentencing were correctly applied and that sentences were not demonstrably unfit, and they had a role in developing the law and providing guidance. Appellate courts would distill many precedents into a single statement, a range of sentences or perhaps a starting point, that sentencing judges could more readily use. As a general rule, appellate courts should give sentencing judges the tools to depart from past precedents and craft fit sentences when a body of precedent no longer responded to society's current understanding and awareness of the gravity of a particular offence and blameworthiness of particular offenders or to the legislative initiatives of Parliament. R. v. Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290, at para. 239 ref. Appellate courts (in Canada) often provided guidance in the form of ranges of sentences, which were summaries of the minimum and maximum sentences imposed in the past and served as guides for the application of all relevant principles and objectives. Some courts used starting points as an alternative. However, sentencing ranges and starting points were guidelines, not hard and fast rules. Appellate courts could not treat the departure from or failure to refer to either as an error in principle. Nor could they intervene simply because the sentence was different from the sentence that would have been reached had the range or starting point been applied. Appellate courts could not interpret or apply the standard of review to enforce ranges or starting points, as doing so would be to usurp the role of Parliament in creating categories of offences. R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089 at paras 57 & 60; R. v. McDonnell, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 948, at para. 33; R. v. Wells, 2000 SCC 10, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207, at para. 45; R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at para. 44 and R. v. Arcand, 2010 ABCA 363, 40 Alta. L.R. (5th) 199, at paras. 116-118 & 273 ref. (b) Criminal trial- -Sentence-Sentencing range-Principles-Proportionality of sentence-Factors to be considered by sentencing court stated. All sentencing started with the principle that sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Sentencing judges must also consider the principle of parity. Similar offenders who committed similar offences in similar circumstances should receive similar sentences. Parity was an expression of proportionality and gave meaning to proportionality in practice. A proportionate sentence for a given offender and offence could not be deduced from first principles; instead, judges calibrated the demands of proportionality by reference to the sentences imposed in other cases. Sentencing precedents reflected the range of factual situations in the world, embodied the collective experience and wisdom of the judiciary, and were the practical expression of both parity and proportionality. R. v. Wilmott, [1966] 2 O.R. 654 (C.A.) ref. (c) Criminal trial- -Sexual offences against children-Sentence, proportionality of-Court considerations-Courts were required to focus their attention on both the emotional/psychological and physical harm caused to children-Courts needed to take into account the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual offences against children as it was important in imposing a proportionate sentence-Courts must impose sentences that were commensurate with the gravity of sexual offences against children and that reflected the normative character of the offender's actions and the consequential harm to children and their families-During sentencing courts must give proper weight to the offender's underlying attitudes because they were highly relevant to assessing the offender's moral blameworthiness and to the sentencing objective of denunciation-Since the legislature/Parliament (of Canada) had increased maximum sentences for sexual offences against children and prioritized denunciation and deterrence in sentencing, and because society's understanding of the gravity and harmfulness of these offences had deepened, courts needed to impose more severe sanctions than the sentences imposed in cases that preceded the increases in maximum sentences-Maximum sentence should be imposed whenever the circumstances warranted it. At the sentencing stage, in order to effectively respond to sexual violence against children, sentencing judges needed to properly understand the wrongfulness of sexual offences against children and the profound harm that they caused and give effect to both in imposing a sentence. This would help bring sentencing law into line with society's contemporary understanding of the nature and gravity of sexual violence against children and would ensure that past biases and myths did not filter into the sentencing process. Parliament's creation of the modern legislative scheme of sexual offences against children shifted the focus of the sexual offences scheme from sexual propriety to wrongful interference with sexual integrity. The prime interests that the legislative scheme of sexual offences against children protected were the personal autonomy, bodily integrity, sexual integrity, dignity, and equality of children. Emphasis on these interests required courts to focus their attention on emotional and psychological harm, not simply physical harm. In particular, courts needed to take into account the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual offences against children when applying the proportionality principle, as these factors impacted both the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender and understanding them was important in imposing a proportionate sentence. R. v. Stuckless, 2019 ONCA 504, 146 O.R. (3d) 752; R. v. McCraw, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 72; R. v. Woodward, 2011 ONCA 610, 107 O.R. (3d) 81 at para. 76 and R. v. Stuckless, 2019 ONCA 504, 146 O.R. (3d) 752 at paras. 56, 90 & 135 ref. Courts must impose sentences that were commensurate with the gravity of sexual offences against children and that reflected the normative character of the offender's actions and the consequential harm to children and their families, caregivers, and communities. Particularly, courts must recognize and give effect to, first, the inherent wrongfulness of these offences; second, the potential harm to children that flowed from these offences; and third, the actual harm that children suffer as a result of these offences. Sexual offences against children were inherently wrongful and always put children at risk of serious harm, even as the degree of wrongfulness, the extent to which potential harm materialized, and actual harm vary from case to case. R. v. Morrisey, 2000 SCC 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90, at para. 35 ref. Courts must also take the modern recognition of the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual violence against children into account when determining the offender's degree of responsibility. Intentionally applying force of a sexual nature to a child was highly morally blameworthy because the offender was or ought to be aware that this action could profoundly harm the child, because it involved the wrongful exploitation of the child by the offender, and because children were so vulnerable. Courts must give proper weight in sentencing to the offender's underlying attitudes because they were highly relevant to assessing the offender's moral blameworthiness and to the sentencing objective of denunciation. The fact that the victim was a child increased the offender's degree of responsibility. J. Benedet, "Sentencing for Sexual Offences Against Children and Youth: Mandatory Minimums, Proportionality and Unintended Consequences"(2019), 44 Queen's L.J. 284, at pg. 310; R. v. Hajar, 2016 ABCA 222, 39 Alta. L.R. (6th) 209, at para. 67 and R. v. Morrison, 2019 SCC 15, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para.153 ref. Parliament (of Canada) had increased maximum sentences for sexual offences against children and prioritized denunciation and deterrence in sentencing. Parliament's decision to repeatedly increase maximum sentences for sexual offences against children should be understood as shifting the distribution of proportionate sentences for these offences. To respect Parliament's decision, courts should generally impose higher sentences than the sentences imposed in cases that preceded the increases in maximum sentences. Parliament's decision to prioritize denunciation and deterrence for offences that involved the abuse of children [by enacting s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code (of Canada)] confirmed the need for courts to impose more severe sanctions for sexual offences against children. R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089 at para 7 ref. To ensure that sentences for sexual offences against children corresponded to Parliament's legislative initiatives and the contemporary understanding of the profound harm that sexual violence against children caused, guidance on three particular points was required; first, departure from prior precedents and sentencing ranges should occur for sexual offences against children because Parliament increased the maximum sentences for these offences and because society's understanding of the gravity and harmfulness of these offences had deepened. Courts were justified in departing from dated precedents that did not reflect society's current awareness of the impact of sexual violence on children in imposing a fit sentence. Imposing proportionate sentences would frequently require substantial sentences. Parliament's statutory amendments had strengthened that message. Mid-single digit sentence terms for sexual offences against children were normal and upper-single digit and double-digit sentence terms should be neither unusual nor reserved for rare or exceptional circumstances. A maximum sentence should be imposed whenever the circumstances warranted it. Second, sexual offences against children should generally be punished more severely than sexual offences against adults, as Parliament had determined by clear indication in the Criminal Code (of Canada). Third, treating the offence of sexual interference with a child as less serious than that of sexual assault of a person under the age of 16 was an error of law. Parliament had established the same maximum sentences for both offences. The elements of the offences were also similar, and a conviction for sexual assault of a child and for sexual interference with a child could frequently be supported on the same factual foundation. R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089 at paras 62-64 & 74; R. v. Vautour, 2016 BCCA 497, at para. 52 (CanLII)); R. v. Scofield, 2019 BCCA 3, 52 C.R. (7th) 379, at para. 62 and R. v. M. (S.J.), 2009 ONCA 244, 247 O.A.C. 178, at para. 8 ref. (d) Criminal trial- -Sexual offences against children-Sentence-Significant factors to be considered by courts to determine a proportionate/fit sentence stated. To promote the uniform application of the law of sentencing, the following non-exhaustive significant factors to determine a fit sentence for sexual offences against children must be considered; first, the higher the offender's risk to re-offend, the more the court needs to emphasize the sentencing objective of separating the offender from society to protect vulnerable children from wrongful exploitation and harm. Second, an offender who abused a position of trust to commit a sexual offence against a child should receive a lengthier sentence than an offender who was a stranger to the child. Any breach of trust was likely to increase the harm to the victim and thus the gravity of the offence, and it also increased the offender's degree of responsibility. Third, sexual violence against children that was committed on multiple occasions and for longer periods of time should attract significantly higher sentences that reflected the full cumulative gravity of the crime and the offender's increased degree of responsibility. Fourth, the age of the victim was also a significant aggravating factor because children who were particularly young were even more vulnerable to sexual violence. The moral blameworthiness of the offender was enhanced in such cases. Fifth, defining a sentencing range based on the specific type of sexual activity at issue posed several pitfalls. In particular, courts must be careful to avoid certain errors, such as attributing intrinsic significance to the occurrence or non-occurrence of sexual acts based on traditional notions of sexual propriety; assuming that there was correlation between the type of physical act and the harm to the child; failing to recognize the wrongfulness of sexual violence in cases where the degree of physical interference was less pronounced; and understanding the degree of physical interference factor in terms of a type of hierarchy of physical acts. Sixth, a child's participation was not a mitigating factor, nor should it be a legally relevant consideration at sentencing. In particular, a child's non-resistance should not be equated to"defacto consent". Victim's participation should not distract the court from the harm that the victim suffered as a result of sexual violence; a breach of trust or grooming that led to the victim's participation was an aggravating factor; and, adults always had a responsibility to refrain from engaging in sexual violence towards children. R. v. L.M., 2008 SCC 31, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 163, at para. 30; R. v. M. (S.J.), 2009 ONCA 244, 247 O.A.C. 178, at paras 39 & 84; R. v. J.R. (1997), 157 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 246 (N.L.C.A.), at paras.14 and 18; R. v. Jarvis, 2019 SCC 10, [2019] 1 S.C.R. 488, at para. 127; R. v. Magoon, 2018 SCC 14, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 309, at para. 66; R. v. Scofield, 2019 BCCA 3, 52 C.R. (7th) 379, at para. 38; R. v. Hajar, 2016 ABCA 222, 39 Alta. L.R. (6th) 209, at para. 38; R. v. E.C., 2019 ONCA 688, at para. 13 (CanLII); R. v. Norton, 2016 MBCA 79, 330 Man.R. (2d) 261, at para. 42; R. v. P.M. (2002), 155 O.A.C. 242, at para. 19; R. v. F. (G.C.) (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 771 (C.A.), at paras. 7 & 21; R. v. Woodward, 2011 ONCA 610, 107 O.R. (3d) 81 at para.43; R. v. Audet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 171, at para. 23 and R. v. George, 2017 SCC 38, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 1021, at para. 2 ref. Lisa Joyal, for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario. John R.W. Caldwell, for the intervener the Attorney General of British Columbia. Joanne B. Dartana, for the intervener the Attorney General of Alberta. Daniel J. Song, for the intervener the Criminal Trial Lawyers' Association. Dane Bullerwell, for the intervener the Legal Aid Society of Alberta.

Summary: Bail granted---Background:In Criminal Petition No. 234 of 2020, brothers Asfand Yar Khan and Salman Khan sought admission to bail after being implicated as accused in a homicide case. The case was registered on August 17, 2019, at Police Station Paharipura, Peshawar, following the murder of Sumera Safdar and her driver Inaam Lag. The incident occurred while they were en route to attend court proceedings related to a previous case of murderous assault in District Courts, Peshawar. The motive for the crime was attributed to a property dispute and ongoing legal disputes between the parties involved.---Issues:Whether the petitioners' omission from the initial crime report warranted their release on bail.Whether the petitioners' case fell within the purview of subsection 2 of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which allows for bail under certain circumstances.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The petitioners were not named in the original crime report and were only implicated through supplementary statements by witnesses. The fact that all witnesses were unanimous in identifying only five accused, excluding the petitioners, raised questions about their involvement in the crime. This omission was deemed intriguing and supported the petitioners' case for bail.The Court converted the criminal petition into an appeal and granted bail to the petitioners. They were ordered to be released upon furnishing bonds of Rs. 500,000 each with one surety to the satisfaction of the trial court or Duty Judge.---Citations/Precedents:Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, section 497(2)

Summary: Background:The Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa appealed against a judgment of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal, which modified the penalty imposed on Shahid, a police constable, from dismissal to withholding of increments for a period of two years due to unauthorized absence from duty.---Issues:Whether the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to modify the penalty imposed by the department.Whether the penalty modification was justified.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by modifying the penalty imposed by the department. The respondent's unauthorized absence from duty for six months and three days was a serious offense, and the penalty of dismissal was appropriate.The Court found that the Tribunal's decision to modify the penalty lacked legal basis and was arbitrary. It emphasized that in a disciplined force, such as the police department, prolonged unauthorized absence cannot be tolerated. Therefore, the Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment, reinstating the original penalty of dismissal from service.

Summary: PLJ 2020 SC (AJK) 56 [Shariat Appellate Jurisdiction] Present Ch Muhammad Ibrahim Zia CJ and Raja Saeed Akram Khan J ABDUL QAYYUM and 2 others - - Convict - Appellants versus STATE through Advocate - General of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Muzaffarabad and 12 others - - Respondents Crl A No 16 of 2018 decided on 1532019 (On appeal from the judgment of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the High Court dated 2672018 in Criminal Appeals Nos 236 and 242 of 2017) Circumstantial evidence - - - - - - Two golden principles of law firstly in case of circumstantial evidence must be inter - linked to make out a single unbroken chain and secondly benefit of a slightest doubt shaking roots of case must be extended to accused we appreciated whole record of case [P 63] A Azad Penal Code - - - - - - S 302 (b) - - Conviction and sentence - - Challenge to - - Case of circumstantial evidence - - Motive - - Political rivalry - - Strong evidence - - Confessional statement - - In case of circumstantial evidence motive plays a vital role and once motive is established it is duty of prosecution under law to prove same whereas in case in hand in view of afore - stated facts motive appears to be shrouded in mystery - - After going through statements it appears that complainant reticulated a net to strengthen case by making dishonest improvement but other star - witnesses did not support story narrated by him - - Such a glaring contradiction in statements of star - witnesses makes prosecution story highly doubtful but unfortunately Courts below overlooked same - - If it is admitted as correct that investigation was entrusted to other officer on 14092013 even then a question arises that when investigating officer who initially investigated case failed to find out any evidence against convicts within a reasonable time how other investigating officer in a couple of days collected all material against them - - From record it transpires that there are many other dentslaws and contradictions in prosecution case however as we have arrived at conclusion that prosecution failed to prove even main pillars of its story without reasonable doubtful therefore there is no need to discuss other dentsflaws and contradictions - - In view of facts and circumstances discussed in preceding paragraphs we are of considered view that in case in hand neither links of chain of evidence are interconnected nor prosecution succeeded to prove case beyond reasonable doubt thus in such scenario acquittal of convicts is requirement of law - - Case law referred to by learned Advocate - General is not applicable in case in hand being discernible facts and circumstances therefore no need to discuss same - - Before parting with judgment we may observe here that investigation is backbone of every Criminal Justice System - - Prosecution is responsible to prove guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt and accused is presumed to be innocent and cannot be convicted in absence of trustworthy confidence inspiring evidence - - This high standard of proof can only be achieved if evidence is property collected secured and documented at stage of investigation - - Its importance can be estimated from fact that any evidence either not collected by investigating officer or not collected in accordance with prescribed law and rules can directly affect result of litigation - - Officials who indulge in dishonest and mal - - investigations at one hand create obstacles in way of justice and on other hand are stigma on performance of police department - - Department should have tried to get rid from such like black sheeps - - We with heavy - heart observe that in spite of fact that in a number of cases inefficiency and mal - investigation of police officials brought into notice of high - ups but they did not take it seriously and no action has been taken against such officials which is very unfortunate - - In case in hand dishonest investigation is obvious from record and it is not difficult to form an opinion that who is responsible for such illegal practice but for sake of justice we once again throw ball in Court of concerned authorities ie Chief Secretary and Inspector General of Police with direction to conduct an inquiry through some independenthonest senior officer not below rank of DIG and Inspector General of Police shall also supervise proceedings against investigating officers who investigated case while suspending them if they are in service - - Concerned authorities after fixing liability and taking action against delinquent investigating officer shall submit report before this Court through Registrar within a period of 3 months positively from communication of judgment of this Courts [Pp 65 70 71 72] B D E F G H Criminal Procedure Code 1898 (V of 1898) - - - - - - S 164 - - Confirmed statement - - Principal - - Held It is also well settled principle of law that statement under Section 164 CrPC when retracted by deposer then strong corroboration and extra - ordinary care is required for awarding conviction on basis of such statement whereas in instant case situation is quite otherwise as neither strong corroboration is available nor Courts below took extra - ordinary care while relying upon statements [P 67] C 2016 SCR 1467 ref Barrister Humayun Nawaz Khan and Ch Ghulam Nabi Advocates for Appellants Sardar Karam Dad Khan Advocate - General and Raja Muhammad Arif Rathore Advocate for RespondentsJudgement Result:Appeal accepted

Summary: VARIOUS CLAIMANTS-Respondents Decided on 1st April, 2020. Tort- -Vicarious liability-Employer-employee-Wrongful acts of employee-Vicarious liability of employer-Scope-Whether (wrongful) act of employee in course of employment-Test which generally applied in deciding whether an employer was vicariously liable for the wrongful conduct of one of its employees was that the wrongful conduct was so closely connected with acts that the employee was authorised to do, that, for the purposes of liability of the employer to third parties, it could fairly and properly be regarded as having been done by the employee while acting in the course of his employment-In cases where employees intentionally inflicted harm for their personal reasons, using opportunities available to them due to their employment, the general rule was that the employer was not vicariously liable, because the employee did not commit the wrong whilst engaged in his employer's business, but while engaged in an independent personal venture. Defendant-employer, which operated a chain of supermarkets, had hired employee's' as an internal auditor.'s' was tasked with transmitting payroll data for the entire workforce to the defendant's external auditors, as he had done in the past.'s' did so, but also made and kept a personal copy of the data, which he subsequently uploaded on a publicly accessible website, intending thereby to cause harm to the defendant.'s' later also sent the data anonymously to different newspapers, purporting to be a concerned member of the public who had found it online. The newspapers did not publish the information and alerted the defendant, which took immediate steps to have the data removed from the internet and to protect its employees. The claimants, who were employees of the defendant whose personal data had been disclosed, brought claims against the defendant for breach of statutory duty under the Data Protection Act, 1998, misuse of private information, and breach of confidence on the basis that the defendant was vicariously liable for the wrongdoing of's'. Trial judge allowed the claims, finding that what's' had done in disclosing the data was so closely related to what he had been employed to do that he had committed the acts in the course of his employment. Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision holding that the wrongful disclosure of the data had been within the field of activities assigned to's' and the fact that his motive had been to harm the defendant was irrelevant. Held, that the "close connection" test which was generally applied in deciding whether an employer was vicariously liable for the wrongful conduct of one of its employees was that the wrongful conduct was so closely connected with acts that the employee was authorised to do, that, for the purposes of liability of the employer to third parties, it could fairly and properly be regarded as having been done by the employee while acting in the course of his employment. In the simplest terms the court had to consider two matters; the first question was what functions or field of activities the employer had entrusted to the employee. Secondly, the court must decide whether there was sufficient connection between the position in which he was employed and his wrongful conduct to make it right for the employer to be held liable under the principle of social justice. Whether the employee was acting on his employer's business or for personal reasons was important, but the reason why he had committed the tort could not make a material difference to the outcome. [pp. 747, 749] A, B & C Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2003] 2 AC 366 , HL(E); Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] AC 677, SC(E) and Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215 , HL(E) ref. Fact that an employee's employment gave him the opportunity to commit the wrongful act was not sufficient to warrant the imposition of vicarious liability. An employer was not normally vicariously liable where the employee was not engaged in furthering his employer's business, but rather was pursuing a personal vendetta. Morris v C W Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716, 737 and Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215 , paras 25, 45, 50, 59, 65, 75, and 81-82 ref. In the present case the online disclosure of the data was not part of field of activities assigned to's' as it was not an act which he was authorised to do. Although there was a close temporal link and an unbroken chain of causation linking the provision of the data to's' for the purpose of transmitting it to external auditors and his disclosing it on the Internet, a temporal or causal connection did not in itself satisfy the close connection test. The reason why's' acted wrongfully was not irrelevant: on the contrary, whether he was acting on his employer's business or for purely personal reasons was highly material. No vicarious liability arose in the present case.'s' was authorised to transmit the payroll data to the external auditors. His wrongful disclosure of the data was not so closely connected with that task that it could fairly and properly be regarded as made by's' while acting in the ordinary course of his employment. Defendant-employer could not therefore be held liable for the conduct of's'. Appeal was allowed accordingly. Dates of hearing: 6th and 7th November, 2019.

Summary: VARIOUS CLAIMANTS-Respondents Decided on 1st April, 2020. Tort- -Negligence-Vicarious liability-Independent contractor-Relationship akin to employment-Person could be held vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of someone who was not their employee if the relationship between them was sufficiently akin to employment to make it fair, just and reasonable to impose such liability-However, such liability would not arise if the person who committed the wrongdoing had been carrying on business on his own account. Defendant-Bank required job applicants to pass a pre-employment medical examination as part of its recruitment and employment procedures. For such purposes the defendant arranged the appointments of prospective employees with a self-employed medical practitioner. Said medical practitioner was paid a fee for each report, and the defendant did not pay him a retainer. It was alleged that the medical practitioner sexually assaulted 126 claimants during their medical examinations. After the medical practitioner died, the claimants sought damages from the defendant. Trial judge held that the defendant was vicariously liable for any assaults that the medical practitioner was proved to have perpetrated. Court of Appeal agreed and dismissed the defendant's appeal. Held, that before one person could be made vicariously liable for the torts of another, two elements must be shown. First, there must be a relationship between the two persons which makes it proper for the law to make one pay for the fault of the other. Second, there must be a sufficient connection between that relationship and the wrongdoing of the person who committed the tort. Present case concerns the first element. A person could be held vicariously liable for the acts of someone who was not their employee, provided the relationship between them was sufficiently akin or analogous to employment. Question was whether the person who committed the tort was carrying on business on his own account, or whether he was in a relationship akin to employment with the defendant. In doubtful cases, the five factors or 'incidents' identified by Lord Phillips in the case reported as Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2013] 2 AC 1 , SC(E), may help to identify a relationship which was sufficiently analogous to employment to make it fair, just and reasonable to impose vicarious liability. But the key would usually lie in understanding the details of the relationship. Where it was clear that the person who committed the tort was carrying on his own independent business, it was not necessary to consider the said five incidents. Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2013] 2 AC 1 , SC(E); Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] AC 660 , SC(E); Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council [2018] AC 355 , SC(E); Kafagi v JBW Group Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 1157 and Ng Huat Seng v Mohammad [2017] SGCA 58 ref.

Summary: Summary pending